PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
PLENARY
STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN GENEVA, ON AGENDA ITEM 65: "COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY" AT THE 50TH RESUMED SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1996.
Mr. President,
Pakistan is gratified that this historic resumed session of the General Assembly convened to
adopt a Treaty eagerly awaited by the world for 40 years is meeting under the wise and
able leadership of a distinguished diplomat from Portugal, a country with which Pakistan
enjoys ties of friendship and cooperation rooted in history.
Pakistan has supported the objective of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for 35
years. We believe an effective nuclear test ban would be good for our region and good for
the world. We shall remain consistent with our long-standing policy in taking a position on
the draft resolution in document A/50/L.78 , which was introduced by Australia on behalf
of a very large number of Member States.
The first operative paragraph of the draft resolution asks the General Assembly to "adopt"
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty circulated in document A/50/1027 . This CTBT text is
the product of two and half years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.
Despite its acknowledged shortcomings, and the reservations expressed by several
delegations on some of its provisions, this CTBT Text enjoyed a virtual consensus within
the Conference on Disarmament. However, one state chose to veto the adoption of the
Treaty, to veto the transmission of the Treaty to the General Assembly, and to veto also a
decision to report to the Assembly that the C.D. was unable to achieve consensus on the
CTBT.
Having frustrated the will of the international community, it is disingenuous of this country
to argue now that the procedure followed in the Australian resolution is contrary to the
letter of General Assembly's resolution 50/65 and to invoke the sanctity of the rule of
consensus in the C.D. This rule is designed to protect the legitimate security interests of
States, not to thwart measures which are in the security interests of all states. As the
philosopher Hegel wrote: "It is a matter of perfect indifference where a thing originated.
The only question is: Is it true in and for itself."
Pakistan - like many others - is also unhappy with the unusual procedure adopted to bring
the CTBT to the General Assembly for adoption. The responsibility for this unusual
procedure - and the responsibility for any erosion in the role and authority of the C.D. -
must rest with the country which chose to block consensus in the C.D., not on the rest of the
international community. We welcome the reaffirmation of the C.D's role as the sole
multilateral negotiating body in Ambassador Butler's introductory statement.
Pakistan is not happy with certain provisions of the CTBT Text in document A/50/1027. In
the final stages, the negotiations lacked full transparency and the texts did not always
reflect the outcome of negotiations. We will state our reservations and interpretations on
the Text after the vote.
We are aware that this test ban will not be comprehensive. It will ban nuclear tests which
result in explosions, not all nuclear tests. Of course, non-explosion tests are not verifiable.
We would have wished, however, to see a more categorical commitment that such
experiments would not be used to continue the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan shares the frustration of the non-nuclear states at the reluctance of some nuclear
powers to agree to more categorical commitments to the realization of nuclear
disarmament, within the earliest possible time-frame. It is regrettable that the compromise
proposals advanced by Pakistan in the C.D. were not seriously pursued in the negotiations.
Pakistan also has serious concerns regarding the danger of the abuse of On-Site
Inspections, specially on the basis of so-called National Technical Means. However, we have
accepted as a compromise the provision that an OSI can be launched only after approval
by 30 of the 51 members of the Executive Council. We note that the Treaty provides States
the right to deny access to non-related and sensitive facilities and structures.
Despite its shortcomings, Pakistan was prepared to accept the CTBT text as the basis for
consensus and to have the CD transmit this to the General Assembly for adoption. We were
prepared to do so for two important reasons.
One, we have been assured that a ban on nuclear explosion will severely constrain the
ability of nuclear weapon states to improve their nuclear weapons and will prevent them
from developing new and exotic types of nuclear weapons;
Two, a nuclear explosion ban will contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation. If
accepted, it could decisively arrest further nuclear escalation in South Asia. It would fulfill
the objectives of the bilateral Test Ban Treaty which Pakistan proposed to India in June
1987.
In other words, if our aim is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this
Treaty is better than no Treaty.
Mr. President,
Pakistan is not surprised at the trenchant opposition of our neighbour to the CTBT. For
over 30 years, Pakistan has warned the world of this country's nuclear ambitions. We did
so when it acquired unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; we did so when it secretly diverted
fissile material from these facilities to build bombs; we did so before it exploded its nuclear
bomb in May 1974; we have done so recently as it has turned to the development and
deployment of short, medium and long-range nuclear-capable missiles.
Hypocrisy has, indeed, been the hall mark of the nuclear posture of the country which
blocked the CTBT in the C.D. Its bomb was called a "peaceful nuclear explosion"; its
medium-range missile a "technology demonstrator". When Pakistan proposed the creation
of a NWFZ in South Asia, when the world community suggested bilateral or regional
full-scope safeguards, or bilateral or regional commitments against nuclear proliferation,
we were all told by our neighbour that it could accept only global measures which
committed the nuclear weapon states also. The CTBT is such a measure. This too has now
been rejected. For us, the reasons are , fully evident. They are not derived from any moral
commitment to global nuclear disarmament, with or without a "time-bound framework".
When this country sponsored the General Assembly resolution in 1993 proposing initiation
of negotiations on the CTBT, it did not insist on a provision linking the Treaty to a
commitment by the nuclear weapon states to a "time-bound" framework for nuclear
disarmament. Perhaps it expected others to block the Treaty. Pakistan supports the
conclusion of a 'time-bound' programme for nuclear disarmament. We have sponsored the
proposal in the C.D. -- together with 27 other members of the "Group of 21"-- outlining a
programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. But the proposal that nuclear
powers give a prior commitment to a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament as a
precondition for the entry into force of a CTBT was obviously put forward by our
neighbour with full confidence that it would be rejected. It is a transparent device to avoid
a commitment to a nuclear test ban treaty, to veto a vital disarmament measure which has
virtually universal support.
Today, we have heard again that if the provision on Entry into Force is changed to exclude
the requirement for its signature and ratification, our neighbour will give up its opposition
to the Assembly's adoption of the Australian resolution. This is perhaps the first time in
history that a country has demanded an amendment to a Treaty in order to be in a position
not to sign it. The CTBT is a specific Treaty with the specific obligation - not to conduct
nuclear explosions. To be effective and 'comprehensive', this Treaty must foreclose the
possibility of nuclear explosions being conducted by all the States which have the technical
and the legal capability to conduct such tests. There are eight such States - the five nuclear
powers and the three so-called 'threshold' States. Their security interests are interlocking.
If one of these States maintains the right to test so will the others. They must all come into
the Treaty. Article XIV of the draft CTBT acknowledges this.
It applies equally to 44 states. It does not force or oblige any of them to act contrary to their
sovereign rights. To accept a formula in which one nuclear capable State can opt out, is to
contemplate the possibility of a Treaty coming into force whose parties do not include one
or more of the eight nuclear capable States. Such a Treaty would be a farce. .
Mr. President,
The people of Pakistan, who have suffered discriminatory pressures and penalties for many
years, were deeply shocked at the gestures and offers made by some major powers to the
opponent of the CTBT. These gestures did not appease, they did not prevent the veto;
instead they strengthened the determination to kill the CTBT. Worse, they may have
emboldened the nuclear militancy of this country.
Its Foreign Minister has said: "We have the right to test". All its leaders have asserted that
they will "keep the nuclear option open" and could "exercise" this option. Ominously, the
preparations made at Pokhran earlier this year for a second nuclear test have not been
reversed. Two days ago, an influential nuclear strategist of this country threatened that "if
pushed to the wall" on the CTBT, this country may "really go nuclear".
I would like to state, once again, for the record, that any step of nuclear escalation in our
region will find a matching response by Pakistan to safeguard our security. We will not
accept double standards or discrimination. We will not accept unilateral obligations and
commitments.
Mr. President,
The adoption of the CTBT should herald a new dawn in the history of the quest for global
nuclear disarmament. Instead, a dark sun has appeared over the skies of South Asia. The
challenge posed by our neighbour is not only to the CTBT. It is a challenge to the
international consensus for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Mr. President,
Consistent with its long-standing policy and the position I have outlined, the Pakistan delegation will support the draft resolution proposed by Australia and other Member States in document A/50/L.78. However, in view of the concerns arising from the position and policies of our neighbour, Pakistan will not be in a position to respond to the call in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution to sign the Treaty until these concerns continue to exist.
I thank you, Mr. President.
For further information please contact:
Pakistan Mission, 8 East 65th Street, New York NY 10021.
Tel: (212) 879.8600 or E-Mail: pakistan@undp.org
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