May 28, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_____________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release May 28, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING
BY MIKE MCCURRY
The Briefing Room
2:37 P.M. EDT
.............
Q Did the detonation of the nuclear devices in
Pakistan seal the fate of President Clinton's trip to India and
Pakistan in the fall?
MR. MCCURRY: Not necessarily. That trip is still under
review, and the President has not made a decision with respect to it.
There are strong arguments to be made for going to press upon both
governments and others in the region the importance we attach to
steps now to de-escalate and to lessen tensions in South Asia. But
there clearly are some arguments against going, as a statement of our
displeasure with both governments for steps, as the President said
today, that move in the wrong direction, contrary to the tide of
history that most of the world is celebrating.
Q What's the assessment now on the part of the U.S.
government that both countries will now move to another step of
actually arming delivery systems with nuclear weapons?
MR. MCCURRY: There are a number of steps that these
governments could take that would be threatening to each other and
would create greater instabilities in the region. There are also
steps they could take that would be very reassuring to the world
community at this point. First and foremost among them would be for
both to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and
without condition, to join the discussions in Geneva for a cutoff of
fissile material production, and to refrain from any steps, any
actions that would suggest deployment or weaponization of ballistic
missiles, which would clearly be seen throughout the world as a very
destabilizing and very dangerous development.
Q Mike, does the President have any reason to believe
that Pakistan may do more tests in the next few days?
MR. MCCURRY: We will assess that and report on that as
we can. The statement by the government of Pakistan was quite clear
that they believe that they have matched the tests that have been
done by India, but obviously we'll continue to monitor the situation
closely.
Q Did the President have any reason to believe that
from his last conversation with Sharif?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, to drop back a bit, he had a
conversation that I reported to many of you around midnight last
night in which he made the very strong case against testing, that the
United States government and the President personally believes -- and
believed -- was the correct course for the people of Pakistan to
pursue. He made the strong argument of what would accrue to the
benefit of the people of Pakistan if its government refrained from
testing and noted that the severe consequences that Pakistan will now
face as a result of these tests.
That argument, obviously, and the arguments of many
others in the world did not sway the government of Pakistan, the
Prime Minister -- the Prime Minister called the President just before
he made his public statement this morning around 8:30 a.m. to note
his decision and to express his respect and respectful disagreement
for the arguments raised by the President.
Q Just for the record, this means that the F-16s that
were held up because of the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan can
certainly forget about ever getting those F-16s?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, there are a variety of sanctions
that will come in place and join those sanctions already in place,
through the Symington Amendment, through the Pressler Amendment.
There are a number of sanctions that have already -- were already
imposed on the government of Pakistan. Those obviously remain in
place. The serious consequences that result from the sanctions
imposed by the Glenn Amendment, Section 102 of the Export Control
Act, now come into place, and they will have a range of effects on
our bilateral assistance programs and on the posture we take in
international lending institutions.
Q So what can the United States now offer to India
and Pakistan in an effort to get them to sign the treaty and forbear
further testing?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, for one, that all these strict
sanctions in place remain in place and cannot be removed until there
are the kind of steps that would allow the President to go to
Congress and suggest that sanctions should be relaxed. So to the
degree that these sanctions do have an impact in these countries --
and there is a report in one of our newspapers today about the impact
that sanctions are already having in India -- to the degree that that
pressure begins to build on these governments and they see fit to
follow the kind of course that we have suggested they need to pursue
at this point, that would put the administration in a position to
make a case to Congress if we were in that position to relax
sanctions. We are a long way -- in the aftermath of this decision,
we're not there at this point.
Q When they talked at 8:30 a.m., did the President
take the call?
MR. MCCURRY: They -- Prime Minister Sharif had called
earlier in the morning -- actually, I step back -- the government of
Pakistan had called earlier in the morning and arranged the call, and
it occurred right around 8:30 a.m.
Q What did the President sat to Sharif when Sharif --
MR. MCCURRY: Well, he expressed exactly what he told
all of you in his statement: his profound disappointment, his sense
that this was exactly the wrong decision for the government of
Pakistan to make. He certainly understands the arguments the Prime
Minister made. He understands the unique regional and domestic
pressures that the Prime Minister felt he faced. But the President,
nonetheless, felt that this was a very wrong decision and regretted
the fact that the Prime Minister did not see the wisdom of the
argument the President had carefully made.
Q Let me follow on the F-16s. Is the U.S. now
obligated to return the money to Pakistan?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, we will have to review that. It had
been the policy of our government that we had accepted payment for
the aircraft, that we were looking for some way that we could arrange
for some compensation for the aircraft. The Pressler Amendment was
quite clear on restricting the delivery of the aircraft themselves.
We'll have to assess now, in light of this development, if there's
any relief that's available. There may not be any relief.
Q When do the sanctions actually go into effect?
MR. MCCURRY: They're being prepared now, and they could
be issued as early as later today or certainly in coming days.
Q Mike, do you have an idea of the economic impact of
this latest sanction?
MR. MCCURRY: The question is for a ballpark estimate
and if you will accept this as really only a ballpark estimate, I can
run through what we anticipate some of the implications of the
imposition of Glenn Amendment sanctions under the Arms Export Control
Act.
First, in the international financial institution
lending that is done to Pakistan, it will now be the posture of the
United States and its executive directors who sit on those lending
institutions to oppose multilateral lending. The government of
Pakistan has got a fairly extensive international financial
assistance program underway. The IMF program there itself is, I
think, a $1.6 billion dollar program. Now, that doesn't immediately
get shut off. It's just the United States position in the IMF is
that we would oppose that type of multilateral lending.
Estimated disbursements by other entities, the Asian
Development Bank, is expected to disburse roughly $1.8 billion during
1998 to 2000. Estimated disbursements by the World Bank are about
$500 million to $750 million annually. The next disbursement under
the IMF program that was anticipated was expected to be $292 million
toward the end of this year. Those are all disbursements that we
don't control, but it will now be our position in opposition to those
disbursements.
There is not much bilateral assistance to Pakistan that
we have currently because of the Symington Act restrictions that are
already in place, so there's not, for example, an AID program to cut
off or anything of that nature because most of that was currently
proscribed, as is international military education training, funding,
IMET funding, not currently prohibited by law or defense, sales and
export licenses, but those now, under Glenn Amendment restrictions,
would be prohibited.
I can give you some sense of the value, if you're
interested in that, of what those licenses approved for commercial
arms exports to Pakistan in the last full fiscal year that we have
data for was roughly $83 million. It's $60 million currently in
FY97, which is the current data that we have available.
Q Mike, other than --
MR. MCCURRY: Let me just run through the rest of this,
okay?
License for dual use commodities, the Commerce
Department regulated items -- don't have the exact value but there
are 11 current license approvals in effect, 21 that are conditionally
approved. That all now, of course, is affected by -- could be
affected by Glenn Amendment restrictions. It's not clear that they
are automatically impacted.
There's no current foreign military financing program
for Pakistan, but that's -- you would assume that's the kind of thing
that the government of Pakistan has now foregone any possibility of
as a result of this decision.
And then in the area of credit guarantees and credit
loan programs that we unilaterally administer, we had just recently
made some decisions about restoring OPIC lending to Pakistan. That
all now comes under jeopardy, although that is something a lawyer is
going to have to look at a little more carefully. The Ex-Im Bank had
already placed Pakistan on "on cover" status and identified about
$293 million for new funding, and that is now in jeopardy as well.
So, all told, I think you can see it's a very
significant range of economic sanctions and a very heavy price for
the government of Pakistan to have paid for what, in effect, the
President today called the wrong decision.
Q What was the tone of Sharif's arguments or
responses to the President this morning after rejecting what sounded
like impassioned appeals that the President made on four previous
occasions not to go ahead with these tests?
MR. MCCURRY: It would be most appropriate for the
government of Pakistan to describe that, but I think it would be
accurate to say that the Prime Minister clearly struggled with what
was apparently, for him, a very difficult decision. He knew the
costs, he understood exactly the President's argument. I think he
had some sympathy for the argument that the right thing to do for the
people of Pakistan and for Pakistan's place in history was to refrain
from testing. But I think he clearly felt the pressure and the
burden of both domestic political opinion and also the reality of the
pressure he faced in the region because of the decision by the
government of India. He sounded, in short, like someone who is very
pained by a very difficult decision.
Q What does it say about the President's clout in
international affairs that both India and now Pakistan have summarily
rejected his advice?
MR. MCCURRY: It says that the United States of America,
despite all of its wealth and its might, cannot control every event
every place in the world, particularly in a place where, for five
decades now, governments have fought wars and peoples have lived with
incredible tension. And it just means it makes it all the more
important and all the more incumbent upon the United States, given
our unique role in the world, to work hard at doing the kinds of
things we do.
We've just recently celebrated the success of a peace
effort in Northern Ireland that took three decades in the making.
And the India subcontinent is a place where we're going to have to
work a lot harder to resolve tensions.
We'll do D.C. Control Board in a little while, Mark.
Q Well, how hopeful should we be about the chances
that the U.S. can try to --
MR. MCCURRY: We have already undergone -- we've already
undertaken urgent consultations. I mentioned the work that the
Secretary of State is doing in Brussels already. By the way, in a
short while, Deputy Secretary Talbott at the State Department will be
briefing. He, of course, is our most recent highest-level diplomat
to have been in Pakistan.
The work that we will have to do to try to encourage
these parties to reach some understanding between themselves and to
take the kinds of actions I described earlier with respect to CTBT,
fissile material production -- the decisions they will have to make
with respect to their own ballistic forces will be, we believe,
impacted by the kind of diplomatic pressure the international
community can bring to bear. And I suspect you'll see in coming days
a real effort by the United States to join with other governments to
address this.
Q What kind of pressure did the administration ask
the Chinese government to exert in the situation, and are you
satisfied with their performance?
MR. MCCURRY: We have had a very important exchange of
views with the People's Republic and it would be better for the
People's Republic to describe their role. We will certainly remain
in close contact with them as we address a regional security issue
that has always been of very keen interest to the government of the
People's Republic.
Q Can you say whether or not they were helpful or
cooperative?
MR. MCCURRY: I think I will leave it to their country.
They've already said some things publicly and we are pursuing some
other ideas as we exchange views with the Chinese government.
Q Other than offering India and Pakistan the prospect
of removing the sanctions, going back to the status quo ante, which
clearly wasn't enough leverage to get them to refrain, what kind of
leverage does the United States have, other than that?
MR. MCCURRY: World opinion, which has turned very
swiftly against the decision by the government of India and will no
doubt bring some pressure to bear on the government of Pakistan as
well, could have a very real impact. As I suggested earlier, there
is some initial reporting that public opinion, which was initially
enthusiastic in India, presumably will be enthusiastic in Pakistan,
turns a bit sour when people begin to see the price they pay. You
can read the reports today of power that's not available in New
Delhi, the price that the citizens of India are going to pay for this
decision by its government, by their government, and that will have
some impact over time, we believe.
Q Have you seen any sign that either India or
Pakistan are actually proceeding with the next step of attaching the
devices to --
MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to describe that. That's an
intelligence matter, and we are monitoring that very carefully.
Q Mike, what prompted the President's call at
midnight. Was he aware that they were about to test and was he
trying to talk them out of it?
MR. MCCURRY: We have had -- I would describe as either
very good or excellent information available to us about the status
of the work being done at a technical level in Pakistan, but more
importantly, the President had a very good sense of the way in which
Prime Minister Sharif was dealing with this decision and he felt it
was incumbent upon him to make what he knew would be, perhaps, a
last-minute appeal to Prime Minister Sharif to reconsider, at least
to consider the importance of the argument the President made. You
heard him -- President Clinton earlier today talk about the price
that Pakistan has paid for this decision. And I think President
Clinton felt it would have been remiss of him not to make one last
effort to remind the Prime Minister of that cost.
Q Does the United States give any humanitarian aid to
Pakistan or India --
MR. MCCURRY: No. As I said, most bilateral assistance
programs, because of the Symington Amendment, are in suspension in
any event.
Q There is some talk floating around that the
Pakistanis --
MR. MCCURRY: I'm sorry, there are some humanitarian and
food relief programs that are not restricted and not covered by Glenn
Amendment, but normal foreign aid, foreign aid assistance --
Q Humanitarian and food to both countries is still --
MR. MCCURRY: In both countries, humanitarian assistance
or things related to drought relief, hunger relief, can proceed.
Q There is some talk of putting nuclear weapons on
the missiles that Pakistan recently tested. Did the President get
any assurance from Prime Minister Sharif that Pakistan would not
deploy weapons if indeed they had them?
MR. MCCURRY: We will continue to press upon both
governments, as I just said earlier, the dangers that would arise
from any weaponization of the missiles they have or any efforts to
nuclearize their current military forces. I think both governments
understand how strongly the United States has made that argument --
or makes that argument, and they understand the consequences that
would arise from that escalation. That would be taking a situation
that is already very bad and making it very much worse than it is
already.
Q But they didn't talk about that last night?
Q Were there any assurances?
MR. MCCURRY: They have had discussions about that and
both governments are well aware of our thinking.
Q Has the administration gotten any pressure from
U.S. business groups to exercise restraint in punishing India and
Pakistan?
MR. MCCURRY: From business groups?
Q Yes, from business groups here that might be
worried that their business or trade will be affected.
MR. MCCURRY: Well, the arguments that we hear from some
in the business community, but not all -- some private sector
enterprises, as you know, have been supportive of the imposition of
sanctions, but we do hear from some in the business community that
the effect of unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States is to
put U.S. companies, who employ people here in the United States, at
risk to those foreign governments that will not adopt similar
sanctions and will go ahead and exchange commerce and goods and
services with both countries.
That is the price we pay for the way we use sanctions as
an instrument of diplomacy. That's true whether it's China, Iran, or
any of the other places where we have sanctions policies in effect.
But that is our law, and this administration intends to enforce that
law.
Q Mike, why did the President decide to make his
Pakistan statement during the patient rights event, rather than
making it a separate venue and giving us a chance to ask him
questions about it?
MR. MCCURRY: It was the venue available and, frankly,
the first available. There was a lot of pressure on us to make the
President available because all of you had very strong interest in
hearing from him.
Q Is the Pakistani delegation still coming tomorrow,
and who are they going to meet with?
MR. MCCURRY: They're coming next week, and I don't have
any update on who or where they will be received here.
Q Does the President support Medicaid patients
getting Viagra?
MR. MCCURRY: It's not an issue we have dealt with here.
You have to ask the health care finance agency. We'll come back on
it. Let's do anything more on this.
Q Even if you get India and Pakistan to de-escalate
somewhat, the genie is really half out of the bottom.
MR. MCCURRY: Half?
Q Well, the genie is out of the bottle, maybe all the
way, but even if you get them not to deploy, if you get them to sign
the CTBT and everything else, they still have the nuclear capability,
so we're living in a world where there are no longer simply these
five nuclear powers and the unspoken nuclear capabilities in other
countries. There would have to be a revamping of the
nonproliferation architecture in some way to recognize that.
MR. MCCURRY: No, because we have faced situations where
other countries that had acknowledged, or at least were suspected of
having some form of a nuclear program, renounced those programs and
came into full compliance. There are ways in which that can happen
under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that's already been
promulgated and is now in the process of ratification, but there are
other ways that you can ensure compliance, too. The International
Atomic Energy Agency has a full-scope safeguards program that either
country could adhere to, and by becoming adherents, you would have
some satisfaction that they were not engaged in a program that had
any proliferation-related risks attached to it. That's the way we
monitor compliance with the North Korea agreement that they made in
Geneva in 1994.
So there are ways in which the international community
can assure itself that those -- even those that have demonstrated
some capacity with a nuclear program remain in compliance and are
respecting international nonproliferation norms. So there are ways
in which they can turn the clock back, and that's clearly what we
will impress upon them the importance of doing.
Q Mike, when you spoke a moment ago about the serious
consequences that the U.S. would see in either India or Pakistan
weaponizing its missiles, did you mean by that the serious
consequences just for the region because that would be inherently
destabilizing, or that the U.S. would view that seriously and the
U.S. would consider that provocative?
MR. MCCURRY: I was not suggesting that it would prompt
any kind of military response, if that's what you mean. The former
formulation is correct, though, that it would be inherently
destabilizing on the subcontinent, it would lead to further tension,
it would run the risk of escalating tensions that could be resolved
diplomatically into military confrontations. So that clearly makes
the situation much more dangerous.
Q Mike, is the United States now trying to get other
countries to impose sanctions to go along?
MR. MCCURRY: We are in very close consultation with
other governments. As we saw with respect to the government of
India, there is limited appetite in the world for the kind of
economic sanctions that we impose as a matter of U.S. law, but there
very clearly is sentiment to take steps that express the accumulated
displeasure that many in the international community feel with these
developments.
There have been consequences that India has faced even
as recently as yesterday at the World Bank and the decisions
governments are making about lending and about other types of
economic activity.
Q Yes, a follow-up on that question. What kinds of
steps -- what other steps, besides sanctions, would we be looking at
from other countries?
MR. MCCURRY: A lot of governments expressed in the wake
of the test by India their own unilateral decisions. Canada did,
Japan did. Some of them have assistance programs that they have
suspended or forms of bilateral aid or bilateral lending that they
put in suspension. Several European nations took action with respect
to India. So that type of response I imagine you will see with
respect to Pakistan as well.
Q Mike, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, one of his
arguments was that he found the response of the world community very
tepid.
MR. MCCURRY: Well, they made that argument at time of
the G-8 meeting, and our argument in response was that the
consequences that over time the government of India would feel would
be significant. And as I say, there is some telling evidence that
that is beginning to be the case.
Q But the U.S. has taken steps, but most of the other
world powers --
MR. MCCURRY: A number of other nations have taken
significant economic steps -- the steps for them, since this is
contrary to the way they normally use economic leverage as a tool of
diplomacy, contrary to what has been their norm. So that's just not
true.
Q What you're saying, the rest of the world had a
limited appetite --
MR. MCCURRY: -- for the kind of unilateral economic
sanctions that we invoke as a matter of a law; that's correct.
Q Is part of that responsible, do you think, for
Pakistan going ahead and testing?
MR. MCCURRY: No, I don't personally believe that. I
think, based on the understanding that we can gain such as we can
gain it from the conversation the President had with the Prime
Minister, I think much more significant was domestic political
opinion and regional security.
Q Can we just nail this thing. You listed a number
of dollar amounts in various world lending organizations that you
said --
MR. MCCURRY: These are eyeball estimates.
Q That's right, I understand. That the United States
will oppose.
MR. MCCURRY: Right.
Q The U.S. opposing it, does that mean they are going
to be cut off or restricted? Or are you simply saying that they
could continue even though we oppose it?
MR. MCCURRY: That we do not have in those lending
institutions -- don't have controlling votes. Now, as you've seen at
the World Bank, with respect to India, we have a great deal of
influence on the outcome. But how we exert that with respect to
Pakistan, if future decision making is done, we'll have to see how
that develops.
Q So, we don't go out automatically and say to --
MR. MCCURRY: To your viewers they are going to cut off
all that. That's correct.
Q That this is going to be cut off.
MR. MCCURRY: That's correct.
Q It may or may not.
MR. MCCURRY: That's correct. Although there has to be
some question mark put next to it.
Q Mike, there's going to be a lot of people who say
that Pakistan is less than culpable than India. First off, they
didn't go first and there wasn't the element of deception that
apparently there was with respect to India. Is it really fair that
they get the same degree of punitive consequence?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, as a matter of law, the Glenn
Amendment sanctions are automatic with respect to both governments.
The tonal quality of the way we have addressed this decision by
Pakistan, I'd suggest you is different, and we would acknowledge that
there's a difference in the way these two governments have dealt with
the United States with respect to this test. Prime Minister Sharif
was honest and straightforward in the description of the decision
that he was wrestling with and in his own internal deliberations.
And the government of India was manifestly not.
Q So what does that get them? I mean, in other
words, what substantive difference is there in the way we --
MR. MCCURRY: We will have to assess that in coming days
and see if there are different ways in which we could clearly express
displeasure with what we think is a wrong decision, but clearly
acknowledge that there is some difference between the respective
decisions.
Q Mike, it's been widely reported that Chinese
companies, including China Aerospace, helped Pakistan get nuclear
technology. To what extent do we think China shares the blame for
Pakistan's nuclear capability?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, the assessments of possible Category
1 or Category 2 MTCR infractions by China and Pakistan is a matter
that is under U.S. law delegated to the Secretary of State and they
can provide you the best update. There has been no determination of
a sanctionable event that's been made under MTCR restrictions. And
beyond that, I don't know I have anything to add.
Q Has the President conferred with any members of the
Congressional leadership since Pakistan tested its weapons?
MR. MCCURRY: Has the President conferred?
Q Yes.
MR. MCCURRY: No, the National Security Advisor has been
in contact with several -- I don't have a full list of all of them --
but we will be in contact with Congressional leaders and others.
Q What's the point, just to describe --
MR. MCCURRY: Well, we want to make sure first, because
Congress is not in session, that we can brief those that we are able
to brief or need to brief. Second, advise them to the steps that the
President is taking, including invoking sanctions.
Q Mike, the President said today that Pakistan missed
an opportunity to actually strengthen its security by foregoing the
tests, which is obviously something Nawaz Sharif disagreed with. Can
you explain how Pakistan would have been more secure?
MR. MCCURRY: In the very direct conversations we have
had government to government, we've made it clear that we understand
the security threat that Pakistan and its people would face because
of the decision by the government of India to test. We understood
that both in terms of conventional arms and in terms of security
assurances, the government of Pakistan would need to be able to say
to its people that they had, if refrained from testing, taken steps
to compensate for what had been done by the government of India.
Without detailing private diplomatic exchanges, the
United States government clearly indicated that we would understand
that reality and there were discussions about the need to enhance
Pakistan's security in the course of making the argument to Pakistan
about the reasons why it should not test.
Q To follow on that, was the F-16 issue -- was that
an impediment to making that case?
MR. MCCURRY: Well, it was --
Q It seems like we're less credible when we shafted
them on that deal.
MR. MCCURRY: It was -- having been used as a stick at
one point, it then became a carrot. (Laughter.)
Any more on this before we do D.C. Control Board?
Q Could I just follow on your response? Were there
U.S. security guarantees involved in those talks or were there talks
about military transfers or --
MR. MCCURRY: I just gave an artful answer that
preempted that question. (Laughter.)
Q Are you in a situation where all your carrots now
are just the absence of sticks? I mean, in other words, the only
thing you can offer them is to not do the bad thing that you --
MR. MCCURRY: I think there are other things growing in
the vegetable garden. (Laughter.)
...................
Q Mike, to understand better what you were talking
about earlier, the United States is not unduly concerned that the
examples of India and Pakistan will prompt others to go the route of
nuclear test because it has confidence in IAEA safeguards and
monitoring?
MR. MCCURRY: No, to the contrary. There are a number
of regimes that are not within IAEA full-scope safeguards, and other
nations that are not adherents to MTCR, to nonproliferation treaty,
other countries that have indicated no desire to conform to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty requirements. All of those things
suggest that there are countries -- rogue nations -- that are
pursuing nuclear programs. And one, among many reasons, that we
deplore the decision by the government of Pakistan and India to test
is because of the impact that might have on the thinking of other
nations.
..............
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