Radiation-Monitoring Stations Set Up at Russian Borders
06 July 2007
Joint U.S.-Russian effort designed to thwart nuclear smuggling
Washington – The United States, in close cooperation with Russia, is spending billions of dollars to account for and secure Russian nuclear materials to keep the world safe from acts of nuclear terrorism.
During the Cold War, it would have been difficult to imagine two nuclear superpowers cooperating on such a sensitive issue. But Russia and the United States have been working together since 1998 to put radiation sensors at key transit points – Russian ports, boarder crossings, international airports and key train and road intersections.
During a June trip to Kazakhstan, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Rood said trafficking in nuclear materials remains a global problem.
“We continue to see nuclear smuggling incidents occur with some regularity,” he said. “While most involved material that would not be useable for a nuclear weapon, some are particularly concerning.”
“We live in a dangerous and unpredictable world,” William Tobey, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation, said. “Prevention plays an important role in our nonproliferation strategy.”
Tobey, who works for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, said the United States has had “a long track record of successful cooperation” with Russia and former Soviet bloc nations.
His agency has worked closely with Russia to account for and secure its nuclear materials. Tobey said these activities are on track, and, in some cases, well ahead of schedule. But the issue remains of what to do about nuclear material that might be undocumented and untracked from the time before those efforts got under way; a legitimate concern given the size of the former Soviet Union’s weapons arsenal.
By the end of 2007, the two nations will have deployed nearly 200 fixed-portal radiation monitors and hand-held wands. The NNSA and Russia’s Federal Custom Service have galvanized the effort. The strategy is to detect what illicit material might be outgoing, but also what might be brought into Russia as a transit point to another destination.
Investigative reporter Steve Coll wrote about the issue recently in the New Yorker magazine. “Although Russia’s resurgent security police and years of investment in nuclear security by the United States and other countries have reduced the dangers, international organized crime networks still thrive in Russia and the smaller countries on its southern rim.”
Russia and the United States share common nonproliferation goals. As Russian and American technicians install these detectors, they are aware that a poor, but nuclear ambitious North Korea is nearby. An unidentified U.S. official told the Reuters news service recently that detectors are now in place on the Russian-North Korean border. In that way, he said, “we are able to monitor not only what is going in to Russia, but also what might be coming out of North Korea.”
Recently, the United States and Russia decided to accelerate their program of passive defense. This means that nuclear and radiological detectors will be in place by 2011 at 350 key Russian border crossings – six years ahead of schedule. Installation and training costs – estimated to be around $280 million -- will be split.
Under the terms of the recent agreement, Russia gradually will become responsible for repairing and maintaining the equipment in the post-installation phase between 2009 and 2013.
Acting NNSA Administrator Bill Ostendorff says that as the U.S.-Russian counterproliferation and counterterrorism partnership grows stronger, it will make Russia safer, while boosting the security of the United States and its allies.
In 2006, Russian customs officials responded to 50,000 alarms from the equipment installed as part of this program. Nearly 500 cases were referred to Russian authorities as potential cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material, but investigators have attributed most of the alarms to irradiated paper money or scrap metal and even radioactive jewelry.
Although no proof of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials has been found, the detectors deter traffickers and increase the comfort level of those concerned about proliferation.
The next step in the process is the development of more sophisticated and sensitive detectors, an effort being pursued at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. Tobey says new detection technology will provide one more tool to counter the proliferation threat. The next generation of detectors will be able to distinguish between harmless materials that emit radiation and materials that pose legitimate threats.
Lab physicist Aleksey Bolotnikov says “the improved devices will be able to detect more minute quantities of radiation, detect radioactive materials more quickly or from greater distances, better identify the sources of radiation and distinguish illicit sources of concern from common, naturally occurring radioactive materials.”
(USINFO is produced by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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