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2. Pakistan did not instigate or initiate the security crisis in South Asia. We were obliged by security considerations and national considerations to respond to India's provocative nuclear tests. We are glad that the action and reaction sequence has been widely acknowledged in the statements we have heard today.

3. India conducted its tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. As we found, it soon followed these up with threats. These threats culminated in credible reports of planned pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan's sensitive facilities. Others may discount these reports, but Pakistan which has been subject to aggression 3 times could not ignore the nature and depth of the danger.

4. Thus, the nuclear proliferation crisis was transformed into a major security crisis in South Asia.

5. The Government of Pakistan understands and appreciates the sense of concern in many parts of the international community at the resumption of nuclear testing and the escalation of tensions in South Asia. We fully appreciate the endeavors of the world's leaders - President Clinton, President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Blair and Prime Minister Hashimoto - and others - who sought to convince our Prime Minister and the government that Pakistan should exercise restraint. We want to tell them, we gave full consideration to their views; we carefully weighed the factors in favour of and against conducting our tests. As the U.S. Ambassador noted in his statement, we dealt with our fiends honestly. There was no deception. And here I reject the assertion made by my colleague from Australia accusing us of deception. Let me cite an example of real deception. During the CTBT negotiations while exhorting France to cease its nuclear testing programme, Aurtralia's former Prime Minister stated that the process of banning nuclear testing was about stopping countries like Iraq and Pakistan and therefore France should stop worrying about countries such as Germany. Such attitudes also smack of racism. Similarly, to our Canadian friends I would like to say that we never characterised Canada's delivery of unsafeguarded reactor to India as "irresponsible" although we could have. We would advise them to desist from using such intemperate language.

Mr. President,

6. Our decision to test became virtually inevitable because of three factors:

7. Pakistan was thus obliged to respond. But the difference between India and Pakistan's actions is crucial. India's were a provocation; Pakistan's were a reaction. India's tests destabilized the security balance in South Asia; Pakistan's tests have restabilized the balance of mutual deterrence.

8. Pakistan, therefore, regrets the failure of some of our friends to appreciate the distinction between India's action and our reaction. We believe that the sanctions and other actions taken are unfair and unjust and in the final analysis will be counter-productive.

9. Pakistan has welcomed the offer of mediation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Unfortunately, India has rejected the Secretary-General's mediation. We also welcome the initiative of the U.S. to call for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council in Geneva. We look forward to a fair and just statement from this meeting which reflects the realities of the situation.

10. Every crisis presents a challenge, but it often presents an opportunity. This crisis today offers the opportunity for the international community to build a stable structure of peace and security in South Asia through dialogue and therefore, it is essential that we not maintain a narrow focus on the issue of non-proliferation. Peace and Security in South Asia must be dealt with in a comprehensive way.

11. Now, the international community needs to look to the future.

12. There are at least 4 aspects which need to be addressed;

13. First, as regards avoidance of conflict, it should be clear that the Indian proposal for no-first-use is disingenuous. Perhaps it is designed to make it safe for India to continue to use its conventional weapons superiority to threaten and coerce Pakistan and other smaller neighbours. Pakistan has proposed a more comprehensive Non-Aggression Agreement, banning all use or threat of force, as required under the UN Charter.

14. As regards the nuclear issue, in the short-term at least, what is required most is an international consensus on how to stabilize the situation - in other words, how to prevent an open nuclear arms race in South Asia. Pakistan is willing to participate in and contribute to international endeavors to achieve such stabilization - to establish, what may be called, a Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia.

15. Pakistan is not interested in an arms race with Indian nor is Pakistan seeking the status of a nuclear weapon state. Our tests were defence oriented and meant to restore strategic balance in the region. We will adjust ourselves in the best interest of Pakistan, as developments in various related areas take place. We will continue to show restraint in the field of weaponisation as a mature and responsible nation. Our response will be carefully calibrated to the provocation.

16. In this context, we in Pakistan cannot ignore that India has declared itself a Nuclear Weapons State; declared that it will be placing nuclear warheads on its missiles; it is already deploying nuclear capable missiles, and has threatened to use its nuclear weapons, in case of either a conventional or non-conventional conflict. This has been confirmed by the Indian statement a few minutes ago. The question arises: does the world accept India as a Nuclear Weapons State? And, if it does not, how can the world change the "reality" of India's nuclear weapons capabilities? Is the demand for India (and Pakistan's) signature of the NPT realistic now - after the tests - knowing that India refused to sign the Treaty for the past 30 years?

17. These are relevant questions for Pakistan. In evaluating our position on the CTBT, it will be important to know whether India will continue to conduct further nuclear tests; whether it will be accommodated in the CTBT as a Nuclear Weapon State, a NNWS or something else.

18. Similarly, as regards the FMCT, for Pakistan this issue is now dependent on India's nuclear status, its degree of weaponization and size and quality of its fissile material stockpiles. Pakistan cannot afford to allow India to once again destabilize the balance of deterrence in future through asymmetry in the level of stockpiles.

19. Likewise, we cannot afford a situation of inferiority in missile capabilities.

20. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to consider means for mutual restraint which can help to stabilize the nuclear situation in South Asia. This would be done through existing agreements, or through specific measures specially designed for a Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia. This regime could also include measures to insulate the proliferation effect of the recent developments in South Asia on the rest of the world.

21. Nuclear restraint and balance in South Asia will be made possible if this is accompanied by credible and effective measures for greater balance and symmetry in conventional arms capabilities in South Asia. In this context, we should not ignore the huge arms purchases which India has contracted or is considering from various sources. Nor can the world ignore that Pakistan's conventional capabilities have been steadily eroded over the years by discriminatory embargoes and restraints.

22. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the danger of conflict between Pakistan and India - whether conventional or non-conventional, arises from the underlying dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. It will not be sufficient to ease "tensions" and sweep this burning problem once against under the carpet. India seeks to portray Kashmir as a problem of "terrorism". This carries no credibility. The fact is that 600,000 Indian troops are currently engaged in the occupation and suppression of the Kashmiri people.

23. India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve this problem bilaterally for 50 years. It is time that the international community took collective action to try and implement the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. At the very least, it should evolve a political framework within which a solution for Kashmir can be found; it should give active support and impetus to future bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India on Kashmir. It should not allow India to circumvent genuine negotiations on the Kashmir issue.

24. The Prime Minister has reaffirmed the Government's determination to resume Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir as well as peace and security. Last year an agreement was reached for commencing negotiations in six Working Groups. We hope that agreement will be implemented and the talks resumed. We want to defuse regional tension which can only be achieved by resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. It is therefore incumbent on all those who genuinely want peace to lend their weight to an early settlement of this basic problem.

Mr. President,

26. Pakistan is prepared to cooperate with the international community in arresting the crisis in South Asia and building a stable structure of peace and security in the region. But, let us remember, cooperation and coercion are not mutually compatible.