• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Washington's wise decision

Nasim Zehra

After an expected struggle within the US administration--between those who advocated for and against a Pakistan-inclusive South Asia trip for their president--a rational decision has been taken in Washington. Although the duration of the trip is yet to be finalised, it is unlikely to even be an overnight stay. Obviously, the content of the trip and not its duration will determine its significance. As a guest in Pakistan, Clinton should be welcomed by the government of Pakistan for whatever duration he may want to come for.

For those who may bicker over the duration factor, the obvious needs to be said: that the duration of a Clinton visit is really not of any concrete consequence for Pakistan, for Pak-US bilateral relations or for peace and security in South Asia. As for Clinton's programme, the early indications are that he will meet the president, the chief executive, the cabinet and may address the Pakistani nation through a televised speech. The question of an overnight visit is still under discussion.

While the Clinton visit is unlikely to lead to any concrete outputs on either the bilateral front, on the regional front or on global issues of mutual concern including nuclear nonproliferation, it does a have a broader and more generalised significance which deserves mention. It conveys a realism that has begun to take root in policymaking circles on the peace and security scene in South Asia. Clinton's decision to visit Pakistan, which reportedly Clinton himself has pushed in spite of the State Department's vote against a Pakistan-inclusive South Asia trip.

There is, however, little doubt that it is Washington's own requirement, given how American policymakers aspire to expand American role in South Asia and deal with issues like nonproliferation, terrorism, narcotics etc. After all, for all these issues an India-only engagement will prove futile since there can be no progress on these issues unless Washington engages with both India and Pakistan. Acknowledging this fact as well as the folly of the Washington strategy of linking Clinton's visit to Pakistani 'good behavior', the American Administration has taken the decision to send Clinton to Pakistan.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's advocacy against a Clinton trip to Pakistan was a sad example of conduct unbecoming. Delhi's competitiveness with Pakistan over the Clinton visit had forced a man of Vajpayee's political stature to stoop to unfortunate levels. In an effort to advance his government's objective that Pakistan be excluded from the Clinton itinerary, in his February 17 interview with the prestigious french paper Le Figaro the Indian prime minister, according to Press Trust of India, said that that the Indian public would "seriously disapprove" of the US President, Mr Bill Clinton, visiting Pakistan after his trip to India next month. He also repeated his demand that Pakistan "give back the part of Kashmir it has occupied and that Kashmir is an integral part of India." Such an attitude by the Indian leadership would create a sense of deja vu for those American official possessing a historical perspective on the Indian state. Half a century ago a farsighted State Department official had singled out India's "arbitrary actions in Junagadh and Hyderabad" and her "inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir" and had feared (according the declassified Foreign Relations of the US-FRUS 1952-54 Volume XI) that "this may indicate national traits in time (which) if not controlled, could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic imperialism".

Despite bilateral relations, the overarching reality is that in addition to bilateral concerns US policy objectives in South Asia are regional in scope and substance. Specifically nuclear proliferation, terrorism, narcotics and the volatile issue of Kashmir, all require a regional engagement. No progress can occur on these issues unless both India and Pakistan are engaged.

Within the regional context there are established facts underscoring serious Indo-Pak problems. Also, skipping Pakistan against the backdrop of escalating cycle of state-terrorism and guerilla activities of the Kashmiri freedom fighters, will be interpreted as Washington's support for Indian state terrorism. Contrary to its earlier indifference towards such an interpretation, Washington would now be uneasy with it. Washington can no longer ignore the stark reality that Kashmir is now clearly at the heart of intermittent military flareups that occur between two nuclear-armed South Asian states. In fact, led by Clinton himself, his Administration has been most forthcoming in acknowledging the existence of the Kashmir problem and has also been consistently articulating the need to settle the problem. Additionally American officials have found it necessary, even if in private conversations, to concede that the Indian linkage between "terrorism" and the Kashmiri freedom fighters is simplistic. Washington, however, remains committed to diplomatically, militarily and politically pursuing men whom they decide have declared a war against Americans; as in the case of Osama bin Ladin.

Clearly, the significance of Clinton's India trip for deepening Indo-US economic, defence and diplomatic ties cannot be underestimated. Clinton himself views his trip also within a broader South Asian context. From the broader South Asian perspective, Clinton has personally chosen to engage with the two main states, indispensable to establishing peace and security in South Asia. In all likelihood, Clinton will issue strong statements calling up Islamabad and Delhi to resume dialogue and to work towards a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem.

After all, against the backdrop of Delhi-triggered rising tensions in the region, Washington may also have rightly concluded that if Clinton opted against visiting Pakistan, the American government's image of a pro-bully partisan would get further reinforced in the Pakistani mind. Such negative images tend to transform into active anger against American policymakers and journey-makers; a factor that Washington would naturally want minimised.

In addition to its own perceptions, Washington's decision to a certain degree has also been influenced by the China factor. A February 8 Press Trust of India (PTI) report indicated that, "China has reportedly advised the US to include Pakistan in.President Bill Clinton's South Asian tour next month." The report added that "China has reportedly told the US deputy secretary of state, Mr Strobe Talbott, that Mr Clinton should visit Pakistan if Washington wants to see an end to tension in South Asia.'' Also according to a February 20 PTI report, "the February Sino-US strategic security consultations provided Beijing an opportunity to air its views on South Asia and coordinate stands on the South Asian nuclear issue."

Interestingly, reinforcing the China factor, an American columnist Jim Hoagland wrote in his February 13 article in The Washington Post that a senior Chinese diplomat Liu Xiamong said that, "We are concerned that the United States will make a compromise with India, to make the president's visit seem more successful. But the benchmarks must not be lowered. We must make sure they will never deploy nuclear weapons, that they sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that they never test again, and that they never use nuclear weapons." According to Hoagland he also said that, "India initiated nuclear testing first and should therefore bear the major pressure and blame."

Meanwhile on the Pakistani front, the Clinton visit signals an appreciation of Pakistan's centrality within the South Asia context. Although the trip will certainly not lead to conclusive discussions on problem areas of Pak-US relations, it will however help further bilateral dialogue.

But not bothered with the nuances of diplomatic processes and uninterested in long-term impacts of diplomatic moves at such high levels, the public is widely interpreting the trip as a rebuff to the Indian leadership. Additionally, for the prophets of doom who incessantly conclude that Pakistan is beset with the problem of isolation, Clinton's decision to visit Pakistan may undermine their myth of Pakistan's isolation.

Perhaps the only immediate and concrete outcome of Clinton's Pakistan's trip will be that Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf will feel more "recognised" and "accepted" by Washington, than he was when his nominee Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi's credentials were accepted in Washington. Clearly putting aside democratic considerations and its past record of not sending in 1978 President Carter to a military dictator-ruled Pakistan, Washington has opted to send Clinton to meet with a military ruler. In doing so, when clearly Musharraf has neither relented on giving a deadline for return to democracy nor promised 'delivery' of Osama, Washington has shown tacit approval of the agenda and the functioning of the Musharraf government. Other elements of Washington's Pakistan policy notwithstanding, support for the Musharraf government at this point constitutes the core of America's Pakistan policy.

(The News 10-03-00)