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THE CTBT : FACILITATING ENTRY INTO FORCE ...Ambassador Munir Akram, Washington, DC. 10 June, 1997

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was eagerly awaited for nearly forty years. Hopefully its entry into force will not take as long.

Pakistan is not entirely happy with the provisions of the CTBT. It is not comprehensive. It will ban nuclear tests which result in explosions but not all nuclear tests. lt does not include a categorical commitment to nuclear disarmament. The procedures for on-site inspection, especially the use of so-called national technical means, are susceptible to abuse.

However, Pakistan has supported a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty consistently for over three decades both for moral and strategic reasons. We believe that a nuclear test ban will serve the security of our region and of the world. Therefore, despite our reservations on the text, and the arbitrary process through which the CTBT was eventually adopted Pakistan supported the Treaty in the C.D. and the U.N. General Assembly.

The CTBT's provisions for entry into force were designed to respond to the specific nature of the Treaty and its basic obligation that its parties will not conduct nuclear explosions. To be effective, the CTBT must foreclose the possibility of nuclear explosions being conducted by all the States which have the technical and the legal capability to conduct such tests. There are 8 such states. If one of these states suspects that another will continue nuclear testing, it will not wish to bind itself not to test. The EIF provisions in Article XIV of the CTBT encompass all the states which can conduct nuclear explosion tests. If all are parties, no state will have reason to fear testing by others. But so long as even one of the 8 nuclear capable states remains outside the Treaty, it would be unrealistic to expect that the other 7 to accept the binding obligations not to conduct nuclear test.

At present, the CTBT has been signed by all the 44 states whose adherence is required under Article XIV, para 1 for its entry-into force except for three states i.e. India, Pakistan and North Korea.

Apart from the special case of North Korea, the real obstacle to the entry into force of the Treaty is the country which vetoed the CTBT in the C.D. Pakistan is not surprised at the trenchant opposition of our neighbour to the CTBT. For over 30 years, Pakistan has warned the world of this country's nuclear ambitions. We did so when it acquired unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; we did so when it secretly diverted fissile material from these facilities to build bombs; we did so before it exploded its nuclear bomb in May 1974; we have done so recently as it has turned to the development and deployment of short, medium and long-range nuclear-capable missiles.

In the Geneva negotiations, once our neighbour realized that the CTBT was unlikely to be blocked by anyone else, it advanced a series of moves to justify ultimate rejection of the Treaty. It proposed linking the CTBT's "entry into force" with a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to a "time-bound framework" for nuclear disarmament. As anticipated, this was rejected by the nuclear powers. In view of this, it declared that it would not support the CTBT. But, three of the nuclear powers insisted - rightly in our view - that to be effective, the test ban must be accepted by all the 8 nuclear-capable states, including our neighbour. When this was reflected in the Treaty text, it decided to veto the CTBT in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Unfortunately, the "bold" rejection of the CTBT by our neighbour was "facilitated" by the placatory postures with which its opposition to the CTBT was sought to be overcome. Indeed, it was assured that it's opposition would produce no negative bilateral consequences, political or economic.

Not surprisingly this country exercised its veto against the CTBT. When the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Treaty, it stated explicitly that it would not sign the CTBT "not now, not later". Its Foreign Minister has said "we have the right to test". Its leaders have repeatedly asserted that they will "keep the nuclear option open" and could "exercise" this option. Ominously, the preparations made at Pokharan last year for a second nuclear test has not been reversed. On the contrary, further escalatory steps, including the reported forward movement of the Prithvi missiles, has taken place.

Consistent with its long-standing policy, Pakistan will be in a position to sign the CTBT only once its security concerns arising from our neighbour's intentions and capabilities are set at rest.

It should be recalled that in the C.D., perhaps no other country made as serious an effort as Pakistan to ensure that our neighbour did not have a reason to reject the CTBT. Unfortunately, Pakistan's compromise proposals on nuclear disarmament and against the qualitative development of nuclear weapons were not seriously persued in the negotiations.

Like many others, Pakistan too has serious concerns that non-explosive experiments will be exploited to continue the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

It should be recalled that in late 1995, the U.S. had enumerated the several major constraints which the CTBT would impose on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. However, subsequently, these specific assurances could not be translated into treaty language reportedly due to the opposition of some other nuclear weapon states. The preambular provisions of the CTBT on this are general. Some nuclear powers have asserted that these are non-binding. Concern has been generated by the "stockpile stewardship programmes" announced by the U.S. and, presumably, also adopted by other nuclear weapon states. According to several authoritative analysts and experts, these so-called stewardship programmes - which envisage the continued operation of nuclear weapons laboratories and test sites - will enable the nuclear powers not only to ensure the "safety and reliability" of their stockpiles, but also enable them to develop new designs for nuclear weapons and their components and the 'modernization' of their stockpiles. It will be difficult to verify the difference between an underground sub-critical and a low-yield test.

Concern regarding continued qualitative development is further accentuated by some accompanying developments:

• The declarations by most of the nuclear powers that they will continue to 'rely' on nuclear weapons for their security. This is incompatible with their commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapon e.g. under Article VI of the NPT. It also erodes their moral authority to seek global non-proliferation.

• The threat of use of nuclear weapons has been held out even against non-nuclear weapon states including those parties to the NPT if they are perceived as posing a threat of use of "other weapons of mass destruction" i.e. biological or chemical weapons or a "proliferation risk". This is contrary to existing security assurances and contravenes the Charter's injunction against the use or threat of use of force. Some nuclear powers are searching for such "new missions" for their nuclear weapons, perhaps in order to justify their indefinite retention.

Various options and alternatives have been contemplated to overcome the requirements of EIF Article of the CTBT and bring the CTBT into force.

One option would envisage a decision by those states which have ratified the CTBT to bring the Treaty into force "provisionally" for themselves. Such a decision could be adopted by a consensus of the ratifying states at the Conference envisaged in para 2 of Article XIV three years after the Treaty's signature. Else, such a decision could be taken by the "consenting" states in a separate "Ottawa-process" type of Conference, even before the three year period.

In the first if not the second of these scenarios, it is presumed that the three nuclear powers - Russia, China and U.K. - which insisted on the formula included in para 1 of Article XIV would change their positions. This seems unlikely at present. The only benefit of such a 'partial' Treaty would be the possibility of applying the CTBT's verification procedures to all the nuclear weapon states.

A third equally unlikely scenario is for the nuclear powers to respond positively India's demand by committing themselves to a time bound framework for nuclear disarmament.

A fourth scenario would envisage the application of new coercive measures against India (and Pakistan). However, while coercion could be envisaged against Pakistan, past experience indicates that even the 'sole super power' may not have the determination to press such coercive measures against India. When in our neighbour's capital, non-proliferation tigers turn into pussy cats!

For Pakistan, the most significant benefit of the CTBT is that it will contribute significantly to arresting further escalation of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Therefore, we cannot contemplate a CTBT without the full participation of India. We believe that our neighbour's complaints about the absence of nuclear disarmament and the discriminatory nature of the CTBT are a 'ploy' to avoid committing itself to a nuclear test ban treaty. But, the sincerity or otherwise of its objectives should be tested. In this context, consideration should be given to politically feasible actions acceptable to all the eight nuclear-capable states. The measures should include easing the nuclear threat and promote nuclear disarmament.

1. Opening negotiations on a legally binding international agreement committing all states - nuclear and non-nuclear - to the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This is a central recommendation of the Canberra Commission; it is consistent of Article VI of the NPT; it would commit all 8 nuclear capable states and thus help nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
2. Start negotiations on a programme or plan of action for the reduction and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. The question of a predetermined or fixed "timeframe" could be left in abeyance at the outset of negotiations.
3. Credible and unconditional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances.
   
   

Specific measures to strengthen security in South Asia may also help. Pakistan has suggested a number of such measures to address the integrated problems of peace and security and non-proliferation in South Asia. This could include an interim declaration or commitment by both India and Pakistan not to conduct nuclear weapons tests on a reciprocal basis.

The CTBT is a test case for multilateral nuclear disarmament and for non-proliferation. The real problem and the obvious solution should not be confused. Pakistan is prepared to work constructively with all countries, including the early signatories of the CTBT, to evolve measures which may lead to the treaty's entry into force if not "now" at least "later".