The White House Briefing Room
August 28, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JIM STEINBERG, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES STEVE SESTANOVICH
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts)
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release August 28, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER,
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JIM STEINBERG,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS,
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES
STEVE SESTANOVICH
The Briefing Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.
4:16 P.M. EDT
MR. BERGER: Let me begin quite briefly by answering what I
expect might be the first question: Given the crisis in Russia, why should
the President still go? I think there are a number of reasons that it's
important that he go on this trip despite the situation -- or perhaps even
because of the situation in Russia.
First of all, we have an enormous stake in Russia's future, in
its continuation on a path of democracy and market reform. Although the key
political and economic choices are up to the Russian people themselves, we
need to engage actively even, or especially in time of crisis, publicly and
privately the President intends to reinforce the fundamental importance
to Russia and to the world of holding fast to the basic objectives of
democracy and economic reform in the face of new challenges.
Second, the Russian people should know that, particularly in
times of difficulty, the United States and the West will not turn away from
cooperation. As they do the things necessary to restore stability and
progress, we are prepared to support them. I believe that alone will have
some stabilizing effect for the Russian people.
Third, there are important foreign policy and security
challenges which continue where Russia must play a key
role. We hope we can agree to some concrete and specific steps
that will reduce further the threats left by post-Cold War
military arsenals. We have work to do on nonproliferation, on
Kosovo, on Iraq. These issues are simply too important to put on
hold.
Fourth, this is an opportunity to talk with
President Yeltsin, Acting Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, opposition
leaders, regional political leaders, as well as directly to the
Russian people about their future.
I've been quite interested over the past few days to
hear reports that Russian political leaders across a very broad
spectrum very much want the President to come. I don't want to
minimize the seriousness of the situation now facing Russia, but
neither should we minimize the distance Russia has traveled, in
the past decade in particular. It has peacefully relinquished
its empire. It's withdrawn its troops from the Baltics. It's
downsized its nuclear and military arsenals. It has generally
played a more positive and productive role on European security
issues. It has opened and privatized its economy and held free
and fair elections for parliament and the presidency.
The challenges it faces certainly are no less
daunting. But the United States needs to do our best to be
helpful. In the final analysis, the choices are theirs, but we
must be ready and prepared to be of help if they make the right
choices. No one is nostalgic for the Cold War, with the world
perched on a nuclear precipice the USSR's neighbors enslaved,
dangerous regional conflicts, spiraling defense budgets. And no
one wants a weak Russia beset by crisis. America has a strong
interest in preventing Russia from backsliding and in promoting
its stability and success.
At this point, we can best do that not by backing
away, but by trying to help Russians find Russian solutions to
their domestic problems that are compatible with the global
economy and consistent with their choice of democracy.
Let me ask Gene now to talk a bit about the
economic.
MR. SPERLING: I'll be very brief. We spoke with --
the security and economic team spoke with the President this
morning, and I think the President fully understands that he is
coming at a time of transition for the government and their
economic team, and in that environment one does not have the
capacity to have a detailed review of a detailed plan, or that
type of engagement. But one does -- and this President does have
the ability in his conversations with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin
and Duma officials to make -- to speak clearly about the type of
economic measures that will signal the markets in a positive way
and provide reassurance that there is movement in the right
direction on reforms and towards reestablishing market
confidence.
Clearly, there are no shortcuts, no silver bullets,
no quick fixes. This is a serious path toward restoring market
confidence, but it's one that many countries have successfully
gone through, and certainly, even this President, though, to
obviously in a less severe situation in our country, we have had
to, with our debts, et cetera, have had to go through a process
that's taken time, but has successfully, over time, been able to
create significant confidence.
Let me, so we have time for questions, let me
introduce the Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Larry Summers, to add
some and then we will all be available for questions.
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: Sandy and Gene have said
it well. The President and our delegation will be going to
Russia at a critical economic juncture, following recent
developments. The choices that Russia makes in the next few
weeks and the next several months will be crucial in determining
its economic future and as the President has said, the way in
which the Russian people define their greatness.
Crucial aspects of those choices will include the
choices about their budget and the adequacy and sustainability of
the way in which they finance their budget, will include the
steps they take with respect to their banking and financial
system, will include their relations and the way they manage
those relations with their foreign creditors, and most
importantly will include their steps to establish a framework for
a market system based, above all, on the rule of law, on secure
property rights, and on the ability to carry out free exchange in
an environment that is properly regulated.
It is their success in carrying out these steps that
we believe will be crucial in determining their economic
prospects in what is not an easy global economic environment, and
it is these issues that the President looks forward to discussing
with President Yeltsin and that we expect to discuss with Russian
authorities during our time in Moscow.
AMBASSADOR SESTANOVICH: Even by Russian standards,
this has been a week of swirling rumors and political uncertainty
in Moscow, which is one of the world's great rumor mills. The
sources of that uncertainty I think are pretty obvious. The
economic crisis, compounded by the need to form a new government
under a new Prime Minister.
The fact that a new government has to be put into
place has spawned intense consultations, bargaining within the
Parliament, which has to vote Acting Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
into office, and between the Parliament and the Executive about
the terms of his appointment. The Parliament, as you may know,
has formed with the government a trilateral commission they've
called -- posed to the two houses of the Parliament and the
Executive Branch to reach an understanding on the direction of
the new cabinet.
This commission's report is now being wrapped up and
a vote, we understand, is scheduled for Monday so that if it
happens, a new government will be in place at the time the
President arrives.
I referred to the swirl of rumors about the future
of Russian politics. I think at this point I should say only
that I think those rumors have been substantially allayed by
President Yeltsin's appearance on TV today, interview he gave on
national television. President Clinton is eager to learn from
President Yeltsin and the other Russian political leaders that he
will meet with from across the political spectrum about how this
process of making the choices on Russia's future, how that
process is proceeding. It's obviously a discussion with great
significance not only for Russia, but for our own national
interest.
Jim will talk about Ireland.
MR STEINBERG: Well, as I'm sure all of you know,
after the two days in Moscow the President will be going to
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. And to paraphrase my
boss, Sandy Berger, let me tell you why we're going to Northern
Ireland and the Irish Republic.
I think there are three main purposes for the visit.
First, to pay tribute to the courage and determination of both
the leaders and the people in Northern Ireland and in the
Republic for making the Good Friday peace agreement possible.
Second, to provide support for rapid implementation of the
agreement including the new political structures, especially the
assembly which will be launched this September. And finally, and
equally important, to demonstrate that the United States intends
to continue to be deeply involved in supporting the peace
process and economic development both in Northern and the Irish
Republic both through the International Fund for Ireland, through
helping to attract investment and job opportunities, and also
political support for the forces for peace.
Now, the President will spend a very full day in
Northern Ireland. A focus of his efforts will be meeting with
the new leadership and the members of the new assembly to
indicate his support for their efforts. The United States is
helping in training and helping prepare the new assembly members
to take on this important bit of self-government in Northern
Ireland. He will then give a major address to the people of
Northern Ireland at Waterfront Hall in Belfast, to talk about our
view about the challenges ahead and the way forward.
He will also travel to Omagh, which is the site of a
terrible tragedy just a few weeks ago, the worst bombing in the
history of The Troubles, both to show his sympathy for the people
there, but also to really pay tribute to the remarkable effort
they've done about pulling together and showing that they're not
going to be deterred by the enemies of peace. And he will also
give an address in the City of Armagh, which is a famed city for
reconciliation -- the two cathedrals symbolizing the two
communities working together for peace.
He'll then spend a day and a half in the Irish
Republic meeting with the Taoiseach Birdie Ahern and his cabinet,
with community leaders there, giving a speech at Gateway 2000 to
talk about the remarkable economic miracle in the Irish Republic,
and then traveling to the west to meet and talk to the people of
Limerick, which is another sign of the great economic
regeneration of the Irish Republic, and then finally to make good
on an old bet and a raincheck for a golf match in Ballybunion.
Q Just yesterday you had a cautionary note saying
that it would be disturbing or you would be concerned, the U.S.
would be concerned, if Yeltsin veered off the course of market
reform and democracy. Today he booted his last two reformers,
economic reformers. At least you and whoever followed you seemed
to speak as if it was last week -- or is it still up in the air?
Hasn't Yeltsin convinced you all yet that he doesn't think he can
stick with at least radical reforms, that he's going in another
direction? Are you disturbed?
MR. BERGER: Let me take a quick cut at that and ask
either Larry or Gene to follow up. First of all, some of those
decisions today I think are non-encouraging. But I think what is
important here is what policies are adopted by the new
government, and whether they are realistic in terms of the
situation that Russia faces, whether they are likely to stabilize
the situation, whether they are likely to bring investor
confidence back -- and I think the policies here are far more
important than who may be the individuals that are in the
government. There have been a number of different Russian
governments. But, by and large, they have stayed on the road of
reform and we would hope they would continue to do so.
Q It sounds like you think it's a time to be
realistic.
MR. BERGER: I think we always believe it's the time
to be realistic.
Q Well, you know, being realistic evidently means
not moving too fast toward those principles that you all have
held so high. He's got to save his skin. He's got to save his
skin by cutting a deal with the Duma and getting rid of the
reformers. Do you disapprove of that?
MR. BERGER: As far as I know, there is yet to be
formed a government. As far as I know, there is yet to be put in
place a set of policies of which you speak. We've been very
clear about what we think the path that we would encourage the
Russians to follow in terms of market reform. And one of the
reasons why the President believes it is important to go to
Moscow, despite the situation there, is so that he can be with
President Yeltsin and with others, speak candidly about what we
believe will be necessary to stabilize the situation economically
and to continue on the path of political reform.
Q What can two politically weakened leaders
expect to achieve from this summit? What do you expect? What
will be assigned? And isn't the President really going
empty-handed? And how will this be viewed in the world, because
he's
--
MR. BERGER: Any more questions? (Laughter.)
Q How can they deal?
MR. BERGER: Do I get to choose any one of those
questions?
Q You can do them all.
MR. BERGER: Okay. Well, first of all, without
accepting the premise of your question --
Q Can you rebut it?
MR. BERGER: I believe that the relationship between
the United States and Russia is a critically important
relationship. The direction that Russia takes as it continues,
hopefully, on this historic path of transition and
transformation, is extraordinarily important to the United
States. On the economic side, the President and his economic
advisors who will be with him, can speak to President Yeltsin and
members of -- those who would be involved in the Russian
government about the policies that we believe are most likely to
stabilize the economic situation and put Russia back on a track
towards market confidence.
In terms of foreign policy and security policy,
there are a range of issues that are enormously important. I
spoke earlier of, in the security field, I believe that -- I hope
that we can reach some agreements during this trip that will have
an impact on lessening and reducing the risk of military arsenals
left over from the Cold War.
I expect that the President will raise with
President Yeltsin and others issues ranging from Bosnia to Kosovo
to Iraq, to Iran and nonproliferation, terrorism. There are a
range of issues where what Russia does is important to the
capacity of the international community to make progress. All of
those things will be on the table.
Q Sandy, to follow on your comment about policy,
the most important thing, yesterday the head of Mr.
Chernomyrdin's parliamentary party, Aleksandr Shokhin, was
talking
about a program of reimposing currency control, reimposing price
control and renationalizing some industries. Today, tonight in
Russia, the Russian news media are reporting that Mr.
Chernomyrdin and the Parliament have reached a deal. What do we
know about the terms of that deal and is there any reason to
believe that the program outlined by Mr. Shokhin is not part of
that?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: We do not know of any
definite set of policies to which the new Russian government has
been committed. It is our belief that a move back towards
centralized planning, based on price controls and administrative
allocation of goods and systematic controls would be a serious
policy error, and very unfortunate with respect to Russia's
economic prospects going forward.
Q After all the money that's been lent by the
International Monetary Fund and after all the help has given
Russia, is there anything left to give? Is there anything the
international lending institutions can do or the U.S., Germany
and Japan? Is there anything left, or is it just all in the
hands of whatever the Russians do?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: Russia's economic future
will be shaped in Russia by Russian policy choices going forward.
The international financial institutions, with our support, are
certainly prepared to provide support to Russia; as to other
countries, that is measured with the pace of reform on the basis
of strong policy measures. That, from what I understand, was the
message that Managing Director Camdessus conveyed to Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin during their recent meeting. But the key
at this point going forward is the policy choices that Russia
makes.
Q Can you tell us anything Secretary Talbott told
you about Mr. Yeltsin's state of health, his demeanor, his energy
level?
MR. BERGER: Secretary Talbott met -- I guess it's
still today -- in Moscow with President Yeltsin. The meeting
lasted I guess 15 to 20 minutes. He said President Yeltsin was
energetic and animated and engaged.
Q And can you tell us to what degree you've had
to sort of throw out the planning you had done for the
summit and redo?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think that, obviously, one
needs to make adjustments as the situation changes, but I think
the fundamental elements which are -- we have been concerned
about even two weeks ago or four weeks ago, which is the economic
policy choices that Russia makes, as Mr. Sperling and Secretary
Summers have indicated, and the range of arms control security
and foreign policy issues remain the same.
The President will also give a speech to the Russian
people and also on September 1st, which is quite a celebratory
day in Russia as children go back to school and parents come to
the school with them, the President will also go to a school in
Moscow on September 1st.
So the basic building blocks were there. Obviously,
the nature of the dialogue shifts as circumstances shift.
Q This is a question for Larry Summers. Have you
discussed the possibility of a currency board with the Russians,
and is that an option or one of the things that the two
Presidents will be discussing?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I don't expect that level
of detail and specificity to figure in the discussions between
the two Presidents. As you're very much aware, currency boards
are a monetary arrangement that have been put in place in some
places, but that require a whole set of surrounding policy
commitments with respect to the budget, with respect to the
banking system, with respect to the way in which economic policy
is organized. And I think at this point it would be very much
premature to look at those kinds of questions until we have a
sense of what the plans and intentions of the new Russian
government will be.
Q For either Sandy or Larry or both, you say that
you're looking for policy, not personality. Can you point to one
significant policy decision since Prime Minister Kiriyenko was
sacked and replaced with Prime Minister-designate Chernomyrdin
that would lead you to believe, that gives you any encouragement
that the new government will continue on a path that you believe
goes towards the reform necessary? Have they done any one thing
encouraging, or has it all been discouraging?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I don't think it's for us
to handicap each statement or indication, or to try to judge what
is obviously an uncertain situation, where judgments are being
made and measures are being selected. I think it certainly would
be fair to say that we view the economic situation in Russia with
great concern and view, as I said earlier, the choices that will
be made as enormously consequential, with the right choices in
our judgment offering the prospect of, over time, rebuilding
confidence and providing a foundation for tapping what is
enormous underlying economic energy in Russia, with natural
resources, with a very educated population, substantial capacity
of technology -- and with the wrong choices running the risk of
creating very substantial instability and uncertainty, with very
substantial costs for the Russian economy.
Q You've been pretty specific about some things
you think are the wrong choices, like currency and price
controls. What would be some specific right choices?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I think I emphasized
earlier the importance of sound budget measures, of addressing in
a strong way the problems in the banking system, of taking the
legal and administrative steps necessary to provide a framework
in which a market can satisfactorily operate -- taxes based on
law, not discretion, and so forth.
The underlying steps that are important to build a
sound economy have not changed, and in light of the setbacks that
have taken place, it becomes, in our judgment -- I think it's not
a political judgment, it's a judgment I think of the vast
majority of economic people who look at this kind of situation --
it becomes ever more important that a framework in which there
isn't pressure to create excessive currency and in which markets
and property rights and entrepreneurs can function be put in
place. Those continue to be critical steps.
MR. BERGER: I think what the international
community does and says about circumstances as they evolve in
Russia are important. I think there are on any particular issue
areas where we have common interests that we have to build upon.
I talk now on the non-economic side.
For example, in the area of arms control. And we
have, for example, huge stockpiles of fissile material that come
from nuclear warheads that can once again be used for nuclear
weapons either in Russia or in some third country. We are
talking with the Russians about things that we could do to reduce
stockpiles of fissile material. We are talking with the Russians
about things we can do with respect to sharing information on
missile launches.
I mean, there continue to be across a very broad
range of issues important areas where the United States and
Russia, working bilaterally, can reduce tensions in the world.
Q Is economic the one area where you have no
leverage?
MR. BERGER: Well, in the economic area -- and again
I'll defer to Gene and Larry -- is an area where we have worked
in concert with and through the international institutions --
through the IMF and through other international institutions.
Q -- the administration feel that we're facing a
global crisis here? I mean, at the same time that Russia has
defaulted on its bonds and suspended currency trading, today the
Japanese market hit a 12-year low. What's going on here? Is the
administration concerned that we're facing the possibility of
global recession?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I think it's very
important that we distinguish between situations in different
countries -- and distinguish clearly between them -- that we, in
making policy, that investors in looking at what happens in
different countries recognize that situations differ in very
important ways and not generalize inappropriately.
Clearly, there have been important economic problems
that we have been discussing in Russia. More generally, there
has been a reduced appetite for risk-taking on the part of
investors in emerging markets globally. That situation has its
roots in the global economic environment, in events that took
place last year in Asia, in altered investor psychology, in
policy problems in some countries, in concerns about the economic
situation in Japan.
And we and Secretary Rubin, Chairman Greenspan, U.S.
authorities continue to be in touch with our counterparts in
other countries and in the international financial institutions
and are prepared to support strong measures, working through the
international financial institutions where appropriate to
encourage appropriate policy steps in particular countries. But
while these events certainly have had a consequence for the
American economy and have in particular had an important impact
on some of our exporters, agricultural exporters, some of our
other exporters to emerging markets, I am convinced that if we
continue to manage our economy prudently with sound budget
policies to which the President is committed, with appropriate
monetary policies, there is no reason why the difficulties in
international markets, while significant, should interfere with
or prevent the basic momentum of economic expansion in the United
States.
I do think it is very important, in light of the
uncertainties that the international situation creates, that the
United States, as soon as possible, ratify its contributions to
the IMF, in order that it can be securely in a position to meet
whatever challenges may arise.
Q Would the U.S. be open to a renegotiation of
the Russia loan package from the IMF?
MR. SPERLING: I just want to follow on for a second
because I think several of the questions have referred to
leverage or whatever specifically you're bringing in, and I think
you need to come back to the kind of stage of engagement that one
has. First of all, it is absolutely the case for any country's
economic policy the ball is first and ultimately in their court
and that country has to have an economic team and a plan that
makes sense.
With the context where you have seen the United
States being able to engage is a context where you're at the
stage where there is a team, has a specific plan, that they're
engaged with the IMF. In that context, there's obviously a limit
to what any one country can do, but in that context there is a
serious role that the United States, this President, our Treasury
Department, plays in working with the G-7, with the international
community and the IFFYs as what to be done.
Here we just happen to be, because of the fortune of
timing, coming at a stage where the government is in a period of
transition, the economic team is in a period of transition, and
so the question is in that situation what makes sense.
Obviously, there isn't the kind of specific plan or engagement at
this point. That does mean, however, that this President, with
his experience and his knowledge that he's learned firsthand of
how markets react, cannot speak candidly in private and in public
about what are the type of things that encourage confidence.
Clearly, a measure, for example, is lowering your --
having a path that gradually lowers your deficit as a percentage
of GDP. That is something that is looked at -- and providing
reassurance in a timely fashion, that they're on a path to get
their fiscal house in order, and do those things will be
important. But we have to just remember the stage that we're at.
We're just not at a stage where answers to a lot of the questions
being asked are appropriate. It doesn't have anything to do with
our particular role being different, but just the stage of our
visit. And I think that's important as we're looking at the
different questions and issues being raised.
Q Who is the President meeting with on Wednesday?
And specifically --
MR. BERGER: The meeting on Wednesday will consist
of a fairly broad range of leaders from the Duma, regional
leaders and other political figures. I believe Mr. Zuganov has
been invited to that, but certainly a broad range of folks.
Q Are any of the agreements going to be signed?
Q Sandy, do you think you've contributed to the
crisis in Russia by over the years being too optimistic about
events in Russia and cutting Yeltsin too much slack --
particularly, economically?
MR. BERGER: No, I don't think there's any basis for
that. We have supported policies that we thought made sense.
President Yeltsin, after all, is the elected President of Russia,
twice elected by the people of Russia; in democracy, they get to
make the decisions about the directions that they take. But I
don't think by any stretch of the imagination one can argue that
the current financial situation in Russia is a result of U.S.
actions.
Q Would the U.S. be open to a potential
renegotiation of the terms of the rescue package from the
International Monetary Fund? I mean, is that a possibility?
Secretary Summers?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: Clearly, following the
breaking of the ruble peg and the restructuring of the GATT and
the very profound problems that have arisen in the banking system
in the last several -- or surfaced in the banking system in the
last several weeks, but that were a long time in coming, you're
in a very different economic situation than contemplated in the
IMF Agreement that was reached.
So, clearly for Russia to go forward with the IMF
would require a new set of understandings appropriate to current
circumstances about Russian policy actions. With such policy
actions and commitments on the Russian part and an appropriate
framework, as I said earlier, we would continue to be prepared to
support IMF and other international financial institution
engagement in Russia. But at this point, the emphasis and the
priority has to be attached to the policy choices that Russia
makes.
Ultimately, what I think we've seen in each of the
many situations that we have confronted is that countries'
prospects depend upon their own policy choices. Financial
support can make a difference in contributing to confidence, in
reinforcing the momentum and the incentive for reform, but it is
ultimately a country's own policy choices that are of greatest
importance.
The question of leverage came up. Leverage is
important when you want to push somebody or encourage somebody to
do something that they don't think of as being in their interest.
In this case, the primary beneficiaries of successful economic
reform will be the Russian people and the Russian economy.
Q -- no longer believe that the Russians can meet
the requirements of the next tranche?
Q -- that there could be more IMF money, new IMF
money? Or were you talking about the basic $23-billion package
that was negotiated in July? Are you talking about a
restructuring of that package? Do you envision more money if
Russia takes the reform steps that you are asking them to?
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I think at this point it
is premature to talk about IMF support or to talk about the
parameters of the IMF support in detail because that has to be
put in the context of Russian economic policy which is what we're
waiting to see. And at this point, we don't have a Russian
economic team, we don't have a Russian economic plan. So I think
all I would want to say is that the policy has been consistent,
being prepared to support through the IMF strong policy from
Russia, but that has to be based on what the actions, the
particular actions, the framework that Russia establishes to
ensure that resources will be well used.
Q Do you believe it is no longer possible for
Russia to meet the requirements of the next tranche of the IMF
loan? Do you believe it's no longer possible for them to meet
the conditions that --
DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: I think that Russia, as I
said, Russia is in a very different economic situation because of
the devaluation, because of the restructuring, because of the
problems of the banking system that was contemplated in the
program. And so I think that there would need to be a new set of
understandings between Russia and the IMF before the provision of
support could go forward. In a context of such a new set of
understandings, certainly it is possible that the support that
had been previously committed could again be committed to support
reform in Russia.
Q Mr. Berger, could you give us your assessment
of how firmly President Yeltsin controls the Russian military
right now, and also tell us why it was that Ambassador Collins
met with communist leaders today?
MR. BERGER: On the first question, absolutely no
reason to believe that he is not in firm control of the military
and other elements of government. I specifically don't know why
Ambassador Collins met with the communists today, although it's
the job of an ambassador to meet not only with the government but
with a range of opposition figures. And since the communists are
the largest part in the Duma, that doesn't surprise me.
Q Mr. Berger, you mentioned in your opening
statement specific and concrete steps on the security agenda, and
then you later mentioned reduction in stockpiles of fissile
materials in the early warning agreement. Can you spell those
out in a little more detail?
MR. BERGER: Well, they're still -- I don't want to
be too much more specific until we see whether we can reach final
agreement on these. But these would involve plutonium stocks on
the one hand and on the other hand, information sharing on
missile launches. Both countries have quite sophisticated
national systems for early detection since the most likely
threats in the future -- at least in the foreseeable future --
come from third countries. To the extent to which we can make
arrangements to share that data on a real-time basis would
obviously be enormously stabilizing.
Q And in a plutonium proposal, are we offering to
reduce our stockpiles of fissile material as well?
MR. BERGER: Let me just leave it at that at this
point, and, hopefully, we'll have more to say or I'll just eat my
words.
Q In the prospect of a cutoff of assistance from
the international financial institutions, are there potentially
other avenues of support that the U.S. or its allies could offer,
particularly regarding your concern over nuclear stockpiles? We
have big arrears in the Russian military wages. Are there other
things that the U.S. can do to stabilize the situation through
assistance?
MR. BERGER: Well, there certainly have been,
through programs like Nunn-Lugar, assistance that has been
provided to Russia that have aided it in the process of
demilitarization, destruction of weapons. Those have all served
security needs and have been perceived by the Congress and
respective administrations as serving security needs of both the
United States and Russia. I think there continue to be areas
where that can be of benefit, but I think it would have to be
measured largely in security terms.
Q Is there an initiative planned to get a first
meeting between David Trimble and Gerry Adams either before or
during the President's visit?
MR. STEINBERG: I think the President has said, and
he's certainly said to the parties, that he thinks it's very
important that all of the parties related to the process begin to
work together effectively to get the assembly up and running.
That means that all of the parties who are going to be
participating in the assembly ought to work together. And we
would certainly hope that Mr. Trimble and Mr. Adams and all of
the others do have a chance to meet. We would certainly welcome
that and if it happened in connection with the visit or at any
other time, it would be something we would welcome.
Let me just say while I'm up here on a completely
unrelated matter, the President today is announcing his intention
to nominate former Governor Michael Sullivan as Ambassador to
Ireland. As you know, the Governor has an enormously successful
record as governor and he is somebody who the President has
enormous respect for. He's very active in the community and will
once again reaffirm the very strong ties between the United
States and the Irish Republic.
He will not go on the trip because we will wait
obviously until -- this is just an intent to nominate him and
have a confirmation. But this is somebody who has the personal
confidence about the President and the Secretary of State and
will continue a long tradition of having somebody who can really
express the personal as well as the political commitment between
the United States and the Irish Republic.
Q Do you have a list of congressional members who
are going on these trips? How big is the delegation?
MR. BERGER: There are, I believe, three members of
Congress going on the whole trip, and I believe 17 joining us in
Ireland. Don't hold me exactly to those numbers, because they
change from day to day.
Q Is that the smallest number you've ever had
with the three members to Russia?
MR. BERGER: What we ordinarily do on presidential
trips is ask each of the four leaders either to come with us or
to designate. So the basic package is four. Since the Senate is
in session next week, I think a number of senators were reluctant
to be gone; so that's why we're short one senator.
COLONEL CROWLEY: We think there are four now.
MR. BERGER: But not any more. (Laughter.) Because
Mr. Crowley has just found another senator. So there will be
three or four people going to Russia. Do you have the list? We
will release the list.
Q How much consideration did you give to delaying
this trip to Moscow?
MR. BERGER: I think over the past several days
we've obviously all looked at the issue in view of the crisis
that is going on in Moscow, and I think we owed it to the
President to not simply be on automatic pilot, but to ask
ourselves whether under these circumstances the trip should go
forward. And I think in the call this morning, which included
the President, the Vice President and most of the President's
both national security and national economic teams, there was
unanimous recommendation to the President, there was no dissent.
Each of the participants agreed that it was
extremely important for the President to go forward with the trip
and that even in this and perhaps because of, to some degree, of
the economic crisis, it is important both to be engaged, to be
seen by the Russian people as being engaged, to try to influence
the choices that Larry and Gene have discussed to the extent that
the President can, and to try to do as much business as we can on
the security and foreign policy areas.
Q Just a quick follow-up on the arms control
issue. Can you say whether, specifically, START II and the
modifications that the administration would like to make to the
ABM Treaty will be addressed?
MR. BERGER: Well, I'm sure they will be addressed,
but it is -- we originally had wanted to go to Russia after START
II was ratified so that we could begin intense negotiations on
START III. You will recall the Presidents at Helsinki reached a
kind of a framework for START III that would bring our nuclear
arsenals down to 80 percent of their Cold War levels.
It was clear as we headed into the spring and early
summer that the Duma was not going to act quickly on START II and
that in fact, the fact the President's trip was in some way
linked to that had become counterproductive in terms of action on
START II. And that is when, in June, the President decided we
needed to go forward and begin to plan the trip in any case.
So I would expect the two leaders to talk about it.
I would not expect any progress on this area. The next step,
obviously, is for the Duma to ratify START II, and I think what
we will try to do, both with the members of the Duma and with the
government, is to make the case, which was quite overwhelming,
that START II is not only in Russia's strategic interest, but
START II and then START III ultimately is in Russia's economic
interest, as you look at the kinds of investments that they would
otherwise need to make in strategic arms.
Q How about the ABM Treaty? Obviously, the
Republicans on the Hill want to scrap that completely and build
missile defenses. You guys want to modify it.
MR. BERGER: Again, I would imagine this would be
discussed. I would not anticipate any new agreements in that
area.
Q Is there any more progress on negotiations
about Iran, over Iran?
MR. BERGER: Well, this is a very important subject.
Let me take this last -- I'm glad you bring it up.
We have spent a great deal of time and effort in
working with the Russians to assist them in both articulating a
clear policy opposing cooperation with Iran on
missile technology, number one -- which President Yeltsin did --
number two, adopting the legal infrastructure that would enable
them to enforce that policy, which they have done through
regulations that they have adopted; and then, three, to enforce
those regulations against a vast network of Russian firms that
now no longer have the same degree of control, obviously, that it
did under the Soviet Union.
The Russians have made progress in this area. They
have not only done the things I've mentioned, but they've
actually launched investigations against nine companies. But it
is an area where I think more work is necessary and where we will
emphasize with the Russians that this is an area that needs
constant attention. And even during a period when there are a
lot of diversions, this is something that they need to focus on.
Thank you.
COLONEL CROWLEY: Just one thing before we go. I
wish to thank our colleagues from the White House Communications
Agency both here and up in Martha's Vineyard for working the tin
cans and the strings right so we could put this interactive
together. Thanks very much. We'll see you in Moscow.
END 5:15 P.M. EDT
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