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PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS

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Address on "Arms Control and Disarmament" by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Institute in Washington on 20 November 1997.

The major developments that have taken place since the end of the Cold War have opened up new opportunities for the realization of the vision concretised in the Charter of the United Nations, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to attain international peace and collective security through the just solution of conflicts and disputes, the non-use of force, and the control of armaments at the lowest possible levels. Coupled with that, the successful completion of half a century of the United Nations, gave rise to high expectations that the post Cold War era would be a world of peace and tranquillity and economic development, in which the wasteful expenditures on the arms race would become a closed chapter of the past. Unfortunately, this has not been the case thus far.

A little over fifty years ago, the United Nations General Assembly, in one of its its very first resolutions called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals. That call remains just as compelling today. While the threat of a global nuclear catastrophe has receded to some extent, it has not been eliminated completely, as a stock-pile of thousands of nuclear weapons still exist in operational readiness to destroy the world many times over.

While this state of affairs might not be very encouraging, we do have many important achievements to the credit of the balance sheet, and and we can be rightly proud of them: START II was concluded and nuclear weapons are being actually dismantled and destroyed; the Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded and came into force; the NPT was indefinitely extended; new Protocols severely restricting anti-personnel landmines were adopted by consensus; Nuclear Weapons Free Zones now cover the whole of the Southern Hemisphere, though not the Northern Hemisphere; and after 40 years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty saw the light of day.

The basic objective remains as it was right in the beginning, namely, the search for security. The problem of course lies in defining whose security we are talking about. Is it the security of some or a few, or is the security of all. If it is the latter, then how do we answer, among others, the undeniable fact that while the end of the Cold War did indeed open avenues for peace and security between the two blocks, it did not affect the security situation in other parts of the world, where it remains critical and worrisome. A simple look around the world will amply prove the point.

Central attention continues to be devoted to nuclear weapons, which constitute obviously the greatest and continuing danger to mankind. While many believe that there has been satisfactory progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, others do not subscribe to this point of view. Questions which were asked three decades ago continue to retain their validity; are we ready to accept a world where nuclear weapons are a permanent feature in the arsenals of some, or we want a world completely free of the nuclear menace. Are we talking of nuclear disarmament, or of nuclear non-proliferation. Are we eliminating nuclear weaponry as a whole, or are we merely legitimizing it in the hands of some, while controlling it from spreading into the hands of others.

There is nothing new in this debate. As technological levels increase around the world, and it is the law of nature that this should be so, and in the absence of a satisfactory resolution of disputes and tensions, there has been the visible tendency of some to try to maintain their superiority in fields and technologies to which non-nuclear weapon states have no access. The perception is that this attitude of the select few states is clearly discriminatory and unjustifiable.

A privileged group of States have thus assumed the right to determine unilaterally the norms which they seek to apply to all States while invariably making exceptions for themselves. Such an approach of unilateralism and unequal regimes which are designed to impose an unequal security order on the smaller and weaker States is not only unacceptable but will, in the ultimate analysis, not endure.

The whole world welcomes the prospect for START II ratification and implementation, and the commencement of START III. But we are all equally disturbed that while down-sizing their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear weapon states are upgrading them qualitatively, using the argument that they will keep their nuclear weapons in operational readiness against unknown threats. So we are back at square one. The debates that we are having in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the agony through which we are all going, are indicative of a deep malaise which is neither new nor unexpected.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty : Pakistan endorses the significance of the decision adopted by the NPT Review Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The manner in which this decision was achieved, and the failure of the Conference, for the third time, to adopt an agreed Final Document while reviewing the operation of the Treaty, are indications of the fragility of the consensus upon which the observance of the Treaty rests. The indefinite extension of the NPT cannot imply the indefinite division of the world into two classes of states - nuclear and non-nuclear.

Pakistan believes that the NPT is a factor of international stability. We are happy that the Treaty has been extended. This does not imply that we can overlook its discriminatory character. In view of our security concerns, which arise principally from threats within our region, Pakistan cannot accede to the NPT unilaterally.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty : The successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty has been a major development. Pakistan is a signatory to this Treaty, but we have, as is well known, not yet been ratified. Arguments are given that Pakistan should sign CTBT independently of India because this treaty would not come into force without India. Our reservations for not signing the CTBT are:

(i) Domestically it is not possible to accept this treaty until India does the same.

(ii) There are moves in the West to bring this treaty into force by circumventing Article XIV, without the participation of India. This would be totally un-acceptable to Pakistan.

(iii) There is always the possibility that India may be tempted to conduct a nuclear test, as it has in the past. Others may even acquiesce in and grant India the status of a nuclear weapon state. Pakistan cannot accept this situation in the light of its own security concerns, nor can it abandon its fundamental doctrine of "ambiguity".

Pakistan has consistently supported the objective of this comprehensive nuclear test ban as an essential step towards nuclear disarmament and as a means of promoting nuclear non-proliferation. We attach the highest importance to the provisions on "Entry into Force", which provides that the Treaty will enter into force once it has been signed and ratified by 44 States, including all the nuclear capable States. The CTBT's effectiveness depends on its acceptance by all those states which have the technological capability and the "legal authorization" to conduct nuclear tests. Paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the treaty envisages consideration of measures to accelerate the entry into force of the Treaty in case it has not entered into force 3 years after it has been opened for signature. It is clear, however, that these measures shall have to be consistent with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article-XIV which cannot be circumvented by any means. Pakistan will take its own sovereign decisions regarding the time and conditions for its ratification of the Treaty.

The Fissile Materials Convention : On the subject of the Fissile Materials Convention, Pakistan has time and again reiterated its willingness to commence work on this treaty. Obviously, this Treaty would have to contribute to our security. It will not do so if it does not address the question of the existing stockpiles of fissile materials in South Asia, as well as banning all future production. All current indications are that a consensus does not yet exist on this question. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe to start work on this aspect of nuclear disarmament.

The Chemical Weapons Convention : In the field of chemical weapons, and in conformity with its policy of seeking the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the South Asian theatre of tensions, Pakistan not only actively participated in the long negotiations leading to the conclusion of Chemical Weapons Convention but also fully endorsed the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The implementation of the CWC in a fair and objective manner can contribute to the promotion of international security. Despite our concerns and reservations regarding certain provisions of the CWC which were articulated at the time of the Convention's conclusion as well as subsequently, Pakistan signed the CWC to underscore our commitment to the objective of the complete elimination, regionally and globally, of this abhorrent means of warfare. In order to promote this basic objective in our own region, we also entered into a solemn declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons in South Asia.

The entry into force of the Convention revealed the unpleasant reality of the presence of Indian chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities designed to be used against Pakistan. This has created a qualitatively new situation for Pakistan and complicated our decision to ratify the Convention. Despite these challenges, the Government of Pakistan has taken a bold decision to submit its instrument of ratification to the CWC on 28 October 1997. Pakistan has, therefore, joined the Convention in the hope that it will be implemented in a fair and equitable manner and that it will serve to ameliorate the genuine security concerns of all states, especially the non-possessors of chemical weapons.

The Biological Weapons Convention : Pakistan also participated actively in the negotiations to elaborate an effective verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. This is a complex and cumbersome undertaking, the negotiations, therefore, cannot be accelerated by arbitrary deadlines. We are of the view that, due to the complex nature of the negotiations, there should be no artificial deadlines which would be counterproductive and prejudicial to the process of consensus building and facilitating the negotiations leading to a comprehensive verification regime.

In order to forestall any future abuse of the verification regime, we are of the view that appropriate safeguards may be included in verification regime itself. Pakistan's perception about the modalities of the verification regime are shared by other important countries. In our view, an emphasis on the verification regime should not eclipse other important facets spelt out in the Convention.

Conventional Arms : While nuclear weapons remain the focus of international concern, we cannot ignore the threats to peace, and breaches of the peace, emanating from conventional weapons. Pakistan also attaches high importance to the promotion of conventional arms control at the global and regional levels. The approach towards conventional weapons pursuits so far that is transparency and restraint on arms transfer is inadequate. It could exacerbate imbalances in various regions and erode the security of smaller states which do not have the capacity for indigenous arms production.

Pakistan believes that a comprehensive approach should be promoted at the global and regional levels for the control and reduction of conventional weapons. This endeavour should consist of at least three components:

One: We need to mobilize efforts to reverse the growing and unequal concentration of sophisticated and increasingly lethal conventional weapons in the hands of only a few advanced states. This process is widening the inequality on security between the developed and the developing countries. An effort to control the proliferation of new and increasingly lethal conventional weapons should be the focus of global discussions and future negotiations.

Two: A conscious endeavour is required to ensure against the creation of serious arms imbalances in sensitive regions of the world. This can happen if some regional states resort to large acquisitions or production of armaments, while others in the region are denied the ability to match such acquisitions. Such imbalance will heighten the insecurity of smaller states. It could encourage aggression against weaker States. It could also create compulsions for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As approved by the General Assembly the Conference on Disarmament should expeditiously formulate a framework for conventional disarmament and arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels. This would be a first step towards building the structures of stability based on "equal security" in various regions of the world.

Three: A number of conflicts and disputes, among and within states, are currently being exacerbated by the illegal transfer of arms, including small arms. There is need to restrain such transfers, especially if these arms can fall into the hands of terrorists and criminals. But such concerns cannot be used to deny smaller states the ability to exercise their right to self-defence, nor to crush the legitimate struggle of peoples for self-determination against colonial or foreign occupation. We were, therefore, deeply concerned at some ill-advised proposals, such as those which sought to confer undefined responsibility on the U.N. Secretariat to address such complex problems without a mandate from the Member States.

Anti-Personnel Landmines : Pakistan has been a longstanding adherent to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which includes the Protocol on restrictions governing the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). Our Commitment to observe its rules reflects our conviction that the Convention and its Protocols represent a bulwark against the indiscriminate use of certain conventional weapons, including APLS. Even before the Convention came into existence, we had a record in wars of strict observance of humanitarian laws which were later embodied in the Convention and its Protocols. Our adherence to the Convention and its Protocols was therefore without hesitation or delay.

A decade later, we welcomed the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to address the global problem of landmines. It is an irony that the escalation in the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of landmines which victimizes innocent men, women and children occurred at its worst after Protocol II had entered into force. Its rules were obviously ignored by many who were not its members. They were violated by others despite their obligations under the Protocol.

Having lived through the long war in Afghanistan, we are fully cognizant of the toll taken by Anti-Personnel Landmines. Therefore, we joined actively in the process which led to the conclusion of the revised Protocol-II of the CCW. The new Protocol establishes a strict regime governing the use of landmines in order to protect civilians and non-combatants. It also establishes an appropriate international consultative mechanism. The negotiations for the revised Protocol-II were complex and difficult. If a complete ban on APLS had been pressed, there would have been no consensus on the revised Protocol.

The ICRC conducted a study of 26 conflicts in which APLS were used extensively. It concluded that only in one case, namely, the wars between Pakistan and India, APLs had been laid and removed after the hostilities ended, in accordance with the rules governing the use of APLs. We will continue to strictly observe our Treaty obligations under CCW. We should therefore be in a position to ratify the Revised Protocol on Landmines.

In order to strengthen international efforts to address the problem of APLs Pakistan has made its policy not to export anti-personnel landmines into a declared moratorium on the export of APLs.

We recognize that States interested and able to ban APLs have concluded a Treaty completely prohibiting APLs. We participated in the "Ottawa Process" as an Observer to underscore our shared concerns over the humanitarian problems caused by the indiscriminate use of APLs. Our legitimate security concerns and requirements for self-defence do not permit Pakistan to sign this Treaty. We, therefore, cannot endorse calls for universalization of the Treaty on the complete ban on APLs.

We are of the view that despite these efforts, the humanitarian problem resulting from the widespread indiscriminate use of APLs will not be alleviated unless the international community addressed important issues. Initiatives should focus in three areas:

First, efforts to secure the widest possible adherence to the new Protocol II.

Second, the international community, especially the financially capable nations must support an invigorated programme to eliminate the landmines which have been laid in the past and which are responsible for the estimated 25,000 people killed by landmines each year. The Final Declaration of the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW called on States to "reinforce international cooperation to reinforce international cooperation for mine clearance, the development and dissemination of more effective technologies for mine clearance and the transfer of technology to facilitate the implementation of the prohibitions and restrictions set out in Protocol II and to seek to devote the resources necessary for this purpose. In this context, we welcome the recent initiative by the U.S. to make efforts to increase finances for de-mining by a factor of five. Pakistan shall seek to contribute to such endeavours in kind. We also take note of the announcement by Canada of an Ottawa Track-II Process which will focus on global efforts for de-mining and rehabilitation. We look forward to participating in this process.

Third, to explore, in the Conference on Disarmament, the further measures that could be taken to move towards the ultimate goal of prohibiting Anti-Personnel Landmines without jeopardizing the security of states. Pakistan was the first country to propose in the Conference on disarmament that a Special Coordinator be appointed to conduct such an exploration and evolve appropriate terms of reference for negotiations in the CD on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

Conflicts and Disputes : A close examination of the situation in various parts of the world indicates that both nuclear and conventional weapons proliferation can best be addressed by resolving the underlying causes of conflicts and disputes. Arms are acquired by most states for defence against threats that arise from the conflicts and disputes in the region.

South Asia has been described by the keen observers of the region as a flash point in the world. Rightly so, for the cold war in South Asia is not over, and tensions between Pakistan and India often escalate to a dangerous pitch. The core cause of tension in our region is the Kashmir dispute. The denial of the right of self-determination to the Kashmiri people by India in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions is the root cause of dispute and tension between Pakistan and India. Pakistan has, as is well known, made several proposals to India, including (a) a mutually agreed ratio of forces between the two countries, (b) steps to ensure against a surprise attack; © the adoption of agreed principles for arms control in the region, (d) mutually acceptable non-proliferation arrangements, (e) proposals for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia and (f) simultaneous acceptance of the NPT or of comprehensive safeguards, etc. None of these have been accepted by our neighbour so far.

Pakistan is deeply concerned about the production and deployment of Indian ballistic missiles against Pakistan. We will be obliged to take appropriate steps to respond to this new and qualitatively enhanced threat to our national security. Despite our peaceful intentions and our sincere efforts to promote peace in the region in comparison to Indian intransigence, it is ironically Pakistan which is always subjected to unjust embargoes and pressures. These merely deny us the means to meet our legitimate security concerns. They cannot affect our resolve to safeguard our security.

Once again as a result of our initiative, the long stalled dialogue between Pakistan and India was resumed early this year at the Foreign Secretaries level. The three rounds of talks held so far have remained inconclusive because India has resiled on the commitments given by her to address the core issue of Kashmir separately in one of the eight Working Groups agreed upon between the two Foreign Secretaries in June 1997 round of talks at Islamabad. The future and success of these talks rely on Indian sincerity to address the core issue which has not only bedeviled the relations between the two countries, but which is also a threat to the global peace and security.

Pakistan has always strived globally and regionally to prevent an arms race and will continue to do so despite all odds. Pakistan is fully committed and continue to endeavour for the realization of a most cherished objective of nuclear disarmament, and of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan shares the NAM efforts to establish an equitable international system of security which relies on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and commitment to nuclear disarmament. Ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction is not a goal which is not attainable. Five decades ago the whole world was a nuclear weapon free zone. Our collective goal should be to return to that status as soon as possible./.