12 May 1999
TEXT: SESTANOVICH TESTIMONY MAY 12 ON U.S., RUSSIAN RELATIONS
(Before House International Relations Committee) (2380) Washington -- Ongoing instability in Russia and the conflict in Kosovo must not undermine the post-Cold War pattern of cooperation between Russia and the United States, a senior State Department official said May 12 in testimony before the House International Relations Committee. "At a time like this, we have to keep our eyes on fundamentals -- on the core interests, and practical results, that we want to advance in our dealings with Russia," said Stephen Sestanovich, ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the secretary of state for the New Independent States. Sestanovich outlined four security challenges for the United States in its relationship with Russia: Russian and American nuclear arsenals and stockpiles; the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the Kosovo conflict; and the strengthening of institutions of European security. Despite the Russian parliament's lack of progress on START II ratification, consultations are underway on the shape of a possible START III agreement, he said. The United States and Russia continue to work together on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Sestanovich asked Congress to support the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), which will further bolster U.S. ability to block proliferation threats from Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia. With regards to the Kosovo crisis, Sestanovich said the main point of contention between Russia and the United States is the nature of the military force that would enforce a settlement. More detailed discussions are needed on this, he said, and on the need for a withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. "We welcome Russia's movement toward the growing international consensus on this conflict, just as we welcome the prospect of Russian participation in a peacekeeping force," he said. As for the apparent rise of anti-Americanism in Russia, Sestanovich said it is being used as a tool for attacking Western-style institutions and is not representative of general Russian sentiment. "Russian public opinion suggests that support for democracy remains strong," he said. "As long as it does, support for cooperation with the West, for integration rather than isolation, is likely to remain strong as well." Following is the official text of Sestanovich's prepared statement: (begin text) "THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY" Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States House International Relations Committee Washington, DC May 12, 1999 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss Russian foreign policy and Russian-American relations. Even before the Kosovo conflict revealed deep disagreement between Russia and the United States on a defining international problem, members of this committee had raised questions about the premises of our approach toward Russia. You have asked where Russian foreign policy -- for that matter, Russia itself -- is headed. Today's headlines about President Yeltsin's dismissal of Prime Minister Primakov give rise to further questions. These are large and urgent issues on which we need a frank and open dialogue between the Administration and the Congress. Such a dialogue should start with a recognition of how thoroughly our relations with Russia have been transformed in the 1990s. The first post-Cold War decade, which is now almost behind us, has been marked by a pattern of cooperation between Russia and the United States that was unimaginable before the collapse of Soviet Communism. The diplomatic landmarks of this period -- the 1994 trilateral agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States; the withdrawal, also in 1994, of the Red Army from Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states; and the conclusion in 1997 of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia -- these were all attended by the closest possible communication between Moscow and Washington. As important as they were, such achievements do not obscure the fact that there are many in Russia who reject partnership with the West. They have rarely been so vocal as during the current Kosovo conflict. Some seem motivated by frustration at Russia's weakness. Others display unconcealed ideological hostility toward the United States and democratic capitalism. Still other opponents of cooperation with the United States seem guided by narrow economic or bureaucratic interests. They may hope bad relations with us will be good for their budget; at a time of economic crisis, they may also think that providing high technology to rogue states is too lucrative to resist. Finally, some opposition politicians find foreign policy issues a useful rhetorical club with which to beat the government. As Russia heads toward parliamentary elections this year and presidential elections in 2000, we should expect to hear more of this rhetoric. This mix of motives and perspectives, as well as weak lines of institutional authority and control, can make it difficult to say what "Russian foreign policy" really is. Is it the offensive press spokesman of the Defense Ministry who compares NATO to Nazis? Or is it the decision to keep the number of Russian warships off the coast of Yugoslavia to a minimum? At a time like this, we have to keep our eye on fundamentals -- on the core interests, and practical results, that we want to advance in our dealings with Russia. Last year in Chicago, Secretary Albright stated that "our most important priority in dealing with Russia is to protect the safety of the American people." In this spirit (and recognizing how many aspects of our relations I am leaving aside, from economic issues to support for independent media), I propose today to touch on four security challenges we face and give you an assessment of the progress we are making in addressing these challenges with Russia. The first of these challenges involves Russian and American nuclear arsenals and stockpiles; second, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; third, the Kosovo conflict; finally, the strengthening of the institutions of European security. Let me start with nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War made possible Russian-American agreement on deeper cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals than ever before. And both governments are committed to negotiating further cuts that would bring forces down by as much as 80 percent from Cold War highs. Unfortunately the START II Treaty has become a political football in the Russian parliament. Although serious Russian political figures, notably including the senior leadership of the Russian military, agree that this treaty is as much in Russia's interest as in ours, it remains unratified -- almost six and a half years after it was signed. Despite the lack of progress on START II ratification, we are active on a number of fronts to bring our nuclear arsenals into line with post-Cold War realities. To be ready for the day when the Duma is at last ready to act (the government did make an impressive push for ratification this winter), we have had expert consultations on the shape of a possible START III agreement. Russian and U.S. officials have also met to implement the agreement reached last year by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on sharing early warning information, to reduce the risk of misinterpreting missile launch warning data. We have begun a serious dialogue on the arms control implications of President Clinton's directive to explore limited national missile defense. Finally, Russia and the United States continue to work together on an effort that does as much as any other to increase our safety -- the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, originated by Senators Nunn and Lugar and supported since then by every Congress. Three quarters of our assistance dollars in Russia go to reduce the danger that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction will fall into the wrong hands. The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), if approved by this Congress, will further strengthen our ability to block proliferation threats emanating from Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. I strongly urge you to support this program, and to fully fund the Administration's $1.032 billion NIS assistance request. Mr. Chairman, Russian-American cooperation on proliferation problems has a strong basis in common interest. Any responsible government in Russia understands that Russia itself will be threatened by the uncontrolled flow of technology to Iran and other countries. In the past several years, there has been no problem on which we have worked harder with the Russian government than we have on this one. In the last two months we have taken some important steps forward. U.S. Special Ambassador Gallucci and Russian Space Agency head Yuri Koptev have developed a work plan to address some of our most pressing concerns about missile proliferation, including rapid establishment of internal compliance offices at high-tech Russian missile enterprises. We have concluded a similar plan to enhance export controls on nuclear technologies. The Russian government has made a commitment to take effective measures to prohibit Iranian missile specialists from operating in Russia and to facilitate the early adoption of a new Russian export control law. U.S. and Russian experts met in late April to begin implementation of these plans; we will continue to make this issue a high priority until we solve it. Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the question of Russian-American cooperation on the Kosovo problem. Until the opening of NATO's air campaign, our approaches to this matter have been broadly similar, including joint support of resolution 1199 in the UN Security Council last fall. But despite these joint efforts, Russian leaders had made clear they would not support the use of force, and when NATO military action began in March it produced an outburst of Russian anger and hyperbole at all levels and across the political spectrum. Since this initial rhetorical spasm, however, the Russian government has adopted a posture different from communist and nationalist spokesmen in two important ways. First, led by President Yeltsin's own strong statements on the subject, the government has expressed its determination to stay out of the conflict, providing neither military equipment nor military intelligence. We have no information contradicting these statements. Second, the Russian government has sought to identify a series of principles that could be the basis for a political settlement of the conflict. In Oslo last month, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov reached agreement on all but one of these principles; they could not agree on the need for an international peacekeeping force. Last week in Bonn the G-8 foreign ministers took the next step and agreed on a full set of principles, including deployment of a strong and effective international security presence. Before we can speak of full agreement, of course, the NATO allies and Russia will need to conduct more detailed discussions, especially on the need for a full withdrawal of Serb forces and on the nature of the military force which would enforce a settlement. NATO allies are united in insistence that NATO form the core of the force, and it is clear that the refugees would return only under the protection of such a force. Today a U.S. team led by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott is in Moscow for further consultations with Foreign Minister Ivanov and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who serves as President Yeltsin's special representative. We welcome Russia's movement toward joining the growing international consensus on this conflict, just as we welcome the prospect of Russian participation in a peacekeeping force. Mr. Chairman, our interest in working with Russia to resolve the Kosovo crisis is but one example of an ambitious effort to deal cooperatively with problems of European security. Russia has been, and should remain, a vital partner in this effort. Consider the breakthrough agreement reached at the end of March I on adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This hard-won result -- which involved meeting a timetable that many thought unrealistic -- was possible because the 30 nations around the negotiating table focused on what they could gain by agreeing rather than on the myriad obstacles in their way. (They wrapped up their work, let me add, in a very difficult atmosphere -- during the first week of NATO's air campaign in Yugoslavia.) Russia's role was especially noteworthy. It had by far the most complex negotiating job of any CFE party, yet hammered out workable understandings in case after case. The new agreement now provides an impetus for Russia to withdraw its troops and munitions from Moldova and to begin drawing down its forces in Georgia. If Russia will take steps to fulfill commitments it has made, the United States and others stand ready to help it deal with some of the practical problems that are involved. Russian-American cooperation extends to other areas. Our diplomats serve as co-chairs (with France) of the so-called Minsk Group initiative to find a political solution to the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict. Our soldiers serve side by side as peacekeepers in Bosnia, an arrangement that both sides are looking at as they consider how they might work together in Kosovo. If we are honest, we have to admit that the Kosovo crisis has put new strains on Russian-American cooperation. Russia's cooperation with NATO seems likely to be on hold for the duration of the crisis but the framework for this cooperation -- the NATO-Russia Founding Act -- remains intact. So do the interests that led to its creation in the first place. On this basis, we should expect both sides to be making active use of this framework once the Kosovo crisis is behind us. Mr. Chairman, I am sometimes asked by Russian journalists whether the U.S. government is bothered by the apparent rise of anti-Americanism in Russia. My answer, of course, is yes: if it took hold, anti-Americanism would limit the ability of the Russian government to pursue our common interests. But let me give you the second half of my answer as well. To my mind, anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions, and above all democracy itself. Looked at from this angle, the problem actually seems a little less hopeless. For everything we know about Russian public opinion suggests that support for democracy remains strong. As long as it does, support for cooperation with the West, for integration rather than isolation, is likely to remain strong as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. (end text)
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