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ROK Has No Alternative But To Regain Its `Sovereignty in Nuclear Policy'

Seoul SINDONG-A
Jul 94 pp 164-175
By Kim Tae-u, director of the Peace Strategy Research Center

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The time has come for us to end a nuclear policy that has abandoned the effort to help ourselves. We should not allow ourselves to stand uncovered against the winds from the United States and North Korea, which sway back and forth. The best way to improve relations with North Korea and to prevent war is for us to regain our sovereignty in nuclear policy.

[passage omitted]

Today, to straighten out the meaning of ROK-U.S. cooperation, to respond to the North Korean nuclear issue more wisely, and--mindful of the Japanese who put the Monju fast breeder reactor into operation--to find our rightful place in the world nuclear diplomacy, there is a need for an overall review of our nuclear policy.

We should no longer stick to a hollow policy that keeps the ROK stripped and at Washington's beck-and-call. Some think that we should not consider any nuclear policy other than the current subordinate-type one, for the reason that doing so will cause friction with the United States or that such friction will give the president added pressure. My advice for them is to reexamine what makes a leader a true leader. The time has come for them to cease their hollow ROK-U.S. cooperation rhetoric which disregards the true interests of the nation.

We should now do away with a nuclear policy that has abandoned the effort to help ourselves, in the name of internationalism. This is not to say, however, that we should treat the North Koreans unconditionally as compatriots, nor to preach such idealistic nationalism. We should find a third alternative. Our nuclear policy should choose a realistic, democratic line to follow, and this should be the basic direction of our nuclear policy planning. Following are the points that should be taken into account in a nuclear policy reform based on the regaining of our sovereignty in nuclear policy:

[passage omitted]

--Expedite the effort for domestic production of non-nuclear strategic weapons.

The present reality is that while leaving all our rights to development of nuclear capability and missiles in the hands of the United States, we are left to watch outside forces deal with nuclear issues. This arrangement should be changed. We must not continue to solely rely on the deployment of Patriot missiles--which is a far cry from what we seek, a self-reliant means of response--in the face of Pyongyang's missile development and its "Seoul in a sea of fire" threat. Changing our conception of strategy, we should develop retaliatory power through domestic production of long-range missiles comparable to the North Korean missiles, rather than attempting to build anti-missile defense by importing the U.S. intercept missiles. The 1978 secret agreement forbidding development of missiles of a 180-km or longer range by the ROK should be thrown out openly, and we should positively exploit the fact that development of missiles is not a violation of the NPT or other international devices banning nuclear weapons. The same thing can be said about non-nuclear strategic weapons including nuclear-powered submarines.

--Be a leading voice for a East Asia nuclear-free zone.

For an ultimate solution to the East Asia region nuclear issue, denuclearization of the Koran Peninsula alone is not enough. The present denuclearization policy putting the ROK at a disadvantage one-sidedly should be revised. The government should take the position that since the ROK is not seeking its nuclear arming, it should in no way be discriminated against in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and that any discrimination in that area will eventually become a destabilizing factor. We must not show ourselves as a gutless people content with a plan to denuclearize only the Korean Peninsula and raising no question about nuclear weapons deployed in our vicinity by nuclear powers. It is desirable to propose a multilateral cooperation organization like ASIATOM.

--Do not give unconditional support to NPT extension.

It is necessary that we stick to the posture of "conditional support" toward the 1955 NPT extension negotiations. The government is required to pursue positive nuclear diplomacy to make nuclear powers know that we will give them our support only after we obtain their commitment to the restoration of our sovereignty in nuclear policy. This is not to say that our fundamental principle against horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons should be altered. If it already promised Washington its support for the NPT extension, it should take steps to take it back. There should no longer be a repetition of the old practice of meeting U.S. demands unconditionally rather than on a give-and-take basis.

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