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Title:  "Raphel: US Proposes Compromise on Pressler Amendment." In testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, a top State Department official claimed that the Pressler Amendment needs to be revised to suit current global realities and to better achieve US non-proliferation objectives with Pakistan. (950914)

Date:  19950914

Text:
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09/14/95 RAPHEL: U.S. PROPOSES COMPROMISE ON PRESSLER AMENDMENT (Text: Congressional testimony, 9/14/95) (2670) Washington -- The Clinton Administration is seeking to revise the Pressler Amendment which prohibits U.S. assistance to Pakistan.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael said that the Pressler Amendment "needs to be revised to fit current global realities and to better achieve our nonproliferation objectives."

"Pressler sanctions have also changed Pakistani perceptions of their role in the world," Raphel stated. "Five years of sanctions have cut off contacts, training, and cooperation projects that reinforced this (Western) orientation. No one should be surprised if Pakistani military officers and civilians look elsewhere for training and contacts, for inspiration and friendship."

Raphel also spoke of U.S. relations with India, which she said were "increasingly broad and deep" while holding "great promise for the future. India has the potential to be among the great world powers of the twenty-first century," she commented.

Following is the text of Raphel's remarks: (Begin text) Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to testify before you today on how the Administration looks at South Asia in the evolving post-Cold War era.

In earlier testimony before this committee I reviewed recent positive developments in South Asia -- in foreign relations, in economic reform and growth, and in the strengthening of democratic institutions and respect for human rights. At the same time, we recognize there are bound to be bumps in the road ahead. Events in Karachi, in Afghanistan, in Sri Lanka, in Kashmir and elsewhere give cause for concern. The threats posed by nuclear and missile proliferation remain. Yet while obstacles will inevitably emerge on the road ahead, momentum continues to build for progress. We must continue to encourage our South Asian friends as they make the sometimes difficult transition to full democracy and open markets. Remaining engaged with South Asian countries is essential if we are to advance our key interests in regional stability and nonproliferation.

While each country in South Asia is important in its own right -- I just returned from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh where both the achievements and the problems are impressive -- I want to concentrate today on the region's two largest countries and long-time rivals, India and Pakistan.

South Asia after the Cold War: India and Pakistan In building stronger relations with South Asia, we seek to break the zero-sum mind-set that has plagued Indo-Pakistani relations since partition and was reinforced by the global rivalries of the past decades. We are now working to build bilateral ties that stand on their own, freed from the complicated triangular equations that dominated the earlier foreign policy calculus. For decades we viewed our relations with South Asian countries largely through the prism of our rivalry with the Soviet Union. Today, the United States emphasizes good relations with each, based on their intrinsic importance to the U.S. and the region.

We continue to place a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems and preserving regional stability in South Asia. The U.S. can play a role in ensuring such stability, a role that has the potential to expand as India and Pakistan join us in realizing that relations among our three countries are not a zero-sum game. Strong and productive U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan serve not only important U.S. interests but also the cause of easing regional tensions. We will continue to use our influence in both countries to encourage economic development and better regional relations.

India, the dominant regional power, will continue to grow in importance on the world stage. With its large population, growing economy, and technological prowess, India has the potential to be among the great world powers of the twenty-first century. Greatness implies a responsible approach toward international affairs. We applaud India's support of multilateral peace and development efforts and its continuing role as a leader among developing countries. It is also important for India, as the most powerful country in its region, to pursue good relations with its neighbors.

Our relationship with India is increasingly broad and deep and holds great promise for future cooperation. In the economic area in particular both of our countries are benefiting from strong progress in trade and investment. We have initiated a regular dialogue with the Indian government on security issues. Indeed, the US-India Defense Policy Group is meeting in Washington this week to discuss expanded contacts between the U.S. and Indian militaries. We have been cooperating with India in developing the Indian Light Combat Aircraft and have an increasing share of the Indian market for military technology.

Pakistan has been a valuable friend and ally of the United States for nearly five decades. It has been an important source for moderation in a troubled part of the world where religious extremism can threaten stability in the region and beyond. As Prime Minister Bhutto's speech in Beijing eloquently demonstrated, Pakistan is striving to uphold simultaneously principles of Islam and of secular democracy. Pakistan is a major contributor to peacekeeping operations around the world and has worked with us to combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking.

Our efforts to work more closely with Pakistan toward our common goals, however, are hampered by the sweeping sanctions unposed under the Pressler Amendment five years ago. The Pressler sanctions ended all military and economic assistance to Pakistan, terminating many long-standing and some highly successful programs. While the Administration strongly supports the Amendment's goal of curbing Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the legislation needs to be revised to fit current global realities and to better achieve our nonproliferation objectives. Of most immediate concern are the Pressler roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering U.S. commercial interests in a lucrative market, where U.S. firms need OPIC insurance to level the playing field with their European competitors. Our ability to press key nonproliferation goals over the longer term has also been eroded by the Pressler Amendment.

Pressler sanctions have also changed Pakistani perceptions of their role in the world. For most of the past 40 years, Pakistan's strong, Western orientation has been continually reinforced by a broad range of contacts with the United States. Five years of sanctions have cut off contacts, training, and cooperative projects that reinforced this orientation. No one should be surprised if Pakistani military officers and civilians look elsewhere for training and contacts, for inspiration and friendship. Given its troubled neighborhood, Pakistan stands in danger, over time, of drifting in directions contrary to our fundamental interest and its own.

Over the past year we have had discussions with many in Congress about how to focus sanctions to pursue more effectively our key national security objectives, including our nonproliferation aims. This dialogue, and work by members of this Committee, have resulted in a proposed initiative to lift sanctions that blocked progress in areas of our relationship unrelated to proliferation -- economic and commercial growth, counter-terrorism, and professional development in the military.

The problem remained, however, of final disposition of military equipment ordered by Pakistan prior to imposition of sanctions in 1990. This included 28 F-16 aircraft and about $370 million worth of other equipment. Three points of consensus emerged from our dialogue with Congress:

(1) The United States needs a productive, cooperative relationship with Pakistan. It is a large, moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region. It has been an important partner in peacekeeping operations, and a supporter of counter-terrorism efforts. Like other countries in the region, it faces threats from narcotics trafficking and ethnic strife.

(2) To preserve a central feature of the Pressler Amendment and avoid contributing to further tensions in the region, the U.S. should not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan.

(3) The United States should, however, resolve the fundamental unfairness of a situation where we have ended up with both Pakistan's money and the embargoed equipment.

The status quo is clearly unacceptable. It is seen as unfair both in Pakistan and by many in the United States, and is an unhealthy irritant to bilateral relations. This irritation continues to erode our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation and other important goals. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan -- or by India, whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern.

Putting this issue behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad, allowing for real progress on nonproliferation and other issues of concern to the United States.

The President, therefore, decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan. Proceeds from sale of aircraft for which Pakistan paid national funds will be returned directly, while proceeds from sale of those aircraft financed by FMF loans will be credited to Pakistan's FMF account.

In addition, the President is seeking authority from Congress to turn over to Pakistan the other $370 million in other, less controversial, equipment in the pipeline. Mr. Reidel (Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary) will expound at greater length on the equipment involved in the context of the military balance in the region.

The key impact of sanctions relief is not military or financial. The effort would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored and an unfairness rectified with a country and a people who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades. This is fully recognized by the Government of Pakistan, which knows we are not re-establishing a defense supply relationship. Indians who worry about the meaning of this step should also be reassured.

Relations with Russia The Indo/Pakistan rivalry often spills over in their relations with countries outside of South Asia. India and Pakistan's relations with Russia are an obvious example, although there are others. Still a major buyer of military equipment, India has imported $3.5 billion in military equipment, primarily from Russia, since 1990, during which period Pakistan imported, from all sources, about $1.7 billion in arms. Russian sales to India are not necessarily a cause for concern but provide a useful frame of reference in assessing the significance of the $370 million in equipment that we seek to release to Pakistan.

However, any Russian resumption of exports of nuclear power reactors or missile related equipment and technology to India would be of concern. In 1992 we applied economic sanctions to the Russian space agency Glavkosmos for the export of rocket engine technology to India. We have since reached agreement with Russia on an arrangement under which Russia terminated the transfer of technology in the rocket engine deal and we lifted the sanctions on Russia. We have continued regular discussions of nonproliferation in South Asia with Russia, which shares many of our concerns. Russia's imminent membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime is another disincentive for it to provide missile-related assistance to India.

With the end of the Cold War, Pakistan also has attempted to build a military supply relationship with Russia. However, in view of its close ties with India, Russia has so far refused to sell any military systems to Pakistan.

Relations with Iran Iran is another country where India and Pakistan compete for influence. Both seek to maintain correct relations with Iran. They see Iran as a major regional player which is active in Afghanistan and Central Asia, areas of great concern to both Islamabad and New Delhi. Both are also concerned about possible Iranian attempts to radicalize their Muslim populations. We would not accept this rationale as justifying efforts by either India or Pakistan to improve relations with Iran, but the rationale is similar in both cases.

Pakistan and Iran share a common border and are wary neighbors, not strategic allies. There is no compelling evidence that they share any defense equipment. Their differing regional strategies can be seen in Afghanistan, where Iran and Pakistan support competing factions in the ongoing civil war.

Questions have been raised about Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation as well as Iranian security cooperation with India. We are not aware of any Pakistani assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program or significant Indian contacts with Iran's military, even following the recent visit of the Iranian President to India. It is clear that no South Asian state is interested in having another nuclear-capable neighbor.

Central Asia and Afghanistan Pakistan has strategic and cultural reasons for wanting to play a constructive role in Central Asia, an area with which it has ties dating back centuries. As a moderate Islamic state, Pakistan is often seen as an alternative model to Iran in Central Asia. Pakistan has contributed to Central Asian stability in Tajikistan, using its ties to the Tajik opposition to promote an end to the conflict, recently by hosting talks between the rebels and the Government in Islamabad. The Government of Pakistan has also played an important, if sometimes controversial, role in Afghan affairs.

The Bhutto Government has also sought to build closer ties with the Central Asian republics through the recently revived Economic Cooperation Organization, a trade organization originally formed in 1977 by Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, but which now includes the Central Asian states. It also has sought to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan to supply its growing energy needs. Neither of these efforts have yet borne fruit, however. Ultimately, a stable, peaceful Afghanistan is a prerequisite for prosperous and stable Central Asia.

India has also sought to build its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, both to as a counterweight to Pakistan and China and for long-term commercial reasons. India would like to keep Afghanistan from being a source of weapons and militants for the separatist violence in Kashmir. On the economic front, India is particularly interested in developing a land transport corridor through Iran to the Central Asian states and Russia. Indian traders and diplomats are increasingly active in the Central Asian states.

China Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China remains strong, despite the gradual rapprochement between China and India. Pakistan particularly values its Chinese ties as a source of both moral and material support for its interests in the region. Prime Minister Bhutto has just returned from bilateral talks with senior Chinese leaders on the margins of the World Women's Conference in Beijing.

Our concersn with aspects of the bilateral security relationship are well-known; they involve Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as well as the provision of missile-related items which would violate the missile export provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. The latter action prompted our imposition of Category II sanctions on both countries in 1993.

We view India's improving relationship with China as a positive trend. Though a boundary dispute remains unresolved, confidence building measures along the Indo-Chinese border and peaceful negotiations on disengagement suggest that this dispute will not block the world's two most populous states from becoming better neighbors. As Indo-Chinese ties improve, the reduced threat may make regional nuclear disarmament a more viable option, and China's military relations with Pakistan less of an issue.

Conclusion Mr. Chairman, I last testified before you six months ago. Since then, we have consulted closely with you and other members of the Committee along with many other members of the Senate and House on how best to pursue U.S. interests in South Asia. I appreciate the interest you and they have shown and your commitment to providing the President with the legislative authority he needs to effectively achieve these objectives. I hope the next time I testify, it will be to report on the success of our efforts to advance our vital goals in South Asia, foremost among them halting nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.

(End text) NNNN