01 April 1999
TEXT: AMB. VERSHBOW SPEECH ON U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
(3/25: Crisis over Kosovo "acute," but we must look ahead) (3600) Wilton Park, England -- The United States is committed to achieving an effective partnership with Russia, and disagreement over policy in the Balkans should not cloud that vision of partnership, said Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. In a speech at a Wilton Park Conference on "Russia and the New Europe" March 25, Vershbow acknowledged that current tensions are acute but stressed that a long-term perspective is needed in assessing U.S.-Russian relations. "We must look beyond the present crisis," he said. "Our commitment must be steady, our energy never faltering, and our assessments not colored by the policies or disputes of the moment if we are to truly build the better personal and institutional ties on which the lasting peace of the Euro-Atlantic region depends." The ambassador reflected that 50 years ago, President Franklin Roosevelt and presidential adviser Averill Harriman often discussed how the United States, Russia, and the nations of Europe might share common values and work together to promote freedom, democracy, security, and free markets. "Clearly," Vershbow said, "as the Russian response to NATO action on Kosovo shows, we're not quite there yet. But we can still be optimistic that we will be able to make our goal a reality." He stressed that "while Kosovo underscores that there will continue to be NATO-Russia disagreements, we do not see a return to the days of NATO-Russia, or perhaps better put -- NATO-Soviet confrontation." Vershbow went on to list current areas of cooperation -- especially the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) -- which he described as one of the most important fora for discussing security issues, and which he hopes will continue to be used during the current crisis. "We need this kind of forum in bad weather even more than when the sun is shining. We want to use the PJC to keep the Russians informed of NATO actions and efforts to end the conflict in Kosovo, and deal with its potential ramifications for the security of the entire region." Vershbow noted that the Russian government had suspended -- but did not terminate -- its military cooperation with the Alliance due to the Kosovo crisis. "The difference may be nuanced," he said, "but it is nonetheless key. Russia is expressing its disapproval, but it is also showing its recognition of NATO as a key security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area." He added that the United States firmly believes it is in Russia's long-term interests to continue to work with NATO. Looking to the future, Vershbow said the United States hopes to be a partner with a peaceful and engaged Russia, "a Russia that pursues its interests while respecting the security interests of its neighbors, a Russia that accepts and acts upon its responsibility for resolving problems, and a Russia that works constructively through the overlapping frameworks of institutions to which it belongs -- the U.N., the OSCE, the PJC and the EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council]. This kind of Russia will be of benefit to us all." Wilton Park, located outside of London, is an autonomous Executive Agency of the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Following is a text of his remarks: (Begin text) U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS: WHAT IMPACT ON EUROPEAN POLICY? Ambassador Alexander Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council Wilton Park Conference on "Russia and the New Europe" March 25, 1999 Thank you. I'm honored to have been asked to give this final presentation. It is a great advantage to be able to draw from the insightfulness of those who have preceded me. The topic I have been asked to address -- U.S.-Russian relations and their impact on Europe -- is always timely, but in light of the events of the past few days, it is especially intriguing. I will try to address some of the likely impact of the Kosovo crisis, to the extent that can be foreseen now. But I do not want to make that the focus of my speech. The present crisis is acute, but I think one needs to take a longer perspective. In that sense, I want to look at the future potential of U.S.-Russian relations. In assessing the relationship, one of the key points to remember, in my view, is that its history, despite the Cold War and the ideological divide that has sometimes separated us, has also been punctuated by periods of hope. W. Averill Harriman wrote -- in "America and Russia in a Changing World" (1971) -- that during World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union were allies working together to defeat the menace of fascism that threatened to destroy all of Europe, he said President Roosevelt frequently discussed their belief that the United States and Russia would some day share a set of common values that would guide the two countries in pursuing close post-war cooperation. We all know that things took another turn. But now, after eight years of working with a democratic Russia, I think that we are back to the same point that Roosevelt and Harriman pondered over 50 years ago. It is now possible that we can achieve that lost vision, that dream of a day when the United States, Russia, and all of Europe, would share a set of common values -- when they would work together to strengthen and promote freedom, democracy, free markets, and the rule of law, in a secure and stable Europe. Clearly, as the Russian response to NATO action on Kosovo shows, we're not quite there yet. But we can still be optimistic that we will be able to make our goal a reality. With this background, let me discuss a bit more the ways we have been working together with Russia -- both bilaterally and through NATO -- to move us closer to achieving our vision for a new kind of Russia in a new Europe. As for our bilateral relations with Russia, the United States continues to maintain a unique and wide-ranging relationship with Russia. This is based not so much on the direct impact Russia has on the United States, but rather our shared history and our belief that a democratic, stable and secure Russia is essential to the establishment of a democratic, stable, secure and undivided Europe. In terms of economic interaction, U.S.-Russian trade is minimal. U.S. trade with Russia as a percentage of U.S. global trade is a mere 0.5 percent. In contrast, our trade with Singapore constitutes 3 percent of the U.S. global total. This is not to trivialize the importance we attach to Russia making the right choices on economic reform. These decisions are crucial, and it is up to Russia to make the tough choices. As a number of senior U.S. officials have said, if the government of Russia takes the issues of economic reform seriously, and their numbers add up, we will be there to help. If their numbers don't add up, our help won't matter. On security issues, of course, Russia does have a more direct impact. Perhaps the most significant area in which our interests have intersected is on the question of reducing the numbers of strategic nuclear arms our countries had aimed at each other during the Cold War. The United States and Russia have agreed to reduce nuclear arsenals, and the U.S. has provided assistance to Russia to help it maintain secure control of its nuclear forces and to achieve treaty-based reductions. We continue to urge Duma ratification of the START II Treaty and are prepared to embark on START III as soon as this is completed. We continue to urge Russia -- and provide assistance where possible -- to forego transfers of missile, nuclear, and other technology related to weapons of mass destruction. We have implemented programs to engage the large community of Russian scientists who can contribute to peace, but without other options might be tempted to sell their skills to rogue states. We are also striving to work together with Russia whenever possible in dealing with regional security matters -- even when we do not see eye to eye. Our efforts on Iraq, for example, represent a mixture of honest and direct consultations that have sometimes had positive results, coupled with our need to take firm action when other measures have proven ineffective. Our bilateral efforts, however, are matched by an increasing number of efforts conducted jointly with our European Allies in the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. These are particularly important and relevant in light of NATO action to bring about an end to Serb repression in Kosovo. Before getting too deeply into NATO-Russia cooperation, however, I should state one thing clearly. While Kosovo underscores that there will continue to be NATO-Russia disagreements, we do not see a return to the days of NATO-Russia, or perhaps better put -- NATO-Soviet confrontation. In NATO's revised Strategic Concept, which will be completed in time for the Washington Summit, the only reference to Russia will be one relating to our cooperation under the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The revised Strategic Concept will state that NATO will continue to carry out the vital tasks of collective defense and maintenance of capabilities for responding to crises, as we are doing in the Balkans. But these tasks are in relation to a myriad of new risks and challenges, not a single, massive military threat from the East. Indeed, one of NATO's most important tasks in the new century will be to extend security and stability across Europe through partnership and cooperation -- through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and other instruments. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is one of the most important of these instruments for building an integrated European security system. It is also becoming one of our most important fora for carrying out a meaningful security dialogue with Russia. Without giving Russia a veto over NATO action, the Alliance is committed to working with Russia as much as possible in specific areas of mutual interest -- peacekeeping operations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, science and the environment, and even the Y2K problem. Even on the difficult and contentious issue of Kosovo, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has proven itself to be a valuable forum for consultation. Last October, Allies and Russia were able to exchange views candidly, and this genuinely helped to manage differences and to focus attention on our common goal of reaching a peaceful settlement. NATO is ready to continue to use the PJC during the current crisis in Kosovo, and we hope the Russians will continue to do so, too. We need this kind of forum in bad weather even more than when the sun is shining. We want to use the PJC to keep the Russians informed of NATO actions and efforts to end the conflict in Kosovo and deal with its potential ramifications for the security of the entire region. Though the press has focused on Russian leaders' statements, NATO and Russia -- and the United States and Russia -- continue to remain in contact on the political level. And even though Russia's public reaction to NATO military action against the FRY has been negative, we note that this has included the suspension -- but not termination -- of military cooperation with the Alliance. The difference may be nuanced, but it is nonetheless key. Russia is expressing its disapproval, but it is also showing its recognition of NATO as a key security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. Now, of course, Russia does not share what it pejoratively describes as our "NATO-centric" approach to European security. The Russians would certainly prefer to see the OSCE emerge as the primus inter pares of European security institutions, with NATO subordinated to it. But they understand that cooperation with an evolving NATO is an important way to advance Russian interests. Although it is still early in the process, I believe that Russia's cooperation in the PJC is indicative of an emerging Russian view of its own role in Europe. In a now famous speech delivered to Russian diplomats at MGIMO in May, 1998, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, (then) Foreign Minister Primakov said that Russia in 1998 -- just as in 1856 when Gorchakov accepted his appointment in the wake of Russia's humiliating defeat in the Crimean War -- is surrounded by other states pursuing their Realpolitik interests. Russia must not adopt the tactics of the past, that is, of playing one power off against another, according to Primakov. Neither should it: -- ally itself with only one grouping of states, or -- continually move from alliance to alliance in order to maximize its position, or -- try to adapt the entire world to Russia's own interests. Primakov concluded that Russia must pursue good relations with those countries that are strong at present as well as those whose power relative to others is growing. Primakov determined -- rightly, in my view -- that just because Russia does not agree with the West on every issue, it does not mean that the two are on the path to confrontation. For our part, we see an historic opportunity to build constructive exchanges and a more cooperative policy by finding issues on which we can incorporate Russian thinking and take into account our common interests, rather than being deterred by certain differences. I see Russia's response to Allied action over Kosovo -- not cutting all ties with NATO -- as a reflection of this pragmatic course that Primakov has charted, as well as the domestic political pressures that are guided by an old-style view of NATO. Where do we go from here? This might be an ambitious question to ask on this day. Kosovo is surely a bump in the road, but we must be prepared for bumps. Old attitudes die slowly, and Russia is still not free from the historical baggage of its communist past, nor will it be for some time to come. Nonetheless, we intend to maintain our commitment to build a new relationship, address the serious concerns the Russians have, and genuinely work together on the full range of issues. I think that in the future, we should be able to think more ambitiously about how we can work more closely with Russia and give it a stake in contributing to the efforts of the international community in addressing new security challenges. Let me describe what some areas of cooperation might be: 1. Cooperation in managing and responding to crisis situations. One avenue for further cooperation would be a joint peacekeeping mechanism that could serve to institutionalize, without limiting either side's freedom of action, the positive aspects of the current operation in Bosnia. We should bring our militaries closer together to enhance Russia's capacity to participate in combined and joint peacekeeping operations. Putting together units from NATO and partner countries (particularly including Russia) would increase their understanding and appreciation of each other's operational procedures and capabilities. This would give real substance to our goal of turning former adversaries into real partners for the 21st century. 2. Cooperating more closely on controlling the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as on theater missile defense and regional air space management issues. This is an area where the Russians face the same threats as Allied countries and seek genuine cooperation with NATO. Creating a "unified European airspace" may be a bit premature. But, if we begin by engaging Russia on a conceptual level on prospects for a joint program on air or missile defense, we may be able to help propel the Alliance and Russia to develop a common approach -- perhaps leading some day to a joint program involving shared early warning systems, joint operations and joint training against ballistic missile threats. This could make a direct contribution to the security of Russia and NATO countries, and symbolize the shift from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship. The key here would be to take the first steps on airspace management to get some concrete programs up and running. These could serve as a prologue for more ambitious activities down the road. 3. Coordinating approaches and consulting on security threats on Europe's periphery, including from terrorism. As I have mentioned, the PJC has already proven to be an effective forum for consultations -- sometimes involving agreement, sometimes not, as demonstrated by Bosnia and Kosovo. There is tremendous scope for building on this experience in dealing with other crises and even "asymmetric" threats from terrorists and other non-state actors that confront Allied and Russian security in equal measure. 4. Using military resources to support emergency or humanitarian operations; and civil emergency planning. As long as Russia has suspended its participation in PFP, there is small likelihood of progress in this area. Nonetheless, previously, the Russian Civil Emergency/Defense Agency (EMERCOM) had expressed support for the idea of hosting PFP programs at a civil emergency training center outside Moscow. We should explore it and encourage our allies to do the same at the appropriate time. Russia faces many choices, with implications for Europe and the United States. While it might not be the easiest decision to take at the present moment, we firmly believe that for the long-term interests of Russia, one of the best paths it can choose is to work with NATO. The United States has long held, and Russia now accepts, that there is a range of security questions that can only be addressed through broad, international cooperation. Conflict in the Balkans is no less of a threat to Russia than to us, nor is the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We can draw from the past some of the lessons we need to deal with the challenges of the future. The Soviet regime defined itself in large part by its hostility to the United States and NATO. Today, Russia shares with us the goal of building a Europe that is undivided, free and at peace. But we need more diplomatic creativity and flexibility and the political courage to use the institutions that have been created. This, if I can be frank, is one of the problems with the Russian approach to Kosovo. While we appreciated the dialogue with Russia in the PJC and welcomed the cooperative work we could accomplish in the Contact Group, in the end Russia remained critical of the Allied stance. Russia objected to backing diplomacy with force, yet could offer no constructive alternative to halt the brutal repression and prevent a wider war. As a consequence, the U.N. Security Council was unable to exercise its responsibility fully. I hope Russian thinking will evolve to the point where it can join other democratic countries of Europe in an action based on humanitarian aims and purposes. What we hope for is a democratic, market-oriented Russia that is at peace with its neighbors and engaged on the international stage in a way that advances prosperity, stability and security; a Russia that pursues its interests while respecting the security interests of its neighbors; a Russia that accepts and acts upon its responsibility for resolving problems; and a Russia that works constructively through the overlapping frameworks of institutions to which it belongs -- the U.N., the OSCE, the PJC and the EAPC. This kind of Russia will be of benefit to us all. In the many things we have done and will continue to do with the Russians, we seek to promote the idea of pragmatism on their part. Being as "realistic" as ever, we feel we need to keep the Russians' feet on the ground and to encourage them to focus on those things which they have a reasonable chance of achieving. George Kennan wrote -- in "At A Century's Ending: Reflection's 1982-1995" -- "that Russia will ever achieve 'democracy'...similar to our own is not to be expected.... This is not an entirely bad thing. Our own models, as most of us would agree, are not all that perfect. And there will continue to be ups and downs in our relationship with Russia, as there are today. But nothing now evident, and nothing in the realm of probability, justifies a view of that country that equates it with the worst examples of imperialistic despotism of earlier years of this century. It is going to take time for the new Russia to come to terms with itself. But let us, in the meantime, not confuse ourselves and not let us unnecessarily complicate our problem, by creating a Russia of our own imagination to take the place of the one that did, alas, once exist, but fortunately is no more." While I disagree with Kennan on many things (including on the issue of NATO enlargement), his words in this case should guide us, both now and in the future. We must look beyond the present crisis. Our commitment must be steady, our energy never faltering, and our assessments not colored by the policies or disputes of the moment if we are to truly build the better personal and institutional ties on which the lasting peace of the Euro-Atlantic region depends. We need to continue pragmatically to deepen and broaden our relations with Russia in ways that will lay the groundwork for achieving our full vision of what partnership entails. (End text)
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