At First Hand": "Topol-M Is the Optimum Weapon for Russia: That Is the Belief of Deputy General Designer of Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering Lev Solomonov
Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye 6-12 Feb 98 No 5, p 6
Interview with Deputy General Designer of Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering Lev Semenovich Solomonov, by Sergey Sokut
The Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT) State Enterprise was formed in 1946. It specialized in creating missile equipment for the Ground Troops. MIT began developing mobile missile complexes (RK) with solid-propellant missiles of intercontinental, intermediate, and shorter range under the direction of Aleksandr Nadiradze in the mid-1960"s. MIT created the Temp (SS-12), Temp-2S (SS-16), Pioner (SS-20) and Topol (SS-25) missile complexes, which are without analogues in the world. In the late 1980"s the Institute developed an improved Kuryer intercontinental-range missile complex that was not placed in service for political motives. MIT presently is the sole developer of strategic land-based missile systems in Russia—it is completing work on the Topol-M missile complex with a standardized (silo and mobile) missile, which is to become the foundation of our Strategic Nuclear Forces in the 21st century. Within the scope of conversion programs, the Institute created a family of Start transportable missile-space complexes, which, in contrast to existing equipment, can launch satellites from any point on land. MIT continues work on antisubmarine missile systems for the Navy, particularly on the Medvedka complex, which has high export potential. Boris Lagutin directed the Institute in the 1990"s. MIT now is headed by General Designer Yuriy Solomonov.
[NVO] Lev Semenovich, the missile complexes developed in MIT invariably were original and did not resemble equipment for a similar purpose created in other Soviet Union design bureaus. Where do you see the roots of such differences?
[Solomonov] I would not be so categorical in assessments. We were only trying to satisfy demands of the military. They wanted the equipment to conform to missions of the future and not of the past. That probably is why our systems were not similar to anything. Equipment without analogues always originates on the basis of new demands, but this often occurs with a lag. Inasmuch as strategic and operational-tactical weapons always were in front, evidently the look of our systems had no precedents before their appearance. We had an uncommonly good collective that assembled, and a tradition took shape within it in the 1970"s, evidently thanks to the director"s initiative, that we must make not missiles, but missile systems and complexes. And for this it is necessary to define, as is the custom in modern, sophisticated equipment, the scope of what is called the big system. We drew the limits correctly, and so it turned out better for us than for our predecessors.
It cannot be said that we were stronger than Yangel"s Design Bureau in designing missiles proper. They had specialists even of a higher class than ours. They came to understand many areas of missile technology earlier than us and, as we know, they were first to begin making a strategic mobile complex, but did not cope with the task, evidently because they incorrectly outlined the limits of the system they were making. They began creating a missile absolutely dissimilar to predecessors, but did not make the necessary launcher for it. Installing a large missile on a tank turned out to be erroneous and was enough for the complex to fail. We, too, were urged to put our missile on a tank. I rode a bit on it...
This is a particular episode, but it is characteristic of those who were creating big systems, both military and civilian. If you have outlined the limits of the big system correctly you will get a positive result; if you erred, it is almost impossible to save the complex. The German V-2 was a good missile and everyone learned from it. Its creation was a step tens of years ahead. But the weapon system based on it did not work out because the Germans threw all efforts into creating the missile proper, taught it to fly after many adventures, but were unable to make an effective weapon out of it (the reasons here of course lie not just in the equipment). The missile, you know, is not yet a weapon, but a flying craft.
We were lucky with component manufacturers; they ended up in our circle (or we in theirs), and we became a single brain center. Above all this concerns the Automatic Equipment and Instrument Making Scientific Production Association (NPO AP) established by Academician Pilyugin, which creates systems no worse than American ones in terms of output characteristics.
[NVO] But the fact is that Pilyugin began with Korolev in the 1940"s, while MIT took up big missiles later, when everything already had been divided up among the firms.
[Solomonov] We began working on big missiles after Sergey Pavlovich Korolev gave his blessing for this to our chief [designer], and so we have common roots. Aleksandr Davidovich Nadiradze told me how he became the chief designer of relatively large solid-propellant missiles after a conversation with Korolev. The latter approved the idea of creating mobile complexes from the very beginning and supported it both in the government and among the military. The latter for the most part were against it at that time—it was a mightily troublesome job. Therefore we had few friends when we worked.
Mobile Missile Complexes: From Temp to Topol-M
[NVO] To whom does the idea belong of creating the Temp-2S and Pioner complexes? Who can be considered the author (or authors) of the basic design solutions worked out on these complexes and retained in equipment being developed today?
[Solomonov] I believe that two persons among the leaders were those who pushed this idea and gave it life. The fact is that many good ideas have been wasted and will be wasted yet because political leaders make the corresponding decisions. We were lucky. In his time Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov assessed very correctly the advantages of the weapon system we proposed. He believed that this weapon system was very close to optimum for Russia. It contained no claims to world domination. This system was a guarantee "just in case" and did not provoke the enemy to a race. Life confirmed the correctness of these decisions, so if we are speaking about authors, it was Ustinov among the political leaders and it was Korolev among those who gave our research area their blessing; well, and the technical ideas were implemented by the collective under Nadiradze"s direction.
But it is difficult to find the author of decisions in major equipment. Almost everything is the result of collective creative power. It practically never happens where one person was able to invent something big. Everything originates from the fact that he has been placed in a collective where there are debaters, where a struggle of ideas and opinions goes on and where there are people who object and who develop some kind of alternatives.
It is impossible to invent a missile complex in isolation. It is tens of thousands of ideas large and small. It is collective creative power, in which it is very difficult to single out someone. The most genuine authors in the newspaper meaning of this word are those who made the correct decisions in managing a major project. Chief designers are respected not for the fact that they are the most qualified specialists, but because they can organize the potential of their work colleagues and force it to serve the overall goal. They probably should be regarded as the authors, but this is in the newspaper meaning of the word. But you will not find the authors that way.
Are those who try out systems on the benches for weeks really not the authors? It is they who "teach" missiles to fly and launchers to travel; it is they who remedy the mistakes of designers, production engineers and workers.
[NVO] Why did USSR political and military leaders reject Temp-2S, the world"s first mobile ICBM, so easily in the early 1970"s and exchange this complex for a temporary ban on the deployment of American cruise missiles?
[Solomonov] It appears they did not exchange Temp-2S for anything—they gave it away. Of course, I do not know the truth—this, you see, is "big politics"—but I think that the Americans carried out a successful operation. Our mobile grouping"s deployment and subsequent elimination extracted many funds from our budget. By having destroyed Temp-2S, the Americans made themselves secure in some things. This specifically was that system against which there were no effective countermethods and none were foreseen for many years ahead. Therefore they probably used all methods accessible to them for pressuring our leadership.
In the example of Temp-2S we showed ourselves what kind of equipment we can create. I believe Temp-2S was a period [etapnyy] system among the missile complexes of those years which realistically could deter the enemy. It is a pity that they eliminated a well-made weapon complex and immediately began developing another, Pioner. These funds could have been used for other purposes.
Temp-2S was placed in service practically without adverse comments. Quality was good and flight test results were excellent. I could understand it had big missiles been destroyed, but no, they chose the tiniest missile. But the fact is that this little missile was like a bone in the throat of the Americans.
Of course, all the work was not lost and came in handy in the Pioner intermediate-range complex.
[NVO] The INF Treaty was signed a little over ten years ago. Politicians and experts express contradictory opinions about it. What is your opinion of this document?
[Solomonov] I believe the Treaty was good in terms of its idea, although we had to give up four or five times more missiles. I think this is not right. By the way, in the course of the talks there was an American position—an intermediate one, it seems—which we rejected of our own free will. We would not have had to spend a pile of money as a result of its implementation and we could have retained several dozen or several hundred Pioners that by that time already had been made and deployed. It also would have been possible to make non-nuclear weapons on their basis, and they would have been on alert without hindering anyone.
The Americans outdid us in the purely arithmetical sense. Why did this happen? Our decisionmaking system failed in some respects. Experts were invited in for technical advice, but decisions were made on an emotional level. Fine, our people destroyed Pioner for the fact that it was too strong a system in every respect. The Americans had nothing to put next to it. By the way, their small Pershing still stands near our Pioner in the Washington Museum. But now why did the Oka operational-tactical system suffer?
But the idea is absolutely correct on the whole. Many weapons are not necessary. Having deployed so many Pioners, we did not act in a thrifty manner and so had to destroy too many of them later.
INF Treaty implementation is coming to a close today; nothing has remained of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles except for our post at the Magna plant and the American one in Votkinsk. It became a school for organizing monitoring and international contact, and the first real agreement on major weapon systems that actually had been created. Both START I and START II are founded on methods approaches created at that time.
[NVO] Much was being said in the late 1980"s about civilian use of equipment (including the MAZ-547 chassis) freed up in implementing terms of the INF Treaty. Did MIT take part in this work? If yes, then is it possible to sum up its results?
[Solomonov] There were many ideas embodied in metal at the Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant with our involvement. Several models were made and tested within the scope of experimental design work. The Americans, an automotive nation, saw them in action at the range near Minsk and, according to the Minsk people, assessed their quality highly. They said that they had not made such a thing and if they needed similar equipment they would purchase it from us.
But from the very beginning the vehicles were not made for civilian purposes, and so their use was restricted basically to the petroleum and natural gas industry. The oilmen purchased and operated them.
Unfortunately, this period fell during the disintegration of our Union.
The difficulty lies in the fact that this vehicle was created for the Army and designed for a certain servicing and maintenance system. But problems arose when the state, which must create an infrastructure for this, ended up being a foreign state. In short, it is by and large a failure here.
In principle nothing was lost; the vehicles went their separate ways, but it probably would have been possible to use them more effectively. As much a pity as it is, our Institute is not the owner of this equipment. It belonged to the state, to the military. We participated in new developments of the Minsk Plant. By the way, the six-axle vehicle made at MAZ for the oilmen turned out to be superb.
We continue to work together with MAZ. Our relations are excellent. The plant"s situation is not very good, but still, it is "afloat." It is interesting that the chassis now being supplied to many world countries as part of the S-300PMU and Bereg complexes were created for us at one time. Some developments which Minsk made for our research area did not reach the mass consumer, but there were interesting, unique motor vehicles there.
[NVO] On 6 October 1991 the USSR rejected development of a new small, mobile ICBM. Was this a development of your Institute? Is it possible to say something about this missile today?
[Solomonov] Everyone already knows this was our missile. The name of this complex, Kuryer, has been mentioned in one of the unofficial publications. It was in no way inferior to its American analogue, the small, mobile Midgetman missile complex. We outstripped them in certain technical points, but, as happened more than once, we lost in the political points. I do not know with what specialists our leaders consulted in making the decision to stop work, but I believe the Americans also could thank us publicly for this. We tossed much money to the wind.
[NVO] Could this complex have taken the place of Topol-M or would it have been a parallel system?
[Solomonov] We would have liked it to be. The complex turned out to be successful. It was fully prepared for flight tests, but the political leadership yielded to the United States at that time and did not permit them to be conducted. By the way, the Americans managed to test their Midgetman in flight. Nevertheless, the basic components of our complex were tested piecemeal, which the Americans evidently surmise.
This missile was revolutionary. It was being developed on a technological upsurge: new materials, fuel, a control system and new design and technological solutions had appeared at that time. In engineering history there are periods of a fortunate concurrence of circumstances... The idea of creating a small missile was supported at one time by the political leadership and by the military, but it is too late to speak about this now. It is of course a pity that our technical direction is too close to politics. It evidently is difficult to economize in making political decisions. By the way, there also are exceptions. For example, thanks to the firm position of CINC Strategic Missile Troops and now RF Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, in the START II Treaty we managed to defend the possibility of using existing silos for installing Topol-M"s.
21st Century Complex
[NVO] Topol-M is being created by efforts only of Russian enterprises. The replacement of which elements and systems of the complex which were being put out in former Union republics involved the greatest difficulties? Do such difficulties reflect on operation of the deployed Topols?
[Solomonov] In creating the Topol-M, a strategic system, we naturally attempted to get by exclusively with efforts of Russian enterprises. Now everything is Russian, to the full depth of cooperation (there is such a term as "depth of cooperation"), beginning with the missiles, silo launchers and motor vehicles and ending with chemical products from which fuel and missile airframes are created. It is only several items that are we purchasing in the CIS under interstate agreements. Any independence is conditional, however; usually no one in the world makes weapons completely on their own.
Although the previous Topol missile complex was made with Union cooperation, the share of Russian firms was overwhelming. It must be understood, though, that if malfunctions arise in a system which has been in operation for a long time, then it is necessary to call upon the developers no matter where they live now: in Belorussia, in Ukraine... Taking into account that the Topols still have many years to serve in the Army, we now are forced to solve this problem. Some things have been done, but it is one thing when you have contact with the author, and another when you have contact with his friend.
[NVO] It has been reported that the Topol-M complex missile has a number of features allowing it to penetrate an ABM defense. Except for the short boost phase, about which of them can you tell?
[Solomonov] This topic is very delicate inasmuch as penetration of a defense is an element manifesting a weapon"s attacking quality, and this always is secret. We cannot tell anything for now about what the system of measures which has been put into our new missile is like.
This cannot be declassified, because the Americans do not see a great deal during launches. We know they keep an exceptionally sharp eye on us, inasmuch as all launches occur with notification, but we can only surmise what they see in the process.
It should be noted that characteristics determining the capability of penetrating an ABM defense relate not so much to the missile as to its payload. Neither we nor the Americans ever say anything about the payload, although of course both they and our inspectors see some things during inspections. But this is a topic about which it is not customary to speak, and this probably is correct. There are those sensitive areas in which you do not know how a third party will take advantage of this. Therefore we never tell anything to anyone.
They respect our technical potential as armorers. When they saw Topol-M for the first time during a demonstration within the scope of talks, they later came up to us and said: "Yes, you are skilled fellows." And the specialists who came up were those for whom we knew this was of interest. They assessed that Topol-M was not the repetition of an old system; it was a step forward, but not to incite them to some kind of answering step connected with arms production. Everything is being done within the framework of parity and they react adequately to our work. The Minuteman which they are modernizing largely is similar to our system. It is important to understand that single-warhead missiles are being made just in case, not in order to fight, but in order not to fight.
[NVO] Is it possible to give the basic characteristics of Topol-M missiles compared with Topol (naturally we are speaking only about what already has been declassified and what the United States knows thanks to observations and an analysis of telemetry)?
[Solomonov] It makes no sense to compare range, inasmuch as the continents have not moved. Accuracy does not play a special role for such weapons. The important thing, I believe, is that weapons must be simpler and more reliable to operate. Any weapon system must be invulnerable in the operational sense, i.e., from one"s own soldiers—from enemies, too, of course. In developing the new complex (development still has not concluded), we tried to take everything into account that the Army presented to us as complaints in operating the existing complexes.
Naturally, we took a step forward and arrived at new solutions, but there is nothing supernatural from a technical aspect. Everyone is moving forward: they are making an antimissile system and in some things perhaps are taking advantage of the imprecisely worded provisions of the ABM Treaty. But we are forced to figure that we will place our system on alert duty and will not remodel it each year.
[NVO] It was stated that the creation and deployment of Topol-M is lagging behind the planned dates. How great is this lag? Can something be said about tentative dates for placing the mobile version of Topol-M on alert duty?
[Solomonov] Development is proceeding with a delay. Everyone knows this involves the money shortage. It is wasteful to fund major systems as we do it. Despite all efforts, the program is being underfunded from year to year. If this occurs constantly, you will not create a weapon on time.
The main trouble is that we all are aging. We simply will not be here in a few years. There will be no one to finish the equipment. There may not be one or two skilled workers performing complicated operations and there may not be several developers at one of the hundreds of enterprises taking part in creating the complex, and the entire program will be threatened. If we do not make the complex now, there will be no one to make it. Herein lies the problem. We are engineers, you know. Of course, like citizens, we have our own opinion, but within the framework of the production structure, we are fulfilling an order: we were given the order and we did it. But if there is an order, it needs resources: financial, human...
The defense industry today largely is being held up on enthusiasm. Young people essentially did not come to us. It is well that there was a recent decision about granting an Army draft deferment for our specialists who have completed universities. It would be even better if this managed to be extended to those who are working with us in cooperation. Tell me what country has created similar systems by testing one missile a year? The Americans see all this—they are wise people. Of course, our weapons are being made not for war with anyone, but so that there is no war. But if they are being made, they must be made genuinely, so that those for whom they are intended understand that these are weapons and they have to be reckoned with. In short, time and money are interrelated. By the way, compared with the funding of other programs, it can be said that our colleagues can envy us with full justification. I cannot tell you anything about the dates for placing the mobile version of Topol-M on alert duty. This is a question for the political leaders. Everything depends on the size and rates of funding.
[NVO] What is bad in domestic missile building traditions is the confusion in names. MIT always stood out from the others in the best light thanks to the resounding names Temp, Pioner and Topol, which have come to be in general use. In this connection, will more convenient and discernible names appear for the silo and mobile version of the new missile complex?
[Solomonov] You have to ask the military this question. By the way, they did not like the name Topol, which, like Temp, was suggested by Nadiradze. Ustinov permitted it to be used, and he suggested the name for the Pioner complex.
[NVO] But you will agree that "RS-12M Version 2 for the silo launcher" is not a very good name.
[Solomonov] It is a terrible name. Even Topol-M is an unpleasant sounding name (although it is our own). The press certainly again will use the American name, SS-27.
[NVO] In the future will space reconnaissance of leading world states be able to track movements of mobile ground missile complexes promptly? Will this not thereby nullify the main virtue of Topol and the mobile version, Topol-M?
[Solomonov] With any development of events it is a thousand times cheaper to camouflage an object and ensure its concealment than to build a system for tracking it over great expanses. There are known limits that are forecast in advance for the development of satellite systems, because everything "rests" upon the laws of physics. Yes, it is possible to increase the resolution of optics to certain limits, but this provides little for combating maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception" —]. It takes negligible money to camouflage an object and to create a shelter for it that is imperceptible against the background of surrounding terrain compared with systems for surveillance, data processing and operational retargeting of missiles. Crudely speaking, a canopy-type cover costs $50, but a satellite costs millions.
Not to mention that the military have techniques of maskirovka and of creating dummy installations developed over centuries. And as can be surmised, our military people check themselves, and tests are conducted under very stringent conditions. Some experts presume that launchers could travel entirely uncamouflaged—rejoice and count. But later they will throw on maskirovka on command and disappear from all the satellite surveillance bands.
And a second point: the one wishing to fight needs complete assurance that he possesses credible data about all enemy missiles. An attempt to create a system with those capabilities will serve as an indicator of preparation for war. Under peacetime conditions inspections permitting precise data to be obtained on the rival"s number of missiles are sufficient. As we know, during the Persian Gulf War the Americans were unable to build a reliable system for detecting Iraqi mobile complexes, and under relatively simple conditions.
[NVO] Will a space delivery vehicle be made on the basis of Topol-M?
[Solomonov] Nothing hampers this, but it still has to be created, while Topol already exists. In addition, warranty periods soon will expire for those missiles placed on alert duty first. [NVO] The majority of enterprises of the military-industrial complex are experiencing serious cadre problems in connection with this. How are things with you?
[Solomonov] Cadres are our chief problem. We have the people to perform today"s tasks, but they are leaving and no replacement for them is seen. I once gave a course on the technology of creating our systems at the Moscow Technical University imeni Bauman. I saw excellent lads who could work and make a career with us, but with our pay... Alas, sad as it may be, many of the present generation of missilemen no longer will be there after 2005.
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