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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: Jamie, can you say who is going to attend the meeting in London - the G-8-plus? Do you know if India and Pakistan are going to be invited?

MR. RUBIN: I do not expect India and Pakistan to be there. My understanding is that the meeting will consist of the G-8 plus, I gather some countries were being added. I don't want to name them before they've been invited. But other countries outside of the G-8 who would have special influence and responsibility and expertise in the proliferation area are expected to be invited to a part of that meeting.

QUESTION: Has there been any reaction from either India or Pakistan to the findings of the communiqué of the meeting on Friday?

MR. RUBIN: Well, not surprisingly the Indians have taken the position that somehow - what was the word they used - grotesque -- regarded the P-5 communiqué as grotesque. Well, we didn't; we regarded it as a responsible step from the international community to try to bring to bear some reason on the situation between India and Pakistan, to set forth some clear goals for India and Pakistan -- essentially to stop nuclear testing; to not deploy nuclear weapons; to not test or deploy ballistic missiles; and to begin to deal with the underlying dispute, including Kashmir, that has led to such tension between India and Pakistan.

The Pakistani Government has had differing reactions to both the P-5 document approved in Geneva on Friday and the subsequent Security Council resolution approved over the weekend.

The bottom line is, both of these countries are countries that should realize the international community is trying to help them dig themselves out of the hole they've dug for themselves. The fact is that we are going to be working bilaterally; other governments are going to be working bilaterally. We're not trying to isolate them; we're trying to engage them to move away from the direction they were going, which only will lead to a futile nuclear arms race and danger to their people, and move toward the kind of responsible policies that would put them back into the mainstream of countries in the world that accept the proliferation norms, that accept the fact that nuclear weapons are not going to make them more secure, and begin to pay a little more attention to the needs of their people and a little less attention to the perceived value of nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Staying on Pakistan - Defense Department officials told reporters a few weeks ago that Pakistan may have nuclear warheads for their M-11 missiles that it bought from China several years ago; and the amendment to the Arms Export Control Act requires economic sanctions to be imposed on the sale of missiles, which the M-11's do fit under. Why haven't there been sanctions imposed on China? And now how can Pakistan dig its way out of the hole?

MR. RUBIN: With respect - I've heard about such a briefing; I've never seen a transcript of it. I would refer you to the Pentagon for the specific details of what this official may or may not have been referring to. But it is the position of the United States Government that we have not determined that Pakistan has received M-11 missiles from China. We have serious concerns about transfers. We're watching these issues very closely, but as a government, we have not made that determination. So that official, if accurately quoted, was mistaken. But I would refer you to the Pentagon for a formal response to that official's briefing.

QUESTION: Did the Secretary raise this issue with the Chinese Foreign Minister on Friday - Thursday?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary raised with the Chinese Foreign Minister a whole series of issues related to proliferation of missiles, of nuclear weapons and the importance of dealing with the situation in India and Pakistan.

Let me say that Secretary Albright was very pleasantly surprised at the cooperative spirit that the Chinese showed in dealing with a real problem the world faces. It's very easy to focus on the past and what may or may not have happened ten years ago, 15 years ago or 20 years ago; but what we as a government need to focus on is what's happening today. What's happening today is the Chinese Government has been helpful and supportive in trying to deal with one of the biggest dangers the international community has faced in a long time, has behaved responsible, chaired this meeting, took very forward-leaning positions and, in the proliferation area, has changed its behavior.

Whether it's on missiles, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nuclear weapons, whether it's chemical weapons, whether it's a whole series of detailed negotiations related to technology transfer, the Chinese Government today behaves in a way that would have been unthinkable ten years ago, for those who were studying the proliferation issue. Our cooperative relationship with them enhances the security of the United States, makes it easier for us to fight the battle against proliferation. And as much as some would like to focus on what happened 15 years ago, reality dictates that we focus on what cooperation we can get now, and it has been significant.

QUESTION: But isn't it a lot less than 15 years ago? This Administration imposed sanctions against China --

MR. RUBIN: Are you referring - there are several issues and I can run through them with you, George. One of the issues was nuclear transfers to Pakistan that date back to the '80s that we have deep concerns about and made very clear and took steps to respond to in the '80s and '90s - early '90s.

More recently, there have been concerns about technology transfers by China to certain countries and concerns in the missile area. But if you look at the whole panoply of chemical, nuclear weapons and missiles and missile technology -- something that ten years ago the Chinese were prepared to justify a transfer in -- they now indicate they will not support; and something four years ago that they would not agree to - namely an agreement not to provide nuclear cooperation with Iran - that they were defending as their sovereign right four years ago they've now cut off.

So if you look at the panoply of issues - whether it's missiles, civilian nuclear cooperation, nuclear cooperation more broadly, chemical weapons - there has been a broad-based policy decision by the Chinese to change their behavior and that has redound to the advantage of the security of the United States.

That doesn't mean there aren't problems. China's a very big country with a lot of companies and needs a lot of experience in export controls that will prevent problems from happening. But to go from a situation where no export controls were promulgated and, in fact, their transfers were defended to some of the most dangerous countries in the world to a situation where those transfers are rejected, export controls are promulgated but there are problems in the implementation, is a massive change in behavior.

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(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)

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