| 28.09.99 GUIDELINES FOR RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AT THE PRESENT STAGE |
Unofficial Translation
ADDRESS BY STATE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA, V. D. SREDIN, TO THE ACADEMY OF PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA
(Moscow, September 28, 1999)
Guidelines for Russia's Foreign Policy at the Present Stage
Thank you for this opportunity to address such a distinguished audience. As I understand it, your business is international cooperation in the spheres of government assigned to you. Accordingly, in your day-to-day work you have to take account of the influence of external factors and the status of Russia's relations with the outside world.
The foreign policy of Russia today cannot be viewed out of the context of historic change that has occurred both on the international scene and in our country over the past decade. The Cold War, a product of the confrontation between the two systems, became past history. Russia cast its choice in favor of democratic and market transformations and embarked on the road of reform.
It is to the latter developments that the priorities of Russia's foreign policy are immediately linked. To be brief, what we are talking about is the creation of as beneficial external conditions as possible for continued reform in Russia, for the genuine ensuring of our national interests, and for securing a befitting place for our country in international affairs. All this makes it imperative to pursue energetic foreign policy in every direction and to aim our policy at open and broad collaboration with all the members of the international community, of course, on the basis of the balance of interests.
Our goal is the building of a fair and democratic world order that would offer a befitting place to every nation and an equal degree of security to every state. It should be admitted that this approach is winning ever greater recognition and support across the world. The initiative for drafting a Concept of the World in the 21st Century, put forward by President Boris N. Yeltsin at the June 1999 G-8 Summit in Cologne, is aimed at the practical implementation of this approach. The core of this initiative is ensuring the security of nations and peoples through cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter and generally recognized norms of the international law and to offer the world clear signposts for the 21st century.
Aware of its role and of its responsibility of a world power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council for the development of world processes, Russia advocates the establishment of a multipolar world. At the turn of the century humankind has actually found itself confronted with the choice between a multipolar world order based on the primacy of the international law and the strengthening of the existing international institutions, on the one hand, and the establishment of a unipolar world order with the unrestricted domination of one superpower or a group of economically and militarily strong nations. The confrontation of these two approaches dramatically came to a head as a result of the direct act of aggression of NATO against sovereign Yugoslavia, when all the positive accomplishments in international relations in the post-war period were put in jeopardy. In these circumstances the Russian leadership is pursuing a consistent and firm policy line for countering aggression and upholding the
strength of the law, while rejecting the law of strength.
What, then, does Russia's policy line on major problems and geographic areas of international relations look like in the light of what I just said?
Efforts to strengthen the United Nations Organization occupy a central place in our entire foreign policy. The UN is a unique mechanism for the regulation of the whole system of international relations, a mechanism to which in many ways there is no alternative. Even for all its known shortcomings the UN remains the sole universal forum, both in terms of its composition and the richness of its agenda. What is needed is to tap, in modern conditions, the vast potential that was built into the Charter of the UN at its foundation.
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned NATO aggression has dealt a very serious blow at the authority and role of the UN. It directly challenged the fundamental principles of is Charter, the prime responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its exclusive prerogative to authorize the use of coercive measures on behalf of the world community.
Attempts to justify the use of force without the sanction of the Security Council by referring to an alleged "right to humanitarian intervention" in order to prevent "humanitarian catastrophes" do not stand up to criticism. The use of force without any mandate from the international community is a direct road to anarchy and chaos in the world.
In the current situation peacemaking activities and reaction to crises acquire high priority for the UN. It is extremely important to seek a uniform approach to the fundamental issues of conducting peacekeeping operations and their criteria. Among these, Russia singles out the existence of a real threat to international or regional peace and security, and ensuring the Charter prerogatives of the Security Council and its leading role in political management of peacekeeping operations, impartiality, rejection of "double standards" and a comprehensive approach to the settlement of conflicts.
At the same time one cannot deny the need for the adaptation of the UN, and in particular, the Security Council to new trends in international relations. The road to enhancing the effectiveness of the UN lies through reforming its mechanisms on the basis of the immutable UN Charter and the experience accumulated over decades. These mechanisms should be adjusted to the current and future realities of international life and the capacity of the Organization to make prompt decisions and implement them effectively should be heightened.
The UN is called upon to play its role in meeting such new challenges as aggressive nationalism, separatism and terrorism. A serious challenge to the world community is religious extremism, notably that variety of it which uses Islam as a cover. Islamic extremists seek to create a network of hot spots on the globe in order to destabilize the situation in individual countries. This is witnessed by their actions in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Kosovo and most recently in Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan) and Kirghizia. Religious extremism, coupled with separatism and terrorism, is fraught with an extremely serious threat to international security and stability. Its global scale calls for an immediate consolidation of the efforts of all the interested states to combat this new evil.
A priority area of the Russian foreign policy has been and remains the relations with the CIS member states. Jointly with our partners we seek to transform the Commonwealth into a dynamic integration association based on the principles of equality and respect of national interests. Coming to the fore in the CIS is the task of establishing effective interaction in the economic sphere, above all by creating a free trade zone. In supporting varying-speed and varying-format cooperation we willingly promote higher forms of integration with interested Commonwealth partners.
An instance of Russian integration efforts "in the small format" is the Customs Union of Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan within which a vigorous effort is pursued to implement the Treaty on the Customs Union and Common Economic Space of February 26, 1999.
Bilateral integration is embodied by the dynamic interaction within the Russia- Byelorussia Union. In December 1998 in Moscow, the Declaration on Further Unity of the Two States, the Treaty on the Equal Rights of Citizens and the Agreement on the Creation of Equal Conditions for Economic Entities were signed taking Russian- Byelorussian integration to a higher level. We are now close to signing a Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Byelorussia.
Russia still considers the Treaty on Collective Security (TCS) to be the main consolidating instrument of multilateral military and military-technical cooperation within the CIS. In April 1999 six states -- Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia and Tajikistan -- signed a protocol to extend the Treaty by another five-year period.
Russia attaches prime importance to maintaining the security of state borders together with other CIS countries, to interaction in combating organized crime and the spread of narcotics. The peacemaking activities in the CIS occupy a special place. Russia took an active part in moving the conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, Transdniestria, Tajikistan and South Ossetia from the stage of armed engagement onto the political settlement track. But the road to final normalization of the situation in these trouble spots in the Commonwealth will probably be long and arduous.
Russia is open for mutually beneficial and long-term cooperation with the Baltic states which should provide an element of stability and not confrontation in the Baltic region. But for this to become reality adequate steps must be taken by our Baltic partners, including in the area of ensuring the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia.
It should be clear that European security is in the front ranks of our foreign policy priorities. Russia consistently seeks the creation of a security system on the European continent that would reliably and, most important, durably guarantee stability and prosperity of all the states in the region.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should provide the core of such a system being the only organization of an all-European format that exercises not a fragmentary, but an all-round and systemic approach to security problems.
A prime task today is to ensure legal support of the corresponding standards and rules in the shape of a European Security Charter whose development is in the finishing stretch. The Charter is called upon to be a weighty document replete with concrete understandings and akin to the Helsinki Final Act. Russia does not need just another empty declaration. I must say that we have managed to make substantial progress in that direction although the situation remains complex because of the opposition of the US and a number of European countries whose aim is to limit the field of OSCE activities. Nevertheless, we are working to ensure that the upcoming November OSCE summit in Istanbul should sign both the European Security Charter and the adjusted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
Russian diplomacy is working persistently to strengthen the operational potential of the OSCE over the whole spectrum, from early warning to post-conflict rehabilitation. Today we also include peacemaking.
Let me stress again that the Russian Federation will not settle for any European security models relying on any versions of "NATO-centrism".
Along with the OSCE, the Council of Europe is called upon to perform an integrating mission on the continent. In creating today the European legal, social and cultural space the Council of Europe is laying down a long-term basis for full political interaction among states throughout Europe. We are therefore interested in a renewal and greater effectiveness of that organization.
Among the key areas of our economic policy one can safely name the development of partnership relations with the European Union. This is understandable. The EU is our major trade, economic and investment partner which supports the conduct of Russian reform. As the overall external policy and security policy are consolidated, the European Union will undoubtedly emerge as an ever more active political agent in international relations and in the future may become an independent pole of the new world order in the 21st century. Such realities and prospects must be taken into account.
An important positive factor in the development of our ties with the EU members was the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and the European Union which came into force in December 1997. So far, only the first steps have been made in tapping the huge potential of the Agreement which provides the basis for further mutual rapprochement.
The strategy with regard to Russia adopted by the European Union summit in Cologne in early June 1999 confirmed its commitment to deeper cooperation with our country. It is accordingly necessary to make full use of the declared commitment in the interests of Russia and all Europe.
There is significant potential, too, in making our foreign policy interaction more effective. As the EU moves towards forming a "European defense identity" a dialog on military-political cooperation will become increasingly topical.
Nor do we overlook the possibilities offered by the various subregional cooperation models emerging in Europe. The potential of such organizations as the Baltic Council, the Barents and Euroarctic Region Council, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and a whole number of other promising regional initiatives has not been exhausted.
The relations between Russia and NATO are not easy. We have exerted significant efforts to turn them into a substantial element in the process of strengthening confidence, stability and security in Europe. To this end we signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with NATO in May 1997. Based on this Act the Permanent Joint Council was established to deal with the security issues that give cause for common concern. Useful discussions of European security, non- proliferation of mass destruction weapons, the settlement of regional conflicts and peacekeeping were held within the Council. There was interaction in the military field, in the Bosnia operation, in cleaning up the aftermath of emergency situations and natural disasters. Parliamentary and scientific contacts have been maintained.
The NATO aggression against the FRY has caused irreparable damage to the relations with the Alliance. We could not afford not to react to the NATO violation of practically the whole range of agreements reached. The actions of the North-Atlantic bloc were at odds with the "spirit and letter" of the Founding Act and diverged from its principle of renunciation of the use or threat of force against each other or any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any way that contradicts the UN Charter. The Alliance has shown disrespect of the fundamental principles of international communication.
In these conditions a continued dialog with NATO on the former scale became impossible. On the President's directions, measures were taken to "freeze" our contacts with NATO. Now that the settlement of the Kosovo situation is back on a legal track under the UN aegis we are interacting with NATO only in this concrete area without as yet going any further.
The NATO military action against Yugoslavia became an embodiment of the new strategic concept of the Alliance adopted at the Washington summit some of whose provisions give us serious cause for concern. The concept fixed NATO's commitment to globalizing its activities, to arrogating the central role in the settlement of conflicts outside the Alliance's zone of responsibility determined under the Washington Treaty on the creation of NATO in 1949.
The Alliance's actions in the Balkans have vindicated our negative attitude to the expansion of NATO. The advance of NATO to the East is a major political error on a historic scale. We believe that the time of military blocs is gone.
We respect the right of any state to choose ways of ensuring its security, but in building our relations with these countries the Russian side will be guided above all by its own national interests and it will judge the true intentions of our partners by their deeds. We must take into account the fact that by seeking to join NATO the East European countries are politically distancing themselves from Russia.
The Russian-American relations are not entirely smooth as they were bound to be affected by Washington's military actions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. More recently this was compounded by the attempts of some circles in the US to put into question the rationale of cooperation between the US and Russia. And yet there are grounds for believing that our bilateral relations have a sufficient margin of strength to overcome the current problems and get rid of the numerous irritants. In any case, our side has the necessary good will for that. We are convinced that Russian-American interaction should continue, in many ways, to be the determining factor in international security and stability.
The questions of disarmament have traditionally been an area in which Russian diplomacy has been active. And there too NATO actions in the Balkans have played a negative part. Our public opinion has become more skeptical about the effectiveness of such key instruments of stability and security in the European continent as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the 1994 Vienna document on confidence measures. But whatever may be said about the shortcomings of these international legal acts, it has to be admitted that they create a generally acceptable basis for the maintenance and development of relations among its participants in the military-political field. Their renunciation would destroy the arms control regime and lead to a free-for- all in the building up of military muscle.
We therefore include the task of early renewal and adaptation of these key documents to new conditions among our top priorities. In the process of such adaptation the restrictive measures will be strengthened, new substantial cuts of the level of forces will be made and the armed forces and military activities of signatory states will become more transparent.
Russia consistently comes out for the reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals. That process is intimately connected with the state of Russian-American relations and the international situation in general. We still expect the START-2 Treaty to come into force. The process of its ratification by the State Duma was not stalled through the fault of Russia. A negative role was played by the events around Iraq, the NATO armed aggression against Yugoslavia and the expansion of NATO to the East. One should note that the process of ratification of this Treaty has not yet been completed in the US, too, and we take this into account.
The situation around the 1972 ABM Treaty merits close attention. The United States, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Treaty, has in fact begun practical preparation for the deployment of a national system of anti-missile defense of the country's territory. This is an extremely dangerous intention. Such deployment, if it goes ahead, may wreck the ABM Treaty and consequently the basis of the structure of strategic stability and the entire disarmament process in recent decades. Russia comes out firmly for the preservation and strict compliance with the ABM Treaty and fulfillment of the entire range of obligations the parties have assumed.
We are aware of the importance of beginning negotiations on START-3 for the purpose of further significant reductions of strategic armaments. The basis for corresponding negotiations was provided by the joint statement of the Russian and US Presidents on the parameters of the future START-3 Treaty signed in March 1997 in Helsinki. The proposal of President Yeltsin that would allow nuclear powers to deploy nuclear weapons only within their national territories is still on the agenda.
Russia pays due attention to measures to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CPCW) of January 13, 1993 and the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxic Weapons of April 10, 1972. Russia honors its obligations under these conventions. From the beginning of 1998 international inspections have been going on in Russia of former facilities for the production of chemical weapons and other objects regulated under the Convention. The signing of the CPCW has confronted us with the problem of destroying the vast stocks of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the USSR, which involves major financial outlays. Because of our known economic difficulties we count on broader international assistance in this matter.
Russia intends to strictly comply with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and missiles for their delivery. We are not interested in any other parties acquiring such weapons or means of their delivery. We are actively involved in the international export control regimes, including dual-purpose technologies.
The southern area of our country's foreign policy. One must admit that it is becoming increasingly difficult, but it is as high a priority as ever.
Along with the diversity of factors that determine the dynamics of the situation in the south of our country, in the Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in the Caspian-Black Sea inter-regional zone an alarming geopolitical trend is becoming ever more discernible. It is an attempt to direct extremist Islam to the North in order to link up the main Islamic mass of Eurasia with its large enclaves in the post-Soviet space.
Aggressive nationalism, radical separatism, extreme forms of confessionalism and other forms of dangerous extremism are moving on us literally in a wedge.
Of course, we are doing everything to prevent the advance of these political trends which threaten us and the whole world towards the heart of the Russian Federation.
Nor are we oblivious of the Asian area and there I would like to single out the Asia Pacific Region. Guided by the interests of preserving stability and predictability in the region we are working to build up active friendly relations with the neighboring states. That applies, above all, to our relations with China which continue to grow stronger. Based on the results of the first informal meeting between President Yeltsin of Russia and Chairman of the PRC Jiang Zemin (November 1998) an important joint statement on "Russian-Chinese Relations on the Threshold of the 21st Century" was adopted. It reflects the closeness of positions on key issues, reciprocal desire for cooperation and interaction in international affairs. Our traditional relations of partnership with India are developing dynamically. The process of accumulation of positive elements in the Russian-Japanese relations continues. On the Korean peninsula Russia pursues the line for maintaining balanced relations with both Korean states and,
together with other members of the international community, contributes to bringing down the level of confrontation encouraging the Korean sides to have dialog.
Our relations with the major regional organization -- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- are developing successfully. The dialog on the problems of regional security within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is proceeding in a constructive manner. Russia's accession in 1998 to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1998 was a milestone.
In September of this year Russia, together with 15 other countries, became a founder of a new regional organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Measures in Asia.
The Middle East remains the object of our constant attention and active diplomatic efforts. We seek to contribute to the creation, in that region, of a climate of stability, the settlement of existing and prevention of new conflicts. Russia is also interested in the development of trade and economic cooperation with the states there.
Russia's participation in the international efforts aimed at the settlement of the Iraq problem continues to be tangible and dynamic. We insist on speeding up the process of lifting sanctions from Iraq on the basis of Baghdad's compliance with the corresponding resolutions of the UN Security Council.
We did our best to keep Washington from using force against Iraq and for a considerable period of time these efforts bore fruit. Unfortunately, in the second half of December 1998 the US and Great Britain launched a military action. The result of this totally unjustified move was the destruction of a unique mechanism of international monitoring in Iraq to prevent it rebuilding its mass destruction weapons potential. That mechanism has still not been restored.
Acting as a co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process, the Russian diplomacy has contributed vigorously to overcoming the crisis in Arab-Israeli settlement. Russia has worked to ensure that the peace process begun at the Madrid conference in October 1991 should continue and advance on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council and the implementation of the "land for peace" principle. And we were acting in concert with the efforts of the American co-sponsor, the European Union, and other advocates of the peace process energetically encouraging the parties to reach and strictly abide by their agreements on the basis of reciprocity, without advancing new demands and unilateral actions. Russia continues to support the indisputable right of the Palestinians to their own state and its exercise in the framework of a peace process. The treaty obligations should remove Israel's concerns in the sphere of security linked to the creation of an independent Palestine.
Just lately our representative took part in the resumption of Palestine-Israeli negotiations to determine the final status of Palestine territories. A prolonged dialog lies ahead, but the ultimate goal of reaching a final agreement is perfectly realistic. What is needed is to strengthen confidence between the parties and to make them equal and reliable partners.
Russia proceeds from the importance of the peace process in the Middle East, its progress and parallel advance on all the negotiating tracks. Accordingly, we have looked intensively for possibilities to secure the resumption of Syrian-Israeli negotiations. A shift on that track may help untangle the South Lebanon knot.
Other substantial aspects of the regional situation remain within our purview. It is in large measure due to our purposeful actions that the process of the settlement of the "Lockerby case" has been launched within the framework set by UN Security Council resolutions. That made it possible to suspend sanctions against Libya in April 1999, to pave the way for their subsequent lifting and final normalization of the situation around that country. We have made a substantial contribution to de-escalating tensions between Turkey and Syria in the fall of 1998.
We continue to consistently work towards the solution of the Cyprus problem.
In 1998 Russia stepped up its efforts to search for ways of settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan and preventing the spread of that instability zone to the CIS.
The relations with the countries of Latin American remain an independent and highly promising area of the Russian foreign policy. Contributing to their strengthening and expansion is the program of further development of cooperation between Russia and Latin American states approved by Boris Yeltsin in February 1998. Along with the development of bilateral relations efforts are exerted to put in place interaction with regional organizations and integration groups of Western Hemisphere countries. Russia has been granted the status of a permanent observer with the Organization of American States (OAS). Contacts are developing with another influential association, the Rio Group.
Russia's approach to acute problems in Africa is comprehensive in character. The guidelines are provided by the 1994 Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy in Africa. As a followup to that document President Yeltsin issued additional concrete directives to step up Russia-African links in 1998.
Russia continues its participation in the settlement of existing conflicts and crisis situations. Examples in point are Angola, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and so on. We contribute to strengthening the peacekeeping potential of the African states and formation of a framework for collective security on the continent.
This is a very general sketch of the Russian foreign policy at the present stage. Of course, considering some alarming trends in the development of the international situation we have to hold the ongoing events under comprehensive and constant review and to adjust certain parameters of our foreign policy activities. But the task remains unchanged, to ensure the long-term state interests of Russia and maintain strategic stability in the world.
Russia is prepared to make an active and weighty contribution to the creation of a world order that would ensure equal security conditions for all the states and enable them to jointly meet the present-day threats and challenges.
We have grounds for this. The Russian foreign policy is perhaps one of the few areas of activity on whose fundamental issues there is a practical consensus among all political forces in the country. Of course, this does not come about automatically. The President, the government and the Foreign Ministry attach great importance to maintaining close working contacts with the Federation Council and the State Duma in the course of which we manage to arrive at a common vision of problems and ways to solve them.
The foreign policy activities of our state are not confined to diplomatic work. Practically all the federal ministries and agencies take part in international affairs. And the subjects of the federation are very active in this. I don't think anyone doubts that these links should promote the interests of the country as a whole. It is no accident that the President and the government attach such importance to the coordination of the foreign policy activities of all the government structures and the subjects of the federation. The Foreign Ministry of Russia has been put in charge of implementing such coordination and this constitutes an important part of its work. I am happy to note the good cooperation the Foreign Ministry enjoys with the subjects of the federation, and with the state federal bodies on these matters.
Thank you.
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