Geopolitics and Security
Moscow Vooruzheniye, Politika, Konversiya (14), 1996 pp 4-7
by General of the Army Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev, CINC Strategic Missile Troops, doctor of technical sciences, member of AVN (Academy of Military Sciences) and RIA (Russian Engineering Academy), corresponding member of RARAN (Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences)
Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev completed the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P. S. Nakhimov, Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and General Staff Military Academy. He performed military service in units, formations and large strategic formations of the Strategic Missile Troops, has held leadership positions in the Strategic Missile Troops central apparatus since 1983, was appointed CINC Strategic Missile Troops in 1992, and the rank of General of the Army was conferred on him in 1996. Igor Dmitriyevich is a doctor of technical sciences, member of the Academy of Military Sciences and Russian Engineering Academy, and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences.
Under present conditions, when Russia is rebuilding its economy and cannot allocate the enormous funds for defense as was the case previously, the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SYaS) and their basic component, the Strategic Missile Troops, remain the only real guarantee for ensuring the country's military security. This is dictated on the one hand by the unique combat capability of weapons with which the Strategic Missile Troops are outfitted (the capability of destroying enemy targets on any strategic axis essentially to an unlimited depth and in the shortest time) and on the other hand by relatively small requirements for the material, financial and human resources necessary to maintain their combat readiness (less than 10 percent of RF Armed Forces numerical strength and of the country's defense budget).
The Strategic Missile Troops retain high combat readiness and are on constant alert duty despite the very difficult economic conditions which affected all the Armed Forces--constant underfinancing, personnel understrength, and shortage of POL, ZIP [sets of spare parts, instruments and accessories] and other kinds of logistic support. Moreover, the cooperation of industrial enterprises capable of manufacturing and modernizing highly effective armament and creating new models has managed to be preserved to this day. Despite meager financing, the infrastructure of deployment areas that has been established in the Strategic Missile Troops is functioning successfully and necessary work is being done to maintain requisite numerical strength and combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Troops grouping. This work includes introducing Topol mobile missile complexes to the order of battle of regiments to replace missile complexes with expired service life; extending the service life of missile complexes on alert duty since the mid-1970's, with absolute assurance of their technical reliability and safe operation; modernizing the battle management system; and developing a modernized missile complex with the single-warhead, solid-propellant, fixed and mobile Topol-M missile based on a new Russian cooperation of developers.
At present the Missile Troops have over 700 operational launchers with five types of ICBM's fitted with approximately 3,500 warheads. These are the RS-20B and RS- 20V missiles of a heavy class and RS-18, RS-22 and RS-12M Topol missiles of a light class. The table shows selected characteristics of these missiles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Missile Complexes of the Strategic Missile Troops | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Missile Designation |Type of Mis-|Number of S-|Type of Pro-|Type of Ree-| | |sile Comple-|tages |pulsion Sys-|ntry Vehicl-| | |x | |tem |e | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Under START |Foreign | |Treaties | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |RS-30B |SS-18 Mod. 2|Fixed silo |2 |Liquid-prop-|Multiple | | | | | |ellant | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |RS-20V |SS-18 Mod. 3|Fixed silo |2 |Liquid-prop-|Multiple | | | | | |ellant | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |RS-18 |SS-19 Mod. 2|Fixed silo |2 |Liquid-prop-|Multiple | | | | | |ellant | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |RS-22 |SS-24 |Fixed silo, |3 |Solid-prope-|Multiple | | | |mobile rail | |llant | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |RS-12M |SS-25 |Mobile land |3 |Solid-prope-|Single | | | | | |llant | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The combination of missiles with fixed and mobile basing in the makeup ensures guaranteed performance of combat missions under any situation conditions. Thus, having the highest technical and operational readiness, fixed missile complexes make the greatest contribution to executing a launch-on-warning [otvetno-vstrechnyy udar], i.e., before attacking warheads impact. Having high survivability, mobile missile complexes give the Strategic Missile Troops grouping the capability also of executing combat missions under conditions of a retaliatory strike (after a nuclear effect). The Strategic Missile Troops presently are capable of executing essentially all Strategic Nuclear Forces missions in a launch-on-warning and around half of the missions in a retaliatory strike.
The survivability of ICBM missile complexes traditionally was ensured through the creation of hardened fixed silo launchers separated from each other by a distance precluding a single enemy nuclear weapon from destroying neighboring silo launchers. But increased accuracy of strategic missiles made the fortification protection of silo launchers by conventional methods essentially useless already in the 1980's. The capability of destroying them with a single nuclear warhead with high probability became real. An insistent need appeared for increasing the survivability of missile complexes.
By this time our country already had created S & T preconditions for solving this problem. Strategic solid- propellant missiles of intercontinental (RT-2) and intermediate (RSD-10) range as well as OTR-22 operational- tactical missiles were developed and made operational. The appearance of solid-propellant missiles permitted creating fundamentally new mobile missile complexes for the Strategic Missile Troops (a land mobile missile complex with the RSD-10 intermediate-range missile) and for the Ground Troops (Temp-S operational-tactical mobile missile complex).
Ten years of experience operating mobile missile complexes with intermediate-range missiles in the Strategic Missile Troops and with operational-tactical missiles in the Ground Troops and successes in missile building and in battle management and communications systems permitted creating a land mobile missile complex with the RS-12M ICBM, widely known as the Topol missile complex, by the mid-1980's.
The creation of the Topol missile complex and somewhat later also of a rail-based combat missile complex and their introduction to the order of battle substantially increased the grouping's survivability and preserved the deterrence potential of the Strategic Missile Troops, i.e., the capability of delivering an effective retaliatory strike, since self-contained launchers of the mobile missile complexes are capable of changing location and dispersing quickly. Along with use of means of maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception" -- FBIS], this hampers the enemy to the maximum extent in estimating the location of mobile missile complexes and almost precludes their aimed destruction.
The Topol missile complex presently accounts for around half of all Strategic Missile Troops launchers. The production of these complexes managed to be preserved, which is very important not only from the standpoint of preserving the quantitative makeup of the mobile grouping, but also as a necessary condition for preserving industry cooperation, ensuring authors' control and warranty control over the missile complexes being operated, making modifications to missile complex elements and systems if necessary, extending the service life of the complex and modernizing it. The proportion of Topol complexes and their contribution to combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Troops will grow as missile complexes with expired service life are removed from the order of battle. Therefore, keeping production of this missile complex at least at the most minimal level is a very important task.
In connection with such an assessment of the role and place of the Topol missile complex in the system of strategic nuclear arms, it is impossible to be silent about the discussion which unfolded in the mass media among lawmakers, military specialists and scientists over ways to further develop our Strategic Nuclear Forces, and particularly over the advisability of retaining and further developing the Topol type of mobile missile complexes. It turned out there were many opponents of mobile missile complexes; their arguments reduce to mobile missile complexes being insufficiently reliable as a result of insufficient mobility, a large signature and weak protection. They are dangerous to operate because of the possibility of an emergency arising while making a march; in addition, mobile missile complexes are expensive to operate and ecologically more dangerous. Therefore the opponents propose to reject mobile missile complexes in favor of fixed or sea-based missile complexes.
But results of scientific research and development and many years of experience in operating mobile missile complexes, including during exercises, drills and training launches, lead to other conclusions. In terms of aggregate combat, operating and economic characteristics, the Strategic Missile Troops' mobile missile complexes are the most ideal means and under present conditions surpass both the Strategic Missile Troops' fixed missile complexes with possible means of enhanced survivability as well as other weapons of the Strategic Nuclear Forces in terms of the "effectiveness-cost-feasibility" criterion. Calculations show that one must expend more munitions by almost an order of magnitude to destroy Topol complex launchers in a nuclear war than to destroy silo launchers, inasmuch as mobile missile complexes can change a position right after its last inspection by enemy technical means of space reconnaissance.
Fixed launchers can be destroyed in a conventional war by special enemy aircraft munitions and cruise missiles intended for destroying highly hardened fortifications. It is considerably more difficult to destroy mobile missile complexes with such weapons because they can change position on receiving information about the preparation of an enemy air raid on missile division deployment areas.
To gain an impression of the degree of survivability of Strategic Missile Troops' mobile missile complexes, bear in mind that to destroy them an enemy needs to track hundreds of launchers located in more than ten deployment areas situated in the interior of the country's territory and organize a strike against each of them. This mission is extraordinarily complex for any possible enemy.
With respect to the allegedly high ecologic danger of mobile missile complexes, the more than 20 years of experience in operating them attest to the opposite. The high operating reliability and nuclear safety of mobile missile complexes are determined by their design features and by the sophisticated system that exists in the Strategic Missile Troops for ensuring safe operation. In all these years not only has there not been a single accident or disaster connected with nuclear weapons of mobile missile complexes, but also no preconditions for them. In addition, work is constantly being done in the Strategic Missile Troops and industrial organizations to further improve the operating safety of such complexes.
Mobile missile complexes indeed surpass fixed missile complexes in terms of operating cost, but this fact in itself cannot be used as an argument either for or against the presence of mobile land-based missile complexes in a grouping. Correct conclusions can be drawn based only on a comprehensive estimate of complete outlays for the life cycle of missile complexes and of the effectiveness of their combat employment under various situation conditions. Such an estimate shows that a Strategic Missile Troops grouping must include both mobile as well as fixed missile complexes in a certain ratio to achieve requisite combat capabilities with minimal outlays. For example, for a grouping of single-warhead missiles in 800-900 PNU [not further expanded, possibly land-based launchers], this ratio is 55-65 percent launchers of mobile missile complexes and 33-45 percent launchers of fixed missile complexes.
The most favorable conditions for development of the Strategic Nuclear Forces are linked with implementation of the START II Treaty, signed in 1993 but not approved as yet by the State Duma. Treaty restrictions on the quantitative makeup of strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation and United States at 3,000-3,500 warheads permit ensuring a balance of the sides' strategic forces at a lower level than now and strengthening strategic stability in the world. This in turn will permit us to refrain from beginning work on a number of costly programs (such as creating a new missile complex with MKR [not further expanded, possibly intercontinental missiles or small space missiles] equipped with multiple reentry vehicles to replace missile complexes of a heavy and light class with multiple reentry vehicles, the service life of which expires by 2000-2005) and to concentrate funds on completing work already under way.
The key work determining Strategic Missile Troops development for the next decade is completion of the development of the modernized Topol-M missile complex with a solid-propellant ballistic missile fitted with a single warhead and its introduction to the Strategic Missile Troops order of battle. The creation and deployment of the Topol-M missile complex of fixed and later also of mobile basing will permit having a stable nucleus of the Strategic Missile Troops grouping ensuring high effectiveness of retaliatory operations both when developed under conditions of a phased implementation of the START I and II Treaties or deeper reductions, and also with a breach of understandings on ABM defense and strategic offensive arms and U.S. deployment of a full-scale ABM defense system.
The Topol-M missile complex is being developed under unprecedentedly difficult conditions requiring the resolution of a multitude not just of technical, but also of organizational as well as economic problems. Nevertheless, much has managed to be done as a result of coordinated work of organizations of the Ministry of Defense and the defense industry under conditions of a constant shortage of funds. Russian cooperation of missile complex developers has formed. Successful design solutions have been found permitting the creation of a complex that fully meets advanced requirements for its combat and operating characteristics and surpasses its predecessors in terms of cost-effectiveness. An experimental facility has been created to conduct ground and flight development of the missile complex, and there have been two successful Topol-M missile launches. In terms of the generalized indicator of energy-mass perfection [sovershenstvo] (the ratio of payload mass that can be delivered to intercontinental range to missile launching mass), level of resistance to damage- producing elements of a nuclear burst, reliability and technical readiness for launch, the Topol-M missile will surpass only [sic] the Topol missile and will become one of the most advanced strategic missiles.
In developing the complex, much attention is being given to all possible economy of funds for its creation. The very arrangement where one missile is used for a fixed and for a mobile complex ensures a great saving in funds in developing the missile complex, producing its elements and systems, and operating it in the troops. Existing silo launchers also will be refitted for the Topol-M missile with minimal outlays for specially developed resource- conserving technology. The existing infrastructure of Topol missile complex deployment areas will be used fully for deploying the mobile Topol-M missile complexes.
A decline in the level of Missile Troops financing led to a sharp reduction in armament and military equipment procurements and consequently also in the introduction of new missile complexes to the order of battle, which does not compensate for the removal of complexes with expired service life. Such a situation leads to a reduction in the grouping's quantitative makeup. A service life extension that is maximum in terms of safe operating conditions of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles whose launchers are planned to be refitted for single-warhead missiles, and chiefly of Topol mobile complexes, can alleviate the existing situation somewhat. This will ensure keeping the Strategic Missile Troops order of battle at an acceptable level and will permit creating a time reserve for deploying modernized Topol-M complexes at rates conforming to the capacities of Russia's economy.
Along with maintaining the grouping's quantitative makeup and upgrading the specifications and performance characteristics of missile complexes, the development of a system of battle management of troops and weapons is of very great importance. This system directly affects the Strategic Missile Troops' level of combat capabilities, and a lag in its development can nullify all efforts to create and deploy new missile complexes.
Although the existing Strategic Missile Troops battle management system on the whole supports their execution of assigned missions, the requirements for reliability of communicating orders to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles increase sharply under conditions of a significant reduction in the Strategic Missile Troops grouping. Fulfillment of these requirements can be ensured, especially under extraordinary conditions, only through an improvement both of battle management and communications equipment as well as of command and control facilities. The program for upgrading the battle management system is aimed specifically at this. It envisages modernization of a highly survivable, distributed grouping of command and control facilities and their outfitting with advanced command and control and communications equipment. At present the Strategic Missile Troops have worked out a precise idea of ways for their further development under the military-strategic and economic conditions taking shape and have determined the priorities of measures depending on a change of the situation. Successful implementation of the outlined plans is a guarantee of strengthening Russia's military security in the 21st century.
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