Statement by H.E. Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 19, 1998.
Mr. President,
I welcome this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It is
particularly auspicious that I do so under the Presidency of the representative of the
fraternal Syrian Arab Republic.
I am confident that, under your dynamic leadership, this Conference will reach a positive conclusion to the painstaking process of consultations initiated by your two predecessors - the Ambassadors of Sweden and Switzerland. It is certainly high time that the Conference was enabled to embark on substantive work on at least a few issues even if these are not considered to be of the highest priority.
Mr. President,
Pakistan attaches great importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a unique and invaluable instrument for the promotion of international peace and security through negotiated arms control and disarmament agreements. The CD has many achievements to its credit - the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and, most recently, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
We have all welcomed the entry into force of
the Chemical Weapons Convention last year. Pakistan never had a chemical weapons programme
and stated so in 1992 whilst signing an agreement with India. We ratified the Convention
with the same confidence. The entry into force of the CWC, however, led to the unpleasant
revelation of an active chemical weapons programme and stockpiles of our eastern
neighbour. Our concern is two-fold:
- first, these chemical weapons pose a direct
threat to our security and thus need to be destroyed as soon as possible;
- second, this incident confirms that Pakistan cannot derive confidence even from solemn
and signed declarations of our neighbour such as the 1992 India-Pakistan Joint Declaration
that neither side possessed chemical weapons. This makes our task of promoting regional
and global peace and arms control more difficult.
Mr. President,
Pakistan is also participating actively in the on-going Geneva negotiations to strengthen
the Biological Weapons Convention. This is a complex undertaking. The positions on key
issues have now been clearly articulated. Negotiations can be facilitated by a sincere
endeavour to promote genuine consensus on these key issues which are reflected in the
"rolling text". The Ad hoc Group on the BWC has a clearly defined
mandate. The Fourth Review Conference has provided the necessary guidance regarding a
realistic time frame for the conclusion of its work. Artificial deadlines should be
avoided. The temptation to impose positions espoused by some through alternate texts will
also prove counter-productive.
Mr. President,
For the past year and a half, the Conference on Disarmament has faced a stalemate in
selecting the next issue for multilateral negotiation. In part, this reflects an erosion
of the mutual trust among C.D. members - an erosion attributable to the unilateral methods
utilized to secure the NPT's indefinite extension and the CTBT's adoption by the General
Assembly. It would be even worse if this stalemate reinforces the trend of seeking arms
control agreements in other forums, notwithstanding the absence of general consensus or
participation by all those whose security interests are affected.
Mr. President,
Beneath the manifestations of unilateralism and pulpit diplomacy, some in the Third World
see a more disturbing design - the objective of perpetuating an unequal world security
order; an order where some States enjoy total security and others total insecurity; an
order where some are free to develop, build, deploy and use any weapon, while others are
prevented from acquiring the means for self-defence; where some can possess, refine and
even consider using nuclear weapons while seeking to impose non-proliferation on others,
even through the use of force.
It is quite natural that the smaller and weaker States, those which have no awesome
weapons, nor the protection of alliances and umbrellas, should seek to level the playing
field by promoting nuclear disarmament, specially now that chemical and biological weapons
have been prohibited.
The danger posed by nuclear weapons is clear and present. It is not confined to the
problem of "loose nukes" or nuclear terrorism, although these threats also need
to be seriously addressed. The principal danger arises from the continued possession and
possible use of nuclear weapons by some of the nuclear weapon States.
The following are some sobering thoughts:
- even if START II and START III are concluded, ratified and implemented, the
nuclear weapons arsenals of the two major powers will be larger than at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis;
- if the world worried about the stability of bipolar nuclear deterrence during the Cold
War, it should have sleepless nights about the uncertainty of multipolar nuclear
deterrence between 5 nuclear powers and perhaps some additional nuclear-capable States;
- our concerns have hardly been eased by the fact that now four of the five nuclear powers
espouse the doctrine of the first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear or conventional
threats to their security;
- the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and theater missile
defenses could also seriously affect the stability of nuclear deterrence and possibly
provoke another round of vertical proliferation;
- the new nuclear doctrines contemplating the actual use of nuclear weapons - even against
non-nuclear weapon States - and matched by the refinement of nuclear designs for this
purpose, could lead to a nuclear disaster. Such doctrines could also destroy the consensus
against nuclear proliferation.
Mr. President,
In short, the nuclear nightmare is not over. The imposition of global non-proliferation is
not a sufficient answer to avoiding a nuclear nightmare. For the peoples of the world
nuclear disarmament, and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, is the only answer.
This goal must remain the highest priority of the international community. This Conference
is required to play a central role in realizing the vital objective of nuclear
disarmament.
When nuclear weapons threaten the security of all States and affect the destiny of all
peoples, how can it be argued that nuclear disarmament is the business of only two or five
nuclear powers? If possession of nuclear assets is the criteria for participation, the
CTBT need not have been negotiated in the C.D. Nor need the Fissile Materials Convention
be proposed for negotiation in this body. In any event, there are reportedly more than 20
countries with the potential to build nuclear weapons. It would not be wise or logical to
exclude them from negotiations which seek the progressive reduction and eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons.
There are several measures for nuclear disarmament which can be negotiated in the C.D., if
there is a will to do so. A Group of 26 countries has suggested a specific mandate for
negotiations on nuclear disarmament in three working groups under an Ad hoc
Committee. This proposal envisages, as a first step, a legally binding international
agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. A simple
and short Treaty could be approved very soon if the political will exists. My delegation
is circulating a Working Paper which illustrates the possible provisions of such a Treaty.
Secondly, the proposal envisages commencement, in a second working group, of negotiations
on a programme for the progressive and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Draft
Programme contained in the Document CD./1419 proposed by 28 CD member States is a good
basis for negotiations. It should be made clear that we are seeking in this process to
identify nuclear disarmament measures, their sequence and the approximate timing for their
realization. We are not pressing for actual negotiations of specific disarmament measures.
Such negotiations will have to be conducted through the appropriate modalities -
bilateral, plurilateral, regional or multilateral.
The Group's proposal also envisages negotiations in a third working group on a Fissile
Materials Convention. Pakistan is prepared to commence work on a Fissile Materials
Convention with a mandate which reflects the Shannon Report and the concerns expressed by
all countries. If it is to be acceptable, the Fissile Materials Treaty must be equitable.
It will not be so if it does not address the problems created by unequal stockpiles of
fissile materials, including in our region.
Mr. President,
Since we initiated and chaired the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Conference in 1968, Pakistan
has been in the forefront of efforts to secure unconditional and legally binding
guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. This endeavour has seen only partial and unsatisfactory results, including as a
result of the earlier deliberations in this Conference.
The entire concept of Negative Security Assurances has now been called into question by
the new doctrines which envisage the actual use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
States, even in response to non-nuclear weapons use or threat of use. Such doctrines are
morally unacceptable. According to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), these doctrines contravene international law. They also violate the
commitments made by some nuclear weapon States under Security Council resolutions 255 and
984 as well under the Protocols to various nuclear weapon free zone Treaties.
It is, therefore, timely for this Conference to re-establish the Ad hoc
Committee on Negative Security Assurances. The work of this Committee should enable us to
collectively clarify the new doctrines for nuclear deterrence and nuclear use propounded
by certain States and Alliance system. Our aim is to conclude a binding international
agreement. The Ad hoc Committee could also examine whether some nuclear
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) could be agreed to reassure the non-nuclear weapons
States, for example, a commitment against nuclear targeting of non-nuclear weapon States,
and a disavowal of the recently propounded doctrines of possible nuclear use against
non-nuclear States.
Mr. President,
Twenty-seven years ago, the world felt reassured that Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems had
been forever excluded from the nuclear calculus. The exceptions which have been recently
agreed to allow ABM systems against medium and shorter-range missiles could possibly open
a nuclear Pandora's box. The development of ABM systems and Theater Missile Defenses could
seriously erode nuclear stability and provoke a new nuclear and missiles race among the
nuclear powers and perhaps other States. Pakistan suggests that, as a first step, the
Conference on Disarmament should establish a Working Group to clarify the legal and
technological developments in this field and their possible implications for the
maintenance of nuclear stability. Following this, the C.D. could consider negotiations for
an international agreement to prohibit or restrict ABM and Theater Missile Defence
Systems.
Mr. President,
While the development of technology cannot be contained, its application for military
purposes can be restricted through collectively negotiated measures. Outer Space is an
environment from which nuclear weapons have already been prohibited. We must ensure that
all kinds of weapons and military activities are excluded from Outer Space. Indeed, all
war should be outlawed in Outer Space. The present moment in history, when no power is
overtly seeking to militarize Outer Space, offers a window of opportunity to negotiate a
legally-binding agreement for the preservation of Outer Space for peaceful purposes.
Pakistan hopes an Ad hoc Committee will be established by the CD soon to
negotiate such an agreement.
Mr. President,
Pakistan agrees with those who argue that the CD must also address conventional weapons -
not only to ensure "balance" but because this is essential to preserve
international peace and security. Pakistan suggests that C.D. should establish an Ad
hoc Committee on Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament. This Committee should
adopt a comprehensive approach and - like the proposed Ad hoc Committee on
Nuclear Disarmament - it should establish three Working Groups to address the three major
components of the problem posed by conventional weapons today.
The first working group should seek to arrest the increasing lethality and sophistication
of conventional weapons which increase suffering and, equally important, further intensify
the concentration of destructive power in the hands of a few militarily and
technologically advanced powers. National and international control measures for arresting
and eventually prohibiting the development of such advanced lethal weapons should be
evolved in the Working Group.
A second Working Group should undertake measures to prevent the creation of serious arms
imbalances in the regions of tension and conflict. A first step could be the formulation
of a framework for conventional disarmament and arms control at the regional and
sub-regional level. This Conference has been repeatedly asked to undertake this task by
the United Nations General Assembly. Such a framework will, we trust, reflect such
principles as:
- none of the potential adversaries should be capable of prevailing in a military attack
launched by surprise;
- equilibrium and a rough parity in defence capabilities should exist between potential
adversaries, in qualitative and quantitative terms; and
- there should be no significant disparity in any of the areas of conventional
defence-land, air or naval forces.
Subsequently, once a framework has been evolved, consideration could be given to creation
of negotiating groups devoted to promoting balanced arms control and disarmament in
specific regions of tension.
A third Working Group on Conventional Weapons could take up the issue of the transfer of
armaments, including small arms. As a first step, there is need to restrain such transfers
to regions where serious arms imbalances already exist; to countries in the throes of
civil war - such as Afghanistan, where an arms embargo should be imposed at the borders
and airfields; - and to criminals and terrorists. Naturally, such measures should be
without prejudice to the legitimate right of States to self-defence and of peoples under
colonial and foreign domination to struggle by all possible means for their right to
self-determination.
Mr. President,
Pakistan's positions on all disarmament issues are, naturally, responsive to our
challenging security environment. We are obliged to contend with the great power ambitions
and aggressive proclivities of our eastern neighbour, which has thrice thrust war upon
Pakistan.
No responsible government in Islamabad can ignore the following realities:
- due to non-implementation of Security Council resolutions, a brutal eight-year old
conflict is underway in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir between the Kashmiris and a foreign
occupation force of over six hundred thousand;
- an average of 2200 ceasefire violations take place each year, along the Line of Control
in Kashmir, and daily firing on the Siachen Glacier;
- two large armies face each other eye-ball to eye-ball along the border. This is the
world's major flash point;
- virtually all of our neighbour's military assets - a 1.2 million man Army, over 500
aircraft, a naval flotilla - are deployed against Pakistan;
- the serial production and deployment of the nuclear-capable Prithvi, aimed specifically
at Pakistan, has commenced. It may soon be followed by the medium-range Agni;
- the on-going acquisition by our neighbour of a large number of advanced aircraft,
anti-missile systems and other armaments, despite the absence of any real threat to its
security.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has been subjected to unjust embargoes and sanctions, severely eroding
our defence capabilities and creating the military possibility of aggression. Pakistan is
obliged to redress this asymmetry in order to deter aggression. No one should doubt our
ability and determination to deliver a swift and telling response to any aggression or
adventurism against Pakistan.
Sadly, the world awakens to the clear and present dangers in South Asia only when Pakistan
is obliged to respond to escalatory steps initiated by our neighbour. This is yet another
reflection of the discrimination to which Pakistan has been subjected for almost 25 years,
since our neighbour's nuclear explosion at Pokharan. Recent public utterances and
pronouncements by the BJP President that India will "go nuclear" should evoke
global concern. South Asia may be pushed into a dangerous arms race.
Mr. President,
The international community should understand that Pakistan does not wish to expend its
scarce resources on a conventional or a nuclear arms race. As Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
has said, Pakistan "strives for peace and stability in the region". He took the
initiative to open a comprehensive dialogue with India. We hope this will be sustained
with the new Indian government which, we hope, will be agreeable to serious negotiations
to resolve the `core' issue of Kashmir. Besides Kashmir, the Agenda also includes an item
on "Peace and Security". Through a dialogue under this item Pakistan is prepared
to evolve agreement for mutual and equal restraint with India in the conventional, missile
and nuclear fields. But we will not accept one-sided or unilateral constraints on our
ability to deter aggression.
The peoples of South Asia cannot be denied their basic social needs - clean drinking
water, sanitation, sewerage, roads, schools for girls and boys, hospitals,
telecommunications, electrification and employment. We cannot meet these needs if we
continue to spend our precious resources on armaments.
The world community can help us to achieve the goal of peace and security in South Asia.
Those who wish to sell arms to our neighbour while denying these to Pakistan should
reconsider. Those who sell our neighbour new weapons systems must know that we will be
obliged to respond to the escalation of the military threat posed to Pakistan by these
weapons. It is not by adopting double standards, - not by pampering a truculent power
while penalizing an accommodating friend, - that the incentives can be created for
equitable arms control or peace in South Asia.
Thank you, Mr. President.
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