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Title:  "India, Pakistan Must Reduce Proliferation Threat, Says Official." Speaking during a USIA WORLDNET television dialogue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn reviewed US policy on nuclear non-proliferation and export controls, saying that India and Pakistan should not wait to resolve regional disputes prior to taking important steps to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. (931124)

Author:  MANDINE MURPHY, ROSALIND (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date:  19931124

Text:
*NEA307

11/24/93 *

INDIA, PAKISTAN MUST REDUCE PROLIFERATION THREAT, SAYS OFFICIAL (Robert Einhorn reviews U.S. policy on WorldNet) (1220) By Rosalind Mandine Murphy USIA Staff Writer Washington -- India and Pakistan should not wait to resolve regional disputes, such as in Kashmir, prior to taking important steps to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Robert J. Einhorn said November 24.

Einhorn reviewed U.S. policy on nuclear non-proliferation and export controls during a USIA WorldNet television dialogue with participants in New Delhi and Islamabad.

U.S. policy on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia seeks "to cap, then to reduce, and eventually eliminate from the region weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery capability," Einhorn said. Obstacles in the way of these goals, however, require a "realistic" course of action, he noted.

"The levels of mutual distrust, underlying political differences, threat perceptions that extend beyond the region itself, as well as domestic constraints, all place important impediments to very rapid movement towards these goals," Einhorn said.

Moreover, the United States recognizes "that if we are to...achieve our ambitious objectives for mutual security and arms control in South Asia, it will be necessary to tackle some of the important differences that divide the two countries (India and Pakistan), including Kashmir," he said.

But he stressed that regional disputes should not be allowed to stand in the way of making some progress on nuclear non-proliferation. There are "a number of steps that can be taken, even while -- hopefully -- the two sides work in tandem to resolve some of the most difficult problems that have plagued the relationship for decades," Einhorn said.

These steps include: joining a comprehensive nuclear test ban, joining a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, and ratifying the chemical weapons convention. It is equally important, Einhorn added, that India and Pakistan "avoid an impending competition in ballistic missiles."

Einhorn said the United States is "encouraged by the responses that we received to some of these ideas" during bilateral discussions held with India and Pakistan in September. However, he stressed, "bilateral talks with the United States are not enough" to achieve real progress.

He urged that India and Pakistan "engage one another directly, and at a high level." The United States is encouraged, he said, by the recent meeting in Cyprus between the foreign ministers of Pakistan and India.

To foster this dialogue, the United States has proposed the establishment of a "multilateral forum with India, Pakistan, and other countries that could assist them in this process of achieving greater stability in South Asia," Einhorn said.

"The United States will do whatever it can to assist the countries directly concerned; we will try to be a catalyst," he said. He noted that the United States "would be willing to assist the parties to verify any arrangements that they can work out -- bilaterally and even in a broader context."

Einhorn was questioned closely on specific aspects of U.S. policy towards nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, including export controls, sanctions, the reprocessing of nuclear fuels, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Pressler Amendment.

He stressed that the Pressler Amendment "is the law of the land" and that the United States is "required to implement that law."

(The Pressler Amendment requires the U.S. President to certify annually that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and ties U.S. assistance to this certification. The United States cut economic and military aid to Pakistan in 1990 in accordance with the Pressler Amendment.

The United States hopes "that Pakistan will soon find it is in its own interest to meet the requirements of the Pressler law," Einhorn said. Meeting the certification requirements "will enable us to resume the kind of cooperation that the United States and Pakistan have historically carried out."

"The resumption of this kind of cooperation, will be very much in Pakistan's security interest," he added.

Einhorn underscored the Clinton administration's full support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He noted that the United States seeks "universal adherence to the NPT," including India and Pakistan. However, he added, "We don't believe India would be prepared to join this treaty in the near future." India successfully tested its first nuclear device in 1974.

"Therefore, we believe, to be practical and to achieve tangible benefits in the near term, we should focus on other kinds of measures," such as a nuclear test ban and constraints on ballistic missile development. "That is not to say we have forsaken the NPT," he stressed.

On the matter of sanctions against the Indian Space Research Organization, Einhorn said the United States has offered a proposal aimed at lifting the sanctions. The proposal asks India to commit itself "to observe the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," he said. He noted that because India "already practices a responsible policy towards missile technology exports," the United States believes India should have no difficulty agreeing to this request.

The United States has also asked India to agree to freeze the technology transfer of rocket engines fueled by cryogenic fuels from Russia, a request the Russians have already agreed to, he said.

"We would like to resume and even expand space cooperation with India. But India owes us a response to the proposal we made a few months ago. We hope we will get a response. We hope it will be favorable," he said.

Einhorn made clear U.S. opposition to the reprocessing of civilian nuclear fuels to extract weapons-grade plutonium by India and Pakistan.

"We don't encourage any state in any part of the world to engage in reprocessing. We think that reprocessing is particularly dangerous in areas of the world where there are instabilities and where there are ongoing nuclear weapons programs, and that includes South Asia," he said.

Einhorn called the issue of reprocessing fuel from India's Tarapur water reactors "controversial" because of differing legal interpretations of the rights over the disposition of the fuel. India, he noted, "does not share the legal interpretation that U.S. consent rights over that fuel remain" even beyond the expiration date of the (1963 Tarapur) agreement."

The United States does "not favor the reprocessing of that Tarapur fuel," he said. India and the United States "are just going to have to find a mutually acceptable way around this problem," he said.

Asked about the possibility of Pakistan acquiring reprocessing materials, Einhorn questioned whether there is a legitimate civil energy use for reprocessing in Pakistan. "I am dubious of that," he said.

On the question of export controls, Einhorn noted that the United States does not have a blanket prohibition on dual-use technology transfer. The United States does transfer technology that has military application "when we are confident that those technologies will not be diverted to those military uses," he said.

The Clinton administration has in fact begun to "relax dual-use controls," such as in the computer field, Einhorn reported. "We are looking at those controls and are considering where those controls are not effective as non-proliferation tools, but simply impeding legitimate commercial interaction."

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