The White House Briefing Room
December 2, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, BRUCE RIEDEL; AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, KARL INDERFURTH
6:15 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release December 2, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, BRUCE RIEDEL;
AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
KARL INDERFURTH
The Briefing Room
6:15 P.M. EST
COLONEL CROWLEY: We had a very important meeting today
between President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of
Pakistan. There was also a follow-on meeting between the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Rubin. Here to
give you a readout of those meetings, the NSC Senior Director for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Bruce Riedel, and the Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth.
Bruce will start. Thanks.
MR. RIEDEL: Thank you very much. As P.J. said, the
Prime Minister and the President had a very warm, very positive
meeting. Let me run you through some of the particulars first, and
then we'll talk about the substance.
They met from about 1:30 p.m. until 2:00 p.m. in a
plenary meeting with their staffs -- Secretary of State and National
Security Advisor on our side; the Foreign Minister on their side, and
others -- Foreign Secretary. The President and the Prime Minister
had a one-on-one for about 20 minutes in the Oval Office, and then
they had lunch for about 45 minutes, from 2:30 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.
These discussions covered a wide range of issues, and I
think the way Rick and I would like to do this is break those issues
up a little bit. Let me start with the number one issue on our
agenda, which was the issues of nonproliferation and arms control.
The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the status
of the ongoing discussions that we have had with Pakistan since the
tests last May. As most of you know, Deputy Secretary Talbott has
been leading the American team on that effort and we have had a
number of meetings with the government of Pakistan, led on their side
by the Foreign Secretary.
The discussions today, both leaders reviewed the status
of those talks, underscored the importance of trying to come to
closure on them. I would not say that major new developments
occurred there. This was more a status-taking and discussing where
Secretary Talbott and the Foreign Secretary had already brought it.
The President reviewed again and expressed his support
for the Prime Minister's decision to adhere to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty by September 1999. The Prime Minister reaffirmed that
commitment, a commitment that he made first at the U.N. General
Assembly earlier this fall when he spoke to the General Assembly and
when he met with the President at New York.
The President reaffirmed our view that more progress
needed to be made on these issues before we would be in a position to
remove all of the sanctions that had been put on Pakistan in the wake
of the tests under the Glenn Amendment.
The Prime Minister and the President reviewed the status
of those sanctions. As you all know, earlier this year, earlier this
fall, the President lifted some of those sanctions under the
authority given to him by the Brownback Amendment. That authority
only lasts for one year. The President underscored that point to the
Prime Minister and made clear we need to find ways to move forward on
these issues.
Why don't I stop there and let Rick talk about the
economics and Afghanistan and terrorism.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: On the economic
situation, there was a very full discussion of Pakistan's economic
situation between the President and the Prime Minister, and of
course, the Treasury Secretary and the Finance Minister of Pakistan
entered into that discussion. Also discussion of the status of the
IMF package. There is agreement in principle and the Paris Club will
meet this month, the IMF board will meet in January, and we made it
very clear that what we're looking for is a strong, credible, and
fully implemented IMF package.
Made it clear also that while we want to be helpful, we
stressed the limited nature -- limited nature -- of the President's
decision which is confined to the IMF package, support for that
package, as well as resuming Ex-Im and OPIC and TDA activities in
Pakistan. That this is limited, that we need to be able to make
further progress to provide further assistance. That will require
additional steps -- concrete steps -- by Pakistan to address
nonproliferation and security concerns.
There was also discussion about resolving the
independent power producers problem in Pakistan. This was mentioned
by several of the participants and it was very clear that the
government of Pakistan believes that this issue is well on the way to
being resolved. And that will be of great importance to us.
On Afghanistan, along with economic issues at the
luncheon, this was the principal topic of the discussion at lunch
with the President. Prime Minister Sharif informed the President
that, of all countries, Pakistan is most affected by what is
happening inside Afghanistan. The conflict there has caused
refugees, narcotics, spillover effect of the conflict. So Pakistan
is on the front lines of what is happening there.
The President, the Secretary of State, National Security
Advisor all made it clear that we want to see the conflict end; need
to see follow-up work on the so-called Six plus Two process at the
U.N. under Ambassador Brahimi, and establish a broad-based
multiethnic government in Afghanistan.
Secretary Albright said we have very serious problems
with the Taliban, including their treatment of women and girls. All
made it clear that of primary importance to the U.S. government is
the expulsion of Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan so that he can be
brought to justice.
While I don't intend to go into details of what was said
about Osama bin Laden in the meeting, I think it's fair to say that
there was no love lost, nor any sympathies expressed for Osama bin
Laden in that meeting.
In our view about bin Laden, it is very simple -- he is
a terrorist, he is a murderer, he plans to kill again and we want him
brought to justice. And that view was made very clear to our
Pakistani guests.
Q How are you going to do that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: The means to
accomplish that are several in terms of working with other
governments, in terms of doing things that the NSC has been
responsible for, in terms of the financial assets of Osama bin Laden.
This is an effort that is being undertaken by all responsible
agencies and departments of government and we hope that it will be
successful.
Q Well, did Pakistan promise active help in this
effort, or simply that they sympathize with our effort?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Pakistan is well aware
of our views on this. Pakistan is well aware of the impact of Osama
bin Laden in the region, and we have asked Pakistan for its
assistance and I think that that message came through loud and clear
to Prime Minister Sharif.
We do not want to speak for him, or what his government
intends to do. That is a decision they have to take. But they have
heard our views loud and clear.
Q Rick, what was the President's reply to Pakistan's
plea for mediation of the Kashmir crisis?
MR. RIEDEL: I think if you saw the two pool sprays
before the meeting, the President made it very clear. He has
expressed on a number of occasions that the United States is prepared
to do all it can to help, but that it is only able to do things in
any kind of mediation process if both parties want the United States
to be a player in this. He reaffirmed that, and he indicated that it
would need to be a request from both parties for the United States to
play a mediation role.
Q Was there more discussion on this issue after the
brief statements to the press?
MR. RIEDEL: I think that the discussion reaffirmed that
position on our side. I don't think it would be a surprise to any of
you that the Prime Minister put forward well-known positions of the
government of Pakistan about the importance of resolving the Kashmir
issue.
Q What about those F-16s? Could you tell us a little
more on the F-16s as to what's the nature of the deal you have with
New Zealand and how we are going to repay the balance that would be
obvious to Pakistan?
MR. RIEDEL: Absolutely. Let me begin by saying, as the
President I think also indicated in the pool spray, that this is an
issue that he has felt from the day he came into office needed to be
resolved, that it is an irritant in a relationship between our two
governments, that he feels some way needs to be found to make
Pakistan whole for the expenditures it put onto this aircraft deal.
And as you know, he made that position clear not only to the Prime
Minister; in earlier meetings, he made it clear to the Prime
Minister's predecessor.
We now have the possibility of the government of New
Zealand being willing to take some of these aircraft. That may put
some money into a position where we could continue to do what we have
been doing for some time, which as parts of that deal are sold or
otherwise dealt with, we return money to the government of Pakistan.
And we have returned a considerable amount of money over the course
of the last several years.
Q How much?
Q Could we have a dollar figure for that, please?
MR. RIEDEL: $157 million.
Q Bruce, I'm told that New Zealand will buy the
entire squadron.
MR. RIEDEL: I think that the government of New Zealand
is still in a process of making a decision about this. I think part
of it is whether it's going to be lease or purchase.
Q I was told that the decision was made yesterday and
the agreement was made in principle yesterday for them to buy, and
you should know what the amount is.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: The 28 aircraft that
New Zealand has been -- we have been discussing this with them for
some time. We are looking at a lease arrangement. We are waiting
for their official offer to purchase or to lease. So this
information is still there. We still have, in terms of the lease,
the amount, the purchase amount, that's still being --
Q Well, I was told that they agreed to lease them for
10 years and then buy them, and that the agreement was reached
yesterday. Is that correct?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: What we're saying is
we're waiting for that official confirmation of the arrangement.
Q But they released it publicly, they released it
giving all the details. They haven't told you?
Q Is it your understanding it will be a 10-year
lease?
Q I'm confused. I spoke with the Ambassador of New
Zealand today and he said that they had reached an agreement
yesterday. And I just wanted to confirm that this is the case.
MR. RIEDEL: Clearly, we have not gotten the official
word and are still -- let me just finish the point, though, because I
think where you're going, Barbara, is, is this the solution to the
problem or is it part of the solution to the problem. And it is
unlikely that the proceeds from that will be a complete solution to
this problem.
The President reaffirmed to the Prime Minister his
intention to try to find ways to resolve this problem. The Prime
Minister of Pakistan is considering some of the ideas the President
put forward at this time, and I think we are going to wait for the
government of Pakistan to get back to us on those ideas.
Q Is the published figure of $112 million correct?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: For leasing? That's
approximately correct.
Q How much more was Pakistan expecting?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Well, Pakistan expects
$501 million. The original amount of $648 million we have been able,
through the sale of spare parts, brought the amount owed to Pakistan
down to $501 million. So that is the figure that we are working on.
Q So how do you pay the balance? How will you pay
the balance?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Well, that's precisely
what we're discussing with them now. There are a variety of ways
that we're looking at. We have not resolved anything; indeed, the
discussion that the President had today was an initial discussion of
our ideas on this. We need to hear more from them. Lawyers will
have to talk to lawyers. We will have to talk to the Foreign
Ministry. The Defense Department will have to be consulted.
This is a complicated process, but I think that it is
fair to say that, of all the years we have been working on this
issue, we are probably closer now to finding a just settlement for
this than we ever have been. They will not receive the aircraft;
they know that. But I think that we can do what the President has
said to the Prime Minister, which is to find a fair settlement. And
that's what we're working on.
Q Do you think the matter will be resolved before the
statute of limitations has expired?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Hope so. We do not
want to see a suit against the United States by the government of
Pakistan. It would not be a helpful ingredient in our relationship.
Q You don't want to see a suit?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: We do not want to see a
suit. Nor should they.
Q When you urge India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir
issue bilaterally, do you mean to say that the U.S. has changed its
policy to -- to the U.N. Security Council resolutions -- because the
U.S. has been having a consistent policy of supporting the U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Kashmir.
MR. RIEDEL: And we have not changed our policy. The
Security Council resolution of this summer, you're referring to
-- correct? We were one of the sponsors of that resolution; of
course, we're going to continue to support it.
Q Was there any discussion of rescheduling the
President's trip?
MR. RIEDEL: I think what the President said in the pool
spray was what he repeated to the Prime Minister, which is he hopes
it will be possible for him to go in 1999.
Q Have you received any new assurances on cutting
back -- on Pakistan's cutting back on the production of fissile
materials or on export controls? Any of those specific points you're
looking for in nuclear --
MR. RIEDEL: No, as I said earlier, there was a review
of all the outstanding benchmarks in the nonproliferation area.
Those we've discussed on many occasions before. I think they're
well-known from the P-5 and G-8 communiques. The discussion did not
change the positions on those issues. We, from our part, continue to
see a need for additional progress in order to achieve the results we
want.
Q Was there any discussion of the deployment or
actions that would prefigure the deployment of nuclear weapons,
either by aircraft or by missiles? In other words, do you know
whether India or Pakistan or both have yet deployed weapons since the
May tests? Or have they, in fact, taken prefiguring deployment
actions, such as putting aircraft and nuclear devices at the same
airbase?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: We do not believe that
either country has deployed nuclear-capable missiles following the
May tests.
Q Or aircraft?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Or aircraft. We
believe that both countries are looking very closely at what next
steps they may or may not take. We are urging, clearly, restraint.
That is part of the benchmarks that Bruce has referred to and that
Secretary Talbott has been pursuing now in seven rounds of
discussions with both Indian and Pakistani envoys.
So we're urging restraint and we believe that both
countries are looking very carefully at what next steps they may
take. Clearly, deployment is one we do not want to see. They
understand that and we do not believe they have deployed.
Q Prime Minister Sharif said after the meeting this
afternoon that his government has information that India is preparing
for another nuclear test, although he also said that he did not
expect that test to go forward. Do you have information that India
is laying the preparations for a test?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: India has stated that
it has imposed a unilateral moratorium on any further nuclear
testing. We believe that they are acting consistent with that
pledge. They have also made it -- in the statement that Prime
Minister Vajpayee made in New York -- that they are moving toward
adherence to CTBT. And Pakistan has made similar statements with
respect to adherence by September 1999, as well as a unilateral
moratorium by Pakistan on further testing.
Q Are you satisfied that this time, if India does
plan another test, our intelligence service will in fact know it in
advance?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Yes.
Q As opposed to last time?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Yes.
Q Did the Prime Minister express any concerns about
the possibility of another test? Did he express those to the
President when he was meeting with him?
MR. RIEDEL: He repeated the same thing that he said
outside. Yes, he did.
Q The Pakistan Prime Minister, after meeting the
President, talked about informing the President about Pakistan's
national security dilemma, as he calls it, as a result of prolonged
American sanctions and depleted conventional weapons. How is the
U.S. expected to help him resolve the dilemma?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: We can't help him
unless he helps himself. The fact is that the President was able to
exercise limited waiver authority under the Brownback Amendment on
economic issues. Brownback does not cover military-to-military
relations. For us to have any opportunity to address the
conventional military needs of Pakistan, Pakistan will have to take
further steps to address our concerns on nonproliferation, which
would provide us the arguments needed to go up to Capitol Hill to
seek further -- either repeal of sanctions or amendment of Brownback
to allow some form of military cooperation.
All that we have been able to do in that regard has been
to restore the IMET program, the International Military Education
Training program -- which is important because it allows us to have a
channel of communication with the Pakistani military which we believe
is important and our Pentagon believes is important.
The conventional military sales, transfers of equipment,
all that will require further steps by Pakistan to allow us to resume
that kind of relationship.
Q -- specific about further steps? Are we talking
about the signing of the CTBT, or are we talking about the rollback
of their nuclear program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: I would call your
attention to Secretary Talbott's speech at the Brookings Institution
where he went into a progress report of what we have achieved to
date, and we have made some modest, I think, important steps forward.
At the same time he also outlined those other things which we believe
are necessary. So I would rather not sort of repeat Strobe's --
Q One further question on the nuclear side. Has the
administration concluded that the thermonuclear component of
India's five tests in May was a failure?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: I think Bruce will --
MR. RIEDEL: We are not going to comment on the results
of our own analysis and the intelligence that goes into that analysis
about these tests.
Q What did the President respond when the Prime
Minister expressed those concerns about possible tests by India?
MR. RIEDEL: The President made clear our position,
which I don't think is a surprise to anyone, which is we strongly
oppose nuclear testing. And I think we've made it abundantly clear
to the government of India and the government of Pakistan that we
would oppose additional tests.
Q Mr. Inderfurth, going back to Afghanistan,
according to India's newspaper that bin Laden is sponsoring terrorism
in the Indian state of Kashmir, do you have any message for the
government of India in this connection, or can they be helpful in
bringing him to justice or his empire down?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Well, I think that the
question of training of terrorists that may operate in Kashmir is a
serious question. It's one that we're also concerned about. It,
therefore, underscores the importance of getting bin Laden out of
Afghanistan and brought to justice. And a full-court press is
underway to do precisely that.
Q Would you say that the ball is now in the Pakistani
court on the nuclear issue?
Q Anything new on Iraq and Saddam Hussein?
COLONEL CROWLEY: I just want to, before we conclude the
briefing, go back over the F-16 numbers. The original value of the
F-16s was $658 million. Through the sale of components subsequent to
the imposition of Pressler sanctions, we reduced that amount by $157
million. So the balance to Pakistan is currently at $501 million --
just to eliminate any confusion on that.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH: Could I just make one
little P.S. addendum on those things. We are somewhat hamstrung
being in the government. We need to see the papers from other
governments saying that they have placed an offer on the table.
Neither Bruce or I have seen that, so we've had to sort of -- yes,
there is a lease agreement; yes, they're looking at purchase; yes,
this is an important development. We will, I'm sure, the folks here
and at State, will give you the full official recording of the F-16
offer by New Zealand as soon as it is available. We weren't trying
to slip out of this; we just didn't have the official notification.
Q Thank you.
END 6:36 P.M. EST
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
