[Page S3510] Mr. PRESSLER From The New York Times, Mar. 23, 1994 South Asian Lands Pressed on Arms OPPOSITION ON CAPITOL HILL PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES INCENTIVES FOR ARMS CURBS [Page S3511] From the Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1994 The United States Proposes Sale of F-16's To Pakistan From the Washington Times, Mar. 23, 1994 Pakistan Nuke Cap Might Win Arms The Reuter Transcript Report--Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, March 23, 1994 [Page S3512]
[Page: S3510]
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, the Clinton administration has announced that it wishes to lift the restriction on aid to Pakistan on a one-time basis and deliver F-16 aircraft to that country. As my colleagues may know, such aid is now prohibited under the so-called Pressler amendment, a law which says that Pakistan cannot receive military or certain other forms of aid so long as the President fails to certify that the country does not have a nuclear explosive device.
I am very much opposed to the Clinton administration's proposal because I think it will both increase nuclear proliferation and escalate the arms race in that part of the world. India will respond by seeking additional fighter aircraft.
I find it very strange that an administration committed to nuclear nonproliferation would seek to achieve that goal by delivering aircraft that can deliver a nuclear bomb to another country.
I am strongly opposed to the Clinton administration's plan. I hope the administration reverses itself. I think we need to reflect very carefully on the history of this amendment. It was passed in the mid-1980's with the support of Pakistan. At that time Pakistan said they did not have a nuclear bomb nor were they developing such a weapon. In the early 1990's, President Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon, and aid--including the sale of military weapons--was cut off. Any renewal of assistance, including a one-time exemption, would require congressional approval.
I could perhaps see some logic if the administration were going to substitute renewal of some other kind of aid in exchange for Pakistan putting a cap on its nuclear weapons. However, make no mistake. I would seriously question even that type of approach. Unfortunately, all the administration seems to be seeking from Pakistan is an agreement not to build any more nuclear weapons. In exchange, Pakistan gets the F-16's with which they can deliver a nuclear bomb against India.
This would be disastrous for a region that has already endured numerous wars and conflicts. It would mean increased proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in that region of the world. In addition it would set an extremely bad precedent.
Our CIA has said--and this has been published in the newspapers--that the existence of the Pressler amendment has played a role in causing Egypt, South Africa, and Brazil to abandon their nuclear weapons programs due to the consequences in Washington. This is the only law that exists on nuclear nonproliferation that has any teeth. If Congress were to repeal the Pressler amendment--even by granting a so-called one-time waiver--it would send a very encouraging signal to every other nation contemplating a nuclear weapons program.
It appears President Clinton and Vice President Gore have not focused on this issue. I say this because the administration's new proposal runs contrary to everything they said in their campaign. It astounds me that this administration, at least the Departments of State, Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is proposing to make this change.
I believe this process is to a great extent being driven by a desire on the part of the manufacturer to keep the production line hot and build more F-16's. I understand there are strong arguments for creating employment opportunities for people in various parts of the country. However, there are other much cheaper ways to achieve this goal without destabilizing entire regions of the world and encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to place additional material in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, March 8, 1994.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I would like to request five minutes at your earliest convenience to discuss nuclear non-proliferation policy.
Despite repeated assurances from members of your Administration, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, I have heard from several sources within the Administration about an attempt to grant an exception to the Pressler amendment. As you may recall, the Pressler amendment prohibits aid to Pakistan unless the President certifies annually that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.
Mr. President, I seek a meeting with you to underscore the importance of retaining the only nuclear non-proliferation law in force currently. I would appreciate having a meeting of no more than five minutes, which can occur in your office, or during a morning run. Should such a meeting prove impossible to schedule, I will raise this issue the next time I am at the White House, or if you should visit the Senate. While I would rather not raise this issue in such a public setting, I think it is critical for the Administration to send a consistent signal about the importance of nuclear non-proliferation.
Sincerely,
Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator.
From The New York Times, Mar. 23, 1994
South Asian Lands Pressed on Arms
Washington, March 22: Worried about an arms race between Pakistan and India, the Clinton Administration is proposing a series of agreements to stop the production of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the deployment of ballistic missiles, Administration officials said today.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott plans to press the arms control efforts when he visits India and Pakistan next month, the officials said.
While American officials have long been concerned about the nuclear programs of Pakistan and India, Washington's arms control efforts have acquired a new urgency because of advances in the two sides' nuclear and missile programs.
According to American intelligence reports, India will soon field new surface-to-surface missiles and Pakistan is also developing a new missile with help from China.
OPPOSITION ON CAPITOL HILL
But a key element of the Administration's plan could face stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. As an opening move, the Administration is offering to deliver to Pakistan F-16' jet fighters that have been blocked by Congressional legislation, if Pakistan agrees in return to accept a verifiable ban on production of nuclear material for nuclear weapons. When the White House raised that idea on Capitol Hill recently it met with a mixed reception.
And all experts agree that negotiating the accord would require overcoming difficult political issues in both Pakistan and India, particularly in light of Washington's currently strained relations with New Delhi.
The Administration's effort also comes as Pakistan and India have continued to differ over Kashmir and are proceeding with weapons programs, including the development of missiles.
`India and Pakistan have the ability to move rather quickly to deploy nuclear weapons and are moving fast to deploy longer-range missiles,' said Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs.
PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES
Washington is proposing several steps to restrain the arms race. One is an agreement by India and Pakistan banning the deployment of surface-to-surface missiles, which would give each side the ability to launch nuclear strikes rapidly.
Another is a set of separate proposals to Pakistan and India that they agree to stop producing nuclear material for nuclear weapons and agree to international inspections to determine that they are keeping their pledge.
That would still leave the two countries with small nuclear arsenals, but officials say that `capping' each side's nuclear potential is a far more realistic step than trying to immediately negotiate the elimination of each side's nuclear weapons stocks, which would, however, would remain the ultimate goal.
The Administration also wants to establish a multinational forum to consider ways to build confidence between the two sides and reduce tensions.
INCENTIVES FOR ARMS CURBS
To persuade India and Pakistan to agree to ban the production of bombgrade materials for nuclear weapons, the Clinton Administration is offering various incentives.
In the case of Pakistan the administration is offering to deliver weapons Islamabad purchased but never received because of the Congressional restrictions on aid to Pakistan, including F-16 fighters and P-3 anti-submarine warfare planes.
Legislation sponsored by Senator Larry Pressler, the South Dakota Republican, and adopted in 1985 bans military aid to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons, Because of advances in the Pakistani nuclear program, the White House has been unable to make that certification for the last four years.
Administration officials say the Pakistani military wants the F-16's because its Air Force's planes are getting older. But experts say that letting international inspectors visit will be a difficult political hurdle for the Pakistani Government.
The Clinton Administration is calculating that Congress will support a `one-time' exception to the Pressler amendment if an agreement can be reached with Islamabad that would ban the production of nuclear material.
Whether lawmakers would agree is unclear. Senator Pressler has expressed alarm at the proposal. But Representative Lee H. Hamilton, the Indiana Democrat who heads the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has argued that the Pressler amendment has failed to slow the Pakistani program and should be replaced with a broader strategy.
[Page: S3511]
From the Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1994
The United States Proposes Sale of F-16's To Pakistan
The Clinton administration wants to give Pakistan new F-16 fighter planes in exchange for proof that the country has capped its nuclear weapons program, Undersecretary of State Lynn E. Davis said yesterday.
The proposal would require U.S. lawmakers to take the politically difficult step of exempting the F-16 warplanes from a congressional ban on U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan that took effect in 1990 after the country built its own nuclear bomb.
Some arms control experts and congressional aides have raised questions about the plan, saying it could effectively reward Pakistan for flouting U.S. warnings not to develop nuclear weaponry and also may wind up provoking India to purchase more advanced weapons of its own to offset the Pakistani warplane purchase.
But the Clinton administration is portraying the proposed $658 million sale of 38 F-16s to Pakistan as a first step in a new diplomatic strategy aimed to getting around the long-standing nuclear stalemate between India and Pakistan. U.S. officials worry that the two arch-enemies might soon deploy new ballistic missiles capable of hurling nuclear warheads at each other.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott plans to present the new U.S. plan to Islamabad and New Delhi during a two-day visit to each city next month, Davis told reporters at a breakfast meeting.
`The basic premise is that you have to have something worthwhile for the Pakistanis to pursue this,' a State Department official said on condition he not be named. `You have to start out with something' that eases Pakistan's military anxieties and improves its ability to compete with superior Indian forces.
Davis and other U.S. officials said that under the new strategy, Pakistan would get the new warplanes only if it accepts international inspections of key nuclear facilities, proving to India and other nations it is no longer making highly enriched uranium for nuclear arms.
India would then be asked to accept similar inspections at nuclear reactors capable of making plutonium for nuclear arms.
These moves, officials said, are meant to defuse tensions growing out of mutual suspicion about nuclear weapons development programs. Proving that both nations have halted production would be `a first step toward the reduction and elimination' of these weapons at a later date, Davis said.
Additionally, both India and Pakistan will be asked to take part in new regional security discussions involving all five declared nuclear powers as well as Japan and Germany.
They also will be asked to sign a ban on nuclear tests and an agreement barring any ballistic missile deployments. But the proposed warplane sale to Pakistan--which has been aggressively promoted in Washington by the F-16's manufacturer, General Dynamics Corp: would not be conditioned on these promises, just the nuclear inspections.
Officials said the strategy reflects an administration decision that its policy of low-visibility, patient diplomacy in the Asian subcontinent has not made enough headway. They said Washington has chosen to pursue a higher-profile effort to try to fend off potential deployments of the new Indian and Pakistani missiles later this year.
Washington is not considering offering India any reward such as F-16s to gain its participation, and some officials predicted that Talbott will encounter significant resistance there. `Maybe they think they can get it for free, because we are not aware of any programs [such as the F-16] for India,' said an Indian diplomat.
Said Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), the sponsor of the legislation that blocked military sales to Pakistan: `I feel very strongly it would be a mistake to * * * have a one-time lifting of the amendment.'
Several arms control experts who criticized the proposal noted that last March when lawmakers asked Gordon Oehler, the CIA's top expert on proliferation matters, which weapons systems Pakistan might use to deliver its nuclear weapons, Oehler replied, `Our best judgment right now would be the F-16s.'
But a senior U.S. official said that in response to congressional criticism, `we will find ways to verify' that the F-16s are not modified for that purpose. The official added that as of now, `we're not sure how' this might be accomplished.
From the Washington Times, Mar. 23, 1994
Pakistan Nuke Cap Might Win Arms
The Clinton administration wants Pakistan to cap its nuclear weapons program in exchange for a one-time exemption from the congressional ban on U.S. military aid, Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis said yesterday.
If Pakistan accepts the deal, the administration will ask Congress to lift the Pressler Amendment and allow the delivery of F-16 fighters that Pakistan purchased from the United States, she said.
Delivery was held up by the 1985 congressional dictum that blocks all but humanitarian aid unless the U.S. government can certify Pakistan is not producing a nuclear bomb, something U.S. officials have been unable to do since 1990.
Miss Davis told a breakfast meeting of reporters that getting Pakistan to cap its nuclear program is part of an effort to stem nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
The proposal is for a one-time exception to the military aid ban with the goal of getting Pakistan to cap production of atomic materiel in a manner that could be verified, said Miss Davis, who heads the administration's nonproliferation efforts as undersecretary for international security affairs.
Pakistan and India are longtime rivals that have advanced nuclear programs. U.S. officials are concerned about long-standing friction between the two neighbors, and they hope to get Pakistan to take a first step to calm the situation.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is traveling to Pakistan and India next month and will discuss the issue with both countries, officials said.
Administration officials say the ban on military aid has failed to keep Pakistan from attaining nuclear capability and that a new approach is needed to halt the growth of regional nuclear programs and roll them back.
The plan would not require Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program, but simply not to move beyond current production.
U.S. officials see the F-16s, for which Pakistan has paid, as a carrot that could advance the policy.
Miss Davis said State Department officials are sounding out Congress to see whether there would be support if Pakistan agreed to the plan. They received some positive response.
But Sen. Larry Pressler, South Dakota Republican and author of the 1985 legislation, opposes the administration's proposal.
President Clinton has told the United Nations that stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a top priority.
The Reuter Transcript Report--Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, March 23, 1994
Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD). Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and this question is related to nuclear non-proliferation. It ties into Russia in the end, but it--I have been concerned, and I saw in this morning's paper that you, Mr. Talbott, will be leading the delegation to India and Pakistan regarding a one-time lifting of the prohibition on aid there to deliver the F-16s to Pakistan. And I can appreciate very much your desire to try to open more talks up there, but I think that is a--that is a very bad first step. The secretary of state and you both pledged here that you would not attempt to repeal that amendment, but--the secretary of state did in particular--but I view a one-time exemption to it to deliver the F-16s would be--would gut the amendment and would leave us in a situation that we'd be much worse off. And I might ask for your response to that.
But let me say that it seems contrary to the positions President Clinton and Al Gore have taken on non-proliferation because the--according to what's been published in this morning's paper, that our intelligence people have said that the F-16 would be the delivery vehicle for a bomb if Pakistan were to use its bomb. And it seems passing strange to me that if the administration is going to offer something, some exemption, it wouldn't be some area of aid or something or this sort rather than the F-16s.
Somebody has been very determined to get the F-16s delivered, whether it's the state of Texas or General Dynamics or Lockheed or whoever. I certainly don't see any conspiracy here, but for some time now there have been--maneuvering around to get the rest of them built and delivered and paid for. But I think that this would increase the arms race in that region, it would not really do anything--
This amendment is the only piece of non-proliferation legislation that has ever made it into law, and it seems passing strange that the Clinton-Gore administration would seek to essentially gut this with this effort.
If there were going to be something to be negotiated, perhaps it could be aid. I'm not suggesting that that would be acceptable. But the whole thing seems out of context with the things that you stand for in non-proliferation with Russia and so forth. What is going on here?
Mr. Talbott. Well, Senator Pressler, let me try to put it as much into context as I can. And I do this acutely aware that this is a subject that you and I have talked about for the past month or so in connection with my own courtesy call on you and, I believe, in open session as well.
I assure you that gutting either the Pressler amendment or our non-proliferation agenda is exactly the opposite of what the administration has in mind here--in fact, quite the contrary. We see the Pressler amendment, which I stress will remain in force, which will remain very much a part of American law, as an important and positive instrument to use in accomplishing our non-proliferation goals for the Indian subcontinent.
When I came--I hope it's all right for me to try to summarize one exchange between the two of us when I came and spoke to you in your office. And I've--I appreciated your being able to see me that day. You made clear that you do not see the Pressler amendment as an anti-Pakistan measure or directed against Pakistan per se, you see it as a means of advancing the goal of non-proliferation, and that's the way we see it, too. Our intention here would be to use the leverage that we have because of your amendment in order to try to achieve a verifiable cap on Pakistan's nuclear weapons material production, in return for which we would seek approval by Congress for some relief for Pakistan from some legislative sanctions. And that would include the F-16s that Pakistan has already paid for.
I am just beginning now, Senator Pressler, to prepare for my trip to the subcontinent, and if you would permit and if your schedule allows it, I would like very much to come by at some point in the next week or so and talk to you about this in detail. Obviously, there are several features of this which will be feasible only if we have the necessary support from the United States Congress. This is a classic example of where we need to work in partnership with each other.
Senator Pressler. Well, let me say that I think that--it--it's--well, it's been the opinion of our intelligence people, it's been printed in the papers that Egypt, Brazil, and South Africa all backed off their nuclear programs in part because of fears of trouble from Washington as--as a result of this amendment, that it's had a broader impact than just there. Also, it was not an anti-Pakistan thing at the beginning; indeed, Pakistan supported it strongly in this room when Alan Cranston had another amendment that would have cut aid off immediately, and they said `We're not building a bomb
anyways,' And this was the mid-1980s, and in the early 1990s the Bush administration certified that they did have a bomb in violation of it. So it didn't start off to be an anti-Pakistan thing, but I think it has slowed the arms race down in that region.
But it seems the logic of saying that since Pakistan still has its bomb and the amendment has not been effective, the logic of delivering F-16s, a delivery vehicle for the bomb, in some sort of a settlement, it seems very ironic. If the administration were proposing a one-time lifting of aid or something of that sort, it would be more consistent with this administration's stated non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and--and nuclear weapons. The whole thing seems to be delivered by a great desire to build the remaining F-16s, get them paid for and delivered than it does anything else. And that concerns me a great deal, because I can't follow the logic of how delivering a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle to a country that has a bomb is going to somehow slow the arms race down there. That is my logic.
Mr. Talbott. I'm reluctant to get too deeply into this both because of the sensitivity of the issue and also because I am beginning now preparations for this trip. But I'm sure that the last point that you make is very much on--I know that the last point that you make is very much on the minds of my colleagues: that is, looking for some way to ensure that we don't inadvertently create new problems in terms of delivery systems in the way that we address the problem of nuclear weapons per se.
But I do assure you that the motive is one of high policy, and the policy is one that you clearly support, and that is trying to bring about a verifiable and comprehensive non-proliferation regime on the subcontinent. But if you would permit me to come and talk to you about this, I would be grateful.
Senator Pressler. Okay, fine. Let me ask about the--about Russia's sale of conventional arms or arms of any sort. How much hard currency are they making from it, and are they increasing or decreasing their sales?
Mr. Talbott. The short answer is that they are--they have decreased their sales significantly from the Soviet period. Nonetheless, Russian arms sales remain a subject of intense and sometimes difficult discussion with them and will for a long time to come. The dilemma is the following.
During the Soviet period in the Cold War, Russia--the Soviet Union--used conventional arms sales as an instrument of its foreign policy, which is to say, an instrument of its political and ideological struggle with the United States. It was--they were pieces that they played on the board of the zero-sum game in the rivalry with the United States. That is, they went out of their way to arm our enemies, as it were.
That is no longer the driving motivation. The motivation now is that Russia is trying desperately to make hard currency in any way it can. It doesn't have a great deal that it can sell in international markets, but it does--has inherited from the Soviet Union a considerable arms industry.
Our effort--and it's going to take time to accomplish it--is to do two things: first of all, defense conversion so that plants which are now making weapons will make items for the civilian sector--and I know that that was a subject that Secretary Perry raised when he was in Moscow--and the other is to get Russia in as many ways as possible to adopt responsible export control policies.
[Page: S3512]
END
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
