Missile Forces' Power.
--Russia's Nuclear Shield Is in Good Hands
Moscow NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE (SUPPLEMENT TO NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA) , 24 Feb 96 No 4, p 6
by Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, chief of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Main Staff, interviewed by Igor Korotchenko
From NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE's Files: Colonel-General Viktor Ivanovich Yesin was born on 14 February 1937. He has served in the Strategic Nuclear Forces since 1959. He has held various posts, from department head in a missile division to deputy chief of a missile division operations sector. He began serving in the Strategic Missiles Forces Main Staff as an operational command and control officer. In 1989 he became chief of operational command and control and deputy chief of the Main Staff, and in 1994 he became first deputy chief of the Main Staff. He was named chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff that same year.
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[Korotchenko] What is the Strategic Missile Forces' current structure? Has the reorganization under way in the Armed Forces in connection with military reform affected them?
[Yesin] Figuratively speaking, the Strategic Missile Forces consist of two types of forces. The first is armed with fixed-base systems. These are individual launchers scattered throughout the territory of a launching district at a distance that precludes the possibility that a single nuclear weapon could destroy two launchers. They account for something on the order of 60 percent of our grouping. The individual launchers have a high level of protection. Each launcher has its own receiving equipment. Even if command centers were to be knocked out of action, the launchers could still receive and execute orders.
The second type is the mobile forces. They consist of wheeled-vehicle and railway launchers. These are Topol-type autonomous launchers with a single-warhead missile and rail-based missile systems with the missile known in the West as the "Scalpel."
The fixed forces are designed to launch a counterstrike. Incidentally, no other component of Russia's nuclear triad has this capability. The mobile forces are intended for retaliatory actions. They are a deterrent weapon.
The Strategic Nuclear Forces are being reorganized in accordance with the concept devised for the development of the Missile Forces and with due regard for the agreements Russia has concluded on limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms. Efforts to carry out the reorganization plans are significantly impeded by extremely insufficient and irregular funding.
[Korotchenko] What role do the Strategic Nuclear Forces play in ensuring strategic stability at this time, and how will this role change in the future amid radical cuts under the SALT II Treaty?
[Yesin] The Strategic Nuclear Forces grouping is currently the main component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, thanks to its decisive role in the structure of our strategic nuclear arms and its contribution to combat effectiveness. Its delivery vehicles and warheads account for approximately 60 percent; under certain circumstances, they are involved in accomplishing up to 90 percent of the tasks assigned to our strategic nuclear arms.
It is the power of the Strategic Nuclear Forces and their ability to serve as a nuclear deterrent that are the guarantor of strategic stability in the world, cooling the hotheads who think Russia is no longer capable of defending itself.
The development of the Strategic Missile Forces over the next 10 to 15 years will be determined both by the country's economic condition and cooperative production arrangements in industry and by the restrictions imposed by the START I and START II treaties. In addition, their development will be influenced by such factors as the established structure of the grouping and the condition of the infrastructure that supports its functioning.
Even after implementation of the START II Treaty, if it is ratified by Russia, the Missile Forces, despite a reduction in their share of warheads on strategic nuclear arms, will maintain their contribution to our combat potential in terms of strategic nuclear arms at the level that exists today thanks to the unique properties of the nuclear missiles in service in the forces and to a rationally conducted restructuring of the grouping (an increase in its proportion of highly survivable mobile missile systems).
[Korotchenko] The United States apparently does not intend to develop new ICBMs. Why are we doing so given the cutbacks in strategic nuclear weapons and the country's grave situation?
[Yesin] Allow me to disagree with the widely held view that the United States is doing nothing in terms of developing new ICBMs. It is continually modernizing the Minuteman and MX missile systems it currently has in service.
And we are doing likewise. Almost 50 percent of the Strategic Missile Forces' missiles currently in service have exceeded their warranty periods. This figure will increase by late 1997. Therefore, in order to maintain the grouping's required combat potential, we are forced to modernize our missiles. And this is being done in accordance with resource-conserving technologies that entail minimal expenditures. We did away with any excess long ago. The unique Topol missile system is being modernized, and solely by Russian enterprises. It is impossible to maintain our nuclear shield without modernizing our missiles.
[Korotchenko] Has the number of exercises and combat- training launches in the Strategic Missile Forces decreased in connection with the country's economic and financial difficulties?
[Yesin] First of all, I should point out that in many respects, including where combat training is concerned, the Strategic Missile Forces are highly specialized. We are on combat alert every minute. And this is not training or an exercise--it's our combat mission.
Without question, tactical and other exercises envisioned in combat training plans are being conducted in our forces too.
Launching an ICBM is not like firing a shell from a tank or an infantry fighting vehicle. It is a very expensive "pleasure." Even before, such launches were not conducted often. Today, given the funding shortage, we conduct launches mainly of missiles whose warranty periods are coming to an end.
As for tactical exercises and drills, they are now being held less frequently and involve fewer pieces of equipment. Instead, we make greater use of simulation equipment and specially equipped classrooms and field training centers, which can compensate for the limited training experience of our personnel owing to reduced allotments of fuel and lubricants and other materials. As regards the system of training officers for combat duty shifts, it remains intact and--I want emphasize this--will be preserved largely unchanged. Although we do of course have to take into account the circumstances caused by insufficient financing.
[Korotchenko] Exactly what is the Topol missile system?
[Yesin] The RS-12M Topol mobile missile system (the SS-25) is regarded as one of the most successful and unique fruits of our designers and researchers' creative thinking. The Topol has been on combat alert duty since 1985. This missile system and its modernized version, the Topol-M, will be the nucleus of the Strategic Nuclear Forces' future grouping. Its development is not limited by either the START I or START II treaties. Plans call for deploying the modernized Topol-M both on self-propelled launchers and in silos.
I would like to say a few words about the high survivability of the Topol mobile missile system. It is capable of moving through roadless terrain, continuously changing its location, and launching a missile from any point along its route. It is impossible to pinpoint its location using modern and even prospective technical reconnaissance equipment. Consequently, specialists calculate that in order to destroy one Topol missile launcher, an adversary would have to expend about 10 nuclear warheads in order to create the required destruction zone, something that is disadvantageous from a military standpoint.
The following fact is eloquent testimony to the reliability of our self-propelled missile launchers and the level of training of the Strategic Missile Forces' specialists. In 1988, when our Pioneer missiles (the Topol's predecessor) were being eliminated under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles using the launch method (incidentally, under the direct observation of U.S. inspection groups), our missile crewmen conducted 72 missile launches. Three missiles struck their targets with a "good" rating, while all the rest got an "excellent" rating.
[Korotchenko] What are the prospects for the development of the Missile Forces and of missile hardware and weapons in the next few years? Are there any difficulties here? After all, some of the equipment- and weapons-manufacturing plants are now on the territory of the other CIS states.
[Yesin] The task of shaping the future of the Missile Forces is not an end in itself. It is a consequence, an objective and adequate response, to the emerging military- strategic situation in the world and is aimed at ensuring the security of Russia and its allies. Consequently, everything ultimately depends on how relations develop among the states of the world community, especially those that possess or are capable of acquiring nuclear arms.
There are of course difficulties in weapons production and servicing that stem from the fact that a number of enterprises are now in other states. But they can be surmounted, and much has already been accomplished in this regard.
A country like Russia is capable of relying on its own funding and resources to compensate for lost production capability, including high-technology production capability. Moreover, we continue to cooperate in a largely successful fashion and on mutually beneficial terms with Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Kazakh enterprises in ensuring missile safety.
One needn't prove that nuclear safety with respect to missile systems must prevail over political, economic, national, and other conflicts between states. Therefore, the states that were involved to one degree or another in the development of the USSR's nuclear-missile potential must be aware of the fact that not only the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, but also of an accident involving them, would be of a supranational character.
[Korotchenko] In what way is 1995 noteworthy for you personally?
[Yesin] It was rather eventful for the Strategic Missile Forces. Despite the meager funding, we were able to continue the process of reorganizing the grouping and to maintain the forces' combat readiness and command and control response at the required level. Flight and design tests on the modernized Topol-M missile system were successfully completed, which allows us to be optimistic about the future. The unique Russian-made, solid-fuel, three-stage Topol-M strategic missile benefits not just the Strategic Missile Forces. Under current circumstances, it is also beneficial to Russian taxpayers, since its production and use will require far fewer expenditures than the missiles of the preceding generation. Moreover, it is absolutely safe in environmental terms. And its tactical- technical characteristics fully comply with all the restrictive parameters of the Russian-American treaties on reductions in strategic nuclear arms.
The year 1995 was also noteworthy in that for the first time, our strategic missile crewmen observed 17 December not simply as the anniversary of the Strategic Missile Forces' creation, but also as their own occupational holiday.
[Korotchenko] Do the Strategic Missile Forces face any problems?
[Yesin] There are problems, unquestionably. They are the same ones confronting the other service branches. The required financing is lacking. Not only are we chronically in debt for electric power and other utilities, we are unable to settle accounts with our supplier-plants and with construction organizations. Our servicemen and civilian personnel are owed up to two months' back pay. These circumstances greatly complicate efforts to solve social problems, to buy weapons and military equipment, and to ensure the nuclear safety of our missile systems.
But despite this, the strategic missile crewmen are confident that the country's (and hence the Armed Forces') current problems and difficulties will pass. We believe that Russia has a great future, we understand our historic vocation, and we are securely wielding Russia's nuclear shield in our hands.
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