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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Missile Forces Power: Russia's Nuclear Shield is in Good Hands

Igor Korotchenko interviews the Chief of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Main Staff
Moscow NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 24 February 1996
[FBIS Translated Text] From NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE's Files: Colonel-General Viktor Ivanovich Yesin
was born on 14 February 1937. He has served in the
Strategic Nuclear Forces since 1959. He has held various
posts, from department head in a missile division to deputy
chief of a missile division operations sector. He began 
serving in the Strategic Missiles Forces Main Staff as an 
operational command and control officer. In 1989 he became
chief of operational command and control and deputy chief
of the Main Staff, and in 1994 he became first deputy chief
of the Main Staff. He was named chief of the Strategic
Missile Forces Main Staff that same year.
* * *
[Korotchenko] What is the Strategic Missile Forces'
current structure? Has the reorganization under way in the
Armed Forces in connection with military reform affected 
them?
[Yesin] Figuratively speaking, the Strategic Missile
Forces consist of two types of forces. The first is armed
with fixed-base systems. These are individual launchers 
scattered throughout the territory of a launching district
at a distance that precludes the possibility that a single
nuclear weapon could destroy two launchers. They account for
something on the order of 60 percent of our grouping. The
individual launchers have a high level of protection. Each
launcher has its own receiving equipment. Even if command
centers were to be knocked out of action, the launchers
could still receive and execute orders.
The second type is the mobile forces. They consist of
wheeled-vehicle and railway launchers. These are Topol-type 
autonomous launchers with a single-warhead missile and 
rail-based missile systems with the missile known in the
West as the "Scalpel."
The fixed forces are designed to launch a 
counterstrike. Incidentally, no other component of Russia's 
nuclear triad has this capability. The mobile forces are 
intended for retaliatory actions. They are a deterrent
weapon. 
The Strategic Nuclear Forces are being reorganized in
accordance with the concept devised for the development of 
the Missile Forces and with due regard for the agreements
Russia has concluded on limiting and reducing strategic
offensive arms. Efforts to carry out the reorganization
plans are significantly impeded by extremely insufficient
and irregular funding.
[Korotchenko] What role do the Strategic Nuclear 
Forces play in ensuring strategic stability at this time,
and how will this role change in the future amid radical
cuts under the SALT II Treaty?
[Yesin] The Strategic Nuclear Forces grouping is 
currently the main component of Russia's strategic nuclear 
forces, thanks to its decisive role in the structure of our 
strategic nuclear arms and its contribution to combat
effectiveness. Its delivery vehicles and warheads account
for approximately 60 percent; under certain circumstances,
they are involved in accomplishing up to 90 percent of the
tasks assigned to our strategic nuclear arms.
It is the power of the Strategic Nuclear Forces and 
their ability to serve as a nuclear deterrent that are the 
guarantor of strategic stability in the world, cooling the 
hotheads who think Russia is no longer capable of defending 
itself.
The development of the Strategic Missile Forces over
the next 10 to 15 years will be determined both by the 
country's economic condition and cooperative production 
arrangements in industry and by the restrictions imposed by
the START I and START II treaties. In addition, their
development will be influenced by such factors as the
established structure of the grouping and the condition of
the infrastructure that supports its functioning.
Even after implementation of the START II Treaty, if
it is ratified by Russia, the Missile Forces, despite a 
reduction in their share of warheads on strategic nuclear
arms, will maintain their contribution to our combat
potential in terms of strategic nuclear arms at the level
that exists today thanks to the unique properties of the
nuclear missiles in service in the forces and to a
rationally conducted restructuring of the grouping (an
increase in its proportion of highly survivable mobile
missile systems).
[Korotchenko] The United States apparently does not 
intend to develop new ICBMs. Why are we doing so given the 
cutbacks in strategic nuclear weapons and the country's
grave situation?
[Yesin] Allow me to disagree with the widely held view
that the United States is doing nothing in terms of 
developing new ICBMs. It is continually modernizing the 
Minuteman and MX missile systems it currently has in
service. 
And we are doing likewise. Almost 50 percent of the 
Strategic Missile Forces' missiles currently in service have
 exceeded their warranty periods. This figure will increase
by late 1997. Therefore, in order to maintain the
grouping's required combat potential, we are forced to
modernize our missiles. And this is being done in
accordance with resource-conserving technologies that
entail minimal expenditures. We did away with any excess
long ago. The unique Topol missile system is being
modernized, and solely by Russian enterprises. 
It is impossible to maintain our nuclear shield 
without modernizing our missiles.
[Korotchenko] Has the number of exercises and combat-
training launches in the Strategic Missile Forces decreased
in connection with the country's economic and financial
difficulties?
[Yesin] First of all, I should point out that in many
respects, including where combat training is concerned, the 
Strategic Missile Forces are highly specialized. We are on 
combat alert every minute. And this is not training or an 
exercise--it's our combat mission.
Without question, tactical and other exercises 
envisioned in combat training plans are being conducted in
our forces too.
Launching an ICBM is not like firing a shell from a 
tank or an infantry fighting vehicle. It is a very expensive
 "pleasure." Even before, such launches were not conducted
often. Today, given the funding shortage, we conduct
launches mainly of missiles whose warranty periods are
coming to an end.
As for tactical exercises and drills, they are now 
being held less frequently and involve fewer pieces of 
equipment. Instead, we make greater use of simulation
equipment and specially equipped classrooms and field
training centers, which can compensate for the limited
training experience of our personnel owing to reduced
allotments of fuel and lubricants and other materials. As
regards the system of training officers for combat duty
shifts, it remains intact and--I want emphasize this--will
be preserved largely unchanged. Although we do of course
have to take into account the circumstances caused by 
insufficient financing.
[Korotchenko] Exactly what is the Topol missile 
system?
[Yesin] The RS-12M Topol mobile missile system (the 
SS-25) is regarded as one of the most successful and unique 
fruits of our designers and researchers' creative thinking.
The Topol has been on combat alert duty since 1985. This
missile system and its modernized version, the Topol-M,
will be the nucleus of the Strategic Nuclear Forces' future
grouping. Its development is not limited by either the
START I or START II treaties. Plans call for deploying the
modernized Topol-M both on self-propelled launchers and in
silos.
I would like to say a few words about the high 
survivability of the Topol mobile missile system. It is
capable of moving through roadless terrain, continuously
changing its location, and launching a missile from any
point along its route. It is impossible to pinpoint its
location using modern and even prospective technical
reconnaissance equipment. Consequently, specialists
calculate that in order to destroy one Topol missile
launcher, an adversary would have to expend about 10
nuclear warheads in order to create the required destruction
 zone, something that is disadvantageous from a military 
standpoint. 
The following fact is eloquent testimony to the 
reliability of our self-propelled missile launchers and the 
level of training of the Strategic Missile Forces'
specialists. In 1988, when our Pioneer missiles (the
Topol's predecessor) were being eliminated under the Treaty
on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range
Missiles using the launch method (incidentally, under the
direct observation of U.S. inspection groups), our missile
crewmen conducted 72 missile launches. Three missiles
struck their targets with a "good" rating, while all the
rest got an "excellent" rating.
[Korotchenko] What are the prospects for the 
development of the Missile Forces and of missile hardware
and weapons in the next few years? Are there any
difficulties here? After all, some of the equipment- and
weapons-manufacturing plants are now on the territory of the
other CIS states.
[Yesin] The task of shaping the future of the Missile
Forces is not an end in itself. It is a consequence, an 
objective and adequate response, to the emerging military-
strategic situation in the world and is aimed at ensuring
the security of Russia and its allies. Consequently, 
everything ultimately depends on how relations develop among
the states of the world community, especially those that
possess or are capable of acquiring nuclear arms.
There are of course difficulties in weapons production
and servicing that stem from the fact that a number of
enterprises are now in other states. But they can be 
surmounted, and much has already been accomplished in this
regard.
A country like Russia is capable of relying on its own
funding and resources to compensate for lost production 
capability, including high-technology production capability.
 Moreover, we continue to cooperate in a largely successful
fashion and on mutually beneficial terms with Ukrainian, 
Belorussian, and Kazakh enterprises in ensuring missile
safety.
One needn't prove that nuclear safety with respect to
missile systems must prevail over political, economic, 
national, and other conflicts between states. Therefore, the
 states that were involved to one degree or another in the 
development of the USSR's nuclear-missile potential must be 
aware of the fact that not only the consequences of the use
of nuclear weapons, but also of an accident involving them,
would be of a supranational character. 
[Korotchenko] In what way is 1995 noteworthy for you
personally?
[Yesin] It was rather eventful for the Strategic 
Missile Forces. Despite the meager funding, we were able to 
continue the process of reorganizing the grouping and to 
maintain the forces' combat readiness and command and
control response at the required level. Flight and design
tests on the modernized Topol-M missile system were
successfully completed, which allows us to be optimistic
about the future. The unique Russian-made, solid-fuel,
three-stage Topol-M strategic missile benefits not just the
Strategic Missile Forces. Under current circumstances, it
is also beneficial to Russian taxpayers, since its
production and use will require far fewer expenditures than 
the missiles of the preceding generation. Moreover, it is 
absolutely safe in environmental terms. And its tactical-
technical characteristics fully comply with all the 
restrictive parameters of the Russian-American treaties on
reductions in strategic nuclear arms.
The year 1995 was also noteworthy in that for the 
first time, our strategic missile crewmen observed 17
December not simply as the anniversary of the Strategic
Missile Forces' creation, but also as their own
occupational holiday. 
[Korotchenko] Do the Strategic Missile Forces face any
problems?
[Yesin] There are problems, unquestionably. They are
the same ones confronting the other service branches. The 
required financing is lacking. Not only are we chronically
in debt for electric power and other utilities, we are
unable to settle accounts with our supplier-plants and with
construction organizations. Our servicemen and civilian
personnel are owed up to two months' back pay. These
circumstances greatly complicate efforts to solve social
problems, to buy weapons and military equipment, and to
ensure the nuclear safety of our missile systems.
But despite this, the strategic missile crewmen are 
confident that the country's (and hence the Armed Forces') 
current problems and difficulties will pass. We believe that
 Russia has a great future, we understand our historic
vocation, and we are securely wielding Russia's nuclear
shield in our hands. 
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