Tracking Number: 416984
Title: "Riedel: India, Pakistan Nuclear Programs, Missiles Top Concerns." Testimony to the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Bruce Riedel. (951206)
Date: 19951206
Text:
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12/06/95 RIEDEL: INDIA, PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, MISSILES TOP CONCERNS (Text: House committee statement, 12/6) (3490) Washington -- "It is not surprising that we view the nuclear capabilities -- and the associated ballistic missile programs -- of India and Pakistan with considerable concern and as the regional issue of greatest importance," Bruce Riedel, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, told the House International Relations subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific December 6.
"While India and Pakistan's geographic and conventional military importance argue for closer defense ties, their nuclear and missile programs demand that we keep them at arm's length," he stated.
Riedel also explained the changes to the Pressler Amendment which are sponsored by Senator Hank Brown (Republican, Colorado) and which the Clinton Administration is backing. These are still tied up in Congress and have not been incorporated into law.
"The Brown Amendment will not re-establish an arms supply relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan," Riedel explained. "Under Brown, a one-time exception to the Pressler Amendment will permit us to release about $370 million worth of military equipment that has been embargoed under Pressler sanctions."
"A second Brown-related concern is that the military equipment that we would release to Pakistan might upset the regional balance," Riedel continued. "We have carefully reviewed the items on this list and have concluded that releasing it to Pakistan will not upset the Indo-Pakistani conventional arms balance."
Following is text of Riedel's statement, as prepared for delivery: (Begin text) Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today with Assistant Secretary Raphel to testify on U.S. security interests in South Asia. In doing so, I would like to build on Secretary Raphel's overview of U.S. security interests and concerns in this increasingly important region by addressing DoD's efforts to support those larger interests through our engagement with the defense establishments of the various countries in South Asia. Given the very prominent role of Indo-Pakistani relations in our security concerns, the preponderance of my presentation will deal with those two countries. Obviously, a key factor as we look into the future of the Indo- Pakistani relationship will be the potential impact of the pending revision of the Pressler Amendment -- an issue I hope to put into sharper focus.
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH ASIA To provide a context for my comments on DoD engagement in the region, I would like to start by discussing DoD's particular perspective as to the importance of South Asia. With the end of the Cold War, operational considerations have caused us to broaden our traditional focus on Europe and Northeast Asia to include concerns elsewhere. So far in this decade, U.S. forces have been committed to operations in the Persian Gulf area on four occasions: DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-'91, PROVIDE COMFORT IN 1991, VIGILANT WARRIOR in 1994, and the still-on-going SOUTHERN WATCH. In 1991, our forces were committed to Operation SEA ANGEL in which they rescued tens of thousands of cyclone victims in Bangladesh. In 1992, they were committed to U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia and two years later they were committed briefly to assist the U.N. in Rwanda. Common to all these operations was their proximity to the Indian Ocean -- a body of water whose strategic significance has only increased as the world's dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf has grown.
A second factor affecting DoD's perception of the geographic significance of South Asia is the location of the second major military power in the region, Pakistan, at the intersection of three often unstable regions: South Asia, Southwest Asia and Central Asia. Pakistan has long been a friend in this area where we have sometimes not had an abundance of friends. Given the troubled condition of many of the states in these regions, we have valued Pakistan's efforts to develop democracy and a market economy.
In addition to the region's geographic significance, DoD must consider the military potential of the South Asia countries, particularly India and Pakistan -- which possess respectively the world's second and eighth largest armies based on the total number of men and women in their respective ground forces. To put that into perspective, the U.S. Army would rank number six by this criterion -- much smaller than India's 1.2 million-man army but not that much larger than the 500,000-man Pakistan Army. While we would not consider either of these to be a likely opponent, the downsizing of U.S. forces requires us to think in terms of coalitions, especially for peacekeeping missions. Accordingly, the willingness of these two countries to commit their forces to causes we support makes them particularly significant in our strategic calculations.
In that regard, DoD has found itself interacting operationally and cooperatively with the armed forces of these two countries more in the last five years than at any time in their 48-year histories. Pakistan contributed two brigades to the DESERT STORM Coalition. It was the first in and among the very last out of Somalia -- an operation, I might add, in which it participated at the express requests of Presidents Bush and Clinton, and in which its forces sustained more fatalities than the U.S. or any other contingent, and to which it ultimately committed over 7000 troops. Pakistan currently has an infantry battalion participating in the U.N. Mission in Haiti and has asked to have one of its two battalions assigned to UNPROFOR transferred to the IFOR in Bosnia. Earlier in the decade, Pakistan committed 1300 troops in Cambodia and an engineer battalion to help clear mines in Kuwait.
India, too, has a long and distinguished record supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations and considers its participation in such operations to be part of its responsibility as a member of the United Nations. Most recently, India has been a major contributor of forces to Somalia (over 5000 soldiers), Cambodia (1700), Mozambique (960), Rwanda (825), and Angola (900), and currently has 120 paramilitary personnel committed to the U.N. Mission in Haiti.
I should also note that two other South Asian countries, Bangladesh and Nepal, have been regular and generous contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations. During this decade, Bangladesh has committed substantial contingents to operations in Cambodia (800), Somalia (1600), Mozambique (1650), Rwanda (990), Angola (1040), Haiti (1050), Kuwait (one battalion), and Bosnia (1320). Nepal has made major troop commitments in Lebanon (one battalion), Somalia (350), Bosnia (960), and Haiti (410).
Obviously, the willingness of the South Asia countries -- particularly India and Pakistan -- to commit their militaries in significant numbers to peacekeeping and other operational missions is an important factor in DoD's assessment of the importance of South Asia.
A final factor influencing the DoD perspective on South Asia is the potential for conflict between India and Pakistan and the consequences that such conflict could have for the United States. There is no need to repeat the history of bitter animosity that has characterized Indo-Pakistani relations. Suffice it to say that these two states have fought three wars in less than 50 years, share a border along which both sides have deployed the majority of their ground forces, and must contend with the potential flashpoint of Kashmir.
Given this difficult environment, it is not surprising that we view the nuclear capabilities -- and the associated ballistic missile programs -- of India and Pakistan with considerable concern and as the regional issue of greatest importance. Accordingly, we do not and will not hesitate to caution Pakistan and India in regard to their nuclear and missile programs.
DOD ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA Some may see a contradiction in my analysis of South Asia's importance. While India and Pakistan's geographic and conventional military importance argue for closer defense ties, their nuclear and missile programs demand that we keep them at arm's length. I would answer that with a comment by Secretary Perry in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association earlier this year:
We believe that a strong defense relationship and increased cooperation with India and Pakistan¡ will allow us to better pursue our common security interests, but, at the same time, they will provide a better basis for working out the policy differences which we have with each of those countries.
He went on: ... we find India and Pakistan's position on nuclear proliferation unpalatable. But to use this as a reason to disengage from the region, or to avoid deepening our security ties with these nations, could undermine efforts to cap their destructive capability. It could even help push them into an unfettered arms race. That would be disastrous.
I believe that we can best help to avoid the disastrous by building bridges of trust between the United States and India and between the United States and Pakistan.
With that as our guidance, we in the Department of Defense have attempted to build bridges of trust through the strengthening of our bilateral defense relationships and increasing our military-to-military cooperation within the established legal limitations. In that regard, let me now review our on-going activities in the various South Asia countries.
India Within the last year, DoD has worked with India to establish an expanded security dialogue and a more cooperative defense relationship. In January 1995 in New Delhi, Secretary Perry signed our first-ever security agreement with India which provides a framework for three levels of defense cooperation. A Defense Policy Group, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, first met in September to discuss security policy and other strategic issues of common interest. Subsequently, a Joint Technical Group, chaired by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Dual Use Technology and International Programs, met to discuss the potential for technology and production cooperation. At a third level, we seek to foster greater Service-to-Service Cooperation by having the Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders of Pacific Command meet with the vice chiefs of their respective Indian Services to promote exercises, training, and other areas of interest.
Our key security assistance programs with India are IMET and the provision of engineering support to the Light Combat Aircraft project. Given the importance we attach to IMET as a vehicle for building military ties on a personal as well as an institutional level, we are seeking to increase the level of IMET funding for India from $208K in 1995 to $364K in 1996.
U.S. Pacific Command's Cooperative Engagement Strategy, which involves training and personnel exchanges, small-scale exercises, and professional conferences and symposia, is the cornerstone of our effort to increase service-to-service interaction. Under that strategy, U.S. Army Pacific, Pacific Air Forces and Pacific Fleet Command have established regular flag-level steering groups to coordinate these efforts. Several U.S. Navy ships call at Indian ports each year and senior U.S. and Indian military officers make increasingly frequent exchange visits. Agreement was also reached this year to establish an instructor pilot exchange under which one pilot from each country will perform instructor pilot duties in the other for a year.
The bottom line is that U.S.-Indian defense ties are better now than at any time in the past 30 years.
Pakistan Despite the cutoff of foreign military sales under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990, U.S.-Pakistani military-to-military relations have remained surprisingly cordial. During Secretary Perry's visit to Pakistan last January, a decision was made to reestablish -- after a five-year hiatus -- the U.S.-Pakistan Consultative Group or CG as a forum for DoD/MOD-level discussions on security issues. The first meeting of the reestablished CG was held in Washington, in late May 1995, and was co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Pakistani Defense Secretary. In addition to an exchange of threat perceptions and foreign policy perspectives, the CG agenda included discussions of military-to-military activities (e.g. exercises) and presentations on peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism. We expect the CG to meet again next fall in Islamabad.
U.S. Central Command's combined military exercise program with Pakistan involves approximately eight exercises each year and includes naval surface, naval air, ground force and special operations exercises. Each year, two U.S. officers attend the Pakistan Army Staff College and one the Pakistani National Defense College. Up to three Pakistani officers attend U.S. staff and war colleges each year under a reciprocal professional military education (PME) exchange. U.S. Navy ship visits occur periodically and exchange visits by senior U.S. and Pakistani military officers are frequent.
Enactment of the Brown Amendment will provide an opportunity to broaden certain aspects of the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship. Under this legislation, restrictions on assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pressler Amendment have been clarified to permit greater cooperation with Pakistani military farces in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping activities. Additionally, the Brown Amendment permits assistance for purposes of facilitating military-to-military contact, training (including IMET) and humanitarian and civic assistance projects. I will have more to say on the impact of the Brown Amendment later.
Bangladesh While not as robust as U.S. relationships with the India and Pakistani militaries, U.S. and Bangladeshi forces have positively interacted for a number of years -- perhaps most visibly during Operation SEA ANGEL, the very successful disaster assistance operation following a highly destructive cyclone in 1991.
Our security assistance program for Bangladesh seeks to train about 15 students a year under IMET -- for which Bangladesh received approximately $209K in IMET assistance in 1995 and $258K has been requested for 1996. Military equipment provided through FMS is limited to materiel with direct application for civic action and disaster relief (construction equipment, communications, vehicles, medical supplies, etc.). In that regard, some $14 million of excess equipment was delivered by DoD in the wake of the 1991 cyclone.
U.S. Pacific Command and the Bangladesh military participate in several exercises each year and the Bangladesh Army is a regular participant in the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS).
U.S. defense ties with Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are even more limited, primarily to small IMET programs. Due to the on-going civil war, DoD involvement in Afghanistan is limited to periodic aerial delivery of humanitarian assistance to Pakistan for onward shipment to Afghan refugees.
Arms Sales One traditional aspect of military cooperation which DoD is not pursuing in South Asia is arms sales. Arms sales to Pakistan, of course, continue to be prohibited under the Pressler Amendment. In the case of India, we have abstained from moor arms sales that might alter the existing military balance of forces and have made clear, to quote Secretary Perry, that "this will not be an area for immediate, bold steps." Due to the economic difficulties of Bangladesh, we have, as a matter of policy, limited sales to engineer equipment and other items useful in disaster relief and infrastructure development. As for Sri Lanka, our policy remains the same: we do not sell lethal equipment due to human rights concerns stemming from that country's on-going civil war. This policy remains under review in light of the evolving situation in Sri Lanka.
IMPACT OF THE REVISION OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT In the balance of my presentation, I would like to offer my views on the impact on U.S. security interests in South Asia of the pending revision of the Pressler Amendment under the Brown Amendment. From reading the Indian and Pakistani press, it appears that there is considerable misunderstanding of this legislation on both sides. In that regard, we realize that the Brown Amendment has been viewed with considerable concern and suspicion in India. I would hope that this hearing will serve to ease those concerns by clarifying a number of apparent misunderstandings.
Let me first of all emphasize that the Brown Amendment will not reestablish an arms supply relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. Under Brown, a one-time exception to the Pressler Amendment will permit us to release about $370 million worth of military equipment that has been embargoed under Pressler sanctions. All of this equipment has been placed on contract before the imposition of sanctions in October 1990. Pakistan has made all required payments on this equipment despite the fact that it was unable to take delivery on it. The President did not believe it fair to Pakistan to take what is not an insubstantial amount of money and to withhold the items for which it was spent. Moreover, he believed that this "unfairness" was undercutting our ability to engage the Government of Pakistan on issues of even greater importance to us such as nonproliferation. Accordingly, in an effort to create a climate that would enable us to more effectively deal with Pakistan on pressing bilateral issues, he sought to remove this irritant through a Congressional authorization for a one-time exception to Pressler to permit the release of the embargoed equipment. I want to assure all concerned that there will be no arms supply relationship with Pakistan until such time as the requirements of the Pressler Amendment are met in full -- that is, until the President can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon.
A second Brown-related concern is that the military equipment that we would release to Pakistan might upset the regional balance. A list of the equipment to be released is attached to this statement. We have carefully reviewed the items on this list and have concluded that releasing it to Pakistan will not upset the Indo-Pakistani conventional arms balance. While I would be happy to respond to your questions regarding the impact of the specific items to be released, I would like to limit my formal remarks to several observations that may put the package into perspective.
First, although $370 million worth of equipment is not insignificant, it must be considered in the context of the totality of Indian and Pakistani forces. Given the size of these two armed forces, and the fact that none of the items on the list provide Pakistan with an advantage that in any way offsets India's roughly two to one advantage in almost all areas of conventional arms strength, we are quite confident that this package does not pose a threat to Indian security nor does it in any way serve to destabilize the region.
Much has been made of the three P-3 aircraft that are part of the package. Armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, of which there are 28 in the package, some have argued that this system could threaten shipping along the entire west coast of India. While this is theoretically possible, it ignores that fact that India is not without considerable means to defend itself against what is a slow-flying, propeller-drive aircraft. Moreover, it ignores the fact that India has superior capabilities to threaten Pakistani shipping. Again, we have examined this issue very closely and have concluded that release of these aircraft and the Harpoon missiles will not upset the existing regional balance.
I would emphasize that in regard to the Pakistani F-16s, we have no plans or intention to deliver them to Pakistan unless it complies with the Pressler Amendment. Instead, we are seeking to resolve the F-16 issue by selling the aircraft to a third country and returning the proceeds to Pakistan.
While Brown does not permit a re-establishment of an arms supply relationship, it does permit us to provide limited military assistance to Pakistan in areas of importance to us. As I indicated earlier, Brown will enable DoD to work more effectively with the Pakistani Armed Forces in peacekeeping, anti- terrorism, and counter-narcotics. We believe such cooperation will serve U.S. as well as Pakistani interests. Authority to facilitate military-to-military contacts (e.g., exchanges, seminars, exercise observes, etc.) and training to include reestablishing the IMET program will enable us to engage the Pakistani military more effectively.
CONCLUSION In closing I would like to emphasize that DoD views South Asia as an important region for a number of reasons -- most importantly because of the potential for nuclear conflict. We believe that we can best pursue our interests in the region -- to include nuclear and missile nonproliferation -- by engaging the militaries of the various countries of the region, particularly those of India and Pakistan. To that end, we have made important progress in our military relationships with the countries of South Asia.
In regard to the Brown Amendment, I want to reiterate that there are no plans to reestablish a military supply relationship with Pakistan and that the equipment that will be released as a one-time exception to Pressler does not pose a threat to regional stability.
I would be happy to respond to your questions. (end text) NNNN
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