Status of Nuclear Weapons Complex in Near Abroad Countries
Moscow YADERNYY KONTROL: OBOZRENIYE PO PROBLEMAM ORUZHIYA MASSOVOGO UNICHTOZHENIYA V ROSSII I NOVYKH NEZAVISIMYKH GOSUDARSTVAKH , Jan 96 No 13, pp 15-23
by Valentin Zakharov, Andrey Sviridov and Ildar Akchurin, associates of All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automation (VNIIA)
1. An idea of the structure of the nuclear weapons complex, detailed to the level of elements fundamental to nuclear weapons development and production, and an idea of the elements' functional purpose;
2. The makeup of each element of the nuclear weapons complex, detailed to the level of enterprises comprising the technological chain of production of fissionable materials and nuclear weapon components;
3. Information on the presence of necessary elements of the nuclear weapons complex and enterprises of the technological chain of production of a particular nuclear weapon component in the country in question.
The experience of nuclear powers shows that the elements and their interconnections schematically depicted in Fig. 1 are fundamental to nuclear weapons development and production.
Fig. 1. Generalized block diagram of structure of nuclear weapons complex and functional connections among its elements In examining each element of this diagram, we will point out the following. Specialists estimate that to create nuclear weapons it is necessary to have approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists, and the proportion of nuclear specialists [atomshchiki] among them should be no more than 10 percent. In other words, to create nuclear weapons a country must have around 100 highly skilled nuclear specialists of various specialties. Of course, this is a very approximate estimate, but it permits becoming orientated in analyzing a specific country's capabilities for creating nuclear weapons.
Typical Scheme for Component Production and Nuclear Weapon Assembly
The experience of nuclear powers in creating nuclear weapons shows that the following are fundamental to producing nuclear weapons: enterprises producing uranium components of nuclear weapons if weapons are being created based only on weapon- grade uranium;enterprises producing plutonium components of nuclear weapons if weapons are being created based only on weapon- grade plutonium;
both of the above enterprises when creating weapons of more sophisticated schemes based on uranium and plutonium;
enterprises manufacturing nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons;
enterprises assembling nuclear weapons.
Fig. 2 shows the schematic structure of a nuclear weapons production complex. The generalized diagram of the nuclear industry should permit identifying those production elements (links) which can be replaced by external connections if necessary.
Fig. 2. Block diagram of nuclear weapons production complex
Analysis of Uranium Production Diagram
The experience of industrial development of many countries attests that far from all links in the technological chain of enriched uranium production are mandatory for each country. Trade in uranium ores, concentrates and even natural uranium metal presently has become widespread in the practice of interstate economic and production ties. Trade in uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), a stable, crystalline substance rather convenient for transporting and warehousing, also is possible.The entire subsequent technological process--after obtaining the UF4--precludes replacing any of its links with an external connection. This is determined by the fact that uranium isotope separation by all presently known industrial methods requires its transfer to a gaseous phase. This is ensured by uranium fluorination (through the stage of obtaining UF4) until uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is obtained. UF 6 is a substance which is in a solid phase up to a temperature of 56[DEG] and sublimates at that temperature.
Therefore obtaining UF6, separating its isotopes and obtaining enriched uranium oxides usually are combined technologically (and territorially) into a single complex. Thus, the technological chain of enriched uranium production can be divided into the part permitting some or all links to be replaced by import, and the part mandatory for organizing enriched uranium production within the country ( Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Diagram of technological chain of enriched uranium production indicating links permitting replacement by import
Analysis of Plutonium Production Diagram
When people speak about plutonium production, they usually mean the production of weapon-grade plutonium (i.e., plutonium where Pu-240 isotope content does not exceed several percent; the United States, for example, sets maximum Pu-240 content at a 6 percent level). The nuclear production reactor, the determining link in this chain, usually uses uranium metal fuel elements (which substantially simplifies radiochemical reprocessing after irradiation) and operates in a low fuel burn-up regime (which ensures accumulation of plutonium with a low Pu-240 isotope content in irradiated fuel elements). The presence or construction of such a reactor unequivocally indicates a country's intent to create nuclear devices [zaryad] of its own production. At the same time, there is a fundamental opportunity to use plutonium which forms in AES [nuclear power station] fuel elements for creating a nuclear device. It should be borne in mind that using energy-grade plutonium in a device for weapons is no less difficult a problem than obtaining weapon-grade plutonium for the device. The main difficulties are as follows.First. At present it is difficult to imagine a country without a developed nuclear industry deciding to build an AES and the enterprises supporting its operation completely on its own. Economically this is far beyond the bounds of what is reasonable, although in principle it is also possible. And construction of an AES with the help of foreign firms is practically completely under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], as is their subsequent operation. Therefore AES irradiated fuel also is under IAEA control, its overt reprocessing is fraught with political complications, and covert reprocessing is practically impossible. Therefore special attention should be given to the presence of international and other restrictions in assessing the possibility of using energy-grade plutonium for military needs.
Second. The overwhelming majority of modern nuclear power stations use water-moderated water-cooled reactors (boiling or with water under pressure) using an enriched fuel oxide. As a result of operating reactors in an economically advantageous high burn-up regime, irradiated fuel must be "cooled" in storage facilities (as a rule, in reservoirs with water) for approximately three years before being shipped for reprocessing (it can be noted in passing that irradiated production reactor assemblies are "cooled" in storage facilities for around five months). In the technological sense it is a considerably more difficult task to reprocess irradiated fuel oxide of an AES than to reprocess irradiated fuel based on uranium metal. Therefore in the plutonium production diagram it is necessary to clearly distinguish radiochemical plants for reprocessing irradiated fuel based on uranium metal and based on its oxides.
Third. It is possible to use energy-grade plutonium for creating weapons in two ways: directly as fissionable material for the nuclear device (albeit with very low tactical-technical and operating characteristics), or by isotope separation to obtain a product with a high Pu-239 concentration.
Plutonium isotope separation is most realistic based on the laser method developed in the United States under laboratory conditions and presently being mastered in industry. Use of this method by other countries appears unlikely at the present time.
With consideration of what has been said, Fig. 4 is a diagram of a technological chain of plutonium production. The first link in this chain is the reactor fuel elements production plant. Ways of obtaining uranium, both natural as well as enriched, were examined above. Replacing this link with the import of fuel elements can be considered possible in principle. All other links in the technological chain are mandatory for a country striving to create its own plutonium production for weapons. Exporting AES irradiated fuel to another country for radiochemical reprocessing with the subsequent import of energy-grade plutonium is possible in producing energy-grade plutonium (this possibility is very problematical, since essentially all radiochemical plants in developed countries are under IAEA control).
Fig. 4. Diagram of technological chain of plutonium production indicating links permitting replacement by import
Analysis of Possibilities of Creating Nuclear Weapons in Near Abroad Countries
Such an analysis requires information about the presence of elements of the nuclear weapons complex in a specific country. Table 1 presents data on enterprises and establishments of the nuclear complex in near abroad countries systematized from open press materials. An analysis of the data presented shows that not one near abroad country presently has the closed structure of the nuclear complex necessary for nuclear weapons development and production. But potential capabilities exist, and this goes for Kazakhstan above all.------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Table 1. Nuclear Complex Enterprises of Near Abroad Countries | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |(based on open press materials) | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Scientific establishments | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Luch NPO [Scientific-Production Assoc-|Research to create nuclear rocket eng-| |iation] (Semipalatinsk-21, Kazakhstan)|ines and nuclear space plants | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Uranium production and enrichment enterprises | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Tselinnyy Mining and Chemical Combine |Engaged in uranium production and rep-| |(Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan) |rocessing for the defense industry | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Yuzhpolimetall Production Association |Produced highly enriched uranium for | |[PO] (Kazakhstan) |military purposes | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Vostokredmet PO (Kazakhstan) |Raw materials for nuclear power engin-| | |eering | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Caspian Mining and Smelting Combine (-|Raw materials for nuclear power engin-| |Kazakhstan) |eering | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Serebryansk Plant (Kazakhstan) |Raw materials for nuclear power engin-| | |eering | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Ulba Metallurgical Combine near Ust-K-|Raw materials for nuclear power engin-| |amenogorsk (Kazakhstan) |eering, highly enriched uranium for m-| | |ilitary purposes | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Uch-Kuduk uranium deposits (Uzbekista-| | |n) | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Mining and chemical combine in Tajiki-|Uranium production and reprocessing | |stan | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Concentration combine in Leninabad (T-|Uranium concentrate production | |ajikistan) | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Chemical-metallurgical association in |Reprocessing imported uranium concent-| |Sillamyaye (Baltic) |rate, extracting uranium from importe-| | |d raw materials | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Plutonium production enterprises | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |The following can be used in principl-| | |e for production of plutonium: | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Baykal-1 reactor complex, in which tw-| | |o research reactors presently operate-| | |-IVG-1M and RA, Semipalatinsk-21, Kaz-| | |akhstan | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |IGR Uranium-graphite research reactor,| | | Semipalatinsk-21, Kazakhstan | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Nuclear weapons production enterprises | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |None | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Ranges | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Semipalatinsk Range, Semipalatinsk-21,| | | Kazakhstan | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let us examine these capabilities of Kazakhstan. Scientific potential. The Semipalatinsk Test Range, where the bulk of nuclear weapons developed in the USSR was tested, is situated on the territory of Kazakhstan. Luch NPO, whose mission is research to create nuclear rocket engines, presently is located on range territory. The Baykal-1 reactor complex, which has two research reactors of different designs, also is located there. In addition, there is a uranium-graphite research reactor. This provides grounds to assume that Kazakhstan has or can preserve the intellectual potential of engineer-scientific cadres capable of performing work in the nuclear physics area which if necessary can be channeled into the development and creation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it is fully probable that the experience and the physical facility have been preserved at the range for conducting model testing for working out nuclear weapons design elements.
Production potential. Here (see Fig. 1) it is necessary to distinguish capabilities for producing components and assembling nuclear weapons and capabilities for producing weapon-grade fissionable materials. There is no direct information on the presence in Kazakhstan of enterprises for producing nuclear and non-nuclear components and for assembling nuclear weapons. But an analysis of its industrial base shows that precision instrument making is developed in Kazakhstan, there is a base for producing modern machine tools and automatic lines, and metalworking and chemical sectors of industry are developed, so the precision production characteristic of enterprises producing nuclear and non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and assembling them can be organized if necessary. The production base for uranium production and enrichment turned out to be developed in Kazakhstan because of the practice of integration and differentiation that formed in the USSR at one time in creating a nuclear weapons complex. It follows from Table 1 that at the very least three enterprises in Kazakhstan are oriented toward the production, reprocessing and enrichment of uranium for military purposes. There are no direct data on the presence of uranium isotope separation plants in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the recent fact of Kazakhstan's sale of 600 kg of 90-percent enriched uranium to the United States poses at the very least two questions.
First of all, what kind enrichment are we speaking about here: U-238 or U-235? If this is pure natural uranium (enrichment in U-238), the cost of which is relatively low, then the purpose of this transaction on the Americans' part is incomprehensible. The press indicated that the possible price of this transaction was $20 million. Then the price should be on the order of $30,000 per kilogram of product, which appears heavily inflated. It was also pointed out that Kazakhstan offered this uranium to the Russian Federation for a price of $14,000 per kilogram. Bearing these prices in mind, it should be assumed we are speaking about enrichment in U-235.
Secondly, where could uranium with such a degree of enrichment in U-235 come from in Kazakhstan? Two ways are possible here. The first is enrichment at uranium isotope separation enterprises. Then this should be proved by the presence of isotope separation plants in Kazakhstan. The second is the presence of such uranium in Kazakhstan that was imported in the past from isotope separation plants located in Russia. The second way is inexplicable from many points of view.
We will also note the following. The domestic and foreign mass media contain mention of the fact that uranium exported from Kazakhstan is weapon-grade, and it was even pointed out that it was possible to make around 20 nuclear weapons from it. Everything that was said suggests the idea that a closed technological chain from producing uranium ore to obtaining weapon-grade uranium may exist in Kazakhstan. With respect to the production and accumulation of plutonium, existing research reactors hardly will be able to support production of plutonium in quantities required for creating nuclear weapons. Summing up what has been said, it can be concluded that nuclear weapons can be created in Kazakhstan based on weapon-grade uranium if the corresponding political decision is made and if state resources are mobilized.
The following can be noted with respect to other near abroad countries in question. Not one country mentioned in tables 1 and 3 has the industrial and intellectual potential that comes close to that of Kazakhstan. Although uranium ore production and enrichment up to obtaining a uranium concentrate can be done in Tajikistan, this is far from enough even for raising the question of possibilities of creating nuclear weapons. This goes for the other near abroad countries to an even greater extent. In the course of further work, we will analyze the status of the nuclear weapons complex in near abroad countries in terms of the following main parameters. Nuclear materials (highly enriched U-235, plutonium, tritium): ore production, enrichment, plutonium and tritium production, metallurgy, presence of materials manufacturing industries. Electronic components of nuclear weapons: materials, element base and experience in designing electronic instruments of the automation system (detonation and neutron initiation systems, safety devices, actuators). Explosive elements: explosives, detonation systems, experience in developing elements of irregularly shaped devices. Measurement equipment: for measuring isotopic composition and chemical composition of all construction materials being used, for measuring transient processes of an explosive electrophysical nature. Scientific, design and technological cadres: specialists in the area of explosion physics, electrophysics, isotope separation, reactor engineering, radiochemistry. Nuclear weapon delivery systems: missiles, bombs, ground transportation assets. This section considers only the possibility of gaining possession of (stealing, purchasing) nuclear materials and nuclear weapon automation elements, not the possibility of gaining possession of (stealing, purchasing) an entire nuclear explosive device. Table 2 shows results of an analysis of possible nuclear activity in near abroad countries. The analysis of data shown in the table provides grounds to distribute countries according to their degree of activity:
1. Possession of nuclear materials (ore, concentrate): Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan.
2. Possession of nuclear materials (semifinished products): Ukraine, Kazakhstan.
3. Plutonium reserves (high-background) in fuel of nuclear power stations: Ukraine, Lithuania, Kazakhstan.
4. Possession of technologies and production capacities for reprocessing nuclear materials: Ukraine (technologies).
5. Electronic components of nuclear weapons: Ukraine (there are technologies, there are no finished elements), Latvia (partially).
6. Explosive elements: Ukraine and Kazakhstan (experience and industry), Georgia (experience).
7. Measurement equipment: Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania.
8. Cadres: Ukraine (along all lines), other countries do not have sufficiently skilled cadres along all lines of nuclear weapons.
9. Information: Ukraine has information on physical principles of first-generation and possibly of second- generation weapons, and on technology for obtaining nuclear materials. It can obtain information through intelligence channels and it also has all the information over unclassified international channels. The other countries basically can possess international information.
Table 2 (continued)
Analysis of Nomenclature of Elements and Instruments Being Manufactured in Near Abroad Countries and Used in Nuclear Weapons Development (Production)
This section considers as examples the following developments which are part of special articles containing a relatively large number of electronic radio articles: TBA486, TSB51, TSB53-01, TSB55, TDG318, TFK51, TPA31 and TEV33. The list of electronic radio articles used in those developments contains 124 items, or around 100 counting repeats. The list contains electronic radio articles produced in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Armenia. The most sophisticated microcircuits are produced at enterprises of Ukraine and Belarus. Around 23 percent of electronic radio articles on the list are produced by enterprises of near abroad countries, including, by individual countries: Kazakhstan 1 percent, Ukraine 6 percent, Uzbekistan 6 percent, Belarus [figure illegible] percent, Armenia 2 percent, Moldova 2 percent, Estonia 2 percent, Latvia 1 [partially legible] percent and Lithuania 1 percent.
In this section VNIIA examines the possibility of putting together sets of nuclear weapon equipment. In 1993 TsNII-22MO, the lead entity of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for the element base, prepared and approved a list of electronic radio articles produced at enterprises of near abroad countries and subject to modernization and mastery at Russian Federation enterprises. According to this list, over 400 types of electronic radio articles are subject to mastery at Russian Federation enterprises. Overall expenditures are R6 billion in second quarter 1993 prices. Financing is proposed to be accomplished from three sources:
1. Enterprises' own funds;
2. Russian Federation Defense Committee fund;
3. Russian Federation Ministry of Defense fund.
Considering the complexity of the problem of organizing duplicative production on Russian Federation territory, this problem hardly will manage to be solved in the next five years. Organization of such work in near abroad countries seems unlikely. A second thing--a local solution--is possible: organization of production of individual types of electronic radio articles on the production base of equipment developers. In March 1993 Minister Mikhaylov signed Order No 194 [last digit only partially legible] organizing the production of microcircuits, semiconductor devices, detectors and banks of resistors at VNIIA and NIIIT [Pulse Engineering Scientific Research Institute]. But financing in an amount of less than 10 percent of the requirement does not permit unfolding the work of creating technological sections and organizing production. Economic and financial difficulties hardly will permit near abroad countries to create the necessary element base in that manner in the foreseeable future. The "Provisional Statute on the Procedure for Russian Federation Enterprises To Use Military Electronic Radio Articles Being Manufactured in Near Abroad Countries" entered into force on 1 January 1995.
This "Statute..." provides for the following: 1. Mutual delivery between the Russian Federation and CIS countries of materials, semi-finished products, and completing articles necessary for production of arms and military equipment within the scope of cooperation ties which have formed shall be accomplished according to agreed-upon lists.
2. Products being supplied according to agreement Lists shall not be subject to allocation and licensing.
3. For the period this agreement is in force, the procedure and time periods for removing from production products being manufactured by enterprises indicated in the annex shall be determined according to established procedure by coordination between the Russian Federation Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry on the Russian side and ministries of industry of CIS countries.
4. The parties shall preserve, on a mutually advantageous basis and in accordance with the states' legislation, the location and specialization of enterprises participating in production of military products and the kind of products in accordance with the list.
5. In case an enterprise indicated in the list is privatized, its specialization shall be preserved for the period the agreement is in force.
6. This agreement will be in force for three years and will be extended automatically for subsequent one-year periods.
But in order for the "Statute..." to work, appropriate intergovernment agreements on coordination in defense sectors must be concluded.
The corresponding departments of near abroad countries must give their consent for attestation of their production and certification of the electronic radio articles. This path of mutually cooperative deliveries is the most realistic from the standpoint of solving problems of making up sets of electronic radio articles of nuclear weapon equipment, but it is under control. Thus, based on existing production capacities for electronic radio articles, near abroad countries, either separately or together, are in no condition to create the bulk of electronic radio articles for making up nuclear weapon sets without Russian Federation assistance.
Electronic radio articles being produced in near abroad countries, including sophisticated microcircuits, contain no secret technologies related to the nuclear area. The nomenclature of electronic radio articles being used in KSA [automation equipment sets] and in telemetry gear is being analyzed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Table 3. List of Electronic Radio Articles Being Used in VNIIA Equipment D-| |evelopments TBA486, TSB51, TSB53-01, TSB55, TDG318, TFK51, TPA31 and TEV33 | |Being Manufactured in Near Abroad Countries | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |TEV33 contains no electronic radio articles of near abroad countries | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |No |Designation of El-|Country Supplier |Equipment | | |ectronic Radio Ar-| | | | |ticles | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Diodes | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |1. |2Ts 112A |Uzbekistan |TBA486 | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |2. |2D 218A |Uzbekistan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |3. |2D 228A |Uzbekistan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |4. |2D 104A |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Resistors | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |5. |S2-23 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |6. |NR1-14 |Uzbekistan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Cables and wires | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |7. |MGTF |Kazakhstan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |TSB51 diodes | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |8. |2D 917A |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |9. |2D 908A |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Capacitors and resistors | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |10. |KM-56 |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |11. |S2-23 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Microcircuits, diodes | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |12. |286 YeP5 |Uzbekistan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |13. |533 AG3 |Moldova | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |14. |533 LYe1 |Moldova | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |15. |533 TM2 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |16. |2DS 627A |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |17. |2DS 212A |Uzbekistan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Radio components | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |18. |DM |Armenia | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |19. |VP1-2 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |TSB55 microcircuits | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |20. |133 LA4 |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Capacitors, resistors, radio components, cables, wires | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |21. |KM-56 |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |22. |S2-23 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |23. |TRPM2 |Armenia |TSB55 | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |24. |MGTF |Kazakhstan | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |TDG318 microcircuits | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |25. |198 NT1A |Estonia | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |26. |198 NT5A |Estonia | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |27. |140 UD 12 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |28. |521 SA3 |Latvia | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |29. |159 NT1V |Lithuania | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Resistors | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |30. |S2-23 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Capacitors, resistors, radio components, wires | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |31. |KM-56 |Belarus | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |32. |S2-23 |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |33. |GICh |Ukraine | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |34. |NGTF |Kazakhstan | | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliography
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