• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

The Sixth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), ended in New York on the 20th of May. While Pakistan had attended all the previous Review Conferences of the Treaty as an observer, this time we decided not to attend, because of the changed nuclear realities in South Asia. Nevertheless, Pakistan has followed the deliberations of the Conference closely, and has taken note of the Final Document of the Conference, in particular the commitment in principle by the NPT nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Pakistan will be prepared to participate in efforts to achieve that global objective on a non-discriminatory basis.

The NPT Review Conference's call for the observance of the CTBT even before its entry into force, is a positive contribution to the strengthening of the no-test norm. Having voted for the CTBT in 1996 and declared a unilateral moratorium on further tests in 1998, Pakistan will maintain its policy of responsibility and  restraint.

We cannot accept the position taken by the Review Conference on the nuclear tests conducted by India and then Pakistan in May 1998. It is important to recall that for over two decades, since the first Indian test in 1974, Pakistan vigorously pursued the goal of keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons. We did not initiate the induction of weapons capability into the region. Nor was Pakistan the first to conduct nuclear explosive tests. While India's nuclear tests destabilised the security environment in South Asia, Pakistan's tests restored the strategic balance. Therefore, the distinction between the nuclear ambitions of India and the compulsions of Pakistan must be acknowledged and preserved.

Pakistan's nuclear deterrent now forms an indispensable part of its defence doctrine. Our nuclear capability is solely for the purpose of deterring aggression against Pakistan. We remain sensitive to the international non-proliferation concerns. We are  opposed to an arms race or introduction of weapons systems which could destabilise the security environment of the region. Pakistan also abides fully by its commitment not to transfer sensitive materials, equipment and technologies.

In sharp contrast to Pakistan's nuclear policy of restraint and responsibility, India is embarked on an ambitious programme for deployment of large-scale nuclear forces on land, air and sea. This was evident from India's draft nuclear doctrine unveiled in August last year. India is similarly engaged in a massive conventional arms build-up.

Pakistan continues to hope that the NPT nuclear-weapon States and the international community will support Pakistan's proposals for a Strategic Restraint Regime, involving nuclear and conventional restraints, and resolution of the long-standing issue of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been recognised by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1172 as the root cause of tensions in the region. India must adopt the course of dialogue to address this grave issue to ensure durable peace and security in South Asia.

Islamabad,
23 May 2000