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PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

DISARMAMENT

Paper on "Missile Technology Control Regime - its Destabilizing Impact on South Asia" presented by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations at the United Nations Conference on "New Agenda for Disarmament and Regional Security" in Sapporo, Japan, on 23 July 1997.

Arms control and non-proliferation regimes are established ostensibly to attenuate the threats to international peace and security posed by the spread of sensitive or dual-use equipment and technology. Over the last twenty-rive years, industrially advanced states have made determined efforts to achieve these objectives by enforcing export restrictions through suppliers cartels. The institutionalization of such cartels, such as the Zangger Committee, the London Club, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the latest Wassenaar Arrangement, have led to a debate about the effectiveness and legitimacy of these arrangements.

2. While the underlying concept on which the suppliers' cartels are premised is understandable, at least from the point of view of the suppliers, the efficacy of such regimes in restraining proliferation is questionable. This is evident from the fact that a one sided approach to curb proliferation has in fact furthered proliferation by obliging states to develop their own indigenous capabilities.

3. Export control regimes do not address the root causes which underlie the proliferation of weapons that they attempt to curb. Instead, they create classes of "haves" and "have-nots", and this has a highly destabilizing impact in some regional situations. States with a heavy reliance on imports for their security are discriminated against, as opposed to those which have developed their own indigenous capability. Moreover, the arbitrary and selective implementation of such regimes also undermines their status, and detracts from their objective of controlling the spread of certain kinds of technologies.

4. Supplier restraints tend to accentuate the security imbalance, and in zones of high tension, invariably oblige the threatened states to invest the necessary resources in building up their own indigenous capabilities. While some proliferation might have been slowed down, the induction of destabilising weaponry and delivery systems has certainly not been eliminated from zones of tension. In fact, far from it. The problem of missile proliferation has unquestionably worsened since the inception of the MTCR in 1987, and this negative impact can be attributed to a number of reasons.

5. Firstly, the MTCR is not a negotiated multilateral treaty. It is a cartel formed by some industrialized countries for the purpose of placing controls on the transfer of technology which could contribute to the manufacture of ballistic missiles with nuclear weapon delivery systems. There is no commitment on the part of the originators of the MTCR to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate ballistic missiles globally. It is, therefore, essentially an arrangement for promoting their own security interests only.

6. Secondly, the MTCR has been selectively implemented by the supplier states. The serious international controversy in late 1989 over the implementation of the MTCR, not only exposed the arbitrary nature of the application of the regime, but also cast serious doubts on its credibility. Over strong US objections, France insisted on its right to proceed with the sale to Brazil of liquid fuel technology, and it was only after two years of dispute that the contract was finally suspended. As against that, Germany's involvement in developing guidance technology for the Indian "Agni" intermediate range missile continued.

7. Thirdly, its legitimacy is questionable. The MTCR does not fulfil the requirements of equity, non-discrimination, and equal security for all states, all of which are essential elements in establishing durable and credible international agreements in the field of disarmament. The attempt by some countries to elevate the MTCR to the level of a multilateral disarmament agreement, or to characterize it as codifying international law, creates serious difficulties. Since the MTCR is not a treaty with specific rights and obligations, it has remained just a political instrument which functions in a discriminatory manner, and may even have prevented the establishment of a more stable system of international security.

8. Over the years, the regime has evolved to include highly subjective and arbitrary criteria. The original criteria for denying technology transfers related to missiles or sub-systems for delivery vehicles which could deliver a payload of 500 kgs. over a range of 300 kms. Systems with lesser capabilities were not covered under the original criteria. Then these criteria were revised to incorporate the concept of a "strong presumption of denial", which really implies a subjective appreciation as to whether a missile, even of lesser pay load and range, was, in the discretionary opinion of the supplier, intended to carry biological or chemical weapons.

9. If nuclear proliferation concerns were the sole criteria for the establishment of the MTCR, then only India's SLV-3 test in 1980 fulfilled the criteria, as no other third world country possessed a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability at the time. It should have been logical to address the specific concerns emanating from the nexus between India's nuclear and missile capabilities, rather than the establishment of a discriminatory, and in so far as the situation in South Asia is concerned, an ineffective regime. Only one country became the target of sanctions. The imbalance is, therefore, likely to encourage a race for indigenous production in the region.

10. Despite the existence of the MTCR, India has successfully pursued its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) launched in 1983. It has not only developed various kinds of surface-to-air, air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles, but also test fired the "Prithvi" short-range missile, and the "Agni" medium-range missile. The Prithvi is a Pakistan-specific missile. It is of little relevance against other neighbors. Its reported deployment along India's border with Pakistan has also substantiated this perception. It has brought the region to a "hair-trigger" security situation, while the MTCR can only stand by and watch.

11. India's claim that it has to acquire this technology to fight a threat posed by China has been totally belied by the latest deployment of missiles on Pakistan's border. India has also asserted on various occasions that it has the capability to defeat Pakistan at every level of conventional military confrontation. The addition of battle-field missiles such as the "Prithvi" further diversify Indian strike capability. In other words, the "Prithvi" and other missiles strengthen India's ability to right and win a war against Pakistan.

12. Indian policy makers assert that this indigenous missiles programme, and the high technology related to it, have increased the flexibility and impact of Indian foreign policy. One practical impact of the missiles programme, notes one Indian analyst, will lead to a greater role for India in international decision-making processes since there would be no future arms-control negotiations without New Delhi's participation.

13. India does not mince words about its ambition to export this high technology and to gain commercial benefits by selling ballistic missiles. Former Defence Minister Pant said publicly that one aim of the 1GMDP was to "sell equipment and systems in the international market competitively, and to conduct joint production of missiles with other countries". The Director of US Naval Intelligence has stated that "Prithvi might attract buyers", and another US officer believes that, "in all likelihood, India's missiles systems will be available for export to selected countries by the year 2000".

14. In the prevailing scenario, even if the MTCR were to be applied in the region, it would negatively affect the security situation. It is evident from the Indian claim that New Delhi would like to join the MTCR to legitimize its future exports and qualify for further imports for its space programme. Members of the MTCR may be trying to bring India on board for this reason.

15. The MTCR has, therefore, had an entirely negative effect on regional security in South Asia. India has been able to develop and deploy ballistic missiles without international censure. There have been no sanctions on India's attempt to manufacture ballistic missiles, thus making the regime irrelevant for the South Asian region. Instead of addressing the growing concerns emanating from the combination of India's nuclear and missile capabilities, the regime has tacitly allowed and encouraged India to engage in missile proliferation.

16. The discriminatory and iniquitous application of the MTCR criteria has thus led to a serious deterioration in the security situation in South Asia. While India is going ahead with development and deployment of ballistic missiles, Pakistan is being stopped from taking measures that are necessary to safeguard its security. While Pakistan continues to be discriminated against through the application of sanctions in a selective manner, India continues to develop an ambitious missile programme which poses a serious threat to Pakistan.

17. Viewed in this perspective, the MTCR guidelines represent a less than an adequate response to the proliferation of missiles. Despite the MTCR, South Asia stands on the verge of an expensive missile race today. India rejected Pakistan's offer to create a zero-missile zone in South Asia. The South Asian experience reflects the failure of the supplier cartels to prevent proliferation, thus exposing the basic flaws of the MTCR approach. The international community needs to re-think and adopt a more effective approach to preventing and reversing proliferation. It has been predicted by more than 600 ballistic missiles scientists and top officials from 24 countries, that the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles in the world will speed up considerably in the coming few years. These missile experts claim that the constantly decreasing cost of production, and the relevantly simple technology needed to manufacture missiles, portends a constant acceleration in the proliferation of missiles. This will doubtless pose increasing dangers to international security.

18. The basis of non-proliferation is a political commitment not to acquire certain weapons. This can be promoted by the creation of a global climate of peace, security and by resolution of conflicts. The goals of non-proliferation can also be promoted by the creation of regional regimes based on equity, reciprocity and non-discrimination. Any regime which is designed to legitimize stratification of states into "haves" and "have nots" is likely to exacerbate the risks of proliferation.

19. There could be a number of ways to firmly check the proliferation of missiles at regional and global levels. We could either proceed along the path of developing reliable anti-missile defenses, or we could try to evolve a universal, non-discriminatory regime to ban the use, possession, production and trade, in missiles. Alternative policy options to address the problems posed by missile proliferation will have to recognize the extent to which missile proliferation is rooted in situations of international or regional tension, and as such, unlikely to be attenuated by selective or discriminatory supplier controls.

20. Among the specific proposals which have been put forward to address the spread of missiles, are the following:

i. An International Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF). The proposal is to transform the US-USSR INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty) into an international treaty, which will simply ban all ground-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. An organization might be formed that would provide space related services in return for a State's adherence to international INF Treaty. A system of international safeguards would be developed as part of space cooperation regime. An agency like the IAEA would serve as the umbrella organization to verify compliance with the agreement. Of course, an International INF Agreement would still allow countries to develop Ballistic Missiles with ranges over 5500 kins. or less than 500 kins. Moreover, it would be difficult to ensure participation by states that suspect or know that their neighbours are acquiring missile capabilities. Countries in the Middle East and South Asia are unlikely to accept such restraints.

ii. Others advocate that supplier's controls may be further strengthened and backed with incentives like special trade benefits, assistance in space programmes, economic investment, and help in international debt resolution, while at the same time accompanying these incentives with stricter sanctions for non-compliance. Advocates of this carrot-and-stick approach also support that industrialized countries may provide assistance in developing short-range anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM) on the lines of Patriot batteries and anti-tactical ballistic missiles. It is highly unlikely that such incentives and disincentives would deter countries from acquiring missiles if they are confronted with a serious challenge to their security.

iii. More ambitious non-proliferators propose a universal non-discriminatory agreement which would not only ban the use, possession, production and trade of missiles, but also ensure universal disarmament. They also envision that such a regime should facilitate transfer of Satellite Launch Vehicles (SLV) technologies for space research and development.

21. In the long run, universal ballistic missile disarmament might seem to be the only alternative policy option. The link between missile capability and nuclear capability being as close as it is, missile disarmament and nuclear disarmament will follow concurrent paths, both regionally and globally. Meanwhile, for the time being at least in South Asia, the MTCR countries may consider encouraging a multilateral agreement which is non-discriminatory, and which focuses comprehensively on the use, possession, production and export of missiles. Anything less than such a regime would not prove effective in halting the spread of missiles in the region.

For further information please contact:
Pakistan Mission, 8 East 65th Street, New York NY 10021.
Tel: (212) 879.8600 or E-Mail: pakistan@undp.org