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29 June 1999

TEXT: WORLDNET - DOD'S WARNER ON U.S.-RUSSIA MILITARY COOPERATION

(June 28: Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner) (7790)
Washington -- The United States and Russia should re-engage and regain
the momentum on cooperative political, economic and defense
initiatives that were put on hold during the conflict in Kosovo,
according to Edward Warner, assistant secretary of defense for
strategy and threat reduction.
"I think in the wake of the agreement in Helsinki about Russian
participation in the Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR), we have
an excellent opportunity to get back on track with our relationship,"
Warner said June 28 on a U.S. Information Agency WORLDNET program.
He outlined the terms of the agreement reached on the participation of
up to 3,600 Russian troops in KFOR. The troops will be situated in the
American, French and German sectors, he said. While they will have a
"control relationship to individual sector commanders," ultimately the
Russian troops will be under Kremlin control. There will be Russian
liaison officers at all levels of KFOR's command chain.
Warner said it is time for the two countries to resume joint efforts
to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction and to implement
international non-proliferation regimes and treaties.
He touched on other areas of potential cooperation suspended by
tensions over Kosovo, including tackling computer challenges related
to the year 2000 (Y2K) and sharing early-warning data from Cold War
space-based sensors and radar stations. Warner said dialogue on Y2K
would resume "on a rather urgent basis."
The United States recently decided to extend the cooperative threat
reduction program -- which provides Russia funding for eliminating
nuclear weapons -- for seven more years, Warner noted.
He called for the United States and Russia to work together to adapt
to the changing geopolitics of the 21st century. The threat of missile
attacks from rogue states is prompting the United States to consider a
limited national missile defense program, which would require
modification of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty negotiated with
Russia in 1972, said Warner.
"We need to work with Russia to...possibly modify the treaty in a way
that would permit the deployment of this limited defense capability,
but a defense capability that would not threaten Russia's nuclear
strategic retaliatory deterrent," he said.
Following is a transcript of the WORLDNET program:
(begin transcript)
DR. EDWARD WARNER
Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Threat Reduction 
U.S. Department of Defense
"RUSSIAN-U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION"
WORLDNET "Washington Window" 
United States Information Agency 
Television and Film Service 
Washington, D.C.
June 28, 1999
HOST:	Jim Bertel
MR. BERTEL: Hi, I'm Jim Bertel. Welcome to "Washington Window," where
we discuss today's most important issues one on one with leading
newsmakers.
The first half of 1999 has seen a Cold War-like chill settle over
relations between Russia and the United States -- this after nearly a
decade of unprecedented military cooperation, that has seen American
and Russian troops soldiering together in Bosnia, a full-time Russian
presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and a cooperative effort
that became the bedrock of the international coalition that reversed
Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait.
But the Kosovo conflict had Russia and the United States lining up in
Cold War fashion on opposite sites of the issue, with Russia
supporting its long-time ally Serbia, as the United States and NATO
began an 11-week air campaign designed to halt the ethnic cleansing of
Kosovo.
But in the end it was NATO's military action coupled with Russia's
diplomatic efforts that eventually brought peace to the Balkans. But
as peace descended on Kosovo, the East-West tensions were once again
heightened as Russian troops raced to occupy the Pristina airport
ahead of NATO peacekeepers. This gambol, described by some as
brilliant, others as risky, gave the Kremlin the bargaining power it
needed to carve out a role for itself in the peacekeeping effort in
Kosovo.
(Begin videotape.)
MR. BERTEL: Ten days ago in Helsinki, Finland, U.S. and Russian
military officials signed an agreement on Russian troop participation
in NATO peacekeeping activities in Kosovo. The deal ended a tense
situation when Russian troops occupied the airport in Pristina, the
capital of Kosovo. Russian military officials wanted troops to have
their own sectors to patrol. NATO rejected the idea, because it wanted
to avoid the appearance of partitioning in Kosovo.
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen told reporters he is pleased
with the deal:
SEC. COHEN: Our agreement meets two fundamental requirements: It
preserves the unity of command necessary to make KFOR an effective
military force, and it gives Russia a unique role by providing for
operations of Russian forces within KFOR sectors run by the United
States, France and Germany.
MR. BERTEL: Russia's plan calls for 3,600 troops to join the KFOR
peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo. The troops would serve under Russian
command but work with NATO commanders in sectors controlled by the
U.S., France and Germany.
Shortly after the Helsinki agreement was reached, U.S. President Bill
Clinton reacted positively to its terms:
PRESIDENT CLINTON: They provide for unity of command, they provide for
a significant range of responsibilities for the Russians which I think
are entirely appropriate and will enhance the mission's effectiveness.
And I am fully supportive of this agreement and very pleased by it.
(End videotape.)
MR. BERTEL: Last week's G-8 summit meeting between Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton may have brought the
first signs of a thaw in relations between the two nations. Already
the two sides are planning talks on a future START III agreement and
the possible amendment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And
the Russian Duma has said it will take up the long-delayed debate on
the START II nuclear disarmament treaty in the fall session.
All of this sets the stage for today's program. Joining me to discuss
the current and future state of military cooperation between Russia
and the United States is Edward Warner, assistant secretary of Defense
for strategy and threat reduction. Dr. Warner was a key player in this
month's Helsinki negotiations over Russia's role in Kosovo. Dr.
Warner, it's a pleasure to have you with us today. In light of the
Kosovo conflict and the tough talk that has come out of the Kremlin in
recent months, such as freezing relations with NATO, how would you
assess the current state of U.S.-Russian relations?
DR. WARNER: Well, I think in the wake of the agreement in Helsinki
about Russian participation in the Kosovo peace implementation force
we have an excellent opportunity to get back on track with our
relationship across a wide range of issues, of a political, economic
and defense nature. Russia and the United States have over the last
several years developed a variety of cooperative programs. Some of
those programs survived even the most difficult stages during the
conflict in Kosovo, but many others were put on hold.
Our opportunity now, and it's clearly been voiced by the two
presidents when they met in Cologne, is to reengage with one another
and to regain the momentum in several different cooperative areas.
MR. BERTEL: Now, one of the negotiations that will be going on in the
near future will be over the 1972 ABM Treaty, discussing whether or
not it should be amended. Why is this important to the United States?
DR. WARNER: Well, this is a vital interest for both sides. The ABM
Treaty, as we described in official documents, has been one of the
cornerstones of the strategic stable and strategic stability
relationship between first the Soviet Union and the United States and
since 1991 between Russia and the United States.
We in the United States are getting close to making a decision about
possibly going forward with a very limited national missile defense
program, one designed to protect the United States against missile
attacks by rogue states as we call them, such as North Korea or Iran.
This would be an extremely limited defense capability, one that can
shoot down a few tens of enemy missiles. We know that the current
provisions of the ABM Treaty, negotiated way back in 1972, and amended
in 1974, may well be in conflict with certain aspects of this
projected American deployment that would begin after the turn of the
century, and possibly be operational by the year 2005.
We, the president, has not made a decision to proceed with this type
of system, but there is strong support within the Congress and within
the country as a whole to move in this direction. So we need to work
with Russia to potentially, to possibly modify the treaty in a way
that would permit the deployment of this limited defense capability,
but a defense capability that would not threaten Russia's nuclear
strategic retaliatory deterrent. In other words, Russia would retain
the capability to threaten massive harm on the United States in the
case that it was attacked or some other grave threat to the security.
The United States would retain similar capabilities vis-a-vis Russia.
So it is important for us to continue a process that began last
January/February to very specifically discuss the potential -- the
nature of our potential limited national missile defense deployment
and the manner in which the treaty might be modified to accommodate a
possible deployment.
MR. BERTEL: Well, we have a number of stations eager to speak with you
today, so let's move on and begin with TV Volga. Welcome to
"Washington Window."
Q: Hello. TV Volga, Nizhy Novgorod -- (inaudible). Dr. Warner, what do
you think -- a few months ago when there was the peak of the Balkans
war, what do you think about the possibility of a U.S. nuclear strike
in the Balkan conflict if Russia was more rigorous? In other words,
could there have been a nuclear track to the conflict in the Balkans?
DR. WARNER: I don't think there was any serious possibility whatsoever
-- any possibility whatsoever -- that the conflict in the Balkans
could have escalated into a nuclear confrontation, let alone a nuclear
strike. There was no aspect of American military plans and American
military capabilities that were assembled and used in that conflict
that would have been connected to nuclear use.
While it was obviously a very serious conflict, the nuclear dimension
was missing, and I don't believe there was any plausible scenario,
certainly none that we had under consideration, that would have
brought it anywhere near the possible use of nuclear weapons.
MR. BERTEL: We are pleased once again to have TV Va Bank with us in
Orel. Please go ahead with your first question.
Q: Good evening, Jim. Good evening, Mr. Warner -- though it's morning
here. I have the following question: nuclear weapons are spreading --
Pakistan, you have in India. Mr. Warner, do you see opportunities to
cooperate in the ABM field between the United States and Russia, two
great powers, to fight against -- jointly against nuclear
proliferation? Thank you.
DR. WARNER: Well, we have lots of work that we are doing together to
work jointly to try to stem the flow of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them. In the
nuclear area, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is a central
contributor to this activity. In many other ways the United States
government and the Russian government are working very actively
together to try to make sure that the various international regimes
and treaties that try to stem further proliferation of these weapons
of mass destruction are in fact effectively implemented.
Now, the link to national missile defense is our belief is despite our
best efforts to combat proliferation, missile capabilities have
clearly emerged in areas of the so-called rogue states. North Korea
tested a three-stage missile that was approaching inter-continental
range last year, and many anticipate they may test an even
longer-range missile within the next several months. Iran is working
very assiduously to try to develop long-range missile capability. In
our view each state should have the opportunity to deploy a limited
missile defense to protect ourselves, and our work together might well
be to adjust the ABM Treaty to permit such deployments.
I might note the original ABM Treaty of 1972 and 1974 does permit
limited deployments by both sides. Russia still has active an
anti-missile system around Moscow that is authorized or sanctioned
within the treaty. The United States has a right to such a system out
around an inter-continental ballistic missile in the Central United
States, in North Dakota -- it is currently not active.
In light of new circumstances of the 21st century, we need to sustain
the ability for both sides to deploy limited defenses and to adapt to
the new technologies and new realities as we turn into the new
millennium.
MR. BERTEL: It's a pleasure to welcome TV ASV back to "Washington
Window." Good to have you with us. Go ahead with your question.
Q: Hello, Jim, hello, Dr. Warner. My name is Anatoly Bulokova (ph), TV
ASV. Let's talk about what's going on in the Balkans right now.
Peacekeeping forces cannot always maintain order and security, so
there is lynching and mobbing and houses being burned down. How do you
resolve this problem?
DR. WARNER: Certainly one of the commitments of the Kosovo
peacekeeping force is to protect all the citizens of Kosovo. This has
been clearly declared by the top political leaders on all sides. It is
certainly understood by the British officer, Sir Mike Jackson, who
commands the Kosovo peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, as the Kosovar
Albanians return to Kosovo after the terrible killings that had
occurred against members of their family and close friends, and in the
face of their now coming to terms or beginning to realize much of the
destruction that may have occurred to their houses and communities, it
is clearly very difficult to sustain order between the Serbian and
Albanian Kosovars.
The peacekeeping force itself is still only in its early stages of
deployment, so it does not by any means have the full complement of
the some 50,000-plus troops that will be there eventually. I'm not
sure of the number today, but it's perhaps in the 15,000 number.
We have a commitment on behalf of the overall Kosovo force to provide
protection for all citizens of Kosovo. As the force is just expanding
and reaching its projected strength, and because of the very difficult
situation, they are clearly not succeeding in stopping all of the
looting and burning for example that is happening to the Serb
community.
I know of no circumstances where there has been individual physical
violence and lynching and the like that you make reference to, but
there has certainly has been the destruction of property. The Kosovar
peacekeeping force will do the best it can as rapidly as possible to
prevent this type of activity.
MR. BERTEL: And we are going to move on now to TV Esta. Welcome to
"Washington Window."
Q: Hello, my name is -- (inaudible) -- I am a journalist from Arkangjo
(ph) actually. I have a question for Dr. Warner. Can you please tell
me what is the projected duration of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo?
Isn't the U.S. government concerned that over this time there are
situations whereby there's victims in the peacekeeping ranks and they
include the United States that will change the U.S. public opinion
vis-a-vis the peacekeeping operations? Can that happen?
DR. WARNER: On the first question, the duration of the peacekeeping
effort in Kosovo, there has been no time limit established. I think we
learned through bitter experience in the case of the Bosnian
peacekeeping effort that trying to set a specific time frame for the
duration of the operation at the outset of the operation just doesn't
work. Some of our top political leaders predicted at the beginning of
the Bosnian activity in 1996 that it would be over within a year.
Clearly that was not the case and the Bosnian peacekeeping operation
remains even today, though at decidedly smaller force levels than it
did in the opening year. We just don't know how long the Kosovo peace
process if you will is going to play out.
It will be important that the troops in Kosovo are adequately
protected against possible snipers or other types of violence. If
there are losses of peacekeepers in any nation in these circumstances
it always creates domestic repercussions. That's why we for our forces
in Kosovo are very careful about what we call force protection, making
sure that these people are properly armed, properly equipped, properly
vigilant to do everything they can to avoid loss of life. But we are
prepared to make our contribution to this force over the next few
years, and I just can't tell you how long that will be. There of
course is an entire political civil government track run under the
United Nations civil administration. That whole effort is just in the
very earliest stages of getting underway. It will be important that
the military component maintains the peace, and that the civil
component gets functioning, the civil administration of the territory,
and then works, as agreed in the U.N. Security Council resolution for
some process of the long-term political future of Kosovo, which has by
no means been determined yet, but will be determined in ways that are
outlined in that resolution.
MR. BERTEL: We'll move on to TV Volga in just a moment, but first I'd
like to ask Dr. Warner about U.S. military doctrine. And that is in
the past it has been set up to accommodate a face-off between the two
superpowers. Now it seems conflicts like Kosovo and elsewhere in the
world are far more likely places where the U.S. military, NATO and
other forces will have to intervene. Has this caused a rethinking of
the long-term strategy of the U.S. military?
DR. WARNER: U.S. military policy began to be changed dramatically as
early as 1991-92, in the last years of the Bush administration. At
that time the secretary of Defense, Secretary Cheney, and the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, began a process to reorient
American thinking and military preparation not against a potential
conflict with the Soviet Union, which no longer existed, but against a
new set of challenges -- regional conflicts, ethnic conflicts,
internal conflicts and the like.
In the Clinton administration we conducted two major defense reviews
-- one in 1993, another at the beginning of the second term of the
administration in 1997. And in those two we laid out quite a different
defense strategy. It's a defense strategy that recognizes that our
primary challenges are deterring conflict in places like the Korean
Peninsula against North Korea, in the Persian Gulf region against the
likes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and that our forces would contribute
to meeting other sort of transnational challenges of the post-Cold War
era. One of those is this question of ethnic conflict, failed states,
and the need for the international community to help provide
transitional military assistance in the wake of conflict. Two examples
there are of course the peace implementation effort in Bosnia and now
the peace implementation effort that is just getting underway in
Kosovo.
So for almost a decade now American military policy has moved fully
away from the Cold War focus on potential Soviet-NATO, Soviet-American
conflict, and has looked instead at a whole set of new challenges. And
that is the bedrock today of American defense strategy and national
security strategy.
In contrast, our relations with Russia are one of partnership, one in
which we seek to find the areas for mutually benefit cooperation --
politically, economically and militarily. So there is a dimension of
our strategy, our defense strategy which relates to Russia, but it's
an aspect of cooperation, not of competition and adversary
relationships.
MR. BERTEL: Well, let's return now to TV Volga for our next question.
Q: Elias Sudakova (ph), TV Volga. Dr. Warner, currently in Yugoslavia
there is a peacekeeping contingent for various countries. What's the
probability of any conflict arising among them?
DR. WARNER: Well, we have had the experience of the Bosnia peace
implementation effort in the Balkans -- well, we really even before
that had a U.N.-sponsored force that sought to help provide security
while the delivery of humanitarian assistance took place. That was
followed in 1995-96 by the Bosnian peace implementation force, first
called IFOR and then SFOR, the stability force. When that force first
went in I think it had almost 50,000 troops, and they were drawn from
over 20 countries, NATO countries and many non-NATO nations, including
Russia. And Russia has contributed effectively to the Bosnian peace
force since its very inception in early 1996. There has been no single
incident of conflict among the peacekeeping forces themselves in the
time in which the implementation took place in Bosnia. And we have
every assumption, and we are fully convinced that this same type of
cooperative activity will be evident in the some 50,000-plus troops
that will be in and implementing the agreements in Kosovo, and they
will be in place within the next month or so.
Q: Dr. Warner, how has the national security attitude changed in U.S.
society after the war in the Balkans?
DR. WARNER: Well, it's a little early to draw any conclusions, since
the war in the Balkans has really just ended only a few weeks ago. In
the United States, while there was strong support for the effort
itself, because it was certainly the conviction of the American people
that the ethnic cleansing and the terrible crimes that were being
perpetrated against the Kosovar Albanians were totally unacceptable
for modern international society, there was certainly concern anytime
when there is a conflict going on.
In the wake of that conflict there is a general feeling, I believe, of
relief that one has been successful in ending that pattern of
activity, and there is considerable hopefulness that with the help of
the peacekeeping force and the U.N.'s transitional civilian authority
we can move toward a better future for all of those in Kosovo and more
broadly in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans itself.
So I think the American security mood is one of relief and one that
looks with some concern but some optimism that we will be able to work
together to provide a more stable situation in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in
the Balkans in general.
MR. BERTEL: We're going to return now to TV Va Bank and Yevgeny
Schwartz for our next two questions.
Q: Thank you, Jim. Mr. Warner, the Kosovo Liberation Army is starting
to take up local administration, take them over and take over civilian
affairs so the Serbs would have no place there. To disarm the KLA is
impossible currently. How do you foresee the resolution of the problem
so that the civilian administration would consist of both Serbs and
Kosovar Albanians as well?
DR. WARNER: On the question of the demilitarization of the KLA, there
has been an agreement struck on that with the leaders of the KLA. They
have committed themselves to a phased process of disengagement and
demilitarization, disarmament in a disciplined manner, and that is all
to be overseen by the Kosovo implementation force, so-called KFOR, and
its commander, Sir Mike Jackson.
That process has gotten underway. There have been some good initial
steps. And it will be up to KFOR to continue to work with the KLA and
to implement this agreement very precisely. Again, the experience of
the last week includes some positive movement in that direction, and
we intend to pursue that.
On the question of civil administration, this is an area where the
United Nations, with the U.N. Security Council resolution of a few
weeks ago, has clearly taken on the responsibility. There will be work
of others I am sure in cooperation of that, but this setting up of
civil administration is designed to provide opportunities for Kosovar
Albanians, including those who may have been members of the KLA. But
it is also to provide opportunities for other citizens of Kosovo,
Kosovar Serbs. It will certainly be one of the crucial roles of that
administration to try to develop an internal administration which is
fair to both communities.
Thank you for the first answer. I have the following question. The
army is not a police-like force, so it cannot do just policing. There
are peace casualties -- a professor was shot and some other people.
How do you see the creation of an international police force that
would maintain order in Kosovo?
DR. WARNER: It is true that the armed forces of all states are
generally resistant of taking on domestic policing functions. And it
is certainly not our desire over even the medium term to give that
responsibility to the Kosovo peace implementation force, or KFOR.
Nevertheless, very much in the short term those are precisely those
types of missions and tasks that KFOR is inevitably being called upon
to carry out, and having some difficulty, as I said earlier, because
of the extreme tension that is in the area.
Over the longer run, the setting up of a police force for Kosovars,
the Kosovars in position, will be one of the central responsibilities
of the civil administration. The international community over the last
decade in this post-Cold War era has shown itself not particularly
well postured to help create new police forces in states that have
recently come out of bitter civil wars or bitter conflicts, as the one
that happened in Kosovo. This will be another test of that capability.
On the whole, we have not done too well. I hope we see some
improvement this time. This is one of the types of capacities that the
international community needs to improve its overall capability. I
hope we will see another step forward in that regard in the
normalization of the situation in Kosovo over the coming weeks and
months.
MR. BERTEL: You are watching "Washington Window," where we are
discussing East-West military cooperation with Edward Warner,
assistant secretary of Defense for strategy and threat reduction.
We'll have more right after this.
(Announcements.)
MR. BERTEL: You are watching "Washington Window." I'm Jim Bertel, and
we are speaking with Edward Warner, assistant secretary of Defense for
strategy and threat reduction. Dr. Warner, we spent a lot of time
talking about Kosovo today, but certainly there's much more going on
between Russia and the United States, and a lot more on the agenda.
Perhaps you could elaborate on some of the things that the two sides
are working on, the two nations.
DR. WARNER: Well, we have several efforts that are currently underway.
One that certainly has a time limit is the question of cooperation in
meeting the computer-related challenge of the transition to the year
2000. As almost everyone knows by now, many computer systems are
designed in a manner in which there is a date-specific dimension to
their programming and the like, even to their hardware. And one of the
challenges for all of us in the modern world is to make sure our
computer systems can be adjusted in a way that they will continue to
operate effectively as we transition from 1999 to the year 2000 in the
coming new year's.
We in the United States have massive efforts underway at the federal
government level, at the state and local government levels and within
individual economic corporations and the like. We reached out to
Russia on these matters beginning almost a year ago, and we had a
series of meetings beginning early in this year. And by about February
or March we were committed to do some very specific cooperation,
sharing management approaches and methodologies for how to
trouble-shoot computer systems, to locate difficulties, to fix them
and then to test them. We also developed a plan for having Russian and
American officers sit together over the transition in the Christmas
New Year's period together at Colorado Springs in a jointly-manned
early-warning center, so if there was any malfunction of the
early-warning radar and space-based systems of the two sides they
could immediately observe what the phenomenon were and consult with
one another.
So we were just on the early stages of I think a very fruitful set of
cooperation activities on so-called year 2000 or Y2K problems. Those
were all suspended because of the tensions that emerged between our
two governments during the conflict in Kosovo. We are in the process
of beginning a dialogue on a rather urgent basis because time is short
before the transition. But we are -- we will seek to reengage and to
restart all the types of cooperation in this area that we might have.
One of the issues I mentioned here is so-called shared early warning.
The two presidents, President Yeltsin and President Clinton, met in
Moscow at a summit meeting last September. At that summit they signed
an agreement to over the much longer-term develop a set of
arrangements to be able to share the early-warning data that is
developed by both sides' sensors -- these are space-based sensors and
large radar stations that belong to both nations. They grew up during
our period of adversarial competition during the Cold War. And now as
a strong symbol of the new era that we have entered and of this danger
of the proliferation of missiles that could endanger both of us, we
are prepared to share early-warning data.
We had a couple of meetings on this subject, follow-up meetings at the
large delegation level, at the expert level last December, and then
again in March just a few days before the Kosovo conflict began. We
need to pick up -- not just the pieces but pick up on that set of
emerging cooperative activities in order to carry out the mission that
was assigned to us by the two presidents. That is, develop the
necessary arrangements for sharing early-warning data, and creating a
jointly-manned warning center that is likely to be located in Moscow.
We again hope to reengage on this matter with our Russian counterparts
probably by the end of this month.
MR. BERTEL: Well, there certainly is a lot on the agenda in the near
future. Let's continue our discussion by returning to TV ASV and
Natalia Bolokova (ph). Welcome back to the program.
Q: Today President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Marshal Sergeyev
discussed the schedule of deploying Russian peacekeeping forces and a
strategy for the future as it applies to Yugoslavia in general. In
your opinion, what political position are you expecting from Russia on
this issue, and what can help in adjusting and closing the conflict in
the Balkans?
DR. WARNER: Well, the negotiations in Helsinki that ended just a
little over a week ago definitely set the framework for Russian
participation in KFOR, the Kosovo peacekeeping force. The Russians
have agreed that they will deploy up to around 3,600 troops. These
troops will be located in three of the different sectors -- the
American sector, the French sector and the German sector. They will be
under ultimately the full political and military control of the
Kremlin -- that is, of the government back in Moscow. But they will
also have a tactical control relationship to the individual sector
commanders as were indicated.
This agreement provides the basis for very significant Russian
participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping force. I have every
anticipation that within the next few weeks that Russia will deploy
its contingent of roughly 3,600 personnel, that those personnel will
then take on the set of difficult responsibilities that all of the
Kosovo peacekeepers will face, that they will do that job very
effectively along the lines that they have done so well in Bosnia
since early 1996.
MR. BERTEL: TV ASV, are you still there? We would like another
question from you please.
Q: Yes, sure. Another question of mine: Do you envision preliminary
preparations or instructions handed out to Russian peacekeepers? They
will be working alongside other militaries of other countries that
speak different languages and have a different mentality as well.
DR. WARNER: Well clearly at the most rudimentary level we have to make
arrangements of communications through interpreters and the like so
there is effective communication. Undoubtedly as the Russian
contingents deploy into the three different sectors there have been
arrangements made for Russian liaison officers at all levels of the
chain of command for the Kosovo peacekeeping force. There will be
Russian representatives on the staff of the sector commanders, there
will be Russian representatives on the staff of the Kosovo commander,
and there will be Russian representatives at higher levels in the NATO
command structure, all the way up to the commander in chief, if you
will, of NATO, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Wesley
Clark, the American general who operates out of the NATO headquarters
in Mons, Belgium.
So there are arrangements made for an effective liaison of the Russian
forces in the field with the various commanders and their staff.
Undoubtedly there will also be a process of familiarization among the
peacekeeping units themselves so they get to know their immediate
neighbors, so they work out their arrangements for carrying out their
various responsibilities, patrolling and the like on the ground in an
effective manner.
We have shown in Bosnia that this type of an arrangement can be
developed, and can be developed relatively easily and can work very
effectively. We anticipate that will be the case in Kosovo as well.
MR. BERTEL: Let's continue our discussion by moving on to TV Esta for
our next two questions.
Q: (Inaudible) -- Television. Hello, Mr. Warner. At the military
agency in the United States Defense Department, you are dealing with
threat reduction. In our city we just had a court trial involving our
high-ranking officials of our local ship-building facility, accused of
stealing materials for nuclear submarines. This is one of the most
criminalized areas in Russia. The fact is that public control over the
military industrial complex and the company Russorajania (ph) is
difficult because of certain strategic interests. What do you think is
such a justification justifiable for super-secrecy? How do you
exercise control over similar areas in the United States, missile
centers and the like, contractors?
DR. WARNER: In the United States clearly the key to accountability and
control is openness. There needs to be in a democratic system a strong
degree of openness, particularly in all the business that is carried
out by the government.
In the defense area as well there certainly needs to be an access to
appropriate information by legislators and by the general public. And
so in our case this is done by having a vigorous and critical and
inquisitive free press and free media -- radio, television and the
like -- that keep a strong eye on potential malfeasance if you will,
potential illegal activity.
As far as the Congress is concerned, our Congress has various rights
of investigation, and keeps a very close eye on these types of
activities. So I think a combination of a free and inquisitive and
critical media and a political system that allows both the federal and
state government to have visibility or transparency into key
transactions is the key to fighting what might be inappropriate and
illegal behavior within defense industrial-related firms.
Q: A second question from Sverdrovinsk (ph). Russian experts, they are
assessing the capability or capacity of the markets in the 21st
century. Russian experts, they are saying that as far as military
aircraft it will 50 percent, vessels 14, 15 percent. As for those two
points, I have a question: Mr. Warner, what portion of Russia would
you see in this sector for the United States and Russia as far as
dealing in arms? Thank you.
DR. WARNER: Well, that's an issue to be settled by the market. There
are countries that are forever out on the international market.
Defense cooperation of the globalization of defense industries and
defense cooperation has certainly occurred in this last decade or so
of this century, and certainly will continue as we move into the next
millennium.
We in the United States -- the one thing the government of the United
States talks with the government of Russia about is the potential
granting of military assistance to countries that are particularly
troublesome in their behavior on the international scene. There are
sometimes international sanctions in place, as they are vis-a-vis Iraq
today, or there is a general idea that it is worthwhile not to assist
rogue states, particularly where there might be specific allegations
about missile technology or technologies associated with chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons. In those areas there is actual
political agreement among many states not to provide assistance. And
then if Russia has joined this group of states it has the obligation
to enforce to its own business entities that they not engage in this
kind of cooperation.
But in other areas throughout much of the rest of the world there is
an open competitive market in armaments that there is in most any
other commodity. In that area there is no granting of quotas among
states. We in the West compete with each other -- American firms
compete with French and British and other firms, and they are
perfectly prepared to compete in a traditional business sense with
those of Russia. And in this sense then it is the buyer who decides
what he can afford and which systems he prefers. I assume there will
be a continuing substantial marketing everything from aircraft to
vessels to small arms and the like, and that will generally be played
out in a classical competitive market condition with the exception of
the fencing off of providing assistance to particular states which
threaten the peace and security of the world community.
MR. BERTEL: You're watching "Washington Window," and we are going to
return now to TV Volga for another question.
Q: Dr. Warner, before the war in the Balkans the United States of
America used to allocate funding for Russia to eliminate their nuclear
weapons. Will this practice continue afterwards?
DR. WARNER: Interestingly this effort, which is called the cooperative
threat reduction program, which was begun back in 1992, and is funded
by U.S. dollars from our defense budget, was continued at full speed
even during the conflict in Kosovo. This cooperation has grown over
the years. We have spent over $2 billion over these last seven years
or so in this effort, and the vast majority of that money has been
spent in Russia. We continue to have a program. For example, we have
before the Congress for their consideration right during this session
a program for the year 2000, whose value would be about $470 million.
We continue to pursue this effort. We have many different contracts
underway for continuing the effort in cooperation with Russian
enterprises. It is directly primarily against the nuclear legacy from
the Cold War era, but it also has dimensions relevant to chemical
weapons and the small but growing portion relevant to biological
weapons. The cooperative threat reduction program named for Senator
Nunn and Senator Lugar, who actually got the program underway in the
early 1990s, remains one of the flagships of the U.S.-Russian
cooperation in this era. We just a few weeks ago concluded an umbrella
agreement to extend our work in this area over the next seven years.
The individual funding will be granted by the U.S. Congress on a
year-by-year basis, but we have very strong support for this effort.
So we envision that we will be working cooperatively in this area for
several years to come.
MR. BERTEL:  Let's return now to TV Va Bank.
Q: Thank you, Jim. Mr. Warner, I have the following question. Three
recent local wars -- Iraq, Yugoslavia -- showed that in the foreground
you have new strategies of massive airstrikes. You have to have very
good anti-ballistic complexes. Russia does possess such a set and does
manufacture them. But, unfortunately, as far as selling them Russia
doesn't have the opportunity, because of the U.S. protesting this. How
do you see a resolution to this problem, so that Russia would also be
a good seller of weapons and arms?
DR. WARNER: Well, this goes back to the issue we have just addressed a
few minutes ago, and it's a very good follow-on. Yes, coming out of
the Cold War Russia was at the forefront of some of the development of
anti-aircraft missile systems, surface-to-air missiles, commonly
called in the defense sector as SAMs. These complexes are significant
elements of a nation's air defense system.
We have no trouble with Russia merchandizing the latest generation of
these systems, as long as they don't sell them to Iraq, because of the
sanctions that are in place from the United Nations -- the United
Nations agreed sanctions vis-a-vis Iraq. And we also certainly prefer
that they not sell them to other rogue states like North Korea.
More broadly, Russia has had an active marketing role for these
systems with many, many other states. Basically again this can
sometimes be a competition -- there may be American manufacturers that
would prefer to sell our systems of this nature. But in the end it is
up to the individual buyers in virtually all cases to make their
judgements on which systems they choose to wish to purchase.
MR. BERTEL:  Let's return to TV ASV for another question.
Q: Dr. Warner, I will have the following question: Certain Russian
military people -- General Ivashev (ph) -- (inaudible) -- known in
Europe for blunt statements -- he says that Russian-NATO talks does
not mean that Russia is ready for close cooperation with NATO in the
future. How would you comment on this statement?
DR. WARNER: Well, in my job as the main interlocuter with the Russian
military, I have shad several dealings with General Ivashev (ph). I
have found him to be an effective and articulate spokesman for a
particular point of view, one that in some cases I certainly don't
agree with. His strong opposition to NATO's activities for instance I
think go beyond what is needed for Russia's national interests.
Nevertheless, NATO-Russian relations most certainly did suffer some
significant setbacks during the conflict over Kosovo. It is agreed
that there is beginning the process of cooperation again -- witness
the participation of Russian forces in the NATO-led Kosovo
peacekeeping force.
There will be much that needs to be done in order to reenergize the
area of fruitful cooperation of a political and military or defense
nature between NATO and Russia. Russia is a member of the Partnership
for Peace, as are many, many nations of Europe and Eurasia. Russia had
begun to play a more active role in cooperation with the Partnership
for Peace. This again was all put on hold during the Kosovo conflict.
It is certainly my desire just as we reenergize our bilateral defense
relationship between Moscow and Washington that we also reenergize the
cooperation between NATO and Russia.
MR. BERTEL: We're going to return now to TV Volga for our next
question or comment.
Q: Dr. Warner, how do you assess this blunt march, rapid race of the
Russians into Kosovo? As a violation of a certain arrangement as was
written by the Times, or as a wise step to solidify our position in
the world arena?
DR. WARNER: I think the Russian rapid move into Pristina turned out to
be an effective move in order to underscore Russia's desire to be
included as a significant participant in the Kosovo peacekeeping
force. In the subsequent discussions and negotiations at Helsinki we
were able to develop a very specific set of arrangements that I think
will allow such constructive participation.
Clearly it was a bold move and one that perhaps had some risks that
might have been associated with it. I would prefer, like most, not to
dwell on whatever were the circumstances of that move but to move on
to this cooperation that we have now set the stage for.
I believe that Russia was certain to play a role in the peacekeeping
force under any circumstance. In other words, the very key role that
former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had played with the Finnish
President Mr. Ahtisaari in helping broker what would be the most
significant, the end to the war in the first place, and very clearly
underscored Russia's prominence as a key participant in security
activities, security matters in Europe. Russia had every right to
expect that it would be a participant in the peacekeeping force. The
sprint to Pristina perhaps underscored that. But even in the
introduction it seemed to say that this was the single thing that made
it possible. I think that's wrong. I think that there have been
continuous discussions between American and Russian senior military
personnel while the conflict was raging about the possible nature of
Russian participation in a peacekeeping force when and if the conflict
came to an end. The conflict came to an end, we very rapidly finalized
those arrangements. This sprint to Pristina gave it a particular
drama, but I believe that we were in fact going to move in this
particular direction in any case.
MR. BERTEL: We have just a few minutes remaining. Let's go back to TV
Va Bank for a short question and a brief response.
Q: Mr. Warner, still how do you see future strategic cooperation
between Russia and the United States in the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction area?
DR. WARNER: I believe that it will continue, and I hope it will even
be further enriched. We share the common interest in preventing to the
maximum extent possible the proliferation of chemical, biological and
nuclear capabilities and the modern missiles to deliver them. We have
cooperated in the past and there is much still left to be done. It
will be one of the most active arenas of our discussions and hopefully
of our concrete cooperation.
MR. BERTEL: And we'll have to make that the final word. We have just
simply run out of time. I'd like to thank Edward Warner, assistant
secretary of Defense for strategy and threat reduction, for being with
us today, as well as all the broadcasters across Russia who took part.
If you would like more information on military cooperation between the
United States and Russia on the Web, visit the Department of Defense
at www.defenselink.mil, or Worldnet Television at
www.ibb.gov/worldnet. In Washington, I'm Jim Bertel For "Washington
Window."
(end transcript)