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CIS Collective Security

Moscow VOORUZHENIYE, POLITIKA, KONVERSIYA, 1 Jun 96 No 1 pp 12-15
Interview with Vladimir Mikhaylovich Mashchits, first deputy minister of Russian Federation for Cooperation with CIS Member States, candidate of economic sciences, doctor of highest degree in field of economic sciences of San Marino International Academy of Sciences, academician of Russian Engineering Academy and International Engineering Academy, by VOORUZHENIYE, POLITIKA, KONVERSIYA]

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Mashchits completed Moscow State University in the specialty of economist. He worked in the USSR Scientific Research Institute of the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration], the USSR Academy of Sciences TsEMI [Central Economics/Mathematical Institute], then as deputy director of the Economic Policy Institute. During 1991-1993 he was chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Member States and, after the Committee's reorganization, first deputy minister of the Russian Federation for Cooperation with Commonwealth Member States. Vladimir Mikhaylovich is a candidate of economic sciences, doctor of the highest degree in the field of economic sciences of San Marino International Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Engineering Academy and International Engineering Academy, and the author of many scientific works and economic programs for transition to a market economy (including "500 Days").

[VPK] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, please tell us about the Collective Security Treaty adopted in May 1992 and about the work of the CIS Collective Security Council.

[Mashchits] One has to recall relatively recent events, although at times already it does seem that they occurred long ago, as time now has been compressed so much and important events follow one after the other.

After disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of the CIS, Army units located on territory of Union republics went over to their jurisdiction, and arms, military equipment and infrastructure went over to the ownership of the new states. The strongest military groupings were disposed in the western part of the USSR: three military districts in Ukraine, Belorussian Military District in Belorussia, Baltic Military District in Baltic countries and Transcaucasus Military District on the territory of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These were military districts of the first category, and it was basically so-called interior districts manned enormously worse and not outfitted with the newest weapons that were on RSFSR territory. True, troops stationed in Germany and in former Warsaw Pact countries subsequently were withdrawn to Russia, but their combat effectiveness was substantially lowered in the redeployment and new bases were not sufficiently prepared.

It must be said that from the very beginning Russia favored another principle of dividing up Union property: not according to the principle of "whatever is located there belongs to that person," but according to the principle of division proportionate to the contribution that had been made by each republic. But this approach met with stiff resistance on the part of the new states. They realized that the Russian Federation had been the greatest contributor. The fact is that a number of Union republics constantly were being subsidized from the state budget, the lion's share of which was being provided by Russia. Therefore the principle of proportional division would have led to where Russia would have had the "controlling share" of many installations. At that time the new states did not wish to have structures on their territory belonging to or controlled by another state. Unfortunately, this position of Russia remained unknown to the majority of our people.

The division of the USSR Armed Forces according to a territorial feature led to where a number of new states simply were incapable of financing the activities of military units that had fallen to their lot. Thus, a powerful grouping numbering 1.3 million persons and outfitted with the newest arms ended up on the territory of Ukraine, and 20 percent of the former USSR's nuclear potential was there.

After the USSR's disintegration, many new states at first favored retaining common [obshchiye] armed forces (OVS) for collective security. They believed that national armed forces must be small. In particular, former Ukraine President L. M. Kravchuk spoke of a numerical strength of the national armed forces on the order of 100,000 persons. Subsequently the positions of heads of new states underwent great changes. Three points played a substantial role in this. The first and main one was economic. The new states were in no position to allocate funds for maintaining common armed forces proportionate to their participation. The second was that the army was an attribute of statehood. Finally, the third one was the desire to place the "power ministers" under their own control. Therefore each state began establishing their own Ministry of Defense and forming rather large armed forces. It must be said that Russia was one of the last to take such steps.

But the idea of CIS collective security continued to exist. At a session of the Council of Heads of CIS Member States in early 1992, an Agreement was approved on organizing the work of the Main Command of the Common Armed Forces. Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov was appointed commander in chief and the ministers of defense of Commonwealth states and chief of staff of the Common Armed Forces became his deputies. The primary mission of the Main Command was to ensure centralized command and control and unified control of strategic forces located on the territory of Commonwealth independent states. Such forces included the Strategic Missile Troops, Air Strategic Nuclear Forces, Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces, Missile-Space Defense Troops, nuclear-technical units and strategic reconnaissance personnel and assets.

It was planned to establish special forces to carry out coordinated measures for preventing and eliminating local conflicts on CIS external borders and inside the CIS. It also was proposed to retain the unified air defense system on CIS territory.

The Treaty on Collective Security of CIS Countries was signed on 15 May 1992, but disintegration processes subsequently developed in Commonwealth countries and the parliaments of individual states adopted uncoordinated statutes on defense questions.

In 1992 the Russian Army was formed and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff was reorganized as the Russian General Staff. On 10 June 1993 the Russian Federation President appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov secretary of the Security Council, after which the position of CINC Common Armed Forces was abolished and the Combined Staff of the Common Armed Forces remained in place of the Main Command. But the role of the Common Armed Forces Combined Staff turned out to be very limited inasmuch as nuclear forces still were being transferred to the Russian Federation (all tactical ones already had been transferred and transfer is ending for strategic ones), the traditional vertical control of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons was being restored, and special troops against local conflicts had not been established.

Today the status of the question of ensuring collective security of Commonwealth countries is rather complicated. Only 7 of the 12 Commonwealth states have signed the Collective Security Treaty. The parties have different opinions on a large number of issues, but the very idea of collective security is very productive and it is necessary to continue work on it.

There are a large number of persuasive factors attesting to a positive approach. It is above all the many- sided ties among Commonwealth countries in matters of economics and also purely psychological and personal ties. Military and military-technical questions also play a role of no small importance. All have one and the same weapons and military equipment, and all military cadres have gone through one and the same school. A tentative assessment shows that defense expenditures can be 2-3 times less in providing collective security than with an individual approach.

This is confirmed by the European Commission in Brussels, which believes that rationalization of military expenditures aimed at ensuring collective security in Western Europe can save member countries up to 11 billion ECU's per year. In implementing these ideas, France and Germany already have formed a common arms procurement office.

Unfortunately, Commonwealth countries have a number of difficulties in realizing collective security such as the shortage of funds for maintaining armed forces and for financing the military-industrial complex. Another difficulty is the desire to build new statehood on national foundations. Some Commonwealth countries, above all Ukraine, have declared that they will not join any military alliances.

[VPK] What specific measures have been taken by the Collective Security Council?

[Mashchits] The Collective Security Council is a political consultative body which includes representatives of all member countries and is subordinate to the Commonwealth Heads of State Council.

The CIS has the Heads of State Council, Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council, and Ministers of Defense Council, and recently the Ministers of Internal Affairs Council was formed, which is to coordinate the fight against crime. There also are a large number of economic assistance entities.

It is possible to speak about several major problems with which the Collective Security Council is dealing, above all peacemaking activity and formation of peacemaking forces. Of course, Russia has the main participation and bears the main expenditures for this activity, but other Commonwealth countries also have been joining in recently. Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzia are participating in the peacemaking forces in Tajikistan. Work is being done on the collective security concept. This is much difficult work. Its difficulty also is determined by the absence of national security concepts as official documents in many Commonwealth countries, including the Russian Federation.

A major problem with which the Collective Security Council and Common Armed Forces Staff now are dealing is restoration of a unified air defense system.

A unified missile attack warning system and unified air defense system existed in the Soviet Union. After the USSR's disintegration, some air defense command posts which were left outside of Russia ceased to function and became worthless. Eight warning stations were built in the Soviet Union to monitor outer space: in Belorussia, the Baltic, in Ukraine near the city of Mukachevo, in Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, in the Urals, near Irkutsk, in Kazakhstan and in the Caucasus. A ninth station was being built at Krasnoyarsk and presently has been dismantled inasmuch as it was believed to be intended for an ABM defense system and the number of phased array radars was limited by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Thus, only three of all these radars are located on Russian territory. Russia concluded an agreement about operating the station in the Baltic for five years, and the other radars abroad are functioning somehow. At a meeting of CIS heads of state in January 1995 the CINC Air Defense Troops reported that a combined air defense system had begun to function. An information exchange system had been restored and in October 1995 a check of working capacity was made and operators were drilled with aircraft flights. The draft Concept of Security of Air Borders provides for directions of development of air defense and resolution of military tactical and troop training problems. It propose ways to reinforce air defense on Baltic, Black Sea and Caspian axes, proposes an improvement of the system in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and proposes establishing air defense in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Russia's help to other Commonwealth states is envisaged on a compensatory basis, and an exchange of technologies and restoration of a number of industrial enterprises are planned.

But it is quite obvious that great efforts and funds are needed to restore the unified system for monitoring and defense of airspace and outer space. Russia cannot maintain it alone and for now it is not quite clear to what degree other Commonwealth states are prepared to finance it. In addition to this work, the Collective Security Council holds regular consultations and resolves military- technical and military cadre training problems. In particular, Russia's higher military educational institutions are training and retraining officers for a number of Commonwealth countries. Again, difficulties of a financial nature arise in resolving this problem.

[VPK] What does the Collective Security Treaty give Russia?

[Mashchits] Commonwealth member states are linked historically and have many mutual political and economic interests and the same military-technical base and infrastructure. Many Russians left outside the Russian Federation ended up there not because that is what they wanted, but because that is how circumstances shaped up. Many have relatives and friends living in Russia. Of course, Russia cannot just simply leave them to the mercy of fate. Russia also has interests in Commonwealth countries in the area of the defense-industrial complex. The fact is that many completing articles for arms and military equipment are manufactured at enterprises in CIS countries, and a large repair base was left there. It is difficult and often simply disadvantageous to arrange the manufacture of these products in Russia.

Today the situation is shaping up so that not geopolitics, but economics plays the main role in the area of collective security and national security of CIS countries. Therefore on 19 January 1996 the CIS Heads of State Council confirmed the resolve to deepen the Commonwealth's economic integration. Creation of a Customs Union and Payments Union was recognized as the basic mechanism for managing cooperation. In 1995 Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan joined the Customs Union. It is expected that Kyrgyzstan will join them in the near future, then other Commonwealth countries have to decide this question.

As parties to the Customs Union, Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan already received a substantial benefit in 1995: mutual trade turnover rose for them.

But it must be borne in mind that Russia is the largest CIS donor; the overall debt of Commonwealth countries to Russia is around nine billion dollars, and there still is no sufficiently effective system of mutual settlements in the CIS.

Russia's political and economic domination in the CIS region took shape historically. This situation now is averting economic ruin and national discord and deterring national ambitions. Questions concerning financial, economic and political support of Commonwealth countries are not being resolved at the international level without Russia's concurrence. At the same time, a big problem connected with great-power psychology exists in Russia. Russia probably is the only country in the world which had colonies, but people of the mother country only lost from this. It was not that the mother country lived at the expense of the colonies, but the colonies lived at the expense of the mother country. This situation also was preserved in the times of the Soviet Union's existence, when many Union republics received subsidies from the budget and developed at Russia's expense. True, this development often was irrational and brought troubles to peoples of the republics. Suffice it to recall the one-sided development of the Central Asian republics and the saturation of Kazakhstan with military ranges. But although the Russian people were being robbed, great-power psychology continued to be instilled in them and it also has been preserved now. This sometimes leads to unnecessary complications in mutual relations with CIS partners and often causes a retaliatory reaction in the form of local nationalism and the oppression of ethnic Russians living in different Commonwealth states.

The economic situation in Russia itself also is very difficult and appropriations for upkeep and outfitting of the Armed Forces and for financing the work of defense enterprises have been reduced sharply. This naturally led to reduced combat readiness of troops, as demonstrated in Chechnya, to where soldiers are gathered from all of Russia. The need for Russian Army reform matured long ago. Inasmuch as we cannot maintain a large army and provide it with everything necessary, it is obviously necessary to reduce its numerical strength sharply. Let us have enormously fewer regiments, brigades and divisions, but they must be combat effective and be supported with the most modern arms. The regular army has existed in Russia for over 300 years and military reforms have been conducted repeatedly. The successful military reform of Milyutin and the military reform of the 1920's can be recalled.

There now are no states on Russia's borders which would threaten its national security. The Collective Security Treaty enables Russia to conduct military reform calmly without fearing aggressive actions of other states. Thus, the Collective Security Treaty is advantageous both to Russia as well as other Commonwealth states.

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