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For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is asacred mission, the only task unfulfilled since Muhammad Ali Jinnah's days.Moreover, a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet for the frustrationat home, an instrument for the mobilization of the masses, as well as gainingthe support of the Islamist parties and primarily their loyalists in themilitary and the ISI.

The ISI has a major interest to continue the crisis.Back in the 1970s, Pakistan started to train Sikhs and other Indian separatistmovements as part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's strategy for forward strategicdepth. Pakistan adopted the sponsorship of terrorism and subversion asan instrument to substitute for the lack of strategic depth and early warningcapabilities. The Pakistani sponsored terrorists and the Pakistani intelligenceoperatives in their ranks would be able to warn Pakistan of any impendingIndian invasion, and then launch a guerrilla warfare against the IndianArmy even before it reached the border with Pakistan. Therefore, sponsoringseparatist subversion has become a crucial component of Islamabad's nationalmilitary strategy.

During the 1980s, the ISI completed a vast trainingand support infrastructure for the Afghan resistance that was also usedfor the training and support of other regional groups. There was a correspondingideological development in Indian Kashmir. Since 1984, virtually suddenly,the prevailing popular sentiments in Indian Kashmir was that "Islam isin Danger," and that sentiment, rather than nationalism, began mobilizingthe youth.

The timing of the change was not spontaneous.Hashim Qureshi, the founder of the nationalist JKLF [Jammu Kashmir LiberationFront] recently recalled how "in 1984 ISI Generals and Brigadiers approachedme with the offer: 'get us young people for training from the Valley sothat they could fight India on return.'" When he refused, Qureshi explained,his struggle was taken over by the ISI who installed Amanullah Khan. "Itis tragic that so-called nationalist Amanullah Khan and some of his supportersstarted the present struggle in Kashmir in league with the ISI. A man withcommon intelligence can understand that any movement started in a Muslimmajority area with the help of Pakistani military intelligence will eventuallymean religious struggle." Qureshi stressed that by 1993 "Amanullah provedthat he was an agent of the ISI" having sacrificed the nationalist liberationstruggle in Kashmir on the altar of Islamist politics. Qureshi himselfhad to flee Pakistan and seek political asylum in Western Europe.

Meanwhile, by the late-1980s, with the war inAfghanistan slowing down, the vast network of training camps for AfghanMujahideen was transformed by the ISI into a center of Islamistterrorism throughout south Asia, as well as the melting pot of the worldwide Islamist Jihad. This transformation concurred with an activeISI program "to initiate full-fledged subversion in Kashmir Valley" thatis still escalating. At first, the ISI's assistance to the Kashmiri Islamistswas funnelled through Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i Islami, thusproviding Islamabad with deniability.

Islamabad increases its support for Islamist terrorismin Kashmir because there is a genuine whole hearted commitment to Jihadamong the Kashmiri terrorists and their international volunteers. Moreover,the ISI transformed its major paramilitary command into a major politicalforce as a direct result of their increase of support for terrorism inIndia. Presently, there is a need for a mission use for the ISI's numerouspara-military and Afghan forces, as well as an institutional interest inpreserving the political clout that comes with these operations. Islamabadfinds a task for the ISI's vast Pakistani and Afghan cadres previouslyinvolved in sponsoring the Jihad in Afghanistan but who are nowno longer needed, that would keep them away from domestic politics andpower struggles. Indeed, the escalation of terrorism and subversion sincethe early 1990s is considered a part of the ISI's implementation of a long-termprogram.

Iran considers an escalation in the Jihadfor the liberation of Kashmir a key for the assertion of strategic prominenceof the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, as well as a demonstration of its regionalpower position. In order to expedite the implementation, the Iranians areutilizing a sacred mission, that is, liberating the area of Ayatollah Khomeyni'sroots, as a rallying point. The extent of agitation and indoctrinationof Iranian, Afghan, Kashmiri, Indian/Pakistani and other volunteers inthe special forces and terrorist training camps in Iran makes it impossibleto call off such a Jihad for any reason.

Similarly, the Armed Islamic Movement, as wellas several Saudis, Gulf Arabs, and other supporters of Islamist causes,put Kashmir high on their list of jihads to be fought. Indeed, Kashmiris mentioned in lists of sacred goals recovered in Israel (HAMAS), Algeria(FIS), Sudan, Egypt, to name but a few examples. Kashmir is a high priorityobjective because of the firm belief in the possibility of success. Itis an easy campaign to wage for logistical considerations because of thepresence of numerous cadres and large weapon stockpiles in Afghanistanand Pakistan. AIM's operations are closely coordinated in Tehran and Khartoum.

All of these states and organizations have large,highly trained and well equipped forces. Virtually all of these forceshave not yet been committed to the Kashmiri jihad. The sole attemptfor mass mobilization, in 1992, was stopped by the Pakistani authoritiesfor fear of Indian retaliation. However, Islamabad desperately needs anexternal challenge for its own domestic political reasons, ranging fromdiversion of popular attention away from the domestic collapse to finding"something to do" for the ISI and the military other than meddling in politics.Islamabad would receive massive financial assistance from Iran, Saudisand Gulf Arabs, as was the case during the Afghan war, if there is a jihadto be waged. Kashmir is the only viable option. Moreover, even if Islamabadis reluctant to move, many of the irregulars -- Pakistanis, Afghans, Kashmirisand Arab 'Afghans' -- will eventually start the escalations on their ownwith a nod and a wink from the ISI and the military, thus dragging thesupporting powers -- themselves already bound by their declaratory commitments-- into the rapidly escalating crisis.

Presently, Pakistani officials repeatedly vowto "liberate" Kashmir, or enforce the recognition of "Muslims' rights"in the Valley, even at a risk of a major crisis. This rising militancyof Pakistani officials is far from being empty rhetoric. Islamabad usesthe escalation in Kashmir as a cover for the overall expansion of the terroristtraining and support system for operations in Central Asia and elsewherein the world.

In order to escalate their Islamist Jihad,the ISI established in the early 1990s the Markaz-Dawar, a centerfor world wide Islamist activities. Mulavi Zaki, the center's spiritualleader, told the trainees that their destiny was to fight and liberate"the land of Allah from infidels" wherever they might be. The commandersand instructors are AIM members, primarily Ikhwan from Algeria,Sudan and Egypt. Most of them had fought for more than a decade in Afghanistan.

In early 1992, with world attention paid to theirpresence in Peshawar area, some of these 'Afghans' were transferred toAzzad Kashmir where new camps were being built for them by the PakistaniArmy. By early 1993, there were over 1,000 'Afghan' Mujahideen inthe Markaz-Dawar alone. Following the completion of advance training,they are being sent to Kashmir, Algeria and Egypt.

Since mid 1993, despite Islamabad's claims tothe contrary, the main offices of the Islamist terrorist organizationsremained functioning in Peshawar. The series of "raids" by police sinceOctober 1992 had resulted in the transfer of some of the 200 hard coreterrorists specifically wanted by the West to facilities near Jalalabad,just across the Afghan border. In principle, the reports of mass deportationof 'Afghans' from Peshawar by the Pakistani government were baseless. Inthe fall of 1993, an Arab 'Afghan' with first hand knowledge confirmedthat "Pakistan pushed them out of the door only to open a window for themto return and they come and go as they wish in Peshawar."

In the summer of 1993, the ISI had in the Markaz-Dawaranother force of some 200 Afghans -- mainly Jallalluddin Haqqani's peoplefrom the Khowst area -- that operated under direct ISI command and wereearmarked for special operations in Kashmir. According to Muhammad Fazalal-Hajj, a PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] terroristcaptured in southern Kashmir in the summer of 1993, additional 'Afghans'and Afghans were being prepared by the ISI for the forthcoming escalation.At least 400 'Afghans' and Afghans were known to being organized in onecamp, where they were trained by the ISI to augment and provide qualitycore of leadership for the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. There wasa corresponding expansion of advance preparations of Islamist terroristsfor operations in forward bases in Kashmir. Some 600 terrorists, abouthalf of them veteran 'Afghans' and Afghans, were already at the final phaseof their training.

Ultimately, many Arab volunteers continue to arrivein Peshawar almost every day. The main Ikhwan facility is the Maktaba-i-Khidmatoriginally established by the late Shaykh Abd Allah Azzam and now run byhis successor Shaykh Muhammad Yussaf Abbas. It still processes the volunteersfor AIM. At present, however, many of the volunteers are then dispatchedto the numerous training camps run by Arab 'Afghan' militants inside Afghanistan.The ISI continues to provide the weapons and expertise. In July 1994, SardarAbdul Qayum Khan, the prime minister of Pakistani Azzad Kashmir, acknowledgedthat "there are a number of elements from various nationalities who participatein the Jihad." He identified most of them as "Arab 'Afghans'."

Meanwhile, the Government of Afghanistan alsoincreased its support for terrorist training and preparations. This growingdirect involvement is important because the main operating bases for theISI's operations in Central Asia are in northern Afghanistan. In the aftermathof the fall of Kabul, many Arab 'Afghans' returned to Peshawar where theywere organized by the Pakistani government to support various Islamistcauses in concert with Iran and Sudan. Many of them returned to Afghanistanas quality forces and personal guard details. For example, Ahmad Shah Massudmaintains some 70-80 Arab 'Afghans' in southern Kabul for special tasks,from "help" in political purges to fighting Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar.

In early December 1993, during a state visit toPakistan, the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Maulana Arsalan Rahmani,elaborated on Kabul's perception of the Islamist struggles world wide,and especially in south and central Asia. He hailed Afghanistan's activesupport for Islamist armed causes world wide and stressed that "we don'tconsider this support as intervention in any country's internal affairs."Maulana Arsalan Rahmani admitted that Afghanistan was providing militaryassistance to various insurgencies because "we cannot remain aloof fromwhat is happening to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia,Somalia, Burma, Palestine and elsewhere. ... We are not terrorists butMujahideen fighting for restoring peace and preserving honor."

He acknowledged that Afghanistan also played amajor role in a recent major development among the Islamist organizationsfighting in Indian Kashmir, namely, the merger of the Harakat ul-JihadIslami and Harakat ul-Mujahideen into the potent Harakatul-Ansar. This support for the unity was but part of the active supportgiven by Afghanistan to the Islamist fighters in Kashmir, Tajikistan, andBosnia. "There are about 8,000 members of Harakat ul-Ansar who aresupporting the Kashmiri struggle against Indian occupation," Maulana ArsalanRahmani stated.

In early 1995, the Harakat ul-Ansar wasmaintaining offices in most Pakistani cities, as well as training facilitiesin Afghanistan and Pakistan. It expanded its global reach in support forIslamist causes. "Ours is a truly international network of genuine Muslimholly warriors," explained Khalid Awan, a Pakistani member. "We believefrontiers could never divide Muslims. They are one nation and they willremain a single entity." Harakat ul-Ansar are known to be fightingin Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Tajikistan, and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the ISI continues to provide the terroristswith new weapons. In the summer of 1993, the Kashmiri Mujahideenwere provided with long range and powerful missiles -- Saqr missilesof Afghan War vintage. At that time, the Kashmiri and ISI crews were beingtrained in the use of these missiles in Pakistani Kashmir.

Subsequently, there has been a marked expansionof smuggling of quality weapons from Pakistan into Kashmir as of late 1993.There has been a corresponding change in the terrorists' tactics, introducinghit and run strikes by highly trained and well equipped detachments. Amongthe new weapons now used in Kashmir are 107mm rockets, 60mm mortars, automaticgrenade launchers (Soviet and Chinese models), modification of 57mm helicopterrocket pods with solar-powered sophisticated timing devise for delayedfiring barrages of rockets, and LAW-type tube-launched ATMs (Soviet andChinese models). A threshold was crossed in the spring of 1994, when theISI began providing the Kashmiri Islamists with Stinger SAMs. Indian securityforces captured a Stinger on 30 April 1994.

As of the fall of 1993, the Kashmiri terroristsalso began using sophisticated communication systems including small radios(including systems with frequency hopping, selective broadcast, digitalburst communications, etc.) and collapsible solar-panels for reload systems,as well as frequency scanning devise for detecting and homing on military-typebroadcasting. All the communication systems are of NATO/US origin, withsome components made in Japan.

All of these systems had been used by the Mujahideenin Afghanistan, having been provided via the ISI. There has been a largeincrease in the quantities of small arms provided to the Kashmiris, includingType 56 ARs (PRC AK-47s), several types of machineguns, long-range sniperrifles, pistols and RPGs, all of Soviet and Chinese makes. Some of theKashmiri terrorist began carrying highly specialized weapons such as pen-gunsfor assassinations.

The ISI 'Afghan' and Kashmiri forces also assistthe flow of weapons and expertise to the Sikhs in the Punjab. The mainweapon depots for this new surge in subversion and terrorism are in Baramullaand Kupwara area of the Kashmir Valley, where ISI-trained Sikhs run thedepot. In addition, there is a key depot for the Bhinranwale Tiger Forceof Khalistan in Singhpora. The source of these weapons are two Hizb-ul-Mujahideenofficials known to the Sikhs as Al-Umar and Fiaz Ahmad.

In early 1994, the ISI already had a force of2,000-2,500 highly trained mujahideen assigned for Kashmir, includingKashmiris, Arab 'Afghans' and Afghans. The key force includes 1,000 Pakistani(inc. Pakistani-born Kashmiris), 500 Afghans, as well as numerous Saudis,Egyptians, Sudanese, Algerians, Nigerians, Jordanians/Palestinians andother foreign volunteers. Their main training bases are in Peerpanjal rangearea. By the spring of 1994, when the weather permitted the resumptionof large-scale terrorist operations, the ISI controlled mujahideen,most of them non-Kashmiri 'Afghans', were already firmly in control ofthe escalation. Some of these ISI-mujahideen ultimately operatedas the Al-Mujahideen Force, ostensibly a "Kashmiri grass-roots"force with allegiance to Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan.

In April-May alone, some 400 of these 'Afghans'were infiltrated into Kashmir. Shaykh Jamal-Uddin, an Afghan mujahidrecently captured in Kashmir insists that the ISI-sponsored Islamist forcesalready in Indian Kashmir are larger. "There are several thousand Afghans/'Afghans'in the Valley," he stressed. The ISI-sponsored mujahideen operatemainly under the banners of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Harakat ul-Ansar.Several highly trained Afghans and Sudanese operatives were infiltratedinto the Valley to assume command over key networks of these operations,as well as impose Islamism on the local population.

The summer of 1994 was a fundamental turning pointin the conduct of the Pakistan-sponsored Jihad in Kashmir. The change didnot take place on the battlefield. In order to ensure its tight dominanceover all aspects of the escalating Islamist Jihad in Kashmir, Islamabadorganized the 13 leading Islamist organizations into the United JihadCouncil [Muttahida Jihad Council - MJC] under the leadershipof Commander Manzur Shah, the leader of Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, andunder the tight control of the ISI. Among the member organizations: Harakatul-Ansar, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq,Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin, Tariq-ul-Mujahideen, and all other Islamist militantorganizations. The declared objective of the escalating Jihad isto join Pakistan.

In early June 1994, Commander Manzur Shah declaredthat the sole objective of the escalating Jihad in Kashmir is toincorporate it into Pakistan. "The declarations of all Kashmiri militantorganizations have announced [that] Pakistan is their ideal and goal. ...The freedom fighters will surrender [Kashmir] to the Pakistani militaryand government." Commander Manzur Shah stressed that "the Jihadhas been getting stronger... The Mujahideen are getting organizednow and are attacking the Indian military strategically." He admitted thatIndian Kashmiri Muslim leaders were assassinated or attacked in order toprevent them from reaching an agreement with the Indian government. "WaliMohammed would not have been assassinated and the caravans of Farooq [Abdullah]and Rajesh Pilot would not have been attacked if the climate was conduciveto political action."

Meanwhile, a campaign of assassinations was launchedin order to eliminate the Kashmiri civic leadership that opposed the escalationof the Jihad. On 20 June 1994, Islamist terrorists assassinatedthe Kashmiri scholar Qazi Nissar Ahmad. He was kidnapped a night beforeand pressured to endorse the anti-India Jihad. He refused and waskilled. A key member of the assassination squad was Fayaz Ahmad Mir a.k.a.Abu-Bakr of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Ahmad was the 17th Kashmiri Muslimscholar and civic leader to be assassinated by Islamists for refusing tojoin the anti-India struggle.

Thus, by the fall of 1994, the ISI was alreadysuccessful in consolidating control over the Islamist armed struggle inKashmir. The ISI can now ensure that key operations and major escalationin Kashmir will serve the strategic and political priorities and interestsof Islamabad.

This marked escalation in the ISI's support forthe Islamist insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir is a direct by-productof Pakistan's national security policy and grand strategy. Ms. Bhutto hasrepeatedly emphasized the centrality of the annexation of the entire Kashmirfor the long-term development of Pakistan. The new rail-line that willconnect Karachi and Central Asia must pass through Indian-held Kashmirto be engineeringly and economically effective. Ms. Bhutto's Islamabadconsiders the opening of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan asthe region's gateway to the Indian Ocean as the key to the growth of Pakistan'scommercial activities. Kashmir is also Pakistan's true gateway to the PRCand into Central Asia -- the path of the new Silk Road. And there liesthe future and strategic salvation of Pakistan.

Indeed, Islamabad expresses its support for "theliberation of Kashmir" in more than words. ISI support for Islamist terrorismand subversion in Kashmir continues to grow. In recent months, there hasbeen a noticeable improvement in the professional skills of Islamist terroristsoperating in Kashmir -- the result of the more thorough training receivedin ISI-run camps in Pakistan. The is also an increase in the deploymentof high quality Afghans, Pakistani Kashmiris, and Arab 'Afghans' into IndianKashmir in order to bolster the local terrorist organizations. Increasinglyusing sophisticated and heavy weapons recently supplied by the ISI in Pakistan,these expert terrorists carry out quality operations. The quality of theweapon systems available to the Kashmiri insurgents crossing over fromPakistan also continue to improve. Islamabad is fully aware of the extentof its active support for subversive operations inside India, and considersit a tenet of its regional security policy.

Pakistan knows that the active pursuit of thecurrent Kashmir strategy may lead to an escalation of the face off withIndia. Islamabad is ready to deal with this eventuality while increasingits all out support for the Kashmiris. Indeed, Pakistani officials areraising the ante of Islamabad's Indian strategy. In mid February 1995,a Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that "if India carries out anotheraggression and war breaks out between Pakistan and India, it would notbe a war of a thousand years or even a thousand hours but only a few minutesand India should not be oblivious to the potential devastation." (The "thousandyear war" is a reference to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's statement of the extentof Pakistan's commitment to a struggle with India.) Other Pakistani officialswere quick to clarify the statement. They stressed that the statement "warnedIndia not by implication but in clear terms that the next war will onlylast a few seconds and will bring inconceivable destruction and devastation.This clearly indicates that the Pakistani Government has bravely displayedits nuclear capability." The officials added that "Pakistan is really ina position to strike a heavy blow against India through its nuclear capability."

What is most significant in both the spokesman'sstatement and the subsequent clarifications is their context. The strategiclogic of using the nuclear factor to offset any deficiencies in conventionalmilitary power has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's nuclear strategy.Recently, a more assertive element was first introduced to the nuclearstrategy by Islamist politicians. The overall Pakistani strategic confidencehas been expressed in brinkmanship statements coming out of Islamabad sincethe fall of 1993. For example, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Jamaat i-IslamiChief Senator, urged the Bhutto government "to declare Jihad onIndia to save Kashmir Muslims from total annihilation." There is no otherway to resolve the crisis, he declared. "Let us wage Jihad for Kashmir.A nuclear-armed Pakistan would deter India from a wider conflict," he stressed.Thus, the statement of mid February 1995 confirms that the Bhutto Governmenthas indeed adopted the strategy and policy outlined by the Islamists.

As the spring of 1995 draws near and the weatherimproves, the ISI is about to unleash a new cycle of terrorism and subversion.Considering the extent of the training, preparations, and organizationaleffort invested in the Kashmiri Islamist insurgency during the last fewyears, it is safe to assume that the fighting in the Kashmir will escalatemarkedly in the coming year. Numerous additional highly trained and wellequipped Mujahideen, many of them professional special forces andterrorists, will join the fighting in Kashmir and will even expand thestruggle into the rest of India. They already have in place extensive stockpilesof weapons as well as large sums of money to sustain and support theirJihad. Their primary mission, however, will not be the liberationof Kashmir but rather furthering the strategic interests of Islamabad andTehran.
 

1. Yossef Bodansky is the Directorof the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. Congress,as well as the World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Center for StrategicStudies (Houston TX). He is a contributing editor of Defense and ForeignAffairs; Strategic Policy, the author of three books (Target America,Terror, and Crisis in Korea), several book chapters, and numerousarticles in several periodicals including Global Affairs, JANE's DefenceWeekly,Defense and Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy, Business Week.In the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the Department ofDefense and the Department of State.

The opinions expressed in these articles aresolely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe members of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare,U.S. Congress, or any other branch of the U.S. Government.