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RUSSIA OPPOSES IRANIAN NUCLEAR-FUEL CYCLE

RIA Novosti

MOSCOW, (RIA Novosti commentator Tatyana Sinitsyna)

While speaking at a recent RIA Novosti press conference, Alexander Rumyantsev, the director of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Power (Rosatom), said, "As the Iranians are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is nothing that can prevent them from developing their own nuclear-fuel cycle. We advise not to do this, though, as it is economically impractical."

Russia is holding talks with Iran on a broad range of issues regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and nuclear energy. Mr. Rumyantsev said the Iranian side had been informed that scientifically grounded documents in strict mathematical terms proved that it would be inexpedient, and even ruinous, for the country to develop its own nuclear-fuel cycle. This is because Iran has fewer than the eight or ten 1,000-mWt nuclear power units needed for such a project to be successful.

The nuclear-fuel cycle theory means a country must have serious scientific capabilities and a powerful industrial base to produce and enrich nuclear materials, as well as to build and maintain nuclear facilities. Few nations can afford to create their own nuclear-fuel cycles. The Russian nuclear sector, for example, employs 337,000 people. However, the "nuclear temptation" is great and many countries are now in its thralls. The IAEA recently accused Egypt of conducting secret experiments with plutonium without notifying the Agency. The Egyptian government claims that its nuclear program is completely peaceful. And this is understandable, as every country would like to receive powerful energy sources that can ensure stable economic development. There are no international bans on this desire.

However, it is common knowledge that nuclear materials can also be used for the purposes of destruction. To exclude this possibility and ensure that nuclear energy is only used for peaceful purposes, the IAEA Charter makes it incumbent on all powers with their own nuclear-fuel cycles to help build nuclear power plants elsewhere. There is only one condition: any country wishing to develop a nuclear power industry has to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iran has already done so, which means Moscow has every right to provide Tehran with nuclear services. Today, Russia is helping construct a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Russia has also undertaken to deliver fresh nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor and to remove spent fuel for subsequent storage and reprocessing. All these operations are formalized in a protocol on returning spent nuclear fuel to Russia that was recently signed in Bushehr. Therefore, Iran will never acquire spent nuclear fuel (weapon-grade nuclear materials) either de facto or de jure. The omnipresent IAEA, which monitors all operations within the framework of the Iranian nuclear program, also guarantees that this will not happen.

However, regardless of Moscow's resolute statements that Tehran will not receive a single gram of irradiated Bushehr fuel, the critics of Russian-Iranian cooperation are making increasingly greater efforts to prove the opposite. Some of them call for tough anti-Russian sanctions, whereas others believe that Russia should even be ostracized and expelled from the G8, better still the world. "They can criticize us," said Mr. Rumyantsev. "But for what? I do not understand."