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[Page: E660]

• Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, a very distressing article has just come to my attention, thanks to Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh, President of the Council of Khalistan. It is a report from the April 17th issue of India Abroad that the Rand Corporation, a widely-respected think tank, predicted that within a few years, there will be a major war between India and Pakistan and that this war could involve nuclear weapons.

• The prospect of a nuclear war in South Asia must be distressing to anyone. This event could pose a major threat to the entire world. We should all commit ourselves to making sure that even if a war does break out, it is fought without the use of nuclear weapons.

• In its report, the Rand Corporation noted that `the insurgency in Indian Kashmir has become unmanageable' and that `the insurgency has begun to spread into Punjab.' The Indian Government is fond of telling us that there is no support for independence in Punjab, Khalistan. Yet Rand Corporation, which has no interest in promoting either side, tells us that the `insurgency' is spreading into Punjab, Kahlistan.

• This disastrous scenario is one more reason the United States, as the world's only remaining superpower, should support freedom for Khalistan, the Sikh homeland that declared its independence on October 7, 1987, and the other nations in South Asia that are seeking their freedom. An internationally recognized and independent Khalistan could serve as a buffer between both India and Pakistan. This would be in the best interests of India, Pakistan, the United States, and the whole world.

• Mr. Speaker, it is time for this Congress to go on record in support of a free and fair plebiscite on the political status of Khalistan. It is time to demand that India keep its promise made in 1948 to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. That is the democratic way to settle these issues. It is also the best way to prevent South Asia from becoming the tinderbox of a nuclear disaster for the entire world.

• I would like to enter the India Abroad article into the Record, and I strongly urge my colleagues to read it carefully.

[Page: E661]

Washington--A scenario prepared for the Pentagon by the semi-official Rand Corporation, a highly regarded think tank which receives some Federal funding, finds large-scale humanitarian operations in a nuclear combat zone in South Asia following the year 2005, which is fueled by an `unmanageable' situation in Kashmir.

The scenario, contained in Rand's report titled `Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy,' paints a picture where `the insurgency in Indian Kashmir has become unmanageable,' so much so that `despite the best efforts of the Indian government, the insurgency has begun to spread into Punjab.'

`Recognizing that it has been left behind in its conventional military competition with India,' the scenario notes, `Pakistan sees these revolts as a way of weakening its great rival and increases its material and diplomatic support, including training and sanctuary, to both insurgencies.'

By early the following year, it predicts, `Pakistan's involvement--never precisely subtle to begin with--becomes highly visible when two Pakistan soldiers, acting as trainers for Kashmiri insurgents, are captured in an Indian commando raid on a rebel-controlled village.'

According to the scenario, `India warns Pakistan to desist from supporting the insurgencies and threatens dire consequences. Pakistan initiates diplomatic efforts to isolate India while increasing levels of covert support for the insurgents.' In the spring of 2006, the scenario shows that `India dramatically increases its counter-insurgency operations . . . and the rebels are pushed into precipitate retreat.'

Pakistan's response, it says, is `by infiltrating a number of special-forces teams, which attack military installations.'

India then mobilizes for war `and launches major attacks all along the international border, accompanied by an intense air campaign.'

Consequently, according to the Rand scenario, `the Indian Army makes significant penetrations in the desert sector and achieves a more limited advance in Punjab, capturing Lahore and heading north toward Rawalpindi and Islamabad.'

Additionally, `a supporting attack from Kashmir is poised to go at the proper moment,' and conventional missile and air strikes `have done extensive damage to Pakistani military infrastructure, while India's air bases, in particular, have been hit hard by the Pakistanis.'

The scenario notes that `fearful that the Indians will use their emerging air superiority to locate and destroy the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and perceiving their military situation as desperate,' Islamabad demands that India cease all offensive operations and withdraw from occupied Pakistani territory `or face utter destruction.'

But it paints a picture of India pressing on with its conventional attacks while announcing that while it would not `initiate the escalation of the conflict,' it would `surely respond in a * * * devastating manner' to any Pakistani gambit.

Bringing in the nuclear dimension to its scenario, the Rand report then notes that as Indian forces `continue to press forward, Pakistan detonates a small fission bomb on an Indian armored formation in an unpopulated area of the desert border region; it is unclear whether the weapon was intended to go off over Pakistani or Indian territory.' India responds by destroying a Pakistani air base with a two-weapon nuclear attack.

Condemning the `escalation' to homeland attacks, Pakistan then attacks the Indian city of Jodphur with a 20-kiloton weapon and demands cessation of hostilities.

But India strikes Hyderabad with a weapon assessed to be 200 kiloton and threatens `10 times' more destruction if any more nuclear weapons are used during the conflict. Pakistan then offers a cease fire.

Meanwhile, according to the scenario, `pictures and descriptions of the devastation in Jodhpur and Hyderabad are broadcast worldwide, and Internet jockeys--playing the role ham radio operators often have in other disasters--transmit horrifying descriptions of the suffering of the civilian victims on both sides.'

This results in the United Nations immediately endorsing a massive relief effort, `which only the United States--with its airlift fleet and rapidly deployable logistics capability--can lead.'

Thus, within 48 hours--after the cease-fire has been accepted by India but before it is firmly in place--`the advance echelons of multinational, but predominantly American, relief forces begin arriving in India and Pakistan.'

In noting the constraints in such a scenario, the Rand report notes the war has rendered many air bases in both India and Pakistan only marginally usable for airlift operations.

`U.S. citizens,' it states, `are scattered throughout both countries, and the host governments' attitudes toward their evacuation are not known.'

The U.S. President meanwhile has assured the nation in a broadcast address that only the `smallest practical number' of troops will be deployed on the ground in either India or Pakistan.

In a preface to the report, Rand said the study, sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, `was intended to serve Air Force longrange planning needs.'

It said the `findings are also relevant to broader ongoing debates within the Department of Defense and elsewhere.'