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06 March 2003

Vershbow on Opportunities, Challenges in U.S.-Russian Relations

(Feb. 27, Perm, Russia: Alexander Vershbow at Moscow School of
Political Studies) (4660)
"U.S.-Russian relations are increasingly guided by common interests,
and the scope of our cooperation is expanding in ways that would have
been inconceivable ten years ago," U.S. Ambassador to the Russian
Federation Alexander Vershbow said February 27.
"Even on difficult issues like Iraq, our differences are more over
tactics than over fundamental goals," said Vershbow in remarks at a
Moscow School of Political Studies seminar.
The ambassador took as his theme opportunities and challenges in
U.S.-Russian relations, recounting Russia's growing Russian
cooperation with the United States and NATO in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks and then turning to the challenges
facing those relationships.
He said international cooperation is a "fundamental principle" of
President Bush's National Security Strategy and "an indispensable
ingredient in our view of national security, whether the goal is
fighting terrorism, promoting regional stability, expanding trade or
dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass
destruction, infectious disease, and international crime."
Among the challenges to the U.S.-Russia relationship cited by
Vershbow:
- Iraq: The United States understands "that Russia wishes to avoid
military action and to keep the issue firmly within the UN Security
Council" and that "Russia has important interests in Iraq, including
economic interests, and we will take them into account. But more
important, both our countries realize that our bilateral partnership
in the war against terrorism is too important for us to jeopardize.
Usama bin Laden drew us closer together; surely Saddam Hussein cannot
drive us apart."
- Iran: Russian export of nuclear technology to Iran "is dangerous to
Russia's own long-term interests," Vershbow said. If Russia cracks
down on weapons technology transfers to Iran, it "could unlock
profitable cooperation in the nuclear and aerospace fields, including
work on space projects that are now blocked by the Iran
Non-proliferation Act passed by the U.S. Congress three years ago."
- North Korea: "Russia could play a major, positive role in bringing
Pyongyang to its senses. The question, however, is whether Moscow (and
Beijing) will put maximum pressure on the North Koreans before it's
too late."
- World Trade Organization (WTO): "It is still not clear whether
Russia is prepared to make the compromises necessary on market access
to meet the U.S. and EU halfway - especially in key areas such as
financial services, telecommunications and civil aviation. ... But the
benefits for Russia of joining the WTO would be enormous: greater
access for exports to other markets; increased foreign investment in
Russia, and the protection that comes from participation in a
rules-based international trading system."
- Chechnya: "We're glad that President Putin has launched a political
process to resolve the Chechen crisis. ... But we are apprehensive,
too, about whether a referendum [on a new Chechen constitution] can
really be held in a region where physical security is so poor.... I
can't help believe that additional steps will be needed."
In conclusion, Vershbow said that "Common interests represent one
pillar of the new U.S.-Russian relationship, but it is a commitment to
the same values that will give our new partnership the quality of a
long-lasting strategic alliance."
Following is a text of his remarks:
(begin text)
Moscow School of Political Studies Seminar 
Perm, Russia
February 27, 2003
U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN 2003
Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation
Thank you very much for that kind introduction, and thanks to Lena
Nemirovskaya for inviting me to speak here today. I've spoken to
seminars of the Moscow School of Political Studies in the past, but
doing so in Perm is a first for me. It's a special honor to
participate in connection with the tenth anniversary of this wonderful
school.
The last time I spoke to an MSPS seminar, in June of last year, I
talked about the new challenges that all countries in the world,
including yours and mine, must face in the 21st century. In the course
of doing this, I also spoke about U.S.-Russia relations and how they
had changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2003. Today,
I'd like to update my thoughts about the new world that has been
evolving over the past couple of years, and of our bilateral
relationship and its important place in that world - and, of course,
leave plenty of time for discussion afterward.
We are all still trying to understand and adjust to the new security
environment that has emerged for all of us in a world increasingly
characterized by a plague of terrorist attacks.
One of the reasons that Russia and the United States have grown closer
to one another over the past couple of years is that our two countries
have been among the first really to grasp, in the most concrete terms,
how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War. Presidents
Putin and Bush have both been leaders, especially, in understanding
how the nature of the threat to civilized countries everywhere has
changed.
Our countries understand that Russian, American and European security
today is endangered far less by fleets, armies and missiles from other
great powers than by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the
hands of a failing state, a dictatorship, or a band of embittered
terrorists. And no one country can deal with these threats alone,
because terrorist ideas, terrorist money, terrorist weapons and
terrorists themselves travel across borders. Today more than ever,
national security depends on how well we help protect one another, not
how well we protect ourselves.
International Cooperation in Response to 9/11
September 11, 2001 was a ghastly day in U.S. and world history, but
perhaps some good can come out of those terrible events. We can use
this opportunity to create new international partnerships and to
strengthen existing alliances - not just to win the war against
terrorism, but also to meet other transnational challenges that
imperil global security. Every responsible nation in the world stands
to benefit from greater attention to defending the rule of law,
recognized standards for human dignity and the international system of
nation-states.
America's global network of allies and partners quickly adapted to the
crisis demands of the post-9/11 security environment. In the immediate
aftermath of the attacks, NATO for the first time invoked its
self-defense mechanisms. In fact, NATO forces drawn from European
nations flew patrols over American skies in the days and months after
the attack. The G-8 nations, including Russia, moved to secure global
networks of commerce and communication, including the stationing of
customs inspectors in each other's ports.
Just as important, however, was the development of new partnerships in
the war against terror and the deepening of old ones. President
Putin's brave and instantaneous response to 9/11 accelerated an
already existing trend of U.S.-Russia cooperation in several fields,
not just security.
Partnership is a fundamental principle of President Bush's National
Security Strategy released last September. On nearly every page the
document underscores - as I wish to emphasize it again here - the
necessity of cooperating with other nations, institutions and
organizations. International cooperation is an indispensable
ingredient in our view of national security, whether the goal is
fighting terrorism, promoting regional stability, expanding trade or
dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass
destruction, infectious disease, and international crime.
A basic responsibility for any government - whether it be American,
Russian, French or German - is to protect its people. The top
strategic priority of the United States, therefore, is to shield the
American populace from the threat of terrorism. As recent horrific
incidents - at a nightclub in Bali, a hotel in Kenya, a theater in
Moscow and a government building in Grozny - have demonstrated,
terrorism continues to be a grim reality around the world. And, as I
stressed earlier, we must remember that terrorists do not respect
international borders.
Our response, therefore, must be global. While the United States will
always reserve the right to act alone if needed to protect the lives
of Americans, our security is enhanced when other countries choose to
play a constructive, pro-active role in responding to international
terrorism and other global threats.
The current coalition against terrorism is unprecedented in scale and
scope. The United States and Russia have joined with dozens of other
nations to counter the threat of terrorism using all the tools
available to us - intelligence, financial institutions, law
enforcement and military operations. A mix of ad hoc arrangements and
more formal alliances has led to a sustained campaign against Al Qaeda
and other terrorists in Afghanistan, and around the world, over the
past 17 months. This is not to mention the collapse of the Taliban
regime, which had supported a network of terror.
And, as a result, the security of all, not just of the United States,
has increased. Russia has profited from the collapse of a
well-organized and aggressive threat to its south. The same is true
for the Central Asian republics. We have a good way to go before we
can say that the terrorist threat to Russia's south is truly dead, but
think about how sharply it has diminished, and at how little cost to
Russia itself. The Afghanistan campaign has truly been a win-win
situation.
Post-9/11 Russian Cooperation with NATO and U.S.
But victory against the Taliban could not have come so quickly in
Afghanistan, nor a democratic government installed there so
successfully, without the important logistical, intelligence and
humanitarian assistance that Russia provided. And today our two
countries continue to work together to combat the continuing threat of
Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Central Asia and around the world,
thereby serving the common security interests of the United States,
Russia and all nations that value stability, human dignity and
freedom.
The new NATO-Russia Council set up last year is another good example
of how much the security environment has changed, and it underscores
Russia's importance to meeting today's challenges. The NRC is off to
an impressive start. Russia held a joint civil-emergency exercise with
NATO Allies and Partners last fall in Noginsk and hosted a NATO-Russia
seminar in Moscow two months ago on the military's role in combating
terrorism. NATO and Russian military authorities in Brussels have
completed joint assessments of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to our
troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation, and they have begun an
assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
As important as terrorism is to our cooperation in Brussels, it's not
the only thing we work on together. Earlier this month, Russia and
NATO signed an agreement on joint submarine search-and-rescue
operations, in the hope of avoiding future submarine disasters such as
the Kursk tragedy. This is the first in what we hope will be a series
of military agreements between Russia and NATO that will help achieve
our shared goal of a secure, stable and peaceful Europe.
U.S.-Russia Partnership
Let me now turn to the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship. At the end
of last year, Foreign Minister Ivanov described Russia's growing
partnership with the United States as the single most important
achievement of Russian foreign policy in 2002. Let me add that our
common recognition that we face a new security environment today
provides our two countries with the opportunity to develop an even
closer relationship. The most recent proof of this is the unanimous
approval on February 5 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a
resolution that will lead to the final ratification of the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
The Moscow Treaty that President Bush and President Putin signed at
their summit meeting last May was a watershed in our relations. It
reflects a recognition that our security no longer depends on
micromanaging the numbers and types of warheads and delivery systems
that each side has, but on working together against the new threats of
the 21st century.
"Yes," we both said in signing the new treaty, "by all means let's cut
the numbers of missiles and deployed warheads we aim at one another -
who needs them all?" "But," we also said, "let's not waste years
arguing over the details when we have so much other important work to
do together - let's draw up our agreement on a couple of pages, sign
it, then get on with our other work together."
And, in fact, the Treaty of Moscow may turn out to be less important
than the second agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in
Moscow last May - their joint declaration on the New Strategic
Relationship. That document sets forth an action plan for joint work
in dealing with new security challenges. It commits us to work
together against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, narcotics trafficking and organized crime. It creates a
framework for transparency and cooperation on missile defense -
reflecting the fact that we each face growing threats from countries
that are acquiring the technology for long-range missiles that could
be armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
The joint declaration also calls for expanding trade, investment and
people-to-people links between our countries. I believe it is possible
that historians will look back on the joint declaration as the marking
the start of a long-term security partnership - perhaps an alliance -
between our two countries, one grounded on common interests and a
shared commitment to the values of democracy, economic liberty and the
rule of law.
Challenges to the Relationship in 2003
2002 was a very good year for U.S.-Russian relations, but we cannot
rest on our laurels. Indeed, the year 2003 will present a whole series
of challenges to the relationship that we will have to handle with
care if we are to achieve the optimistic future I just described. I
can hardly talk to you today about the challenges we face without
discussing Iraq. (And why do I have the feeling that some of you will
have questions for me later about this subject?) This is an area where
our two countries don't share the same approach; at least, not yet.
Nevertheless, our goals are the same: Saddam Hussein must be made to
disarm. But Russia feels that inspections should go on in order to
determine whether Saddam in fact has weapons of mass destruction.
We look at the question differently. Saddam does have weapons of mass
destruction. We know that he had, for example, thousands of tons of VX
nerve gas and thousands of liters of deadly anthrax and other toxins
when the previous UN inspectors departed in 1998. Now he claims not to
have them any more. Well, what happened to them? Saddam says Iraq has
destroyed them, but just didn't bother to make any record of the
destruction.
Why would anybody believe this? The Iraqis generally keep quite
detailed records, but they just "forgot" to note down that they
destroyed large quantities of nerve gas and biological agents? Saddam
has lied and deceived for years about his programs to build weapons of
mass destruction - it's the UN that says this, not just the U.S. His
track record of lies is clear and well documented. But somehow we're
supposed to believe him now that he says that he got rid of these
horrible weapons? Why?
Here's our approach: We all know that Saddam had these weapons. And,
if reality, we all know that he almost certainly still has them. He
must account for them - either declare that he has them so they can be
destroyed, or give evidence that they've been destroyed. If he fails
to do either, he must face "serious consequences." That's what UNSCR
1441 says. It gave him one last chance, after 12 years, to comply with
the terms of the bargain that ended the Gulf War in 1991. And the sad
but clear fact is that Saddam has already failed to comply. He has
missed his last chance.
So we - the international community, but especially the members of the
Security Council - are fast approaching the moment of truth. We
understand that Russia wishes to avoid military action and to keep the
issue firmly within the UN Security Council. But Russia, I believe,
also shares our interest in demanding that Saddam fulfill his
obligations to disarm.
We understand that the authority of the Security Council is important
to Russia, as a permanent member of that council. But what kind of
authority will the Council have if it can be defied by every dictator
with enough nerve?
And we all have to keep firmly in mind that the Security Council is
not some shining ideal bestowed on the world by heaven. It is a
practical device created by nations for the purpose of solving
real-world security problems. If it turns its face from these problems
because they are too hard to solve, or because the solutions make us
uncomfortable, then the Council won't maintain its authority, it will
lose it. Russia and others have rightly called on the United States
and Great Britain to allow the Security Council to resolve the Iraq
crisis. We readily agreed to do so. Now we, in our turn, are calling
on the Security Council to accept its responsibility and insist on
Iraqi compliance, and not just talk about it. I hope the Council makes
the right decision, for its own sake and for that of all our
countries.
Well, difficult diplomacy lies ahead. But whatever happens, I don't
think the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia
will be strained to the breaking point. As I stated earlier, whatever
the differences in our approach to the problem of Iraq, we have the
same underlying goal.
We also understand that Russia has important interests in Iraq,
including economic interests, and we will take them into account. But
more important, both our countries realize that our bilateral
partnership in the war against terrorism is too important for us to
jeopardize. Usama bin Laden drew us closer together; surely Saddam
Hussein cannot drive us apart.
Iraq dominates the news these days, but let's step back from today's
headlines to look at some of the other major challenges that Russia
and the United States have to face together:
Russia continues to export nuclear technology to Iran. We believe this
is dangerous to Russia's own long-term interests. It's clear that
Russia intends to complete the reactor at Bushehr. But Russia needs to
fully contain the proliferation risks from that reactor. Insisting
that Iran return spent fuel to Russia is a start, but it's not enough.
Iran is making no secret of the fact that it is seeking control over
the entire nuclear-fuel cycle. Why? If it just wants to generate
electricity, why does it need the ability to reprocess spent nuclear
fuel? What does it intend to do with the main product of reprocessing,
plutonium, except make bombs?
We would also like to see Russia crack down more effectively on other
transfers to Iran of technology and expertise for WMD and ballistic
missiles. If the situation doesn't get better, it will get worse. On
the other hand, serious change for the better could unlock profitable
cooperation in the nuclear and aerospace fields, including work on
space projects that are now blocked by the Iran Non-proliferation Act
passed by the U.S. Congress three years ago.
North Korea is an area where Russia could play a major, positive role
in bringing Pyongyang to its senses. The question, however, is whether
Moscow (and Beijing) will put maximum pressure on the North Koreans
before it's too late. Pyongyang is defying not just the United States,
but all signatories of the NPT and all members of the IAEA, including
Russia. What's more, a nuclear-armed North Korea would increase
tension on Russia's own eastern border, and could easily set off an
arms race in Northeastern Asia.
Such instability and tension could only damage Russia's interests.
Suffice it to say that the North Korean nuclear program is far from
simply a bilateral U.S.-North Korean matter. It simply isn't enough to
say "well, you Americans caused the problem and you have to sit down
with the North Koreans and fix it." This kind of approach doesn't fit
the facts and it doesn't fit Russia's role as a power in Asia.
In 2003, we should expand our bilateral security relationship. This
will be a challenge. The Russian military has historically been
reluctant to engage with the United States in serious military-
to-military cooperation. And yet, how can we face together the common
threats of the 21st century if our militaries can't cooperate
effectively?
Our dialogue on missile defense cooperation remains handicapped by
Russian military concerns that we seek to steal technology rather than
collaborate against real threats. Both our sides need to overcome
inhibitions to substantial MD cooperation, including in the areas of
joint early warning, and even joint development of MD architecture and
systems.
Missile defense cooperation and enhanced military-to-military
cooperation should be among the top priorities for strengthening the
NATO-Russia relationship as well.
How Russia handles its relations with its neighbors will also affect
the bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship. We hope to see continued
Russian efforts to normalize its ties with Georgia and promote
settlements to decade-old disputes like Abkhazia and Transnistria. We
also need to work together to support democratization in Belarus and
other former Soviet republics.
Those were some of the challenges facing us in the political and
security spheres. I also see several challenges on the economic and
trade side:
Talks on Russian accession to the WTO have accelerated in recent
months and Russia is continuing to move essential legislation through
the Duma. Russia has also launched a long-overdue crackdown on
Intellectual Property Rights violations, especially rampant CD/DVD
piracy.
But it is still not clear whether Russia is prepared to make the
compromises necessary on market access to meet the U.S. and EU halfway
- especially in key areas such as financial services,
telecommunications and civil aviation. Meeting the WTO standard in
these areas will threaten some powerful interests - a tough challenge
for the Duma and for President Putin in an election year. But the
benefits for Russia of joining the WTO would be enormous: greater
access for exports to other markets; increased foreign investment in
Russia, and the protection that comes from participation in a
rules-based international trading system.
Russia also needs to take steps at home to improve the climate for
U.S. and other foreign investment. Even in the most promising area,
energy, Russia has yet to complete the Production-Sharing Agreement
legislation that is the sine qua non for the multi-billion dollar
investments it needs to develop its remote offshore and Arctic
reserves. And looking beyond the energy sector, Russia still has to do
more to protect investor rights and uphold the sanctity of contracts.
Although some major corporations have made investments over the past
year (Ford, GM, Pepsico), doubts about the rule of law and rampant
bureaucratic red tape continue to deter many small and medium-sized
American companies from investing in the Russian market.
And there's the ever-present danger of another chicken war! The recent
announcement of import quotas into Russia was not helpful, and further
manipulation of veterinary standards to restrict poultry trade would
be even worse.
The United States has to deliver some things, too. For example, we
need to graduate Russia once and for all from the Jackson-Vanik
amendment. The Administration is working energetically with the
Congress to make this happen.
But perhaps the biggest challenges to the relationship will come from
how Russia handles some major domestic challenges. The durability of
the U.S.-Russian partnership will turn on whether Russia remains on
the path of democratization - or, put another way, whether Americans
see Russia as a country committed to the same values as themselves.
The endless war in Chechnya is not only causing a horrific human toll,
but it corrodes Russian democracy. Of course, terrorists must be dealt
with firmly. The United States has just designated three groups
involved in the attack on the Dubrovka Theater as foreign terrorist
organizations in order to help cut off external support for terrorism
in Chechnya. But not all Chechens are terrorists. Continued human
rights violations by Russian forces against the civilian population
will not only set back chances for a political solution, but also
weaken the foundation for U.S.-Russian cooperation. (They also
undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the Russian military
itself.)
We're glad that President Putin has launched a political process to
resolve the Chechen crisis. We hope that the March 23 referendum on a
new Chechen constitution turns out to be a step forward in that
process. But we are apprehensive, too, about whether a referendum can
really be held in a region where physical security is so poor. We
wonder how meaningful can be a vote on a new constitution when so few
people have access to information about what they'll be voting on. I
can't help believe that additional steps will be needed, aimed at
attracting the support and participation of the civilian population
while marginalizing those unwilling to renounce violence and terror.
What other internal factors do I see as affecting our partnership'?
The conduct of the upcoming federal elections, the fate of the
independent media, the treatment of the Catholic Church and other
religious groups, measures to rein in skinheads and other extremists -
all these will be bellwethers of the future of Russian democracy and
factors affecting the U.S.-Russian relationship.
The future health of Russian civil society will also hinge on whether
Russia faces up to the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis and growing problems
of human trafficking. On this latter issue, I'm glad to see that an
anti-trafficking law has just been introduced into the State Duma.
In conclusion, I think that the pace and direction of economic reform
and the strategic direction of Russia's external policy demonstrate a
strong commitment on President Putin's part to make Russia a stronger
and more stable international partner for the United States and other
countries - to its own benefit and to that of the rest of the world as
well. U.S.-Russian relations are increasingly guided by common
interests, and the scope of our cooperation is expanding in ways that
would have been inconceivable ten years ago. Even on difficult issues
like Iraq, our differences are more over tactics than over fundamental
goals.
Common interests represent one pillar of the new U.S.-Russian
relationship, but it is a commitment to the same values that will give
our new partnership the quality of a long-lasting strategic alliance -
the kind of ties that we have with our partners in NATO, the EU, Japan
and Australia. In this respect, the trends in Russia's internal,
democratic development are favorable, but the overall picture is still
mixed. The institutions of civil society are taking shape, but the
roots are sometimes still shallow, and the habits and practices of
decades under communism still lie too close to the surface.
Institutions like the Moscow School of Political Studies, however,
make me very optimistic about the future. Seminars like this one are
important "schools of democracy" that strengthen the pillar of common
values on which the U.S.-Russia partnership also rests. It is people
like you who will shape Russia's future and the ones who will
guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations achieve their full potential.
The road ahead may be a bumpy and uncertain one. But I'm confident
that we are moving forward and that the journey is well worth the
effort.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)