03 October 1997
[EXCERPT] TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING, OCTOBER 3, 1997
BRIEFER: JAMES P. RUBIN FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1997 INDEX ARMS CONTROL 11-12 Dept. of Defense Laser Test/Not a Treaty Violation/Impact on Passage of START II by Russia RUSSIA 12-13 Control and Security of Nuclear Weapons Q: How does the State Department feel about the Pentagon's decision to go ahead with the anti-satellite test? RUBIN: Well, as you know, Carol, I have some familiarity with this issue over the years and there is always going to be discussions back and forth on a subject like this. But having checked with our people, I have no reason to believe that we here in the Department had any specific problem with this test. The reason is that the kind of test that it is doesn't pose any problem with becoming an anti-ballistic missile system and this experiment does not violate any arms control agreement. As you know, there is no anti-satellite treaty, other international law, or US domestic law. It is an experiment. It is designed to collect data that will help improve computer models used for planning protection measures for US satellites. This is not a test of an anti-satellite system. This experiment will not destroy the satellite, will not result in any orbital debris, and will not pose any risk to other satellites. Furthermore, this laser, as I said, does not have an ABM capability. We, therefore, see, no reason why this experiment should cause any problems with the Russians or any other country. I can't rule out that officials in the State Department might have asked some questions, but this is an experiment that we don't believe is anything but a good use of research and development funds. Q: Well, as the Secretary has argued in the case of the Middle East, where there is a climate of distrust or at least there is a problem or some tension, sometimes even things that seem to be in other situations maybe benign, in certain environments, they are viewed more as greater tension-producers. And I just wondered, given the fact that you're having so much trouble getting the START II treaty through the Russian Duma and that there are elements in the political ferment of Russia that are concerned about the ABM treaty and what the United States may be doing in terms of missile defenses, do you believe this is the right time for this kind of a test? RUBIN: Today is, what, Friday? Last Friday the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Russia signed two arms control agreements -- one very important one on the ABM treaty and how to make sure that anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses were permitted and strategic defenses were prohibited. We have been working very, very well with the Russians. There is no crisis of confidence in the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Frankly, Secretary Albright finds her ability to work very closely with Foreign Minister Primakov one of the true surprises and something she's very pleased about in her job. So there isn't the kind of environment in this case that would lead to the analogy that you were suggesting some might have. So we don't have trouble with this test. As I said, it's not a test of an anti-satellite system. It's an experiment that will not destroy the satellite, will not result in any debris, will not pose any risk, and we see no reason why it should be a problem, especially in an environment where things are moving forward with the Russians on subjects like the ABM Treaty. Q: (Inaudible) the Russians? RUBIN: Yeah, let's stick with Russia. I know where that next one's going. Q: Do you? I'll bet you do. An eminent Russian scientist came all the way from Moscow yesterday to testify to Mr. Weldon's Committee on the House that, indeed, he knew the scientists that designed and made these hand carryable munitions, sometimes called suitcase atomic devices, but they're not that small. He knows they exist. He knows that Lebed made a very accurate study. He testified to that effect and he believes, as Lebed does, that some of these weapons are unaccounted for. The Russians are saying that they never even existed; whereby, our Defense Department refutes that. Jamie, is there a problem with these types of weapons that the Russians will either not account for them or can't? RUBIN: Our view of allegations that numbers of suitcase-sized warheads were missing from Russia's inventory have not changed. There is no evidence other than hearsay to support such claims; therefore, we give such claims little credibility. Russian officials, including Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, as well as Defense Ministry Officials, Atomic Energy Ministry Officials and others have strongly denied these specific allegations and confirmed that all Russian nuclear warheads are under Russia's control. This is a subject of the highest possible interest to the Secretary of State and the President. We have a number of officials in this Department and many in other departments who work every day on programs to try to ensure that nuclear weapons don't get out of control. As you know, movies are made about the people who do work on this subject and there are a lot of them. We have remained in close and cooperative contact with Russia on questions involving command and control of their nuclear arsenals. The government of Russia continues to assure us that it retains adequate command and control and that appropriate physical security arrangements exist for these weapons and facilities. We have no reason or evidence to doubt these assurances. We believe Russia, like the US and other nuclear powers, produced nuclear weapons of various sizes from strategic warheads hundreds of kilograms in weight to smaller atomic demolition munitions. We cannot comment, however, about the precise specifications or dimensions of any nuclear weapons, but we have no information or evidence suggesting that nuclear weapons were ever developed for or put under the control of the KGB, which is part of the story here. The U.S. Government is taking considerable steps to assist Russia in improving the security of its nuclear materials and technology through the Nunn-Lugar program and other programs. The United States is working cooperatively with Russia and other governments to further enhance the physical security of Russian nuclear storage facilities. I've been following this issue for a long time and there are always different accounts of what happened in Russia during the Soviet period and what capabilities there were. There are many different experts who have many different opinions as to what was or wasn't happening. I can tell you this, that there's probably no issue where you have the combined resources of the US Government working as well together and with such determination as on the issue of security of nuclear weapons. We work on it every day -- hundreds, if not thousands, of people in the government -- and if they say that we have no information on this and they say that these accounts are hearsay that's pretty compelling. Q: Wouldn't it be appropriate to challenge them or to go to say (inaudible) the KGB head that was in charge at the time? RUBIN: Well, I welcome, you know, your efforts. I'm just saying that we worked this problem. We are aware of these allegations. This is not news to us, these kinds of stories. That's my point. So we do what we can here in the government to try to get to the bottom of stories, to try to work with the Russians. From the top all the way down to the lowest levels, there are always going to be stories that you can't ever get to the bottom of, but for now that's our position. Q: So, no challenge or accounting should be asked for of the Russians of these types of weapons? RUBIN: We have worked with the Russians on this subject and I am sure that in the course of that work the issue of atomic demolition munitions, which are the ones that might be small, have been discussed. .............. (end transcript)
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