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Japan-U.S. Military Technology Cooperation

by Aihiko Ueda, Defense Research Center
Tokyo JAPAN-U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION in Japanese 10 Mar 94 pp 1-8

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[FBIS Translated]

1. Introduction

Interchange between Japan and the United States began in 1853, about one and one-half centuries ago, when the four warships and trade ships led by Admiral Perry appeared off the coast of Uraga. It is extremely important to start discussion on the security of Japan over a broad range, based on the current relationship between Japan and the United States and reflecting upon the Pacific War a half century ago.

Even with the termination of the cold war, issues concerning security cannot be neglected if any nation is to maintain its basic existence. New frameworks and consideration for security have been discussed in broader perspectives by Asian and Pacific nations, where there are new unstable factors, as well as by European nations, centered around NATO. This indicates that, instead of limiting defense capabilities to military force in the narrow sense, such as fighting power, equipment, number of men, etc., more effective defense policies, including invisible defense awareness among the people as a whole, defense technology and organizations sufficient in quality and quantity, have been introduced as part of the worldwide trend to reduce military spending. When such an idea is viewed from a wider perspective, the security of a nation is related more or less to all the functions of that nation. In particular, although it is natural for economic issues to have a fundamentally close relationship with national security, there are some natural limitations in that Japan which tends to think of the two separately.

It is not useless to describe ideal images of the United Nations and one of its organizations, the Security Council. However, if discussion remains idealistic, lacking military perspectives, and Japan is unable to make international contributions as an ordinary nation in the sphere of real-life activities, it will be impossible to gain reliability on the international level. The Japanese will then be regarded with contempt as ``economic animals'' who are interested only in money.

Upon considering Japan's security from an international standpoint, adherence to the Japan-U.S. security system becomes increasingly important, and more active responses from Japan are expected from now on. This paper will discuss the central role of technological cooperation between Japan and the United States in such a context and to consider concrete actions to be taken in the future.

2. Japan-U.S. Relationship

The relationship between Japan and the United States deepened after the Pacific War was terminated. During the Meiji Era, the army and navy had been modeled after those of France, Germany and Britain. The main part of the diplomatic mission was located in Europe at that time as well.

After World War II, due to the increasing importance of the United States with respect to military, economic and technological power, its international role produced substantial results as a result of extreme efforts and burdens in such areas as voluntary activities as policemen of the world, the intensified East-West conflict represented primarily by the Soviet Union and the United States, and wars and struggles related to religions and oil. Under the protection of powerful America, Japan took advantage of the nuclear umbrella, receiving military and other vital information from the United States from a strategic standpoint and using the opportunity to train a number of cadre of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces at military schools and military units in the United States each year. Moreover, as for defense-related equipment, Japan received various arms, warships, and aircraft at no cost, even though such equipment was not at the top level at that time. After Japan became independent, the United States contributed directly to Japan's defense by providing onerous equipment and licensed production, as well as through the improvement of defense technology. The technological standards for the research and development of equipment in Japan were also enhanced on numerous occasions by way of invisible assistance and technological information for the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces.

Such improvements of technology were sought after in post-war Japan not only in the area of defense, but also in all other areas and industries. In this way, American military technology contributed directly and indirectly to improving technological capabilities in general in Japan. For instance, commercial mill specifications, the standards for military specifications for various equipment and parts designated by the United States Forces, were used as a goal to reach top-notch technological standards of the world, regardless of whether such products were to be delivered to the Defense Agency. We can observe many examples today where parts surpassing these standards are produced at low cost. The mill specifications have been developed not by mere impromptu ideas, but by defining numerical values based on the accumulation of numerous practical experiments and technological test data. It would not have been easy to develop any one such specification in Japan. It is true that such assistance by the United States has, in various ways, been provided by placing Japan in the middle of conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union and as proof of the Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, owing to American assistance, Japan has maintained an extremely low defense budget, something that is rare in the world, with minimum defense efforts, i.e., only 1 percent of the GNP for defense spending and around 2.5 percent of related research and development expenditures, and has grown into an economic giant by allotting extra power for economic growth as helped by the diligence of the people. Even though the relationship between Japan and the United States has, in this way, been built on the mutual interests of the two nations, Japan owes the United States in a general way, and an irresponsible attitude, i.e., that defense efforts can be left up to someone else, has been cultivated in Japan, leading to a lack of perception with regard to national defense. Needless to say, the United States is not to be blamed for this. Naturally, although it must be considered and dealt with by the Japanese people and the Japanese government, the rest of the world is paying attention to it.

Even though the threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared, a minimum defense effort is still necessary, together with other types of efforts such as diplomacy, to cope with the unstable factors that exist in the Asian-Pacific region. Adherence to the Japan-U.S. security system is becoming even more important for Japan, which does not possess the means to defend itself from strategic arms that can fly instantly from outside Japanese territorial soil, waters and airspace. In short, Japan's defense still cannot be implemented without coordination with the United States. An important issue from now on will be how deeply that aspect can be analyzed, and to reflect it in governmental policy with the broad support of the people.

3. Need for Japan-U.S Technological Cooperation

With respect to implementing Japan's defense, at least by the world's standards, based on the Japan-U.S. security system and with the decline of the relative economic power of the United States, there are a number of problems, in addition to the issue of the Constitution of Japan, with its execution. Japan's defense has not attained the minimum fundamental military functions possessed by an ordinary nation. These problems are in a different dimension from the tactical training and achievement accumulated as a result of continuous effort on the forefront, and can be roughly divided into functional defects in the strategic phase, items that cannot be implemented due to legal restrictions, and items that can be more or less executed if sufficient time is spent, but will not be functional in urgent situations.

For instance, concerning strategic functions, since Japan does not possess a military information network on an international scale, one must be provided by the United States. Japan is still dependent on the United States in such aspects as supplying parts for American arms and strategic transportation from the continental United States quickly during an emergency, the communication of strategic information by way of reconnaissance satellites and communications satellites of the United States in urgent situations, the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the event of threat by nations with nuclear arms, and the presence of U.S. forces to prevent invasion. It will continue to be difficult for Japan to execute such functions independently. It is important to analyze the status of these strategic issues owing to the long-term effort of the United States and in order to gain the mutual understanding of the peoples of both nations. The American people will reconsider whether or not they, experiencing difficulties, should pay taxes to contribute to Japan, the economic giant.

Although legal restrictions must be discussed and determined by the Japanese, naturally they will have to be modified according to international conventions if Japan is to be accepted by international society. The designation of moderate legal systems from the military standpoint requires research and analysis of the military perspectives as well as coordination with the United States. For the time being, sufficient discussion with the United States concerning issues based on legal restrictions is necessary.

The May 1993 experimental firing of ``Labor-I,'' North Korea's ballistic missile, in the Sea of Japan increased its range to 1,000 kilometers. It will only take a few minutes to reach Tokyo. Since ballistic missiles drop suddenly and sharply from a point above the sky, it is difficult to catch them with the naked eye, or even with radar. Under the current conditions in Japan, it will take several hours to analyze the situation on the governmental level, and several hours longer to come up with ad-hoc measures. If ballistic missiles are shot continuously, without mercy, at an interval of several minutes, Tokyo will be in a panic, unable to take any countermeasures. The modern Japanese people do not really want to think seriously about such a thing. However, since trial firing has actually been executed, the probability of [the above scenario] taking place is several hundredths of one percent. The prevention of such an event by diplomatic negotiations may not succeed under the worst case conditions, and extremely disadvantageous conditions may be forced on Japan. Having a defense means to present responsible policy by keeping the worst case conditions in mind, which must be clearly distinguished from preventing the uncontrolled maneuvering of military power. It must be broadly understood by the people at large. In conclusion, the relationship between Japan and the United States must be reinforced more than ever before since governmental measures for emergency and crisis control involving different sections and ministries require a considerable amount of time and lack strategic and military information, even if those in charge of defense make serious efforts in their designated positions.

Therefore, this paper is concerned with the issue of how the alliance between Japan and the United States should be maintained. The alliance could not have existed in the first place if there had not been an advantage on the part of the United States. The alliance has more or less been maintained due to Japan's location between the United States and the Soviet Union, who were in conflict. Now that the Soviet Union does not exist, other nations that create unstable factors in Asia cannot actually represent a direct threat to the United States. The missiles of North Korea, however improved, cannot reach the continental United States.

During the past half century, the United States has continued to implement policy to attain military superiority over the former Soviet Union by carefully nurturing science and technology. Research on the Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI) started in 1983 by ex-President Reagan produced various partial results and triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union by clearly demonstrating the superiority of American military technology without the ultimate production and distribution of arms.

The United States has requested the cooperation of Japan, with her improved economy and technology, in the area of military technology based on the belief that the development of technological power is still indispensable. The overall technological difference between Japan and the United States today is thought to be more than one hundred times. In the United States, massive spending for research in military technology has been invested and technological results have been accumulated in various well organized governmental research and development organizations, while Japan has barely continued military research. However, careful examination of individual technological fields indicates that Japan is superior in some electronic technology and material technology. It is also believed that the United States is superior in system technology, while Japan is superior in some parts technology. Concerning production technology in general, Japan is superior with respect to economy and reliability.

Although there are not many technological fields in which Japan can take charge, proper technological cooperation can be the most important factor contributing to maintaining the Japan-U.S. security system. From now on, it will be necessary to examine individual technological content. If technological cooperation concerns a certain ministry, such as the Defense Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc., it will be necessary to cope with it by means of strategic thinking beyond the interests of the ministry, for instance, by establishing dedicated research teams directly under the cabinet to determine what kinds of legal issues exist and how to approach private enterprises with such technologies.

4. Current Status of Technological Cooperation Between Japan and the United States

When technological cooperation is considered in detail, we tend to lose the entire image, focusing instead on procedural discussion such as the definition of technology and the range of cooperation. Although it is important to determine definitions and ranges, in this paper, the term technology indicates not only products, but also ideas and know-how. It includes ways of thinking to create new capabilities, corresponding to the English word ``technology,'' rather than production techniques. Cooperation indicates the mutual exchange and sharing of values that are considered approximately equal. However, technological values often remain undetermined and flexibility is required when evaluating them.

Figure 1 [not reproduced] illustrates the interchange of military technology between Japan and the United States from a historical perspective. From 1945-1954, gratuitous arms and equipment were provided by the United States. When new technology was included in them, top-level products were provided in onerous assistance and the debt was returned by payment. While DEA is the exchange of technological information based on memorandums, in principle information flows more from the United States than from Japan. Licensed production refers to production in Japan according to design specifications bought from the United States based on agreements. Although there are many conditions that cannot be changed in Japan, new types of technology can be very stimulating.

The Japan-U.S. regular meeting for equipment and technology (S&TF) is held once a year to strengthen the cooperation of the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Such topics as Japan-U.S. cooperative research, onerous assistance and licensed production have been discussed. In 1983, the transfer of military technology to the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty became possible through exemption from the three principles for arms export. So far, such technologies as portable SAM, shipbuilding and repair, fighter support experimental (FSX), a digital flight control system for the PC3, etc., have been provided. Cooperative research includes such themes as ducted rocket engines, ceramic engines for tanks, millimeter wave-infrared compound seekers, closed loop demagnetization, advanced steel materials for warships and armed vehicles, and eye-safe lasers for examination and promotion by working committees. FSX is the first case of cooperative development and, following a number of discussions, has been implemented with Japanese funds.

In addition, in the past year, the United States has proposed cooperative research and development for theater-of-war missile defense (TMD) and the transfer of dual-use technology (DUT) to the United States. TMD is intended for defense from mid-range ballistic missiles, which is lacking in the Japanese defense system. Although the issue has been covered under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, it has newly arisen against the background of the reduction of the nuclear umbrella, the development of missiles in North Korea and Japan's economic growth. The initial proposal by the United States included the transfer of TMD technology from the United States in exchange for comparable Japanese DUT. In the meantime, the technological contents of TMD are being studied and examined since it is difficult to relate DUT directly to TMD and, therefore, it is to be studied separately. If the research and development of TMD is implemented by Japan and the United States in cooperation, since TMD consists of many systems, it could give a number of technological stimuli to the Japanese defense industry. It is possible that a number of cases will arise in which highly advanced American interceptor missiles can be purchased, communications networks newly developed partially also using Japanese DUT, and command and control systems can be developed combining American software and Japanese hardware.

5. Concrete Responses of Japan

In order to maintain the Japan-U.S. security system, it is necessary to clarify what we are asking the United States to do for Japan and what Japan can contribute. It is desirable that the two portions of mutual work be equal in value. Although a number of measures, such as cooperative maneuvers by the two nations, the interoperability of arms and equipment, and the payment of expenses for the United States forces in Japan, can be taken, the most important issues for the United States today are the maintenance of military technology with declining military expenditures, the reorganization of the defense industry infrastructure, and the effective commercial use of accumulated military technology, etc., all of which concern fundamental technological issues. The United States proposes, among other things, paying attention to Japanese DUT, acquiring its innovative ideas and economical production technology, and using them in the development and production of various arms systems. In such a case, it would be relatively easy to consider the transfer of Japanese DUT to the United States if the products of an arms system collaborated on by the Defense Agency and private enterprise are initially developed for commercial use by the enterprise.

However, many items of DUT desired by the United States are totally commercial products unrelated to the Defense Agency, and the transfer of such technology is a matter of commercial consideration for enterprises. There are two cases, depending on who the customers are, as described in Figure 2. One is the relationship between one enterprise and another enterprise, which can be considered ordinary DUT transactions of DUT for military purposes. The other case is the relationship between a Japanese enterprise and the U.S. Department of Defense. Since there are a number of governmental arsenals and research organizations under the Department of Defense, DUT is expected to be used there first and then, in some cases, transferred to enterprises. In the latter case, the point that is more important than ordinary transactions is that the transfer of DUT to the United States be implemented to maintain Japan's security, for instance, in return for the nuclear umbrella. Then, it is natural that various agreements related to the DUT transfer be endorsed by the Japanese government in order for enterprises to initiate it voluntarily.

Furthermore, although the economic loss resulting from DUT transfer is to be compensated for by the U.S. Department of Defense in principle, relief measures such as supplementation by the Japanese government, financing of research and development costs, partial exemption from corporate taxes, etc., are necessary. In the United States, there are sufficient items for technological interchange which are produced through governmental investments, including those by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. However, since such examples are extremely rare in Japan, it is necessary to consider purchasing defense technology.

If such treatment of DUT becomes possible even though the current laws and regulations do not permit it, it will be necessary to reconsider the legal system in the Diet to check whether or not Japan's national interests are being damaged due to the current system. Since there has been, for a long time, a strong trend toward a vertical way of thinking in both governmental and private organizations in Japan, there should be an organization to examine policies for important issues involving national strategies, maintaining an equal distance from the Defense Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of foreign Affairs, etc. It will also be necessary to develop a strategic analysis group that can exchange actual intentions freely with the United States prior to policy decision and sufficiently examine the fundamental technological contents.

6. Conclusion

The policy for technological cooperation is considered extremely important in establishing a Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. security system. Technology has been considered supplementary to security in Japan. This is exactly the point where the United States and other foreign nations differ somewhat in value judgment. In the United States, technology is the invisible origin of fighting power and the constant motive for developing into the future. The creation of technology is considered the most important issue. In Japan, on the other hand, technology is something provided by advanced nations rather than something to create on its own. Japan is interested in copying the technology to manufacture marketable products, in other words, her interests are directed toward innovation, mass production and cost for procurement. Although those in charge are passionately engaged in the current issues, the situation requires internationally sensitive responses as Japan's position improves. Just as technological cooperation cannot be implemented without fully understanding technological contents, it is equally vital to fully understand the differences in concepts about cultures, traditions and technology from nation to nation. It is necessary for the Japanese to device a method to maximize the contribution of Japanese technology to Japan's security.

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