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Military News Bulletin Vol. V, No. 12
(60) December, 1996

RUSSIA AND ITS ARMED FORCES IN CHANGING EUROPE

From the speech of General of the Army Igor RODIONOV, Defence Minister of Russia, in the Italian Centre for High Military Studies on 14 November 1996

I will address several key issues characterising the current internal and external military policy of Russia, the situation of its Armed Forces and certain military aspects of international relations developing in Europe.

The basic vector of socio-political changes in Russia is its choice in favour of a completely new direction of historical development. The progress towards a post-socialist society proved to be difficult. We have come across many painful problems and processes.

The facets of this contradiction are best seen in the attitude to defence and security, which is expressed in the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of Russia. I will speak about the military-strategic aspect of the problem, which has a moulding influence on the notions of defence and security of the state in new conditions, characterised by the absence of a national security concept.

ON THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Basic Provisions of the Russian Military Doctrine consist of three intertwined parts: political, military, military-technical and economic.

The essence and contents of the political aspect of the military doctrine constitute two interdependent tasks: to prevent a war and to repel a potential aggressor.

The political part of the military doctrine includes fundamentally new provisions, such as:

• Russia does not regard any state as its enemy;
• nuclear weapons are regarded above all not as a means of waging hostilities, but as a means of deterring an aggression.

The military aspect of the doctrine deals with the tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops and the organisation of control of them. It is important that the Russian Armed Forces have been given new tasks, such as involvement in peace-keeping operations by decision of the UN Security Council and other collective security agencies, or in accordance with Russia's international obligations, first of all in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Another new element is the provision on the admissibility of the deployment of Russian troops and facilities at bases beyond the national territory, if this serves the interests of Russia and other CIS states.

The military-technical and economic aspect of the military doctrine stipulates the aims, principles and directions of the development of the system of weapons of the Armed Forces and the national defence industries in conditions of a transition to a market economy.

The fundamentally new elements here are:

• the creation of an optimal system of weapons and military hardware ensuring a higher combat effectiveness through quality;
• the satisfaction of the requirements of the Armed Forces and other troops for weapons, military hardware and property, with due account for the scientific-technical and economic possibilities of the country;
• the concentration of financial and material-technical resources in the priority directions of the provision of military-technical supplies to the Armed Forces and other troops.

The basic provisions of the Russian military doctrine are a document of the transition period. They will be geared to changes in the military-political situation in the world, the continued development of Russia and the reform of its Armed Forces and other troops.

ON DEFENCE

What defences does the new Russia need? What internal and external factors should be taken into account to ensure a correct development of defences? These are the main strategic, doctrinal questions of the national military policy, which call for correct and clear-cut answers.

The thing is that Russia, as one of the world's largest states, has its global and regional strategic interests. We were once too "shy" to openly proclaim them, while the USA has always proclaimed its global strategic interests boldly and present this position as a long-term and invariable element of its foreign policy.

On the global plane, Russia is interested in a progressive development of civilisation and the strengthening of economic, political, cultural, scientific, military and other ties and contacts with all countries.

The sheer size of the Russian Federation, situated in both Europe and Asia, predetermine its vital interests on the Eurasian continent. To begin with, the sphere of Russia's vital interests includes the independent CIS states, which had been Soviet republics only recently. Politico-economic and military relations with them are of prime importance for Russia.

In elaborating a new military policy of Russia, we are trying to abandon theoretical attitudes, old ideological dogmas and the principle of building up fears. Today we need deep, honest and objective calculations. This is especially important because in the current conditions Russia can allocate only limited resources on defence.

National defence in modern conditions is a package of interrelated political, economic, military, social, legal and other measures taken to ensure the state's readiness for guaranteed defence against a potential aggression, the protection of the population and its security, and territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state.

Defence should be economically possible; it should not be an unbearable burden for the national economy. On the other hand, defence should not be excessively light; it should be sufficient for an adequate reaction of the country to any threats to its security. If these threats grow, the defence might of the state should grow accordingly, and vice versa. In other words, defence should be flexible and mobile.

Proceeding from the modern realities, Russia's defences should be based on deterrence.

ON THE MILITARY REFORM

The system of views on the nature of defence determines our attitude to the military reform and the reform of the Armed Forces as a whole. Today we face the following key tasks:

• to maintain the combat readiness and ability of the Armed Forces;
• to improve the composition and infrastructure of the military districts, fleets and the control system of the Armed Forces as a whole;
• to fulfil peace-keeping functions beyond the national territory and honour certain international obligations of the former Soviet Union;
• to streamline the combat structure of the arms and services of the Armed Forces and organise their control in new conditions.

The Defence Ministry and the General Staff are preparing to launch a package of measures to change the composition of and to continue to reduce the Armed Forces. The strength of the Armed Forces dwindled by more than one million servicemen since May 1992. We continue to consistently introduce a mixed system of drafting servicemen.

Our multilateral military cooperation with the CIS states spotlights the solution of problems related to the creation of a collective security system based on the 1992 Collective Security Treaty of the CIS States.

We see the future of the Russian Armed Forces in using a rational composition of the Strategic Nuclear Forces to ensure guaranteed nuclear prevention of an all-out war and to prevent and localise armed conflicts in the vicinity of Russian borders.

The improvement of the Russian Armed Forces should take into account changes in the military-political situation in the world and in the socio-economic situation at home, and satisfy the demands of ensuring the national military security.

The army and the military reforms are two things apart. A real and effective reform of the Armed Forces can take place when the whole of the state's defence system is reformed on a clear-cut conceptual basis, when each new carefully substantiated measure to reform the army and the navy proceeds on guaranteed financial, social, everyday, military-technical basis and a system of efficiently fulfilled military orders.

Hence the question: What army do we need?

In answering this question we should take into account the factor of existing and potential military threats to Russia.

We know that many subjects of global policy have not renounced the use of force for attaining their interests and are spending vast sums of money on the development and improvement of their armies and weapons, the creation of new means of destruction based on the latest scientific achievements.

The strategic formula of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is simple and easy to understand: To use a smaller army and navy to ensure a better quality of defence of the state.

The armed services cannot be reduced indiscriminately. We should elaborate an individual attitude to and the speed of the reduction of each one of them.

When determining the strategy of the reform of the Armed Forces, we do not forget about the recent major changes in the military-political situation in Europe and the rest of the world. We see that the world has changed. Russia wants detente to become irreversible, since the reduction of the risk of a nuclear war has always met the interests of all nations of the world.

RUSSIA AND THE NEW MODEL OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

I believe that even despite a major thaw in Russia's relations with many countries of Europe and other continents, it would be premature to think that there is no military threat to this country. The threat of local crises and conflicts engendered by territorial, ethnic, religious and other differences has grown in the past few years. One graphic proof of this is the developments in the former Yugoslavia and in some sovereign republics of the former Soviet Union.

We can say that Russia has entered a new stage of real partnership relations in many spheres, including in the solution of strategic problems of regional security. The time has come for pooling efforts in the creation of a new security system in Europe, which would be free of elements of power confrontation and attempts to impose one's will on the partners. We are prepared to work constructively with everyone in this sphere.

Our position, which has been more than once stated at all levels, is to build a new security system in Europe on the basis of OSCE, which should act as the centre coordinating the efforts of all basic regional institutions, including the renewed NATO, to create an effective mechanism for the solution of all regional security problems.

We believe that the fundamental principles of this new system of European security should be freedom from the bloc influence, comprehensive control over weapons and equal level of security for all European states.

Of course, to implement this concept we should seal the central role of OSCE in ensuring security and stability in Europe, strengthen the political institutes of this organisation, and elaborate a universal document on the basic principles and criteria of its efforts to maintain peace and to prevent, localise and liquidate seats of tension.

Now about the position of the West. We believe that some leading Western countries think that the new European security system has been virtually created on the basis of NATO. Their main argument is the successful solution of the problem of the post-Yugoslav settlement and the operation of the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is presumed that the NATO leadership will continue to play the key role in solving such problems, determining the aggressor and the victim, whom to disarm and whom to arm. The claims that NATO is the only guarantor of security in Europe and the proclamation of the idea of NATO expansion actually divide European countries into NATO members and non-members.

But what should non-members, including Russia, do in this situation? Bow to the NATO decisions, or try to pass the examination for political maturity by Western standards and join the bloc?

All aspiring countries, waiting for the NATO decision, will remain in the sights of the well-oiled military machine of the bloc, which has also nuclear weapons. Of course, we may be assured that these weapons are not targeted at us. But the question is: At whom are they targeted then?

It is surprising that we are regarded as simpletons. They think that we will believe these assurances and disregard the movement of the NATO military infrastructure towards out borders. We are seriously worried by the fact that this will reduce the flight time of NATO planes from the western borders to our strategic facilities many times over. We are also carefully analysing other major consequences of this potential threat.

I think we should discuss this problem not from the standpoint of unconditional belief in one's infallibility, but on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the current situation in Europe and Russia. We wouldn't like to turn out to be bad construction workers, who save on materials and consequently build a faulty foundation of the future building of European security.

The Western variant neglects the main principle of ensuring a stable peace in Europe, the principle of equal security for all European states irrespective of their political and economic weight, military might and membership of military alliances.

At the same time, we are happy to note that the leading European countries understand the necessity of approving a concise but politically comprehensive document at the OSCE summit in Lisbon on 2-3 December, which would set forth a practical working programme for creating a security system at the next stage. This document should reflect the basic principles of building a system of European security. But the principles alone will not suffice. We should ensure the formalisation of decisions, in particular reach an agreement on launching the legal formalisation of the future security system and on elaborating a network of agreements or memoranda of understanding between the organisations dealing with security problems.

As for Russia-NATO relations, one element of our attitude to the problem is the development of all-round cooperation with the alliance, provided it renounces its plans of quantitative expansion of its military organisation. We believe that NATO should change in order to gear to the new European realities and become a major political element of the system of European security, rather that its foundation relying on military force.

We regard Russia's involvement in the Partnership for Peace programme from the same viewpoint. It can help us to establish partnership relations with NATO adequate to the current European realities, and the first positive steps in this direction have been already taken.

At the same time, we regard our involvement in partnership functions as a contribution to preventing the programme from eventually turning into a transition stage in the process of the NATO expansion. We take into account the previous assurances, voiced at different levels during the elaboration of the programme, to the effect that partnership should become the alternative to the NATO expansion. But facts prove that these promises have been broken, and this worries us. We will have to review our attitude to Russia's involvement in the programme if this trend persists.

There are enough threats in Europe now. They are the continued ethnic conflicts, internal tensions in some states, economic and ecological problems. It is our common task to liquidate and prevent them, rather than initiate new conflicts.

In this context, it is vital to strengthen stability through arms control and confidence-building measures. The modernisation of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the elaboration and implementation of new confidence-building measures, and the stabilisation of the situation in some regions of Europe will provide an effective reply to the challenges to military security.

The Mediterranean region is vital for ensuring security and stability in Europe and the rest of the world. The inter-state contradictions in that region, such as the war in former Yugoslavia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, constant tensions between Greece and Turkey, the unsettled problem of Cyprus, and the low level of socio-economic development of some regional countries exert a pernicious influence on European security as a whole.

Russia is doing its best to strengthen peace in that region, and is trying to energise dialogue with all Mediterranean countries on the issues which can promote security and cooperation in the region. We are monitoring the implementation of the decisions made at the Barcelona conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Naval activities in the Mediterranean directly affect the military-strategic situation in the region. We are advocating the curtailment of naval activity in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and the reduction of the presence of foreign naval forces there, which, I think, pose a threat to security both in the Mediterranean and beyond it.

Russia believes that the elaboration of the principles and methods of ensuring the safety of navigation, especially in international straits, by the Mediterranean and other concerned countries will play a positive role in turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace, neighbourly relations and cooperation.

As for regional security as a whole, we welcome the statements made by the Mediterranean states on their intention to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of each other, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other and to resolve all disputes peacefully. Russia believes that priority in the creation of a new Europe should be given to equal involvement of all European states in the process and respect for their security interests.

It is important to elaborate the procedure for establishing, training and using multinational peace-keeping forces designed to prevent and settle conflicts and crises.

Russia's interest was awakened by the decision of the defence ministers of Italy, Spain, Portugal and France on the establishment of a rapid deployment land force designed to fulfil humanitarian and peace- keeping tasks independently and in collaboration with other NATO military groups. We are prepared to collaborate with such armed groups, working under the auspices of the UN or OSCE, in the interests of international peace.

Russian military observers are taking part in the UN peace- keeping operations in Syria, Egypt, Israel, on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, in Western Sahara, former Yugoslavia, Georgia and Angola. Russia's military contingents are involved in the UN peace-keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia and Angola.

Moreover, Russia has shouldered the bulk of responsibility in the peace-keeping operations in all volatile regions of the former Soviet Union since the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The peace-keeping forces of Russia and the other CIS states, are working in close collaboration with respected international organisations to localise the conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Moldova. Their efforts were instrumental in ending the bloodshed and active hostilities in South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

* * *

The Russian Defence Minister pointed out that there are a great deal of latent possibilities in the Russo-Italian military relations. Seeking to create a legal basis for bilateral cooperation in the military and military-technical spheres, Igor Rodionov said, the Italian Defence Minister and I signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the military-technical sphere and between our defence industries, and an agreement on defence cooperation between our defence ministries.

General of the Army Igor Rodionov expressed the conviction that the implementation of these two documents will give a new impetus to the development of mutually advantageous relations between Russia and Italy and between their defence departments.