Tracking Number: 192475
Title: "Congress Urged to Support Korea Jet Program." The US will be involved with a program to sell, co-assemble, and license the production of 120 F-16 C/D fighter planes with the Republic of Korea unless the plan is blocked by both Houses of Congress. (910801)
Author: FELDMAN, AMY DEBRA (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date: 19910801
Text:
*EPF412
08/01/91 *
CONGRESS URGED TO SUPPORT KOREA JET PROGRAM
(Hearing on U.S., Korea producing F-16 jets) (1260)
By Amy Debra Feldman
USIA Staff Writer
Washington -- The United States will be involved with a program to sell, co-assemble, and license the production of 120 F-16 C/D jet fighter planes with the Republic of Korea unless both the House and the Senate pass joint resolutions by August 8 disapproving of the agreement.
The estimated value of contracts which will be placed with (American) F-16 contractors is over 3,800 million U.S. dollars, Glenn A. Rudd, deputy director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency of the Department of Defense, told a joint hearing of two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee August 1. The panels were the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee and the Arms Control, International Security and Science Subcommittee.
Urging Congress to accept the agreement, Rudd said, "I believe that we have a good program in the works, a program that when finalized will greatly benefit both the United States and the Republic of Korea."
"The program is very important in producing economies of scale and continued work on the F-16 production line," Rudd said. "Concurrently, it also means work for the 3,000 or so United States subcontractors, which will extend into the next century."
The Bush administration hopes that this agreement will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of the Republic of Korea.
"It seems to me that this is a deal that will clearly benefit the United States," said Representative Stephen Solarz, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Solarz asserted that there may be a great risk in not signing the agreement with Korea because the Koreans are virtually certain to co-produce a similar aircraft with another country.
"This is not a country with which the United States has anything but warm relations," Congressman Jim Leach (Republican of Iowa) said, describing the agreement with the ROK as strictly a business deal.
It is likely that no action will be taken on the agreement in the Congress by the August 8 deadline as the House and
GE 2 EPF412 Senate prepare to recess. Even if joint resolutions are passed, they are subject to a veto by President Bush.
The 120 F-16 planes which compose the Korean Fighter Program are divided into three categories. Twelve planes are "off-the-shelf" -- that is, they are considered foreign military sales because the aircraft were built in the United States and have already been used by the U.S. Armed Forces. Thirty six planes would be sold in "knockdown kits" -- parts would be shipped to Korea, where personnel would assemble the aircraft. The third category consists of 72 license produced aircraft -- aircraft that are built in another country under license from the United States.
Rudd explained these categories by saying that "the United States government took the position that 48 aircraft needed to come from the United States production lines."
"From a military perspective, we get the obvious military benefits of seeing new fighters flow into the force structure of a key Northeast Asian ally; fighters that are fully interoperable with ours," Rudd said.
But There were some powerful, dissenting voices heard at the joint hearing.
"This proposal raises a few questions," said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (Democrat of Florida).
And House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (Democrat of Missouri), was critical of the agreement, contending that the Korean Fighter Program would be unfair to American workers.
"Have we struck as good a deal as we can get? Are we giving up too much in terms of compromise?" Gephardt asked.
Gephardt testified that he was concerned about "the diminishing value and possible adverse effects of licensing and co-production aerospace agreements to the United States economy and our national security."
"Although I think we may be convinced that it is," he said he was not convinced that the agreement was in the best interest of the United States, its aerospace industry, or its workers.
"We cannot continue to be party to agreements, which disproportionately benefit the workers of our allies and trading partners, cede market leadership to them and gain very little in the American national interest," Gephardt said.
The House Majority Leader cited a report released by the General Accounting Office which stated that much of the
GE 3 EPF412 Korean Fighter Program's work share (this refers to the amount of work given to American and the amount given to Korean workers) and subcontracting agreements on the F-16 systems has not yet been worked out.
"GAO raised a number of preliminary reservations about the Korean Fighter Program," Gephardt said. He said that American workers "are capable of manufacturing a majority of the parts to be used in the F-16."
There were many unknown factors about the program found in the GAO report. Joseph E. Kelley, director of the National Security and International Affairs division of the GAO testified that "the United States Air Force's assessment of the program's impact on the United States industrial base has methodological problems and includes questionable data."
"The key issue is the question of the workshares. We have been unable to identify dollar values to the man hours" that would result from this program, Kelley said.
Furthermore, he said, "while more U.S. jobs will result with the sale than without the sale of the F-16, Korea will be manufacturing most of the airframes for the last 72 aircraft."
The agreement does not provide limitless opportunities for American workers, Kelley said. He said that information on the work shares on the F-16s was unavailable and that the U.S. government and General Dynamics may limit the opportunities of American workers regarding the 12 off-the- shelf aircraft and the 36 knockdown kits. Additionally, he said, General Dynamics could not guarantee that these 48 planes would contain only U.S. and European parts.
"This is an age-old problem, determining what the hours are and what the costs are," HFAC chairman Fascell said.
Korea had previously agreed to a program with F-18 planes instead of F-16 planes. Kelley said that, "unlike the F/A- 18 program, the specific parts that Korea will be authorized to produce are either not yet determined or not well documented."
The agreement to co-produce aircraft has taken many years to finalize. Judd said that in 1984, the ROK began searching for a different models of the same aircraft to replace obsolete inventory. At that time, Korea decided that it would co-produce these updated aircraft rather than purchase them from another country.
"It was our assessment that an F-16 Korean Fighter Program, with the same basic program structure as the F-18 Korean Fighter Program, was comparable in advantages to the F-18," Rudd said. He said that mission performance was probably
GE 4 EPF412 why the Korean government had selected a program with F-18 planes in 1989.
The views of the government had changed by March 1991. Rudd said the ROK Minister of National Defense announced on March 30, 1991, that Korea had chosen the F-16 for the Korean Fighter Program. Rudd believes the minister stated that the lower cost of acquiring 120 F-16s was the primary factor leading to the decision. A Memorandum of Understanding was initialed on May 30, 1991, Rudd said.
NNNN
File Identification: 08/01/91, EP-412
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: KOREA (SOUTH)/Defense & Military; KOREA (SOUTH)-US RELATIONS; MILITARY
AIRCRAFT; BUSINESS JOINT VENTURE; TRADE; REPORTS & STUDIES; GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION
Thematic Codes: 140; 1DE
Target Areas: EA
PDQ Text Link: 192475
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
