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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: New subject: from The Washington Post about the Russian missile defenses. How do you answer critics who say the Administration is moving too slowly on helping Russia compensate for its inadequacy in its early warning system?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the capabilities of specific Russian systems, it would be difficult to discuss because of classification. Nevertheless, it's fair to say that we are concerned about the potential deterioration of Russia's ballistic missile attack warning capabilities, without referencing any specific systems.

But let's bear in mind, Russian political and military leaders have repeatedly stated that there is greatly reduced likelihood of a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack, which makes clear they are less concerned about the possibility of a surprise attack, which is where these dangers become most acute.

Therefore, we believe the idea that there are increased risks of a serious miscalculation overstates the current Russian launch posture, which is based on their assessment of whether there is a real chance of a nuclear or conventional attack.

We do recognize, however, the need to minimize even further the consequences of false missile attack warnings. Just last September, the two presidents agreed to begin discussions on the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning. We have pushed aggressively to follow up on this agreement with detailed negotiating sessions occurring in Moscow at the senior levels, and we have presented the Russian side and their experts with a clear and far-reaching vision of where this initiative might lead. We are pushing this very aggressively.

QUESTION: What about the critics who say that the US is not?

MR. RUBIN: Pushing it aggressively? They're wrong.

QUESTION: How much in danger should Americans feel that they are as a result of this lack in ...?

MR. RUBIN: Well, what I'm trying to say is that there are two issues. One is the general posture between the United States and Russia; and two is the possibility of false missile warning data.

The general posture of the United States and Russia has been drastically reduced, as a result of the end of the Cold War and the onset of deep strategic arms cuts. The Russians themselves have said that they do not believe there is a great likelihood - or there is a greatly reduced likelihood of a nuclear or large-scale conventional war. So their whole alert posture has been affected by that. That doesn't mean we can't improve this situation even further, by trying to minimize the chances of false missile warning data, or the consequences of a particular false warning. That is what the two presidents agreed to do.

I don't think Americans should sleep - they should sleep a lot more soundly today than they did at the height of the Cold War, when both sides were on a hair trigger posture. The general improvement in US-Soviet relations -- and now US-Russian relations -- and the reduction in alert postures has made, in our view, this risk from the Russian side reduced. But we are working to reduce it even further. But you can never do too much to reduce the risk of a miscalculation or an accident, when it comes to nuclear forces.

QUESTION: What about the allegation here in the article by Mr. Hoffman that Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov was, in September of 1983, in a position where he received a warning that went, let's say, it endangers a launch - came close to a launch, at least in his opinion; he had to make a gut decision? What about that particular incident? There was another incident about a rocket being launched in Scandinavia that the Russians in the 1990s - '92,'93 - thought was another possible attack against them? Did those things really happen; does the United States accept that?

MR. RUBIN: Let me simply say that I read this very interesting article, and it was pointed out deep inside the article - for those of us who read the whole thing - that the particular officer was neither punished nor promoted, that there was a look into what it is that he did. There was no conclusion to the investigation.

With respect to specific incidents and specific failures of specific Russian missile warning capabilities, I have no comment.

QUESTION: You seem to be suggesting that while the Clinton Administration is pushing very hard for this - to implement this agreement that the presidents agreed to in September, the Russians don't be seem to be willing, for whatever reason - don't seem to be as eager as you guys are to move ahead with it.

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. What I would agree with is that we're pushing hard, and we need to have more discussion and response from the Russians, in order to be able to move this forward. But I don't think it necessarily is a reflection of eagerness or not. So I would welcome you putting the question to them.

QUESTION: Is there on-going technological assistance to Iran? Is that wrapped up in this question in anyway?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Sharing of that sort of technology doesn't --

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: In light of this, is there any concern here that talk of renegotiating ABM and a national missile defense might increase tension with the Russians?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think that as we and the Russians talk more and more about sharing and improving each other's early warning capabilities, some of the nascent fears that might exist with respect to limited national missile defenses will go away. Because remember, the logic is that the Russians may - some experts have suggested that the Russians would be concerned about allowing a limited national missile defense, because of a fear that, with a limited national missile defense, their early warning capability being limited, and lower numbers, that this might all add up to losing their deterrent. But the more that we can convince them that we can assist them in ensuring their early warning capabilities and improving them, then the less this - what we believe an unjustified fear -- may take hold.

So to the extent that we can improve our discussions with them about early warning, there would be less and less concern, we would think, about discussing potential adjustments in the ABM treaty, if it comes to that.

(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)

[end of document]