Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Conflict Studies Research Centre

Russia 1998

Dr M A Smith

S35 March 1998

Disclaimer - The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence.

Table of Contents

RUSSIAN INTERNAL POLITICS

The Nature Of The Current System 3

What Is The 'Party Of Power' 4

The Succession 4

Can An Outsider Challenge The 'Party Of Power'

In A Presidential Election 6

Could The 'Party Of Power' Ever Be Broken? 6

Scenarios Of Russia's Future Development 7

Westernisation

Muddling Through

Break Up

Authoritarian Backlash

Civil War - Collapse of State

Which Is The Most Likely Scenario? 8

Scenarios For An Authoritarian Takeover 10

Military Coup

Bureaucratic Coup

Constitutional Coup

Revolution From Below

Revolution From Above

Possible Threats To Stability 12

Succession Crisis

The Military And Other Power Structures

The Regions

Organised Crime And Corruption

RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

The Development Of CIS Integration 16

Some Scenarios 23

Possible Future Trouble Spots 24

Indication of Likelihood

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NON FORMER

SOVIET STATES

Russia's Post-Communist Foreign Policy Role 26

The USA And Europe

Asia-Pacific

Middle East

Major Challenges to Russia's Interests 30

US Global Unilaterlism

NATO Widening

Islamic Expansionism

Chinese Assertiveness

Conclusions

Russia 1998

by Dr M A Smith

RUSSIAN INTERNAL POLITICS

The political scene in the Russian Federation has remained fairly stable since Yel'tsin's re-election as president in July 1996. There were strong concerns over his health after the election, but since his heart bypass operation in November 1996, these fears have been somewhat allayed. However in view of his age (66 years) and his poor health record, these concerns are likely to resurface, and Russian politics could once again be dominated with speculation over the post-Yel'tsin succession. This paper will analyse the nature of the political system presided over by Yel'tsin, and then discuss succession issues, before proceding to an examination of various post-Yel'tsin scenarios for Russia.

The Nature Of The Current System

The current system has been described as a proto-democracy. It is dominated by the "party of power", ie the ruling post-communist establishment. The presidency has enormous power in this system. Whilst presidential elections take place, it is by no means clear that the party of power would ever be prepared to accept the verdict of the electorate if this verdict was unfavourable to it. Had Yel'tsin lost the 1996 presidential election, it is extremely unlikely that he would have stepped down and handed power over to his opponent, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) Gennady Zyuganov. In January 1996 Yel'tsin reportedly told a meeting of Western aid experts that "I may not win the election, but I will certainly not lose".

It may therefore be argued that the presidential elections of 1996 were virtually meaningless, in that they would not result in a transfer of power from the incumbent to an opponent, should that have been the wish of the electorate. They simply legitimised the incumbent's current hold on power.

It would seem therefore that the "party of power" will dominate the national leadership of the Russian Federation for as long as it is able to do so, with leaders emerging from its ranks. In this sense the Russian political system may resemble that which has existed in Mexico until recently, where elections take place, political parties and an independent press, trade unions and other features of a pluralist system may operate, but the national leadership (ie the presidency) is always controlled by the same party, namely the PRI (Partido Institucional Revolucionario - Institutional Revolutionary Party). The Mexican (and by extension, the Russian) political system is therefore different from political systems where one party or coalition has dominated for long period, yet can be removed by elections and replaced by opposition forces (eg Britain under the Conservatives 1979-97 or France under centre-right governments 1958-1981). In Britain and France the hegemony of the ruling party could be successfully contested and replaced, whereas in Mexico until recently, and possibly also in Russia, it cannot.

What Is The "Party Of Power"?

The "party of power" is not a formal political party, although some political groupings and parties may be regarded as belonging to it. The party that has been most closely linked with the "party of power" is Our Home is Russia - Nash Dom Rossiya (NDR), headed by the former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The "party of power" is an a collection of groupings and individuals which have all benefited from the political and economic changes that have taken place since 1991. Its key components may be seen as:

1. The Russian state bureaucracy.

2. Liberal economic reformers that have been closely associated with the Russian leadership's economic reforms, such as Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais.

3. The managers of large industries privatised since 1991, such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Avtovaz.

4. Some of the new entrepreneurs, such as Boris Berezovskiy and Vladimir Gusinskiy.

5. The banks that have emerged since the collapse of communism, such as MENATEP, MOST, ONEKSIMBANK.

These elites have formed into competing clans, and some of them are also linked with organised crime. Industrial managers and the banks are closely allied with the state bureaucracy, resulting in a form of corporatism. Pro-Yel'tsin regional leaders, who are also allied with business and financial elites, also form part of the "party of power". The president's role is to balance and set the ground rules for the competition between the competing elites. While Yel'tsin remains relatively healthy, these clans will probably remain in some equilibrium.

The Succession

It is not entirely clear whether the presidential term 1996-2000 will necessarily have to be Yel'tsin's final term in office. Under the 1993 constitution, the president can serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. However Yel'tsin has only been elected once (in summer 1996) since the 1993 constitution came into force, as he was first elected president in 1991 under the previous constitution, and he could therefore conceivably run again in 2000. On several occasions since 1996 Yel'tsin has said that he would not do so, but Aleksandr Shokhin, a deputy chairman of the Duma, raised in May 1997 the possibility that Yel'tsin might run in 2000. This possibility was again raised by the presidential press secretary, Sergey Yastrzhembsky in October 1997. Such a move would cause considerable controversy, as some might argue that it is unconstitutional. It may also be argued that at the age of 69, Yel'tsin would be too old in 2000 to run for re-election. His opponents would obviously make this claim, and it quite possible that various clans within the "party of power" would also be of this opinion.

However, if a Russo-Belarusian confederation is ever formed, this could effectively be regarded as a new state, and Yel'tsin may argue that he could run again as he could not violate the constitution of a non-existent state. Were such a state to be formed, then the current president of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, could also run for president, and Yel'tsin could argue that he needs to run in order to counter the threat posed by Lukashenko's authoritarian populism.

However, as most assume that the presidential term 1996-2000 is to be Yel'tsin's final term in office, attention is inevitably focused on the post-Yel'tsin succession. Yel'tsin's health problems also highlight the importance of the succession. There were attempts by CPRF deputies in the Duma in early 1997 to introduce legislation that would determine the procedures whereby a president would resign on medical grounds, should his state of health incapacitate him. These attempts failed, but they may well be repeated if Yel'tsin suffers another serious illness between now and 2000.

Under the constitution, if the president dies or is forced to step down, the prime minister takes over as acting president and fresh presidential elections have to be held within three months. It is likely that there would be a battle among several politicians to succeed Yel'tsin as the candidate of the ruling establishment.

The strongest contenders to be the establishment candidate in the next presidential election are (listed alphabetically):

Boris Berezovskiy, former deputy secretary of the Security Council, and currently independent consultant to the head of the presidential administration.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former prime minister.

Sergey Kiriyenko, the prime minister.

Yury Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow.

Boris Nemtsov, first deputy prime minister.

Another possible establishment candidate could be Yegor Stroyev, the chairman of the Federation Council.

Viktor Chernomyrdin is less credible as a candidate following his dismissal as prime minister, but he may well still run, and he would probably enjoy significant backing from some sections of Russian business and industry. He would also probably have the backing of some sections of the NDR. If Chernomyrdin both he and any successor to the premiership run in the presidential election in 2000, then there may effectively be two establishment candidates running.

The most credible non-establishment candidates are, in alphabetical order:

Aleksandr Lebed', former secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council and now leader of the Popular Republican Party.

Grigory Yavlinskiy, leader of Yabloko.

Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the CPRF and the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia. Zyuganov could be replaced as CPRF leader, and his sucessor would probably be a credible candidate owing to the large size of the CPRF vote.

The former commander of the Russian Border Service, Andrey Nikolayev, may also emerge as a presidential candidate.

Can An Outsider Challenge The "Party Of Power" In A Presidential Election?

Currently the two most significant outsiders are Gennady Zyuganov and Aleksandr Lebed'. It is unlikely that Zyuganov would ever win enough votes in a presidential election. He is colourless, and the label "communist" probably deters a key proportion of voters, even though the CPRF would probably contest the election with allied socialist and nationalist groups under the auspices of the umbrella organisation of the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia, of which Zyuganov is chairman. A more attractive non-establishment leader such as Lebed' could pose a significant challenge to an establishment candidate. Even a candidate as unattractive as Zyuganov was able to win 40 per cent of the vote in the second round in 1996, and therefore a more dynamic candidate could do better. The obstacles any non-establishment candidate would face are enormous. The establishment will dominate the electronic media, have a superior election machine, and have the ability to use public spending to influence the electorate. In the 1996 election it also seemed that the Yel'tsin camp was able to manipulate the counting of votes. In one respect Yel'tsin was fortunate, as he was clearly more popular than Zyuganov, and so it was not necessary for the establishment to rig voting on a large scale. It would probably be impossible to rig voting on a large scale due to the presence of overseas election observers and media, and in such a situation, the establishment would probably find a pretext for cancelling the elections or for refusing to recognise the election result and remaining in power.

If however a non-establishment candidate is able to mount a significant challenge in 2000, then it may be more difficult for the "party of power" to rig the election outcome. Whether the establishment candidate would step down, or whether he would seek to remain in power illegally is one of the major questions facing Russian politics as the next presidential election approaches. It is possible that some elements (ie clans) in the "party of power" may form an alliance with a non-establishment candidate if they feel that he is likely to be the most effective leader. This would seem to be the only likely way that a non-establishment candidate could be permitted to come to power under the present status quo in Russia.

While the "party of power" remains impregnable, it would seem that whoever leads Russia is likely to preside over a nation dominated by a shadow state, which consists of unofficial alliances between the state bureaucracy and post-communist economic elites, where the official, 'legal' state is unlikely to be able to enforce its will over the federation.

Could The "Party Of Power" Ever Be Broken?

It is possible that the profile of the "party of power" could be changed as a result of changes in economic policy. This could transform the "party of power" and possibly even bring about its break up, as competing interests could support different political leaders.

However, it would seem that only a revolution, or a putsch, which propelled a leader to power, could decisively break the "party of power". It could be argued that the 40 per cent of the vote that went to Zyuganov in July 1996 reveals that there is considerable dissatisfaction, that a dynamic, charismatic leader could harness under certain circumstances. If the military structures were to break up, then it is possible that civil war could ensue which might enable such a leader to come to power and establish a new system by force.

The current political system is one that has been created very much in Yel'tsin's image, and is therefore identified with him personally. It is thus highly likely that the post-Yel'tsin leadership will make significant changes in the political system.

Scenarios Of Russia's Future Development

There are at least five broad scenarios that present credible outlines of future developments within Russia.

1. WESTERNISATION

Russia develops into a functioning democracy, with all key political institutions abiding by the 1993 constitution. A viable federalism also emerges, and the economic reforms pursued by the government since 1991 result in the creation of a market economy. Local, parliamentary and presidential elections result in the success of candidates committed to westernising political and economic reforms. Any fears that the system might break down dissipate.

2. MUDDLING THROUGH

Russia continues much as it has since done 1991. A fragile and uneasy modus vivendi exists between the president, government and parliament, and economic reforms proceed, albeit somewhat uncertainly. An uneasy relationship continues with the regions and republics, and reformers in the government feel themselves to be under pressure from communist and extreme nationalist political forces. The fear that the system might break down remains strong.

3. BREAK UP

The Russian Federation breaks up into its constituent parts, so emulating the break up of the USSR in 1991. Autonomous republics and oblasts declare their independence from Moscow, and local security forces transfer their allegiance from the centre to the local authorities. The central Russian government is unable to exercise control over the regions. Disputes emerge between some oblasts and republics over boundaries.

4. AUTHORITARIAN BACKLASH

The spectre of national disintegration, economic decline and the resultant social unrest leads to serious and destabilising political conflict, which runs the risk of exploding into civil war. This results in the seizure of power by an authoritarian regime, possibly in the form of a coup. The regime itself may consist of communists and extreme nationalists, with the backing of the army and the internal security forces. The regime would be dictatorial, it would suspend the constitution and aim at establishing tight centralised control over the country. Economic reform would be severely circumscribed, with the state playing a dominant role in economic activity.

5. CIVIL WAR - COLLAPSE OF STATE

This scenario could arise out of an attempt to realise scenario four. An attempt to seize power by force could be resisted by force. This could then lead to an all out civil war as the armed forces and internal security forces break up and take various sides. There are several civil war scenarios:

a) The sides fall into clearly defined camps, as in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39 or the civil war in Soviet Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, with one side eventually triumphing and establishing a new post-civil war state.

b) The civil war leads to no clear outcome, and it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the various protagonists in the conflict. The state then effectively collapses.

Which Is The Most Likely Scenario?

It is the contention of this paper that the fourth scenario is the most likely in the long term. The first scenario would seem to be excessively optimistic in view of the onerous nature of the problems facing the Russian Federation. It assumes a remarkable degree of success in the resolution of Russia's political and economic difficulties. It also assumes that all the major political forces reach a consensus on the 'rules of the game', and on the path that they would like Russia to take. This is highly unlikely. Furthermore, respect for the rule of law is still weakly held in Russia, despite the reforms of the Gorbachev era, and it is therefore unlikely that both Yel'tsin and his opponents will develop a firm commitment to the principles of a Rechtstaat that will enable the political institutions established in late 1993 to develop firm roots.

The experience of western democracies shows that successful parliamentary democracy requires the development of a stable party system, usually with two large parties or groups of parties capable of commanding the support of a large part of the electorate. Russia lacks such a system.

Although there are a large number of parties in the country, they lack the necessary social base, programmes, and organisational structure to become the equivalents of the mass parties that dominate the political systems of western Europe. They are unable as yet to form viable connecting links between society and the state. There are no effective nationwide parties, with the exception of the CPRF, which is also the best organised party. Yel'tsin has been unenthusiastic in creating a presidential party committed to reforms. Parties remain dominated by personalities rather than programmes, and parliamentary factions lack the cohesion and discipline of their counterparts in stable parliamentary democracies. The lack of firm control by the federal government over the country, and the wide psychological gap between politicians and the mass of the populace would seem to argue against the creation of viable nationwide parties in the short term.

Genuine federalism also seems currently unattainable. The inequality between the republics and the oblasts substantially undermines the notion of a stable federal system. The idea of an 'asymmetrical federation' has been discussed by some, with some administrative units enjoying greater powers vis-.-vis the federal authorities than others. However it seems unlikely that the oblast authorities would reconcile themselves to enjoying fewer rights than the republics, particularly if the tax burden on the republics is less weighty than that of the oblasts.

Russia's moves towards the market are probably irreversible. A return to the command-administrative system of the communist era appears inconceivable. The smoothness of the transition is more difficult to gauge. Official statistics produced since 1991 show drastic declines in economic production. They do, however, understate the growth of the private sector, and do not therefore give an accurate picture of Russia's economic situation. Whilst the economic picture may not be as gloomy as official statistics suggest, this does not signify a smooth transition to a fully-fledged market economy. Tremendous social problems lie ahead. Many enterprises are still dependent on state credits and this could create inflationary pressures despite the fall in inflation since 1991. Large-scale unemployment has not so far become a problem, due to the political need to maintain a high level of employment. However if enterprises re-structure, then coping with high levels of unemployment may become a major problem for the Russian leadership, which could seriously affect social stability.

For the time being, the second scenario seems the most plausible, whilst Yel'tsin remains in power. Since his suppression of the old parliament in October 1993, no political force seems inclined to challenge him directly. Whilst the State Duma is dominated by forces hostile to his vision of reform, it does not wish to obstruct the president overtly. The new constitution is functioning. Yel'tsin seems determined to avoid any risk of confrontation with the parliament. The increased emphasis on the social dimension of reform reflects an awareness of the need to avoid aggravating economic difficulties that can be exploited by nationalist and communist opponents. The current system (if it can be properly described as such) is fragile and could break down once Yel'tsin leaves the political scene.

This therefore leaves scenarios three and four. The complete break up of the Russian Federation has been feared by many within Russia since 1991, and the Federation Treaty of 1992, the constitution of 1993 and the various bilateral treaties signed between the federal government and various regional governments since 1994 can be seen as an attempt to provide a framework for centre-regional interaction that would remove this danger. Although it is inevitable that regional leaderships would demand greater freedom of manoeuvrability vis-.-vis the central authorities in Moscow, it is unlikely (with the exception of Chechnya and possibly some other parts of the North Caucasus) that they would emulate the leaderships of the union-republics in 1991, which sought complete independence from the all-union central authorities in Moscow.

There are significant differences between the oblasts and the former autonomous republics of the Russian Federation and the union-republics of the Soviet Union. The ethnic dimension is important. Russians made up just 50 per cent of the former Soviet Union, and titular nationalities constituted a politically significant part of the population of the union-republics, even if they did not make up an arithmetical majority. With the flourishing of nationalism and the discrediting of all-union Soviet institutions, demands for full independence from Moscow became more and more credible. The Baltic states had a recent history of independent statehood, and other states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, briefly enjoyed independence after 1917. This is not the case with the constituent parts of the Russian Federation. Russians comprise 82 per cent of the population of the Federation, and also form a predominant part of the population of the former autonomous republics. Only in a very few republics does the titular nationality make up more than 50 per cent of the population, and the strong Russian presence seriously inhibits any moves toward formal independence.

The leadership of Tatarstan has consistently demanded greater freedom from Moscow, but it has been careful (so far) not to alienate its Russian population. This is true of other republics within Russia. The sole exception so far has been Chechnya, and while the Dudayev leadership's defiance of Moscow could prove attractive elsewhere in the northern Caucasus, Chechnya remains very much a special case. No oblast or republican leadership appears willing to adopt the necessary attributes of statehood (currencies, armed forces etc) that independence would require. Many remain dependent on Moscow for subsidies and would therefore not wish to detach themselves from the Russian Federation. However, centrifugalist tendencies do exist in the Russian Federation, and they will make it difficult for the central authorities to exert tight control over wealthier and peripheral regions, which are both likely to increasingly ignore the centre. As a result, the federation may come to exist in name only.

Many have predicted the emergence of the fourth scenario, namely the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Yel'tsin and his opponents have accused each other of attempting to do so. Many observers have also drawn analogies with the Weimar period in Germany, and so warned of the danger of liberal political leaders being swept aside by reactionary political forces enjoying the support of an embittered and disenchanted population, attracted by simplistic authoritarian solutions.

It could be argued that an authoritarian nationalist regime is a more likely alternative than either the flourishing of democratic capitalism, or the complete disintegration of Russia or the indefinite survival of the post-October 1993 status quo. This is especially likely if economic difficulties result in major social instability, and if the armed forces become restive as a result of poor social conditions now endured by the Russian officer corps, the breakdown of the Russian army and concern over the continuing decline in Russia's great power status. It is possible that a power struggle may result in the staging of a coup, probably headed by a civilian authoritarian leader, with the backing of the armed forces and internal security forces.

This regime would reverse the process of democratisation, endeavour to establish tight authoritarian control, and reverse regional centrifugalism. It would be strongly nationalist in ideology (possibly with strong emphasis on Orthodoxy), and place emphasis on order, central control and the restoration of Russia's greatness. Force may be used to neutralise any opposition to the regime, and although a complete return to the old communist command economy would be highly unlikely, economic reform could slow down, and the new regime would enhance the role of the state in the economy.

Given the traditional reluctance of the Russian military to become involved in domestic politics, any form of coup by the military and/or the internal security forces would be establishing a major precedent in Russian political life. However, as so many unexpected developments have occurred in the recent history of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation, further such developments should not be ruled out.

The viability of an authoritarian military-oriented regime is another question. Would it bring stability to Russia or simply aggravate existing instabilities? The problems of reforming the economy would remain, and the regime would face the additional tasks of repressing democratic forces and establishing tight central control. Paradoxically, this could even result in the fulfilment of scenario three, as some peripheral regions may try to break away from the centre in order to escape the embrace of harsh authoritarian control. In a worst case, it could of course provoke the fifth scenario, namely that of civil war and the complete collapse of the Russian state.

Scenarios For An Authoritarian Takeover

In light of the contention that scenario four is the most likely, it is useful to consider how an authoritarian regime could come to power in Russia. Alexander Yanov has suggested the following scenarios:

A. MILITARY COUP

The classic military coup. The military leadership disbands the government and parliament and establishes either a regime of personal power or a junta. This has happened in many Latin American countries There can also be a colonels' coup which overthrows the civilian government and military leadership.

B. BUREAUCRATIC COUP

Leaders of the institutions of the old (ie Soviet) regime appeal to slogans of the re-establishment of legality and order, disband the government and declare a state of emergency and set up a Committee of National Salvation.

C. CONSTITUTIONAL COUP

There are three variants. All assume that authoritarian forces gain a majority of votes either in parliament or at presidential elections.

1. Coalition

The president is forced to form a coalition with the strongest authoritarian party in the parliament in the hope of creating a stable government. The authoritarian party however takes over the coalition, changes the constitution and establishes a dictatorship.

2. Impeachment

An authoritarian coalition in parliament gathers enough votes to remove an unsuitable president.

3. Electoral

An authoritarian presidential candidate wins a presidential election, and once having done so, establishes an authoritarian regime.

D. REVOLUTION FROM BELOW

1. Mass

The country is paralysed by strikes. There are large scale street demonstrations demanding the resignation of the government. Armed detachments try to seize government buildings and communications. For the success of a mass uprising, the army must be neutral, and the opposition must have a wide social base, especially at key points.

2. Charismatic

A leader relying on a powerful political movement and armed units seizes the capital and the police and the army refuse to defend the legitimate government.

3. National movement of irregular militias

The country's regions unite, they refuse to trust the centre, they form an army, march on the capital and force the national government to capitulate. In 1612 Kuz'ma Minin, the Nizhny Novgorod merchant and Dmitry Pozharskiy voyevod freed Moscow from the Poles and in 1613 the Zemskiy Sobor (the representative organ of the victorious regions) elected an autocratic Tsar. A modern variant could be regions uniting in a refusal to pay taxes and where representatives from the regions oppose the president in both house of parliament and bring the government down.

E. REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

1. Presidential

A legally elected and popular president removes an unpopular government, disbands parliament and establishes a personalist dictatorship.

2. Procedural

The head of state leaves office, and his successor sponsors a revanchist opposition (or is scared of it). To appease it, he appoints a new administration and establishes an authoritarian dictatorship.

Possible Threats To Stability

1. SUCCESSION CRISIS

As discussed above, if Yel'tsin dies or is forced to leave office before 2000, then this could prove destabilising if those forces contending for leadership attempt to seize power by unconstitutional means. Furthermore, if Yel'tsin runs for a third term, this may prompt a coup attempt against him.

2. THE MILITARY AND OTHER POWER STRUCTUES

The Russian armed forces and other power structures (ie the various internal security forces) have hitherto been extremely quiescent in response to the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia's weakness in the international arena, and the break down of the armed forces themselves as a result of underfunding and the break down of the social discipline of the authoritarian communist era. In many respects it may seem surprising that the armed forces have reacted so passively. This is probably explained by the pre-Soviet and Soviet tradition of non-interference in politics by the military, by the fear that any attempted putsch could precipitate civil war, and by a reluctance to assume the responsibilities of governing an entire country, particularly one as large as the Russian Federation. The armed forces were extremely reluctant to become involved in the attack on the parliament building in October 1993, and have generally avoided becoming embroiled in political conflicts both before and after the collapse of communism.

Whilst this remains true for much of the military leadership, it should not be assumed that both the armed forces and various internal security forces will automatically acquiesce in any further decline of their status, and that the armed forces and internal security forces will always adhere to the precedent of non-involvement in politics. Several politico-military movements have emerged since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, but they have not so far launched a frontal assault on the Yel'tsin leadership.

The most recent, and arguably the most significant could be the so-called movement in support of the armed forces, the defence industries and military science formed in September 1997, and headed by General Lev Rokhlin, the chairman of the Duma defence committee, and one of the few Russian military commanders to emerge from the Chechen conflict with any credit. Rokhlin takes serious exception to the military reform plans of defence minister Igor Sergeyev, and has called for the impeachment of Yel'tsin. If Sergeyev's reform plans add to the burden of hardship already being suffered by the armed forces, then it is possible that anti-government sentiment may grow in the military and then seriously threaten political stability. The armed forces' recruitment problems are aggravated by the fact that they only receive about two-thirds of all conscripts. The remainder serve in other power structures and ministries which have their own military units. An opinion poll survey taken of 2,500 servicemen commissioned by the Ministry of Defence in late 1995 showed that 90 per cent believed that their pay was less than that of Interior ministry troops. The Federal Security Service openly spies on the regular armed forces, and interior ministry forces are pampered compared to the regular armed forces. Perceptions such as these could lead to the armed forces believing that they are being run down at the expense of other power structures. This may provoke a response from the armed forces and could also lead to conflict between them and the internal security forces. Disaffected military commanders could look to a strong figure such as Lebed' to champion their cause against the national political leadership.

3. THE REGIONS

The inability of the central leadership to exert full control over the 89 subjects (ie administrative units) of the Russian Federation poses a further threat to stability. In most cases this is an irritant rather than a serious threat, and the dependence of most regions on subsidies from the federal budget constrains their freedom of manoeuvre in relation to the federal government. The most serious threat to stability comes from regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation. The leadership of the Maritime Region in the Russian Far East under its governor Yevgenny Nazdratenko has defied the federal government on many issues, and this example could prove attractive to regional leaderships that are far from Moscow, particularly if they are relatively strong economically. Such regions may even secede. Regions that are rich could finance opposition to recentralisation. In February 1998, Yel'tsin urged regions to develop direct ties with foreign countries, so recognising the inability of the federal government to exercise effective control over the regions.

If regional governments are able to finance units of the armed forces and internal security forces stationed in their territory, and form alliances with local military commanders, this could encourage the disintegration of these forces and the growth of warlordism. In May 1996, when the then defence minister Pavel Grachev toured the Ural, Siberia and Transbaykal military districts, he thanked the Transbaykal local adminstration for helping to feed and house soldiers. If the central federal authorities are failing to provide adequate accommodation and food supplies, but local authorities are doing so, then local military commanders are likely to be more loyal to regional leaders than to Moscow. These forces may well support a regional leader who opts for greater autonomy or even outright secession.

At present an uneasy modus vivendi exists with most subjects, and the federal government has signed bilateral power sharing agreements with about one-third of the subjects. The area with the greatest potential for instability remains the Northern Caucasus. Although peace came to Chechnya following the Lebed-Maskhadov agreements in August 1996, there still remains potential for conflict. The Chechen leadership is determined to regard itself as an independent state, which Moscow is not prepared to accept, arguing that Chechnya's status cannot be determined until after 31 December 2001 when a referendum will be held. Even if the referendum produces a result in favour of independence, Moscow is still unlikely to reconcile herself fully to Chechen independence, not least because the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline runs through Grozny. It has also been argued that an independent Chechnya would be expansionist, as the only viable form of an independent Chechnya is a greater Chechnya that would embrace Dagestan. Chechen expansionism would obviously destabilise the North Caucaus region further, and could aggravate Russo-Chechen tensions. Instability in Dagestan would again affect the security of oil supplies from the Caspian as the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline runs through this republic. Moscow cannot afford to lose the Northern Caucasus, but if she were to become again involved in conflict in this region, this could prove to be a death knell for Russian democracy.

The state's inability to collect taxes throughout the Russian Federation also undermines the viability of the Russian state. In 1996, the state recovered only 60 per cent of planned revenue. Major corporations such as Gazprom and Avtovaz owe the state massive tax bills. The state's ability to gather taxes remains limited, and the Temporary Extraordinary Commission for gathering taxes formed in October 1996 has had no real impact on this problem. In 1996 the sum of taxes that was owed was more than twice the 1995 level, and of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation, only 3 have fully paid their debt to the federal budget. Furthermore, seven out of the 89 regions provide almost 52 per cent of the budget's revenues, with Moscow providing 27 per cent. The state's seeming inability to tackle this problem does indeed undermine the viability of the federal state machine, and could promote the break up of the federation.

4. ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION

Organised crime and corruption remain a major problem in Russia. The former interior minister Anatoly Kulikov has noted that the development of capitalism in post-Soviet Russia has been accompanied by the development of a huge organised crime sector, that could be called the "fifth power" in the land. In 1997 more than 22,000 crimes committed by organised crime were discovered.

Kulikov stated in December 1997 that some experts estimate that illegal economic activity accounts for 40 per cent of Russia's GDP. He gave as an example the Avtovaz car plant in Togliatti, where seven criminal groups were liquidated. They controlled the entire production of the plant and enjoyed an illegal annual income of more than R500 billion. Organised crime thus plays an important part in the Russian economic system. According to the analytical centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences 55 per cent of the capital and 80 per cent of shares under privatisation are in the hands of foreign and domestic organised crime. Criminal groups have taken advantage of the privatisation of the Russian economy to gain control of a large number of privatised enterprises. Criminal organisations are also responsible for a significant outflow of funds from Russia. It is estimated that about R1 billion leaves Russia monthly, and much of this money is illegal. Organised crime has a strong hold in the banking and finance sector in the Russian Federation, and between 1992 and mid 1995, there were 83 attempted assassinations of bankers, of whom 46 were killed.

Organised crime makes use of contract killings to achieve its objectives. A journalist investigating corruption in the armed forces was killed in Moscow in October 1994, and a prominent TV journalist, Vladislav List'yev was shot in March 1995. In 1997 the authorities were aware of 118 contract killings.

The authorities are ill equipped to tackle organised crime due to the scale of its operations and the level of corruption that penetrates the law enforcement agencies. The chairman of the Duma Security Committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, stated in April 1994 that in 1993, 1,500 officials were investigated or charged in connection with corruption. About 50 per cent were officials from central government and 27 per cent worked in the law enforcement agencies. In 1993 more than 46,000 officials from all levels of government were tried on corruption charges. In January 1997 Kulikov reported that in 1996, 10,000 Interior ministry employees were brought to account for ccorruption, of whom 3,000 were prosecuted.

It should be noted that it is often difficult in Russia to determine where organised crime ends and legitimate business begins. It is also unlikely that illegal business operations will ever become civilised and brought within the rule of law as happened with the so-called robber barons in the USA.

The prevalence of large-scale organised crime and corruption may not necessarily be a threat to stability in Russia but it could become so. If a leadership is serious about clamping down on these phenomena, then attempts to do so could provoke serious resistance from organised crime, which is likely to support leaders sympathetic to it. Furthermore, resentment of a privileged and corrupt establishment by the 'have nots' in society could result in mass protest and a revolutionary situation akin to February 1917. Corruption in the armed forces has resulted in officers attempting to sell arms illegally, and this could in a worse-case scenario, even include nuclear components or other weapons of mass destruction.

RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Since 1991, Russia has promoted the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a means of promoting relations between the former Soviet states (with the exception of the three Baltic states). Integration has become the key notion of Russian policy towards its partners in the CIS. Russian policy-makers reject accusations that Russian policy is imperialist, and instead portray Moscow's policy as one of promoting and leading integration in the post-Soviet space. This process embraces political, economic and military integration, which is seen as a natural process, as it covers a region which was formerly a single state (ie the USSR, which was preceded by the Russian Empire). Some Russian politicians speak of the possibility of integration processes ultimately resulting in a confederation. At the very least, most of the Russian political elite support the creation of a cohesive pro-Russian bloc of states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Development Of CIS Integration

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