Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee forthe 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, Deputy Director of the Department forNon-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Mikhail Kondratenkov (ClusterII: Non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards), Geneva, 26 July, 2024
26 July 2024 19:04
1433-26-07-2024
Mr. Chairman,
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the pillars of international peace and security. The IAEA Safeguards System plays a pivotal role in supporting it; it was established in accordance with the IAEA Statute, improved after the conclusion of the NPT and today has become universal. The NPT States Parties' confidence in the IAEA Safeguards System is a key to ensuring resilience of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. This confidence can be secured only if the mechanism the Agency applies to verify the States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, is objective, technically sound and politically unbiased. The failure to meet these criteria has a most negative effect on the IAEA verification mechanism, and on the non-proliferation regime as a whole.
The safeguards system is intended to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the NPT with their non-proliferation obligations. The safeguards should be applied while respecting the sovereignty of States. Any attempts to use them for settling political scores or exercising external pressure undermine the credibility of the NPT's verification mechanism and affect the Treaty itself adversely.
Russia closely follows the situation around the reform of the IAEA Safeguards System, which continues to cause our serious concerns. We are still expecting the Agency's leadership to present an exhaustive report on the State-level concept clearly stating all the parameters of the reform, the procedure for applying the new approaches, the obligations and rights of the IAEA Secretariat and Member States. Let us remind that this report should be presented to the Agency's Board of Governors for consideration and approval.
To our mind, at the moment, State-level approaches to safeguards implemented by the Secretariat remain purely experimental, leaving the States the right not to recognize any safeguards findings and conclusions derived from such approaches. We believe that only the verification measures and procedures provided for in the State's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol should be applied to this State (for those States that have signed them). The mechanisms determining the frequency and intensity of verification activities should be equally transparent for all Members without exception. They should also exclude the possibility of subjective assessments and rely on clear, measurable and statistically substantiated models. We emphasize that to make safeguards conclusions the IAEA Secretariat should take into account only the information, the credibility of which it is prepared to stand up for in an open discussion at the session of the Agency's policy-making bodies.
We note the significance of Additional Protocols to IAEA Safeguards Agreements for ensuring confidence in the peaceful nature of all nuclear material in the country and the country's nuclear activities. At the same time, it is our firm belief that concluding such additional protocols remains a voluntary step.
Russia supports the IAEA's efforts to ensure resilience and improve the efficiency of the NPT verification mechanism. We have contributed money and expertise to this work, including through our national safeguards support programme. For over 40 years of its history, significant work has been done to strengthen the conceptual framework and build technical capability of the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA Secretariat.
In particular, under this programme Russia assists the IAEA by analyzing environmental samples collected by the Agency as part of its inspection activities, in Russian analytical laboratories. We pay considerable attention to training the IAEA inspectors, including in the conduct of inspections on facilities for isotopic separation of uranium and facilities using plutonium. We perform joint missions to elaborate approaches to verification for new types of nuclear plants, such as mobile nuclear power plants with small modular reactors, and to examine the feasibility of safeguards by design.
Mr. Chairman,
Russia has consistently supported addressing nuclear non-proliferation challenges exclusively through political and diplomatic means based on the NPT, in strict compliance with the norms of international law and taking into account the legitimate security and development interests of all States.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are an essential component of the non-proliferation regime. Establishing such zones is envisaged by Article VII of the NPT. We consider establishing such zones and nuclear-weapon States' signing legally binding protocols on security assurances to the parties to such zones as a meaningful factor strengthening the non-proliferation regime and regional security and stability.
Russia has signed and ratified the protocols to the existing treaties establishing NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), thus providing security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons to over one hundred States parties to such zones. While acceding to such protocols, Russia traditionally makes reservations that serve the purposes of clarity and do not affect the interests of States following the "letter and spirit" of NWFZ arrangements in good faith.
Such reservations to the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones have been wholly justified, as the situation around the United States', United Kingdom's and Australia's AUKUS deal has demonstrated, as one cannot exclude the possibility that as a result of such partnership nuclear-weapon States create their military infrastructure in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty of Rarotonga.
We deplore that to this date, only one NWFZ has a full set of international instruments in force. I would like to stress that the protocols to the remaining NWFZ treaties have not been ratified by the United States. We call on Washington to complete the necessary internal procedures and thus strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free status of the impressive number of our planet's regions that expressed such intention.
Mr. Chairman,
The issue of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the Middle East as envisaged by the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, has always played special role in the NPT context. Russia, which co-sponsored the resolution, is fully conscious of the responsibility this status implies and intends to continue making all the necessary efforts to reach the objectives of this resolution.
We welcome the process of annual sessions of the Conference on a Middle East WMD-Free zone, which was launched by the UN General Assembly in 2018 and in which our country takes part as an observer. Many important substantive discussions have already taken place there, and many specific decisions have been made.
Certainly, this process can only be meaningful if it involves all Middle East countries excepting no one. In this context, we once again call on the United States, who co-sponsored the 1995 resolution, and Israel not to disregard the Conference, but rather take this opportunity to contribute their vision and engage in an open discussion on strengthening security in the Middle East. We emphasize that we regard the decision on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East as an integral part of the arrangements concerning the NPT reached in 1995. We regret that the United States blocked the final document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in order to prevent a language on the WMD-free zone.
We hope that the States of the region will manage to arrive at an arrangement on establishing such zone in the foreseeable future. For out part, we will provide all possible assistance to this work.
Mr. Chairman,
We would like to highlight the situation around the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As far back as 1999, the United States Congress denied to ratify the Treaty under invented pretexts. Since then, Washington has made no practical steps in this regard. We view the allegations that the Treaty cannot be passed through the Congress as a poor excuse. Consequently, we have concluded that the American establishment is not interested in ratifying the CTBT.
Russia's withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty has become a natural response to the disparity in obligations with the United States. Nevertheless, we remain committed to the purposes and objectives of the CTBT and have recently completed our national segment of the International Monitoring System, the largest certified segment to date. We stand ready to return to the issue of the CTBT ratification as soon as the United States ratifies it.
Mr. Chairman,
Russia supports launching negotiations to elaborate a universal, non-discriminating, and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices — the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) — at the Conference on Disarmament.
At the same time, it should be understood that to achieve result, this process should be part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the Conference and strictly abide by the principles enshrined in the 1995 document CD/1299 (the so-called Shannon mandate). It is equally important that the negotiations involve all countries possessing capabilities for the production of weapon-grade fissile material.
We see that the FMCT, if it is ever to be elaborated, should aim at providing reliable guarantee that fissile material for nuclear weapons will not be produced globally. This is the only way to ensure the compliance with the principle of equal and indivisible security for all.
We emphasize that we believe statements on the possibility of transferring the FMCT negotiations from the Conference on Disarmament to another forum, to be destructive. In such a case the number of participants in the negotiations may be extremely limited.
Mr. Chairman,
We attach great importance to the implementation of Article III para 2 of the NPT. We believe that the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, which was established as the NPT Exporters' Committee, have demonstrated that there is practical possibility of establishing an agreed non-discriminating procedure of nuclear export controls. Russia arranges its national export control system in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254). Russian legislation, including control lists, has been fully harmonized with this document. Regular updates are made to reflect the relevant changes introduced.
We believe that international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil cooperation in the areas of science and technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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