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PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

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Statement by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on Thursday, 19 March 1998 at Geneva.

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Mr. President,

I welcome this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It is particularly auspicious that I do so under the Presidency of the representatives of the fraternal Syrian Arab Republic.

I am confident that, under your dynamic leadership, this Conference will reach a positive conclusion to the painstaking process of consultations initiated by your two predecessors - the Ambassadors of Sweden and Switzerland. It is certainly high time that the Conference was enabled to embark on substantive work on at least a few issues even if these are not considered to be of the highest priority.

Mr. President,

Pakistan attaches great importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a unique and invaluable instrument for the promotion of international peace and security through negotiated arms control and disarmament agreements. The CD has many achievements to its credit - the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and, most recently, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

We have all welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year. Pakistan never had a chemical weapons programme and stated so in 1992 whilst signing an agreement with India. We ratified the Convention with the same confidence. The entry into force of the CWC, however, led to the unpleasant revelation of an active chemical weapons programme and stockpiles of our eastern neighbour. Our concern is two-fold:

• First, these chemical weapons pose a direct threat to our security and thus need to be destroyed as soon as possible;

• Second, this incident confirms that Pakistan cannot derive confidence even from solemn and signed declarations of our neighbour such as the 1992 India-Pakistan Joint Declaration that neither side possessed chemical weapons. This makes our task of promoting regional and global peace and arms control more difficult.

Mr. President,

Pakistan is also participating actively in the on-going Geneva negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. This is a complex undertaking. The positions on key issues have now been clearly articulated. Negotiations can be facilitated by a sincere endeavour to promote genuine consensus on these key issues which are reflected in the "rolling text". The Ad Hoc Group on the CWC has a clearly defined mandate. The fourth Review Conference has provided the necessary guidance regarding a realistic time frame for the conclusion of its work. Artificial deadlines should be avoided. The temptation to impose positions espoused by some through alternate texts will also prove counter-productive.

Mr. President,

For the past year and a half, the Conference on Disarmament has faced a stalemate in selecting the next issue for multilateral negotiation. In part, this reflects an erosion of the mutual trust among C.D. members - an erosion attributable to the unilateral methods utilized to secure the NPT's indefinite extension and the CTBT's adoption by the General Assembly. It would be even worse if this stalemate reinforces the trend of seeking arms control agreements in other forums, notwithstanding the absence of general consensus or participation by all those whose security interests are affected.

Mr. President,

Beneath the manifestations of unilateralism and pulpit diplomacy, some in the Third World see a more disturbing design - the objective of perpetuating an unequal world security order; an order where some States enjoy total security and others total insecurity, an order where some are free to develop, build, deploy and use any weapon, while others are prevented from acquiring the means for self-defence, where some can possess, refine and even consider using nuclear weapons while seeking to impose non-proliferation on others, even through the use of force.

It is quite natural that the smaller and weaker States, those which have no awesome weapons, nor the protection of alliances and umbrellas, should seek to level the playing field by promoting nuclear disarmament, especially now that chemical and biological weapons have been prohibited.

The danger posed by nuclear weapons is clear and present. It is not confined to the problem of "loose nukes" or nuclear terrorism, although these threats also need to be seriously addressed. The principal danger arises from the continued possession and possible use of nuclear weapons by some of the nuclear weapon States.

The following are some sobering thoughts:

• Even if START II and START III are concluded, ratified and implemented, the nuclear weapons arsenals of the two major powers will be larger than at the time of the Cuban missile crisis;

• If the world worried about the stability of bipolar nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, it should have sleepless nights about the uncertainty of multipolar nuclear deterrence between 5 nuclear powers and perhaps some additional nuclear-capable States.

• Our concerns have hardly been cased by the fact that now four of the five nuclear powers espouse the doctrine of the first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear or conventional threats to their security;

• The development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and theater missile defenses could also seriously affect the stability of nuclear deterrence and possibly provoke another round of vertical proliferation.

• The new nuclear doctrine contemplating the actual use of nuclear weapons - even against non-nuclear weapons States - and matched by the refinement of nuclear designs for this purpose, could lead to a nuclear disaster. Such doctrines could also destroy the consensus against nuclear proliferation.

Mr. President,

In short, the nuclear nightmare is not over. The imposition of global non-proliferation is not a sufficient answer to avoiding a nuclear nightmare. For the peoples of the world nuclear disarmament, and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, is the only answer. This goal must remain the highest priority of the international community. This Conference is required to play a central role in realizing the vital objective of nuclear disarmament.

When nuclear weapons threaten the security of all States and affect the destiny of all people, how can it be argued that nuclear disarmament is the business of only two or five nuclear powers? If possession of nuclear assets is the criteria for participation, the CTBT need not have been negotiated in the C.D. Nor need the Fissile Materials Convention be proposed for negotiation in this body. In any event, there are reportedly more than 20 countries with the potential to build nuclear weapons. It would not be wise or logical to exclude them from negotiations which seek the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

There are several measures for nuclear disarmament which can be negotiated in the C.D., if there is a will to do so. A Group of 26 countries has suggested a specific mandate for negotiations on nuclear disarmament in three working groups under an Ad Hoc Committee. This proposal envisages, as a first step, a legally binding international agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. A simple and short Treaty could be approved very soon if the political will exists. My delegation is circulating a Working Paper which illustrates the possible provision of such a Treaty.

Secondly, the proposal envisages commencement, in a second working group, of negotiations on a programme for the progressive and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Draft Programme contained in the Document CD/1419 proposed by 28 CD member States is a good basis for negotiations. It should be made clear that we are seeking in this process to identify nuclear disarmament measures, their sequence and the approximate timing for their realization. We are not pressing for actual negotiations of specific disarmament measures. Such negotiations will have to be conducted through the appropriate modalities - bilateral, plurilateral, regional or multilateral.

The Group's proposal also envisages negotiations in a third working group on a Fissile Materials Convention. Pakistan is prepared to commence work on a Fissile Materials Convention with a mandate which reflects the Shannon Report and the concerns expressed by all countries. If it is to be acceptable, the Fissile Materials Treaty must be equitable. It will not be so if it does not address the problems created by unequal stockpiles of fissile materials, including in our region.

Mr. President,

Since we initiated and chaired the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Conference in 1968, Pakistan has been in the forefront of efforts to secure unconditional and legally binding guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This endeavour has been only partial and unsatisfactory results, including as a result of the earlier deliberations in this Conference.

The entire concept of Negative Security Assurance has now been called into question by the new doctrines which envisages the actual use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, even in response to non-nuclear weapons use or threat of use. Such doctrines are morally unacceptable. According to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), these doctrines contravene international law. They also violate the commitments made by some nuclear weapon States under Security Council resolutions 255 and 984 as well as under the Protocols to various nuclear weapon free zone Treaties.

It is, therefore, timely for this Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. The work of this Committee should enable us to collectively clarify the new doctrines for nuclear deterrence and nuclear use propounded by certain States and Alliance system. Our aim is to conclude a binding international agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee could also examine whether some nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) could be agreed to reassure the non-nuclear weapons States, for example, a commitment against nuclear targeting of non-nuclear weapon States, and a disavowal of the recently propounded doctrines of possible nuclear use against non-nuclear States.

Mr. President,

Twenty-seven years ago, the world felt reassured that Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems had been forever excluded from the nuclear calculus. The exceptions which have been recently agreed to allow ABM systems against medium and shorter-range missiles could possibly open a nuclear Pandora's box. The development of ABM systems and Theater Missile Defenses could seriously erode nuclear stability and provoke a new nuclear and missiles race among the nuclear powers and perhaps other States. Pakistan suggests that, as a first step, the Conference on Disarmament should establish a Working Group to clarify the legal and technological developments in this field and their possible implications for the maintenance of nuclear stability. Following this, the C.D. could consider negotiations for an international agreement to prohibit or restrict ABM and Theater Missile Defence Systems.

Mr. President,

While the development of technology cannot be contained, its application for military purposes can be restricted through collectively negotiated measures. Outer Space is an environment from which nuclear weapons have already been prohibited. We must ensure that all kinds of weapons and military activities are excluded from Outer Space. Indeed, all war should be outlawed in Outer Space. The present moment in history, when no power is overtly seeking to militarize Outer Space, offers a window of opportunity to negotiate a legally-binding agreement for the preservation of Outer Space for peaceful purposes. Pakistan hopes an Ad Hoc Committee will be established by the CD soon to negotiate such an agreement.

Mr. President,

Pakistan agrees with those who argue that the CD must also address conventional weapons - not only to ensure "balance" but because this is essential to preserve international peace and security. Pakistan suggests that C.D. should establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament. This Committee should adopt a comprehensive approach and - like the proposed Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament - it should establish three Working Groups to address the three major components of the problem posed by conventional weapons today.

The first working group should seek to arrest the increasing lethality and sophistication of conventional weapons which increase suffering and, equally important, further intensify the concentration of destructive power in the hands of a few militarily and technologically advanced powers. National and international control measures for arresting and eventually prohibiting the development of such advanced lethal weapons should be evolved in the Working Group.

A second Working Group should undertake measures to prevent the creation of serious arms imbalances in the regions of tension and conflict. A first step could be the formulation of a framework for conventional disarmament and arms control at the regional and sub-regional level. This Conference has been repeatedly asked to undertake this task by the United Nations General Assembly. Such a framework will, we trust, reflect such principles as:

• None of the potential adversaries should be capable of prevailing in a military attack launched by surprise.

• Eequilibrium and a rough parity in defence capabilities should exist between potential adversaries, in qualitative and quantitative terms; and

• There should be no significant disparity in any of the areas of conventional defence-land, air or naval forces.

Subsequently, once a framework has been evolved, consideration could be given to creation of negotiating groups devoted to promoting balanced arms control and disarmament in specific regions of tension.

A third Working Group on Conventional Weapons could take up the issue of the transfer of armaments, including small arms. As a first step, there is need to restrain such transfers to regions where serious arms imbalances already exist; to countries in the throes of civil war - such as Afghanistan, where an arms embargo should be imposed at the borders and airfields; - and to criminals and terrorists. Naturally, such measures should be without prejudice to the legitimate right of States to self-defence and of peoples under colonial and foreign domination to struggle by all possible means for their right to self-determination.

Mr. President,

Pakistan's positions on all disarmament issues are, naturally, responsive to our challenging security environment. We are obliged to content with the great power ambitions and aggressive proclivities of our eastern neighbour, which has thrice thrust war upon Pakistan.

No responsible government in Islamabad can ignore the following realities.

• Due to non-implementation of Security Council resolution, a brutal eight year old conflict is underway in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir between the Kashmiris and a foreign occupation force of over six hundred thousand.

• An average of 2200 ceasefire violations take place each year, along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and daily firing on the Siachen Glacier;

• Two large armies face each other eye-ball to eye-ball along the border. This is the world's major flash point.

• Virtually all of our neighbour's military assets - a 1.2 million man Army, over 500 aircraft, a naval flotilla - are deployed against Pakistan.

• The serial production and deployment of the nuclear-capable Prithvi, aimed specifically at Pakistan, has commenced. It may soon be followed by the medium-range Agni;

• The on-going acquisition by our neighbour of a large number of advanced aircraft, anti-missile systems and other armaments, despite the absence of any real threat to its security.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has been subjected to unjust embargoes and sanctions, severely eroding our defence capabilities and creating the military possibility of aggression. Pakistan is obliged to redress this asymmetry in order to deter aggression. No one should doubt our ability and determination to deliver a swift and telling response to any aggression or adventurism against Pakistan.

Sadly, the world awakens to the clear and present dangers in South Asia only when Pakistan is obliged to respond to escalatory steps initiated by our neighbours. This is yet another reflection of the discrimination to which Pakistan has been subjected for almost 25 years, since our neighbour's nuclear explosion at Pokharan. Recent public utterances and pronouncements by the BJP President that India will "go nuclear" should evoke global concern. South Asia may be pushed into a dangerous arms race.

Mr. President,

The international community should understand that Pakistan does not wish to expend its scarce resources on a conventional or a nuclear arms race. As Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has said, Pakistan "strives for peace and stability in the region". He took the initiative to open a comprehensive dialogue with India. We hope this will be sustained with the new Indian government which, we hope, will be agreeable to serious negotiations to resolve the 'core' issue of Kashmir. Besides Kashmir, the Agenda also includes an item on "Peace and Security". Though a dialogue under this item Pakistan is prepared to evolve agreement for mutual and equal restraint with India in the conventional, missile and nuclear fields. But we will not accept one-sided or unilateral constraints on our ability to deter aggression.

The people of South Asia cannot be denied their basic social needs - clean drinking water, sanitation, sewerage, roads, schools for girls and boys, hospitals, telecommunications, electrification and employment. We cannot meet these needs if we continue to spend our precious resources on armament.

The world community can help us to achieve the goal of peace and security in South Asia. Those who wish to sell arms to our neighbour while denying these to Pakistan should reconsider. Those who sell our neighbour new weapons systems must know that we will be obliged to respond to the escalation of the military threat posed to Pakistan by these weapons. It is not by adopting double standards, - not by pampering a truculent power while penalizing an accommodating friend - that the incentives can be created for equitable arms control or peace in South Asia.

Thanking you, Mr. President.

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For further information please contact:
Pakistan Mission, 8 East 65th Street, New York NY 10021.
Tel: (212) 879.8600 or E-Mail: pakistan@undp.org