PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENTS AND INTERVENTIONS
STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN GENEVA, BEFORE THE FIRST COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE 50TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATION GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 26 OCTOBER 1995,
Mr. Chairman,
At the outset, please accept the sincere felicitations of the Pakistan
delegation on your election to preside over this important Committee. Your
profound knowledge and long experience in the field of disarmament will
contribute immensely to the realization of concrete progress on vital issues
at the 50th Anniversary session.
I would also like to express our high appreciation for the great
competence and skill with which your predecessor, Ambassador Luiz Valencia-Rodriguez
of Ecuador, guided the work of the Committee last year.
Mr. Chairman,
The historic deliberations of our leaders on the occasion of the
50th Anniversary of the United Nations have confirmed the dramatic ways
in which the world has changed in the past few years.
The threat of a global nuclear holocaust has receded over the horizon.
The nuclear arsenals of the two largest nuclear states are being reduced
significantly. The entire southern hemisphere may soon be covered by adjacent
nuclear weapon free zones. The Chemical Weapons Convention may soon come
into force. The NPT has been extended indefinitely and gained ever wider
adherence. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may be around the corner. There
is hope that the world will soon be a safer place.
But the threat to world peace, the possibility of catastrophe, have
not been eliminated. The dangerous stability of "mutual assured destruction"
has been replaced by a less fearsome, but more uncertain and unstable multipolar
world; a world in rapid transition to an unknown destination. The end of
the Cold War has released long-repressed national and ethnic aspirations
and precipitated festering disputes in various regions. The quest for global
domination and regional hegemony still inspires the policies of some states.
Mr. Chairman,
Under these circumstances, disarmament measures, nuclear and conventional,
global and regional, are more essential than ever before. As stipulated
in the Final Document of this Assembly's first Special Session on Disarmament,
the lead must be taken, by "the states with the largest military arsenals
and other militarily significant states". And the first priority must
continue to be accorded to nuclear disarmament.
In the post Cold War era, nuclear disarmament is both more feasible
and, at the same time, imperative. The nuclear powers do not need nuclear
weapons to defend themselves against each other or they certainly do not
need them against the non-nuclear weapon states. But, if nuclear weapons
are retained, the world will have to develop a complex system of multipolar
deterrence, where the danger of miscalculation and accident would be much
greater than in the bipolar deterrence of the Cold War. It is important
for the world community to act now, while there are no strategic confrontations
among the five nuclear powers, to ban nuclear weapons and agree on a specific
programme for their phased reduction and eventual elimination.
The argument that significant reductions are being made by the United
States and the Russian Federation is not sufficient reason to avoid multilateral
action --- for nuclear disarmament. Even after the agreed reductions under
START II --- once it is ratified by both parties --- the 3000 nuclear warheads
retained by each side will be sufficient to destroy the world several times
over. We are also disturbed that while downsizing their nuclear arsenals,
the nuclear weapon states are upgrading them qualitatively. They have argued
boldly that they will keep their nuclear weapons in operational readiness
against unknown threats. These are the ingredients of a future disaster.
Pakistan believes that the international community should take the
following steps:
One, secure solemn and binding commitments from the nuclear weapon
states that they will never use their nuclear weapons and that they will
progressively reduce and eventually eliminate them;
Two, as proposed by the recent Non-Aligned Summit, commence negotiations
within the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of priority, on an international
convention for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their phased reduction
and eventual elimination within a specific-time frame. This was envisaged
in paragraph 50, sub-para c of the Final Document of SSODI.
Mr. Chairman,
Pakistan has advocated the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty for over 30 years as a means of halting the qualitative improvement
of nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation. For Pakistan, and
indeed for most of the world, it has always been self-evident that a nuclear
test ban should be total and complete since any loophole could be exploited
to defeat the purpose of the prohibition. Yet, over two years of negotiations
in the CD, the nuclear weapon states have argued that an exception be made
for so called "safety and reliability tests". Separate talks
were held among the five nuclear weapon states to agree on the "threshold"
of such tests, ranging from a few kilograms to hundreds of kilotons. We
are happy that France, the United States and the United Kingdom have declared
their acceptance of a zero yield CTBT which would prohibit any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other explosion. China has long-proposed a
"no energy release" ban on nuclear explosion tests.
Yet, the fact is that, so far, there is no agreement on the central
issue of the "scope" of a CTBT. The US, France and the United
Kingdom had declared their support for the Australian formulation on the
scope of the CTBT before and after their acceptance of the "zero"
yield ban. Therefore, a question remains whether the Australian formula,
which has gathered considerable support, is sufficiently comprehensive
to ensure against the conduct of nuclear testing in ways that are technically
excluded from the test ban or are simply undetectable.
Apart from the CTBT's scope, there are a large number of issues on
which difficult negotiations lie ahead specially the CTBT's verification
regime. Pakistan supports an effective, non-discriminatory and non-selective
international verification system which would create equal access, rights
and obligations for all States Parties. We believe that the International
Monitoring System, the procedures for on-site inspections and the use of
National Technical Means must be evolved within the framework of these
principles which are widely endorsed in the CD. On-site inspections should
be rare, non-intrusive, effective and cost-efficient. We are opposed to
the use of so-called NTMs which are not part of the recognized monitoring
network since these would erode the credibility of the International Monitoring
System and they may amount to endorsing questionable external interference
in the sovereign affairs of states.
Pakistan shares the sentiment that we should seek the earliest possible conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. We shall participate positively to realize this. But the Treaty must secure a genuine consensus on the outstanding issues.
Mr. Chairman,
While considerable progress was made in the CD this year in the test
ban negotiations, the Conference could not undertake work on the other
issues on its agenda. On 6 April 1995, speaking in the CD, I stated inter
alia; "we must seriously consider whether the linkages that were created
between various issues constitute a precedent or a practice that will advance
the work of this Conference in future". Subsequently, when the Group
of 21 insisted on the establishment of a negotiating mechanism on nuclear
disarmament as part of the "package", the early proponents of
'linkage' became disenchanted with this negotiating device which has now
been described as a "formula for paralysis".
No state or group should seek to impose their unilateral position
on the rest of the CD's membership. All the items on the CD's agenda must
be addressed in a balanced manner reflecting the global priorities.
Mr. Chairman,
Much have been said here and elsewhere about fissile materials issue.
As originally proposed by Canada, and endorsed for years by the General
Assembly, the objective was to halt the production of fissile materials
and gradually reduce stockpiles, thus serving the goals of both non-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament. Freezing nuclear stockpiles at their present unequal
levels will not serve either goal. To freeze such disparity is not only
unfair, it could be dangerous in certain regions of the world. There are
many other problems e.g. uncontrolled or loosely controlled stockpiles
and disposal of fissionable material released from dismantled nuclear weapons,
which a simple cut-off will not address.
Despite these concerns, Pakistan accepted the establishment of an
ad hoc Committee on the basis of Ambassador Shannon's report - since it
does not prejudge the scope of the fissile materials Convention. We look
forward to commencing work on this subject as soon as possible, together
with work on other issues on the CD's agenda. We continue to hope that
our concerns regarding the scope of the fissile material treaty, concerns
will evoke a more positive response from the proponents of the cut-off.
Mr. Chairman,
It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to
re-establish the ad hoc Committee on security assurances this year. It
is equally regrettable that the CD - the single multilateral negotiating
body on disarmament - was excluded from the consideration of resolution
984 of the Security Council offering positive and negative assurances to
non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. The resolution is inconsistent
with the UN Charter. The right of individual and collective self-defence
is available to every state, not only to states parties to the NPT or any
other Treaty. The Charter offers assistance to all states, both through
and outside the Security Council in case they are subjected to the use
of force or aggression, with nuclear weapons or other weapons. In any event,
resolution 984 does not offer real security even to the states to which
it is addressed. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will undertake
serious negotiations, next year, to conclude an international convention
extending categorical, unconditional and universal assurances to all non-nuclear
weapon states.
It is unfortunate that CD has been able to address the issue of conventional
weapons only in the context of transparency. We believe that a supply side
approach is unlikely to promote the goals of conventional arms control
and international stability. One sided control on the transfer of arms
cannot redress the imbalance within sensitive regions of the world. Discriminatory
embargoes have in many cases enhanced the threat to peace, accentuated
the danger of proliferation and frustrated initiatives for disarmament
and non-proliferation. Conventional arms control must address the root
causes of insecurity, emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions.
Conventional arms control must seek to promote balance and security among
all the regional states concerned. We hope that the CD will find it possible
to evolve such a comprehensive approach to promote conventional arms control
and disarmament in future.
Pakistan has consistently supported the desire of a number of States
to assume membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We were prepared
to accept the 23 countries proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan for membership
in 1993. We would have hoped that instead of the two-stage process evolved
painstakingly by the CD President, the Ambassador of Morocco, the Conference
would have immediately admitted the 23 States. We hope this will happen
at the start of the 1996 session. Pakistan cannot endorse any procedure
which would seek to impose limitations on the rights and obligations of
CD membership on one or more of the 23 States.
Mr. Chairman,
Pakistan has participated actively in the work of the Group of governmental
experts on land mines and the First Review Conference of the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons. The millions of indiscriminately used
mines threaten civilian populations in over 60 countries. There must be
a global commitment to remove these mines, specially those in the developing
countries. We are disappointed that the Vienna Conference adjourned without
success in amending the land-mines protocol. The progress made was insufficient.
However, the understandings reached during the last few days of the Conference
provide a sound basis for completing the Protocol when the Conference resumes
next year.
Mr. Chairman,
We have also participated in the ad hoc Group (of Experts) of States
Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention. We believe that the difficulties
involved in devising a verification regime for the BW Convention, which
may involve intrusive on-site inspections, are well recognized. The mandate
of the group can be fulfilled through systematic work to progressively
establish objective criteria and a practical approach for the verification
of various substances as well as the implementation of the Convention's
provisions for scientific and technological cooperation.
Mr. Chairman,
Pakistan endorses the significance of the decision adopted by the
NPT Review Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The manner in
which this decision was achieved, and the failure of the Conference, for
the third time, to adopt an agreed Final Document reviewing the operation
of the Treaty, are indications of the fragility of the consensus upon which
observance of the Treaty rests. The indefinite extension of the NPT cannot
imply the indefinite division of the world into two classes of states -
nuclear and non-nuclear.
Pakistan believes that the NPT is a factor for international stability.
We are glad that the Treaty has been extended. This does not imply that
we can overlook the discriminatory character of the Treaty. And, in view
of our security concerns which arise principally from threats within our
region, Pakistan cannot accede to the NPT unilaterally.
Mr. Chairman,
South Asia has been described as the most dangerous place in the
world. This Committee is well aware of the efforts made by Pakistan ever
since 1972 - when former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called for
the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia - to hold back
nuclear proliferation in our region. Despite this, Pakistan was consistently
subjected to discriminatory restraints and pressure. The entire Pakistani
nation has demonstrated its firm determination to resist and reverse such
discriminatory measures.
As in other regions of the world, the cardinal guiding principle
for the promotion of stability in South Asia must be balance and symmetry.
A solution to the dilemma of peace and security in South Asia can be promoted
by addressing, simultaneously and integrally, three inter-related issues:
One, a solution to the underlying disputes and causes of tension
between Pakistan and India, first and foremost, the Kashmir dispute. The
suppression of the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination must be halted
and an effective modality found to promote a genuine dialogue to resolve
this 'core' issue justly and peacefully in accordance with the resolutions
of the Security Council.
Two, agreements on conventional arms control and confidence building measures. Pakistan has proposed:
- a mutually agreed ratio of forces between itself and India;
- steps to ensure against a surprise attack;
- adoption of agreed principles for arms control in the region.
Three, mutually acceptable non-proliferation arrangements. Pakistan's
proposals for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, for simultaneous
acceptance of the NPT or of comprehensive safeguards have not been accepted
by our neighbor so far. We hope they will eventually find acceptance. Meanwhile,
it seems necessary to explore equitable, non-discriminatory and acceptable
ways and means to promote mutual restraint in South Asia and avoid a disastrous
arms race, conventional or non-conventional.
In this context, Pakistan is deeply concerned about the impending
threat posed by the planned production and deployment of ballistic missiles
against Pakistan. This fateful step, once taken, will transform an already
tense situation in South Asia into a hair-trigger security environment.
Pakistan will be obliged to take appropriate steps to respond to this new
and qualitatively enhanced threat to its security. We suggest, once again,
consideration of our proposal to create a Zero Missile Zone in South Asia.
Last year, the United States proposed multilateral talks on security,
arms control and non-proliferation in South Asia. The comprehensive approach
of the US proposal offers a realistic mechanism to address the inter-linked
security problems of South Asia. We hope the US proposal will be promoted
actively and accepted by all the proposed participants.
Mr. Chairman,
The prospects of peace and security in our region are strongly inter-twined with the evolution of a stable structure of international peace and security, based on the principles of the UN Charter, on just solutions to conflicts and disputes, on balanced arms control and general and complete disarmament. Pakistan will participate actively in the Assembly, in the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies together with other member states, to build such a new, just and durable structure of international peace and security.
For further information please contact the Press Section at:
Pakistan Mission, 8 East 65th Street, New York NY 10021.
Tel: (212) 879.8600 or E-Mail: pakistan@undp.org
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