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In Whose Hands is the 'Button': The President has Authorized the Premier to Carry the Nuclear Suitcase for a While

[FBIS Translated Text] We learned from D. Yazov's
testimony in the State Emergency Committee case that the
"suitcase," simply speaking, is a special kind of telephone,
a so-called conference line, which cannot be either jammed
or suppressed. The information is transmitted not by voice
via the receiver but by special character codes. Missile-
attack warning stations monitoring the situation via
satellite communications are arrayed around the perimeter of
the country. If a nuclear launch in our direction is
detected, this information is transmitted to the central
command post, where officers of a rank no lower than general
are on duty around the clock. The information on the attack
that is received is verified by other channels, and only
after missile aggression has been reliably confirmed does
the duty officer switch all three "suitcases" to operational
mode. The order to unlock the missiles is given, the duty
officers at the launchers push the buttons....
According to the Constitution, Viktor Chernomyrdin 
will for the time of the president's operation be in charge
of the "nuclear button." It is the third time that the
world's attention has been called to our "suitcase."
We first learned of its existence following 
Gorbachev's Foros "captivity." Would the Communists be back,
would the cooperatives be closed--in August 1991 these
questions were of concern only to Soviet citizens. Foreign
countries, on the other hand, were persistently trying to
ascertain in whose hands the "button" was. Several months
later it had a new master--the president of Russia.
In the winter of 1995, following a surprise launch of
a missile from Norwegian territory, the "suitcase" was for
the first (and, thank God, for the sole) time switched to
operational mode--for several minutes the world was, truly,
on the brink of nuclear war.
The present temporary handover of one of the principal
attributes of Russian power from the president to the
premier has raised a clamor of quite a different kind. The
"suitcase" will, in fact, remain in Yeltsin's hands--in
accordance with the prior agreements, Chernomyrdin will
touch it only while Boris Nikolayevich is under the
anesthetic. As far as we know, it is not planned for this
period of time to fit the premier's office or his dacha or
his car with special communications. Nor is this necessary:
The "suitcase" can operate in two modes--permanent (when it
is hooked up to communication channels in the pertinent
premises) and free (off its own power components).
Training a new person to handle the "suitcase" is not
difficult. The designers made provision for this to take the
minimum amount of time and mental effort--after all, it was
created at the start of the 1980's under Brezhnev, who was
already at that time a very sick man....
Three Faces of the 'Nuclear Button'
/The black suitcase, which is permanently carried with
the president, is of no military value--it long since became
a weapon of political struggle/ 
First Stage: We Are Not Enemies of the Planet
The world learned the secrets of the Soviet "nuclear
button" thanks to the State Emergency Committee. That is,
prior to the president of the USSR's Foros "captivity,"
Western special services undoubtedly knew of the existence
with us of the "Kazbek" strategic nuclear weapons command
and control system and of the fact that its ultimate device-
-the so-called "nuclear button"--was in the presence of the
leader of the Soviet state. This is why there was this
agitation at that time--what if the "suitcase" were to end
up in the shaking hands of Yanayev or, even worse, at the
complete disposal of the military? 
The leaders of the soon-to-be-victorious democracy
hastened to reassure Western friends and quickly let out the
first "suitcase" secret: The USSR is not developing plans
for a nuclear attack or the "preventive strikes" so beloved
of the Americans. We will fight only for defense, and for
this reason the "suitcase" is with us "retroactive," and the
system will be switched to operational mode only in the
event of a nuclear attack on the USSR. The rest of the time
you could "hammer in nails" with the "nuclear suitcase."
[Begin box]
Incidentally
The idea of the "nuclear suitcase" emerged at the end
of the 1970's. Prior to this, the supreme commander in chief
could "participate" in command and control of the nuclear
arsenal only by going to the appropriate command post. And
if an enemy missile was already in flight and only minutes
for making a decision remained? The designers still did not
know what shape the device for the head of state would take:
This could have been an electronic index, a panel with push
buttons, a briefcase, and simply a "red telephone." Two
conditions were mandatory: to accommodate fundamentally
incompatible components in a comparatively small space and
to simplify the command and control to the utmost. The
latter demand came from the Ministry of Defense--at the
moment the decision has to be made, it said, the leader will
be under the greatest stress. But the engineers quickly
understood: The first owner of the "suitcase" was to be L.I.
Brezhnev.
They were not in time. They were not in time to 
present it to Andropov either. The test operation began in
1983 with Defense Minister Ustinov and Ogarkov, chief of the
General Staff. The first general secretary to be permanently
accompanied by "key-punch operators" carrying the "suitcase"
was Chernenko. The work began to the full extent under
Gorbachev, and the latter familiarized himself with the new
technology with interest, although he did not investigate
the details. Such a "suitcase" had come to be carried with
the president in the United States 20 years earlier.[End
box]
For the attention of the state security authorities:
It was not spies, not blatherers from secret institutions,
and not even pushy journalists but representatives of the
new Russian elite, sometimes from the president's immediate
entourage, who initiated the breaking open of the state
secrecy which surrounded the "nuclear suitcase." An
allegedly anonymous photographer sold with total impunity to
the German magazine BUNT shots of President Yeltsin closely
studying an open (!) "suitcase." Enterprising prosecuting
attorneys published investigative material of the State
Emergency Committee case, which contained sufficient top-
secret material on "Kazbek," and the "suitcase" was just one
of its components.... 
When democratic Russia was actively disowning the 
Soviet heritage, such "openness" was only encouraged. We
sedulously endeavored to persuade our friends that Russia
posed no threat to peace. We ceremoniously arranged the
handover of the "button"--even if purely defensive--to more
reliable hands (from Gorbachev to Yeltsin), swiftly scared
away pretenders to the "suitcase" from the ranks of republic
leaders (the West would have been in a state of shock had
several nuclear powers appeared simultaneously on one-sixth
of the globe), and, finally, promised to retarget the
intercontinental missiles.
How could the Russian president's undertakings not be
supported after this? How could multi-million-dollar loans
not be allocated?
Second Stage: Battle for the Symbol
Whereas on the international front the "suitcase"
performed purely diplomatic functions, within the country it
very quickly became one of the main symbols of state power.
It is said that upon seeing it for the first time Boris
Nikolayevich was nonplussed: The "suitcase" bore the number
"51." "I'm not just some whathisname, I'm No. 1," the
president is alleged to have specified. Since that time he
has been followed by "suitcases" exclusively with the number
"1."
Though Yeltsin has never been the sole owner of the
"nuclear suitcase." Right up until the State Emergency
Committee there were three subscribers to the system: the
general secretary, the minister of defense, and the chief or
the General Staff. But after both Yazov and Akhromeyev had
distinguished themselves in the soil of imposition of states
of emergency, the "suitcases" came to be issued the military
with apprehension. The "button" was given to Yevgeniy
Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed
Forces--a dependable person who in August 1991 proposed the
destruction of the Kremlin together with the State Emergency
Committee types by bombing. And Samsonov, chief of the
General Staff, was unfit, evidently--the third "suitcase"
was unable for a long time to find an owner.
Only in the summer of 1993, following the dismissal of
Shaposhnikov, did the Russian "suitcase" hierarchy take
final shape: Aside from the president, the system's
subscribers were Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the
Russian Federation (now Igor Rodionov), and Mikhail
Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff.
For two years--until Boris Nikolayevich fetched up in
the Central Clinical Hospital--the "suitcase" was just about
forgotten. But the president's health had only to give way
for a real staff war to break out over the "button."
Virtually nothing has been written about it here, it is
true, things having been confined to press spokesman
statements: Despite his illness, the president is in control
of the nuclear arsenal, and the "button" is constantly
alongside him, in the Central Clinical Hospital. According
to the American TIME Magazine and the British SUNDAY TIMES,
on the other hand, ruling circles were talking back in the
summer of 1995 about a temporary transfer of the "suitcase"
to Chernomyrdin. But Yeltsin's immediate entourage,
primarily Aleksandr Korzhakov, is alleged to have sharply
opposed such "encroachments." The most intricate defensive
device had conclusively become a bare, almost supernatural,
symbol of power in Russia. Seriously, now, Korzhakov was
surely not expecting a surprise nuclear strike at that time!
But the following words are attributed to Aleksandr
Vasilyevich: "Whoever possesses the codes (unlocking the
nuclear arsenal--ed.), also has the fullness of power."
[Begin box]
Incidentally
The people accompanying the top persons and carrying
the "nuclear suitcase" are called operators. This is a
special profession, which cannot be taught at any higher
educational institution. The selection demands are
considerable: They have to be people with a broad outlook
(able, if necessary, to maintain a conversation), efficient,
experienced in alert duty at intricate apparatus, and
familiar with electronics.
The form of clothing is according to the situation: on
a fishing trip, jeans, at a reception, a suit. The work
takes no account of holidays, be it 1 January or 23
February. According to the set of instructions, the operator
is required to be in a direct proximity to the "boss"
permitting him to perform his functional duties. Upon
reaching home, "No. 1" goes to his room, the operators, to a
small separate office next to it, and inscribed on the hot
line is the word: "President." Sometimes this telephone will
ring--everyone can make a mistake, you want to call security
and you pick up the wrong phone or it is the children
fooling around.... So the operators are in a state of
permanent tension, and people become pretty well burned
out.[end box]
Third Stage: Weapons of Mass Destruction of Political
Targets
It is believed that Yeltsin has really been able to
avail himself of the "suitcase" only once: on 25 February
1995, when a meteorological rocket was launched from the
Norwegian coast. The "Kazbek" system was switched to
operational mode, and the alarm signal reached all the
"suitcases." Perhaps Boris Nikolayevich's new booklet will
describe the feelings he experienced at that moment (the
stress, it has to be thought, must have been colossal), but
several days later he calmly informed journalists: "I was in
touch in an instant with the minister of defense and with
all the requisite military generals, and we tracked the path
of this rocket from start to finish." When it was
ascertained that the Norwegian rocket would fall far from
Russia, the system returned to its customary operational
mode.
It would seem to us, however, that in September 1996
the Kremlin decided to avail itself of the "suitcase" on one
further occasion. Not according to its intended purpose, of
course--no one is, after all, about to attack us. But recent
events suggest that the "suitcase" could be a very powerful
weapon for the mass destruction of political targets.
Once again, as in 1991, interest in the "button" is 
being kindled in every possible way, once again the veil of
secrecy is being torn: The "suitcase" is being shown on the
television screen, in closeup, and slightly open even. A
chance occurrence? An oversight? Or.... It is possible that
an unloaded gun truly does go off, if only once, but it is
hardly possible that it can hit so many targets at once.
/First target/--domestic competitors. The president
has taken ill, and, according to analysts' commentaries, a
new election campaign, in which Chernomyrdin and Lebed and
even Chubays, who has gained in importance, are not averse
to participating, is beginning.... This is premature, the
president responds, power--the "suitcase," that is--is, as
before, permanently at my side. Which was confirmed for the
world community by personal friend and colleague Helmut
Kohl, who came to Moscow specially. The handover of the
"suitcase" to the premier, on the other hand, is an
involuntary and extremely brief measure.
/Second target/--overseas friends. Before issuing
orders for the bombing of Iraq, it was necessary, for all
that, to inquire of the opinion of other members of the UN
Security Council--those, for example, who have systems of a
response to missile strikes. Concerning the retargeting of
Russia's missiles, incidentally: If it is considered that
the coordinates of Washington or New York have, indeed, been
removed from the ICBM flight plans, incidentally, why is the
West so concerned about the fate of our "nuclear button"?
The same question for the Council of Europe, which is
intending to hold hearings on Chechnya and, aside from
official representatives of the Russian Federation, has
invited Maskhadov as well....
/Third target/--tranquillity. The world should know
that Russia's nuclear arsenal is under control, as before,
and the country, that its security is not being forgotten
for a second.
/Fourth target/--probably accidental. The one who has
suffered the most from the clamor surrounding the "nuclear
suitcase" thus far has been Communist leader Gennadiy
Zyuganov, whom the adroit hands of domestic television
reporters presented to the world as a laughing-stock.
"Malicious tongues are joking: Kohl came and met with no one
but Yeltsin because he has taken the nuclear box with him"--
this is the precise quote of Gennadiy Andreyevich's now-
celebrated remarks. But the first four words disappeared for
some reason or other in the television coverage. Independent
reporters are defaming the unsuccessful candidate from force
of inertia, most likely. Although a social commission cannot
be ruled out.
[Begin box]
Incidentally
The first "suitcase" was home-made, bulky, and double-
lidded, with four cable-grip locks--it opened both from the
bottom and from the top. Today's "suitcase" is a black
attache case made by the Samsonite firm about 10 centimeters
thick and weighing 10 kg, with a coded lock. Three pairs
(just in case) are permanently hooked up, and backups are
kept somewhere in reserve. 
To give an order, it is not necessary to push all 
three "buttons" simultaneously (how the holders of the
"suitcases" resolve this problem among themselves, no one is
permitted to know). All the "suitcases" are technically
equivalent. The designers adhered to an obvious logic: The
"approach time" of the enemy's missiles at that time was
seven minutes, seconds remain for a decision to be made, and
imagine that at this moment there is absolutely no radio
contact.... 
The system is "insured" against accident. The scenario
of the boss taking it into his head to push the "buttons"
and dozens of missiles taking off is impossible. The holder
of the "suitcase" merely gives approval, only he knows the
code for the use of nuclear weapons against an aggressor.
This code unlocks the missiles. In the event of repeated
unsanctioned attempts to select the code, the missile is
disabled.
The missiles--each individually--are launched by
people, nameless officers, on round-the-clock duty in secret
bunkers.[end box]
In Place of an Afterword
And how with all these political battles is the 
"nuclear suitcase" itself doing? First, the presence of this
system with us and the other nuclear powers--the United
States, Britain, France, and China--forces all to display
toward one another exceptional politeness. Second, "Kazbek"
maintains the moral-psychological composure of our own
citizens and servicemen and, particularly, officers of the
strategic missile forces, together with whom both the
president and the defense minister are on alert duty.
Consequently, a system like "Kazbek" needs to be
preserved. Its 10-year service life expired in 1993. Today
it is constantly being overhauled and, as far as possible,
modernized, and the minimum amount of money is being
allocated for this. But this is not at all the sort of money
that would be required for the creation of a really new
system in keeping with the current situation. For the
"suitcase" to cease, finally, to be a resource only of a
political game--this was not what it was created for.
The intellectual efforts of dozens of top-class design
engineers, of which far more diligent use could be made, are
concentrated in the "suitcase." With the present turmoil,
for example, it would do no harm extending the system to the
warehoused nuclear weapons--so that it be impossible to move
them without approval at the top. Otherwise the continued
conversion of the nuclear deterrent forces into
environmentally dangerous trash together with the economic
havoc and domestic conflicts will lead to Russia's total
incapacity for defending itself. But this is a separate
subject.
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