18 September 1997
TEXT: NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL DISCUSSES MIR SPACE STATION
(Statement to House Committee on Science about safety) (2120) Washington -- Roberta L. Gross, inspector general at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, questioned whether NASA "has adequate processes and procedures to assess the risks versus the benefits" of participating in the Russian Mir Space Station program. Gross testified before the House Committee on Science September 18 at a hearing on the safety of the Mir Space Station. She noted that recent events aboard Mir, including a fire and the collision with the spacecraft Progress, "have heightened concerns about NASA's continued involvement in the Mir space missions." Mir is inherently riskier than other human space flight programs for NASA astronauts, Gross said, due to factors such as "NASA's lack of baseline information about Mir's systems and operating environment," language and cultural differences, differences in Russian and U.S. approaches to record-keeping and other procedures, and "telemetry limitations which curtail contact with the astronaut on board the Mir." Furthermore, Gross said, "NASA began the Shuttle-Mir program without benefit of a rigorous safety analysis or risk assessment of the program. This decision was based on several factors: lack of documentation by the Russians, the considerable cost and time needed to recreate the baseline information, and the reluctance of the Russians to share proprietary information." Since "the risk level associated with Mir operations appears to have increased" in recent months, Gross said, "we have raised for public consideration the question as to whether the current structures and processes for conducting risk assessment in the Mir Phase I program should be reorganized." Following is the text of the inspector general's statement: (Begin text) Statement of Roberta L. Gross Inspector General National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Committee on Science House of Representatives Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) participation in the Russian Mir Space Station Program. On July 11, 1997, the Honorable George E. Brown, Jr., and you requested that my office assess NASA's participation in this endeavor. Specifically, you asked my office to address: (1) the suitability of Russia's Mir space station for habitation by U.S. astronauts, (2) research productivity on board the Mir, and (3) cost effectiveness of continued NASA involvement in the Mir space station program. Recent events on the Mir -- the fire on February 23, 1997, and the collision with the spacecraft Progress in June 1997 -- have heightened concerns about NASA's continued involvement in the Mir space missions. Thus, we forwarded to you a brief overview of some of the risks that the Agency must assess against the benefits it hopes to achieve in this program. We explained that time constraints prevented our providing definitive answers to the specific questions you posed. I would like to have that letter and appendices entered into the record. I am not questioning whether astronaut participation aboard the Mir space station is risky -- of course it is. Human space exploration is inherently risky. The issue I am addressing in my written testimony is whether NASA has adequate processes and procedures to assess the risks versus the benefits of participating in this program. I have previously discussed some of my concerns with the Administrator. At his direction, the Agency will be making some responsive changes. My testimony should not be viewed as minimizing important scientific or technical gains that the United States has achieved through its participation during Phase I on the Mir space station. There have been critical lessons learned from working with the Russians that will impact on the operation of the International Space Station (ISS). These gains include insight into engineering, scientific, and human factor issues which NASA and its partners are applying to Phases II and III of the ISS. However, the American public has a right to expect important and meaningful results. NASA is investing sizable resources directly through its 4-year, $471 million dollar contract and through other resources applied to Russian-U.S. space programs (that is, Shuttle transport of supplies, equipment, and crew to and from the Mir). Nevertheless, the recent cluster of accidents, mishaps, and serious problems on the Mir raise an obvious question -- has NASA implemented appropriate oversight mechanisms, procedures, and controls to objectively and adequately assess the risks of continued astronaut flights aboard the Mir? Clearly, there are other important questions for the Agency to answer about the program. These include: the cause of the fire on board the Mir in February 1997, and the Progress collision in June 1997; the risk of future ethylene glycol leaks and their effect on astronaut health; the availability of crew, power, equipment, and proper environmental conditions on the Mir to conduct further meaningful science experiments; the proper training for the astronauts, including some basic training in the operation of the Soyuz (the "life boat" to be used by the crew in case of a life-threatening event or the premature termination of a flight, for example, health needs). I have briefly addressed these issues in my letter to the Chair and Representative Brown of this Committee. NASA is fully aware that recent events have raised safety and reliability concerns regarding Mir. For example, in his Mir Safety Status Briefing of April 3, 1997, for the Office of Space Flight Management Board, Astronaut Frank Culbertson, the NASA Shuttle-Mir Program Manager, identified many of the same problems we highlighted. He included the Elektron oxygen generator failures, the thermal control system leaks (which cause ethylene glycol leaks into the air and water on board Mir), the reduced availability of spares, and supplier and subcontractor difficulties. The recent flight readiness reviews reflect greater involvement by the United States in the Mir flight decisions for the astronauts. Nonetheless, we raise the question, does the assessment process need a major shift by increasing the oversight by NASA Headquarters? NASA has three mechanisms for assessing its participation on the Mir flights: (1) the NASA Shuttle-Mir Program Manager (Frank Culbertson) conducts internal safety reviews, (2) the NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance also conducts safety reviews, and (3) an external team led by Lieutenant General Tom Stafford, a former astronaut, reviews safety and operational readiness. As I stated previously, because of time constraints, we have not evaluated the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Regardless, both current and former NASA employees question the adequacy of the assessment process. Their concerns fall into three main categories: (1) the chilling impact on free discussion and criticism caused by the pivotal role of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) for the human space program, (2) the lack of independence of the Stafford team due to its perceived ties to the JSC Center Director, (3) and the reduced level of risk assessment performed because of the overriding goal to continue participation in the U.S.-Russian partnership. Some of those employees have also said that they feel it would jeopardize their careers to be frank in their opinions, observations, and assessments of the Mir program. These remarks were made by even those employees who support the mission and characterize it as being safe. In a human space program, free and open communication is an essential component. JSC's pivotal role reflects NASA's implementation of its strategic plan. The policy and oversight for the human space flight program resides with various Associate Administrators at Headquarters, including the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, for Safety and Mission Assurance, and for Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications (who is also the Chief Medical Officer). The strategic plan concentrates major responsibility for the implementation of the human space program at JSC. It is the Lead Center for Space Operations, Phase I Mir, ISS, Space Shuttle, Advanced Human Support Technology, Biomedical Research and Countermeasures, and Gravitational Biology and Ecology. The following JSC offices (among others) play key roles in the Phase I human space program: the Flight Crew Operations Directorate; the Astronaut Office; the Office of the Manager, Phase I Program; the local Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office; and the Medical Science Division. The ISS and, in particular, Phase I Mir space station program, is a different paradigm for NASA regarding safety and risk assessment. This paradigm poses increased risks for the astronauts in Phase I because of various factors. These include: NASA's lack of baseline information about Mir's systems and operating environment; the learning curve associated with working with the Russian government (for example, language and cultural differences); different approaches to assessments, protocols, documentation, and record-keeping; differences in working under public scrutiny; and telemetry limitations which curtail contact with the astronaut on board the Mir. NASA began the Shuttle-Mir program without benefit of a rigorous safety analysis or risk assessment of the program. This decision was based on several factors: lack of documentation by the Russians, the considerable cost and time needed to recreate the baseline information, and the reluctance of the Russians to share proprietary information. The Agency had to make a decision as to whether it wanted to begin a long duration flight mission program so as to apply the lessons learned to Phases II and III of the ISS. Based on the historically safe performance of Mir operations, NASA agreed to participate in the program. The Phase I baseline safety concept was that each partner would be responsible for the safety and flight readiness certification of its own vehicles. We believe that because of the different risk assumptions in the ISS program, particularly the Mir-Phase I program, the Agency should seriously consider whether the concentration of program responsibility at JSC provides sufficient checks and balances to ensure adequate program assessments. Are there proper checks and balances when JSC has major implementation responsibilities for the Phase I program, has a major voice in the selection of astronauts for the limited flight opportunities, and oversees both the astronaut medical program and the local safety, reliability, and quality assurance office? Will astronauts be candid about their assessments, opinions, and observations if they perceive that the price of candor is to risk their participation in flight opportunities? Will medical and safety risk assessments be properly considered and presented when those officials report to the Center Director who is responsible for operation of the program? Instead of the current arrangements, should the astronaut medical office and the safety, reliability, and quality assurance officials as well as the astronauts be located at JSC but report to Headquarters officials? This arrangement would better ensure their independence and serve as a check and balance to the program implementation focus of JSC. In other words, should the Associate Administrators for Space Flight, for Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Chief Medical Officer be given greater oversight responsibilities for the program? More than a decade ago, NASA went through a painful examination as to the cause of the crew's death in the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986. Two recommendations from the "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident" (referred to as the Rogers' Commission Report) may have some application to the current situation. The Rogers' Commission strongly endorsed the need for a strong, central safety, reliability, and quality assurance function. It also recommended that NASA needed to create a climate which would improve internal communications. The report suggested that the Agency should take energetic steps by making changes in personnel, organization, or indoctrination (in the context of Marshall Space Flight Center's tendency toward management isolation). (See Rogers' Commission Report, Recommendations IV and V, Volume I, p.199) I want to underscore -- I am raising these issues as concerns. We have not conducted a systematic evaluation of NASA's risk assessment procedures. Instead, we have spent these last few months trying to gain insight of NASA's assessment efforts both here and in Russia. As a result, we believe that in the context of the different paradigm of the ISS program, particularly Phase I, NASA should carefully reassess the current implementation of its strategic plan as it applies to the current oversight role of NASA Headquarters. Conclusion: When the Shuttle-Mir program began, NASA accepted the basic safety of the Mir based upon historically safe operations. However, in recent months the risk level associated with Mir operations appears to have increased. We have raised for public consideration the question as to whether the current structures and processes for conducting risk assessment in the Mir Phase I program should be reorganized. Does this Russian-U.S. partnership require increased Headquarters oversight? This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or members of the committee may have at this time. (End text)
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