Tracking Number: 407379
Title: "Pressler Argues Against Sale of P-3 Aircraft to Pakistan." According to Senator Larry Pressler in a speech before Congress, the sale of the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft
to Pakistan would undermine US policy goals in South Asia. (950914)
Date: 19950914
Text:
*NEA407
09/14/95 PRESSLER ARGUES AGAINST SALE OF P-3 AIRCRAFTS TO PAKISTAN (Text: Pressler Senate Subcommittee testimony) (2170) WASHINGTON -- Administration proposals to weaken the Pressler Amendment and provide P-3 maritime patrol aircraft to Pakistan "would undermine (U.S.) policy goals in South Asia," Senator Larry Pressler (Republican-South Dakota), author of the Pressler Amendment, testified September 14 in Washington.
At a hearing on "South Asia in the Post-Cold-War Era," Pressler told colleagues of the Senate Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee that the P-3s would give Pakistan "surveillance capability (that) would cover the entire Arabian Sea and the entire Persian Gulf. The data from this extended surveillance -- data on the movements of our own Navy in the region -- surely would be of critical use to Iran as it seeks to extend the reach of its naval power," he said.
The Pressler Amendment made U.S. assistance to Pakistan conditional on the President's certification that Pakistan was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. When then-President Bush was not able to make that certification, most U.S.-Pakistan programs were brought to a halt.
Pressler described today's South Asia as a region of "striking contrasts. In no other place is the threat of nuclear conflict greater," he said and added, "I do not agree with the Administration that furthering our policy goals in South Asia requires this nation to weaken our critical anti-proliferation laws."
Following is the transcript of Pressler's remarks: (Begin transcript) WASHINGTON -- Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss United States policy options in South Asia.
Two weeks ago, Majority Leader Bob Dole told the American Legion that China is arming Pakistan with nuclear missiles. The question before us is whether we also will arm Pakistan.
Last month, the McGraw-Hill newsletter "Nuclear Fuel" disclosed that Pakistan, in 1991, sought to violate a joint venture with a German company by diverting telecommunications equipment to its nuclear weapons program.
Last week, the commander of the Iranian navy announced it would hold another round of joint naval maneuvers with Pakistan later this year -- the latest chapter in a sustained military relationship between Pakistan and her terrorist-coddling neighbor to the west.
And our hearts and our prayers are with the friends and family of our fellow American Donald Hutchings, and the three others who have been held captive for ten weeks by brutal terrorists in Kashmir.
Today's South Asia is a region of striking contrasts. In no other place is the threat of nuclear conflict greater. However, few regions have South Asia's enormous potential for economic growth and opportunity for millions who have been denied it for centuries.
U.S. policy goals in the region are obvious -- nuclear arms elimination, an end to wanton terrorism, regional stability, economic growth and human rights. Ways to achieve them are not so obvious. I do not agree with the Administration that furthering our policy goals in South Asia requires this nation to weaken our critical anti-proliferation laws. These laws prohibit U.S. aid to the government of Pakistan as long as the President fails to certify that Pakistan is not in possession of a nuclear explosive device otherwise known as the Pressler Amendment.
The Clinton Administration has offered two proposals to weaken the Pressler Amendment the first would allow the U.S. to transfer unconditionally to Pakistan $370 million in military equipment that was never delivered because of the Pressler sanctions; the second would repeal the prohibition of non-military aid. Both proposals would undermine our policy goals in South Asia, and our broader non-proliferation efforts.
It was last summer that the Clinton Administration proposed an unconditional transfer of military equipment to Pakistan. This package includes three P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles, MK-46 torpedoes, and engines and parts for Pakistan's existing fleet of helicopters and F-16 aircraft.
There are three very serious problems with this transfer. First, it would spark a renewed arms race between Pakistan and India. As my colleagues know, P-3s serve a dual function -- they are naval reconnaissance aircraft with offensive capabilities. The military aid package also includes torpedoes and missiles that can be launched from a P-3. As this map shows, the P-3 would give Pakistan greater naval surveillance and striking capabilities than the aircraft Pakistan currently uses, the French-made Atlantique.
In addition, as the Department of Defense admitted, the F-16 components in the military package represent a reliability upgrade of Pakistan's F-16 aircraft which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. I do not understand why the Clinton Administration would seek to improve Pakistan's nuclear delivery capability with U.S. made equipment.
Mr. Chairman, the Indian Government announced it would have no choice but to engage in additional military procurement if the Clinton Administration's transfer goes through. Why should we risk a potential arms race in an already unstable South Asia?
Second, the military transfer could inadvertently improve the terrorist state of Iran's military capability in the region. According to news reports, Iran and Pakistan have been cooperating on nuclear weapons research for a decade. Also, Iran and Pakistan have been engaged in cooperative military efforts dating back as far as last year, when the two countries conducted joint naval maneuvers in the Arabian Sea. I was disturbed to learn that a new round of naval maneuvers is scheduled later this fall.
Given this sustained Pakistan-Iran cooperation, the P-3s take on added significance. Again, I direct my colleagues to the map. The P-3s surveillance capability would cover the entire Arabian Sea and the entire Persian Gulf. The data from this extended surveillance -- data on the movements of our own Navy in the region -- surely would be of critical use to Iran as it seeks to extend the reach of its naval power.
Why would we inadvertently enhance Iran's military alliance with Pakistan to the detriment of our own naval forces, and our friends and allies in the region?
Finally, this transfer sends the worst possible message: Nuclear proliferation pays. Mr. Chairman, the Clinton Administration assured Congress that the United States would oppose any commercial military upgrades for Pakistan. This has been U.S. policy since 1990. Yet, the Clinton military transfer would break its assurance to Congress in the worst way -- by upgrading Pakistan's nuclear delivery vehicles -- its F-16s. This upgrade is not just a reversal of U.S. arms policy, it undermines the very principles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It defies logic that the Clinton Administration would work so valiantly to ratify this treaty and then turn around and violate its very principles.
Further, the Clinton Administration is willing to let this transfer go through without gaining one concrete nuclear non-proliferation concession from Pakistan.
Despite these very disturbing activities, the Administration is intent on going ahead with the military transfer -- one that does not achieve one credible U.S. policy initiative, while undermining three vital policies -- regional stability in South Asia, containment of Iran and worldwide nuclear non-proliferation.
Do we have alternatives? Yes. Last May, I proposed an initiative to solve the impasse involving the 28 F-16s sought by Pakistan. The initiative -- a third party sale of the F-16s to democratic non-nuclear powers -- was designed to further a number of American foreign policy goals, including reduced tensions in South Asia, and maintenance of a strong nuclear non-proliferation policy. I am pleased that the Administration has adopted this initiative. Today, I am sending a letter to President Clinton, urging him to expand this initiative one step further by pursuing the third party sale option on all the military equipment sought by Pakistan. And as I said With the F-16s, if the Administration and the Congress wish to use the proceeds from the third party sales to reimburse Pakistan, I would not object.
However, let me remind my colleagues Pakistan received approximately $3.5 billion between 1985 -- when the Pressler amendment became law -- and 1990, when it was invoked. It received funds from the American taxpayer in return for the promise not to go nuclear. The existing government in Pakistan of the time broke its promise and produced nuclear explosives, Even worse, it used the American people's money to do it. That was an extraordinary act of deception. I hope Congress keeps that in mind when it considers how much we should reimburse Pakistan;
I now want to address the amendment offered to the Department of Defense Authorization bill last August. This amendment could be used to aid Pakistan's nuclear program. Mr. Chairman, a story in the McGraw-Hill newsletter Nuclear Fuel, detailed how Pakistan intended to violate a joint venture with Siemens AG by using telecommunications equipment as part of a project to enhance uranium into bomb grade material. I ask that this story be included in the Record.
This is just one example. In February 1993, then-CIA director James Woolsey described for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs how untied and seemingly "nonmilitary" loans and grants could further Pakistan's nuclear program. Why should we once again set ourselves up to make the same mistake? Why would we once again put ourselves in the position of inadvertently aiding Pakistan's bomb program?
Further, let me correct for the record a serious misperception Of the Pressler Amendment. Some have argued that we need to modify the Pressler amendment so that we can provide vital civic and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. We already can provide that assistance. Current law permits U.S. aid to Pakistan through nongovernmental organizations in a wide range of areas, including agriculture and rural development, nutrition, human rights, endangered species and illicit narcotics prevention. Pakistan also continues to receive annually hundreds of millions of dollars in development assistance via multilateral lending agencies to which the United States is a major contributor. The proposed amendment to the
DOD bill went beyond even a limited approach, and again would do so without requiring a single nuclear concession from Pakistan.
Again, I do not object to efforts to improve our relations with Pakistan. I want to see our relations improve, but not by sacrificing other vital U.S. policy goals. Conditions must be made and kept before modifications are made to the Pressler amendment. What kind of conditions?
First, we need to put South Asia on the path toward a nuclear arms build-down to zero. I commend the Chairman for seeking a U.S.-led multilateral summit designed to reduce the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia.
Second, Pakistan should provide verifiable, written guarantees that it has capped its nuclear program and that any future U.S. assistance would not be used to further its nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery programs.
Third, Pakistan should provide written, verifiable guarantees that no military or civilian officials will not provide assistance that furthers the military or nuclear programs of a terrorist country.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of U.S.-India relations. For more than forty years, our relations with the world's most populous democracy were difficult, dictated largely by Cold War conventional wisdom. Since 1991, our relations have improved markedly. India's economy is undergoing a remarkable transformation, fueled by a nearly five-fold increase in foreign investments from 1990 to 1994. More than one-third of those investments were from American firms. It is my hope that Pakistan can enjoy similar progress in the near future. Economic growth for both countries is the key to long-term regional stability.
One of the lessons of our improved relationship with India is that our actions have a clear impact on Indian public opinion. That certainly is the case in Pakistan as well. Given this impact, I believe that we must pursue our policies in South Asia with great care and great caution. We must ensure that we do not unnecessarily return to the previous, unproductive levels of our relationship. We also must ensure that we do not unnecessarily fuel the already strong tensions that exist in the region.
I look forward to working with the Chairman and the Administration to further U.S. policy goals in South Asia. Our goals are clear. We can work with our allies to achieve them. Just as important, we can do so without weakening our nonproliferation policies. Last year, the President stated that no single foreign policy issue was more important than nuclear non-proliferation. If that is the case, there is no justifiable reason why Pakistan once again must be exempt from federal non-proliferation laws or the non-proliferation policies we impose on all other signatories of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
Let us give Pakistan some concrete incentives to honor its word. Let us not reward proliferation.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to share my views.
(End transcript) NNNN
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