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Statement at the Conference on Disarmament on January 30, 1997.

The personal participation in the CD of the new Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, is a welcome confirmation of the importance he attaches to the role of this Conference.

The Pakistan delegation also wishes to welcome the distinguished Foreign Minister of Australia whose statement, as usual, has illustrated Australia's abiding commitment and contribution to global nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Following the conclusion of the CTBT, the CD is called upon to determine the issues on which it will next open negotiations. It would be best to leave aside, for indepth consultations, the question of revising and updating our Agenda - the so-called "Decalogue" - and to focus at present on the Work Programme of the CD for 1997.

The Pakistan delegation believes that the issues on which the CD will negotiate this year should reflect: the imperatives for disarmament dictated by the evolution in the world situation and the balance of interests and priorities of all CD members, not those of one state or a group of states. The CTBT veto last year by one state, no matter how regrettable, is no justification to bypass the mandate of this Conference. Exaggerated fears of future impasse do not justify unilateral processes which will result in the more rapid conclusion of hollow agreements.

Pakistan believes, Mr. President, that you have presented a balanced proposal for the CD's 1997 work programme. My delegation is prepared to take up consideration of all the items listed in your paper. Let me offer some comments on the major issues.

Like most other members of this Conference, Pakistan attaches the highest importance to opening negotiations in the Conference on Nuclear Disarmament. Throughout the past year, the Group of 21 has repeatedly affirmed its formal proposal for the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee to open negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

With the end of the Cold War, there is now an unprecedented opportunity to renounce and eliminate nuclear weapons. Some successes have been achieved: the START-I and II, the NPT's indefinite extension and the CTBT's conclusion.

Nevertheless, the nuclear threat may now be escalating, not declining. Firstly, the nuclear weapons states wish to retain their nuclear arsenals, even if at drastically reduced levels, "for the foreseeable future". Nuclear deterrence is now propagated against "unforeseen threats" rather than specific adversaries. Multipolar nuclear deterrence is inherently more unstable, and thus more dangerous, than the bilateral Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Will deterrence remain effective if old contests are renewed or new competitions are opened among the nuclear weapon states in future? Since there are no strategic confrontations at present, is it not wiser to seize the moment to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons altogether?

Instead of contracting, the compass of nuclear weapons appears to be enlarging. A statement issued last December 18 by the Defence Ministers of one major Alliance stated:

"New members (of the Alliance) therefore will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance strategy".

In our view, this would amount to the horizontal proliferation of the nuclear threat, if not horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation.

Moreover, nuclear weapons are not being restricted to a deterrence role. New "missions" are being proposed for nuclear weapons, perhaps to justify their indefinite retention. After its signature of the Protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty, creating the African NWFZ, a senior official of one major nuclear weapon state asserted that it "will not limit the options available to (this nuclear power) in response to an attack by (a treaty) party using weapons of mass destruction". The same Alliance Communique I mentioned previously also stated that efforts will be made "to develop on an accelerated basis new force goals to address proliferation risks". Thus, it seems that any country is open to the threat of use of nuclear weapons if it is considered to pose a"proliferation risk" - nuclear, chemical or biological. And, adherence to the NPT, the CWC or the BWC is irrelevant. For, as another senior representative of the same nuclear power stated, on 26 November 1996, at the recent BW Review Conference: "surely we know, based on experience, the membership in a regime is no guarantee of compliance". The implicit and explicit threat against Non-Nuclear Weapon States are, unfortunately, likely to breed the very dangers they are designed to prevent.

It is not unreasonable for the Group of 21 to press for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This is now not only the Cartagena consensus, but also the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, the recommendation of the Canberra Commission, the view of the UN General Assembly and, above all, the dictate of common sense and of the human instinct for survival.

The world does not have the luxury of waiting for the major nuclear powers to convince their visionary legislators to ratify START-II and rapidly conclude START-III while the CD collectively sits on its hands. The 2000 plus nuclear weapons left with each of the two nuclear powers, and the hundreds available to the other nuclear powers, will still be sufficient to completely obliterate human civilization. Nor can the demand for CD negotiations on nuclear disarmament be deflected by incantation of the Principles and Objectives adopted at the NPT Extension Conference. Two of the three `Objectives' listed in that document - the CTBT and the FMCT - are construed by their proponent mainly as non-proliferation rather than nuclear disarmament agreements. The third objective i.e. systematic efforts for nuclear disarmament, is what the G-21 is proposing for negotiations in the CD. Is it seriously contemplated that nuclear disarmament efforts could be pursued in the NPT Review process, when its parties have failed to agree on a review of the Treaty's implementation at their last three Review Conferences? Is the assertion made here by 3 nuclear powers that nuclear disarmament will be possible only if the non-proliferation regime is maintained, designed to justify holding back from the third objective in the "Principles and Objectives" document?

Pakistan is convinced that the international community can best pursue the imperative of nuclear disarmament in the CD - the only body which exists to conduct multilateral negotiations. Nuclear disarmament is an amenable subject for negotiations; and the CD is the appropriate forum where such negotiations should be conducted. If nuclear weapons involved only the five nuclear weapons states, they would not have brought the CTBT and the FMCT to this body for negotiations. If, as has been asserted, 20 countries possess the capability to build nuclear weapons, would it be reasonable or even wise to exclude them from nuclear disarmament negotiations? I would submit that the star gazers are those who want this body to wait for START-II and START-III before contemplating any multilateral action on nuclear disarmament.

My delegation believes that the CD should seek to promote at least four important objectives during 1997 and beyond in the context of nuclear disarmament.

First, it is urgent to secure a legally binding international agreement committing all states - nuclear and non-nuclear - to the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This is also the central recommendation of the Canberra Commission. We should adopt a simple, short Treaty which would contain such a commitment and an undertaking to pursue `good faith' negotiations to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

Second, we must open negotiations on a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within an agreed and specific time-frame. A Group of 28 countries, including Pakistan, have proposed a draft programme in CD/1419. This proposal, and counter proposals if any, should be the subject of negotiations in the CD this year. The negotiations we are seeking would be designed to elaborate a programme, to identify the measures which constitute a part of the programme, their inter se priorities, and the phases and time-frames within which these measures would be achieved. In our view, each disarmament measure included in the programme would be negotiated through a mechanism - bilateral, regional, multilateral or global - which is the most appropriate for that specific measure. The nature of that specific disarmament measure would itself indicate the countries whose participation will be relevant in negotiating it.

Third, the CD should also pursue specific measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, Pakistan is prepared to commence work on the Fissile Materials Convention. We had welcomed the adoption of the Shannon Report which reflected the understanding that the scope of the proposed Treaty would be further considered in the Ad-hod Committee. We would like to assure explicitly that our concerns regarding stockpiles, especially unequal stockpiles, will be addressed in negotiating this Treaty. Else, this Treaty too will be another measure for non-proliferation only. It would make no contribution to nuclear disarmament.

Apart from the Fissile Materials Convention, there are other measures of nuclear disarmament which can be negotiated in the CD forthwith. Again there are practical proposals in the Canberra Commission's report. One such measure could be a Protocol to the CTBT designed to conclusively halt the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Such a Protocol should contain a categorical commitment by the nuclear weapon states not to improve their nuclear weapons. It could also entail the closure of nuclear test sites and the international inspection of those facilities which have been designed to test or keep nuclear weapons "operational".

Similarly, one or more agreements can be negotiated to remove nuclear warheads from missiles and other delivery systems and place both under internationally safeguarded storage. This would be a significant and rapid way to enhance international security and stability.

The fourth objective in the nuclear arena should be to secure credible, legally binding and unconditional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has consistently pointed to the shortcomings of the assurances so far offered by the nuclear powers. Now it is clear that even the NPT parties have no guarantee of security against the nuclear threat. The nuclear powers have reserved the right to determine arbitrarily when and against whom they will use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons.

We hope, therefore, that the Ad-hoc Committee on NSA will be re-constituted. It should examine ways and means to reassure all NNWS against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. These could include technically verifiable commitments by the nuclear powers not to target their weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

Pakistan has often affirmed that while nuclear weapons remain the focus of international concern, we cannot ignore the threats to peace and breaches of the peace emanating from conventional weapons.

Having lived with the long war in Afghanistan, we are fully cognizant of the toll taken by Anti-Personnel Landmines. Therefore, we joined actively in the process which led to the conclusion of the revised Protocol-II of the "Inhumane" Weapons Convention. As we all know, the negotiations for the revised Protocol-II were complex and difficult. If a complete ban on APLs had been pressed, there would have been no consensus on the revised Protocol.

The question before us is: what is the best means of ameliorating and eliminating the suffering and danger posed by Anti-Personnel Landmines? Our view is that the international community should pursue three aims:

one, to secure the widest possible adherence to the new Protocol-II. In this context, it is legitimate to expect that two-thirds of the states which voted for General Assembly resolution 51/45 S, calling for a complete ban, will as an indication of their commitment take the first step of adhering to Protocol-II;

two, we must mount an invigorated programme to eliminate the landmines which have been laid in the past and which are responsible for the 25,000 people killed by landmines last year; and

three, explore, in the CD, the further measures we can take to move towards the ultimate goal of prohibiting Anti-Personnel Landmines without jeopardising the security of states. We propose that a Special Coordinator be appointed to conduct such an exploration and evolve appropriate terms of reference for negotiations in the CD on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

The escalating production and acquisition of armaments by some States have created insecurity and instability in several regions of the world. Such imbalance and insecurity also creates incentives for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The attempt to control the transfer of armaments without regard to asymmetries can accentuate imbalance and the threats to peace instead of ameliorating such threats.

Pakistan believes that, in most instances, the regional approach offers the most effective framework to successfully negotiate agreements for conventional arms control as well as aspects of non-proliferation. The General Assembly has asked the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate "principles" for conventional arms control within the regional and sub-regional framework. This will make a useful contribution to specific negotiations for conventional arms control in various regions of the world. The Conference on Disarmament should commence this process in 1997.

South Asia has been described as the most dangerous place in the world. Apart from vetoing the CTBT and declaring its nuclear option open, our neighbour is also embarked on massive new acquisitions of offensive weapons and weapons systems. It is proceeding with the creeping deployment of the Prithvi, a short-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile, whose declared targets include: Pakistan's air-fields, military formations, oil refineries and factories. No major Pakistani city will be out of reach of this missile. In case of a presumed attack, our response time will be as short as 5 minutes. And, Pakistan will have to assume that the Prithvi is intended to be a nuclear carrier.

Over the past few decades, Pakistan has been obliged to respond to the escalating steps of proliferation by our neighbour. Perversely, we have faced the brunt of the international reaction to such escalation. Now we hear appeals to us to sign the CTBT. Our friends know very well where this appeal should be directed. Unfortunately, in our neighbour's capital, non-proliferation tigers turn into pussycats.

Pakistan has demonstrated extreme self-restraint. This is often taken for granted. In the face of threats from across our border; in face of efforts to erode our capacity for self-defence, we reserve the right to take all appropriate measures to safeguard our national security.

Pakistan has made constructive proposals to address the problems of security, arms control and non-proliferation in South Asia. We hope these will evoke a positive response from the international community, especially our neighbours.