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PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

FIRST COMMITTEE

Statement by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office in Geneva, on item 69 "Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or threat of use of Nuclear Weapons" in the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the General Assembly on 5 November 1997.

On behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam and my own, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/52/L.41 entitled "Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons".

The demand of the non-nuclear-weapon states for security assurances against the nuclear threat emerged during the 1960s. It crystallized at the 1968 Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Conference. It received a partial and adequate response in Resolution 255 of the Security Council.

While noting the unilateral statements made by the nuclear-weapon states at SSOD I, the Final Document called for the conclusion of an international instrument by the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, despite the lapse of almost 20 years the CD has been unable to conclude this international agreement.

During the Cold War, the CD could not evolve a common formula for the offer of unconditional and credible assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states. Four of the five nuclear-weapon states offered only partial and restricted assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states. One side excluded any non-nuclear-weapon state which was a member of a military alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. The other side excluded those non-nuclear-weapon states which had nuclear weapons on their territories. All four nuclear powers excluded non-nuclear weapon states which were not parties to the NPT. Only one nuclear-weapon state - China - offered unconditional and unrestricted assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It was the general expectation that with the end of the Cold War, reliance on mutual nuclear deterrence would decline and even be given up entirely. In such circumstances, the nuclear powers, it was thought, may be prepared to rapidly conclude agreements for nuclear disarmament and, at the same time, to offer binding and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, until all nuclear weapons had been eliminated.

Alas, it seems that these hopes were Utopian. Far from resiling from reliance on nuclear weapons, most of the nuclear powers have, if anything, reaffirmed and reinforced their reliance on these weapons. As my delegation has had occasion to note earlier, following the indefinite extension of the NPT, some nuclear-weapon states have openly said that they will retain nuclear weapons indefinitely, against uncertain threats and contingencies. The use of nuclear weapons has been introduced into actual war-fighting doctrine. New designs for nuclear warheads, such as those which could destroy targets deep underground, are being developed. Their use is clearly envisaged against non-nuclear-weapon states - even those non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the NPT and parties to regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. The use of nuclear weapons is contemplated not only in response to the use of nuclear weapons by another state, but even the use or threat of other "weapons of mass destruction".

Under these circumstances, those non-nuclear-weapon states which are not the beneficiaries of old or extended nuclear military alliances - in other words, the entire membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, is quite justified in being gravely concerned at the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. Their demand for binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is not only legitimate, it has gained special urgency in view of recent developments.

Mr. Chairman,

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/52/L.41 reiterates the call by the UN General Assembly to the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international agreement to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This objective enjoys wide-spread support among the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on an internationally binding convention to provide assurances to these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a major step in the international community's endeavour to create a nuclear-weapon-free world. An unconditional and legally binding commitment of non-use against non-nuclear weapon states would be a major confidence building measure between the nuclear powers and the other states. It would remove a major impediment in the promotion of nuclear restraint and non-proliferation in certain regions of tension. Finally, it would facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament by establishing new legal norms which will outlaw the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, and could facilitate agreements on the non-first use or non-use of nuclear weapons.

It is unfortunate that the CD was unable to reach a consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances this year. My delegation shares the view that the endeavour to restrict negotiations on this issue only to the States Parties to the NPT is unjust and unwise. The nuclear weapon states have an obligation - arising from their possession of nuclear weapons - to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is not the non-nuclear weapons states which have an obligation to prove their credentials by just adhering to the NPT to obtain security assurances. Such a stand would only compound the injustice of a world where only five powers are accorded the right to possess weapons of mass destruction which threaten the security of each and every Member State and every man, woman and child in every country. Pakistan, like the entire NAM, rejects such a proposition. If this gains acceptance, the consequence will be more nuclear proliferation, not non-proliferation.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/52/L.41 hope that the CD will find it possible in 1998 to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. We hope that this draft resolution can be adopted unanimously by this Committee and the General Assembly.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For further information please contact:
Pakistan Mission, 8 East 65th Street, New York NY 10021.
Tel: (212) 879.8600 or E-Mail: pakistan@undp.org