A Questionnaire for Prime Minister Murayama: Is Crisis Management in the Far

A Questionnaire for Prime Minister Murayama: Is Crisis Management in the Far East Adequate?

Tokyo CHUO KORON
Mar 95 pp 51-69

[FBIS Translated Text] During his first visit to the United States on 12 January, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama held talks with U.S. President Clinton, stating that Japan was prepared to provide appropriate financial cooperation to North Korea for the construction of light-water reactors in accordance with the U.S.-North Korea accord.

When the U.S.-North Korea accord was concluded in October last year, the Murayama administration immediately expressed its support for the accord, and reaffirmed this at the summit meeting of Murayama, Clinton, and Kim at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] conference. The recent Japan-U.S. summit again confirmed Japan's commitment of assistance to North Korea.

On 26 December 1994, before the recent Japan-U.S. summit, the Japanese, U.S., and South Korean governments issued a joint statement in which they announced their decision to establish the Korea Energy Development Organization [KEDO], in accordance with the U.S.-North Korea accord.

The gist of the joint statement is as follows: (1) Japan, the United States, and South Korea will establish KEDO to immediately implement the U.S.-North Korea accord; (2) KEDO's headquarters will be established in New York; (3) South Korea will play the leading role in the fields of funding and construction of two light-water reactors of South Korea's standard type; (4) Japan will play a proper role in the fields of management and funding for the light-water reactors plan; (5) the United States will take responsibility for providing 500,000 tons of heavy oil -- the energy source for five years -- as well as of safe storage and disposal of plutonium fuel rods; (6) KEDO's first meeting will be held in February, etc. According to a report dated 5 January, as a result of the conference of the three countries, it has been decided that South Korea will share more than 50 percent of some $4 billion needed for the construction of light-water reactors, and Japan will share about 30 percent of the cost -- more than $2 billion for South Korea and about $1.2 billion for Japan -- and the United States will provide 500,000 tons of heavy oil as substitute fuel for five years until the completion of the light-water reactors -- about $600 million in terms of the cost. The Murayama-Clinton summit of January did not explicitly touch on the amount of money to be borne by Japan, and the matter was to be referred for discussion at the administrative level. However, at a news conference immediately after the signing of the U.S.-North Korea accord on 21 October of last year, U.S. Representative Gallucci created a stir by stating: "Japan will bear $1 billion for the construction of the light-water reactors. We have the consent of the Japanese Government concerning this matter." Japan's sharing of $1 billion has become an established fact, and somehow everybody has come to regard it as right and proper. The sum of $1 billion is a colossal amount of money, which is equivalent to every one in the nation donating 1,000 yen each. The money is financial aid to North Korea which cannot be given back to Japan, and the money is paid out of the nation's taxes. Despite all of this, why is it that we should pay now, so hurriedly, and at the suggestion of the United States, such a large sum of money -- $1 billion -- to assist the nuclear development of North Korea which displays a hostile attitude toward Japan in everything, out of the ultra-tight, subzero budget caused by an economic recession and financial difficulties? No political leaders, no administrative officials, and no one, including Prime Minister Murayama, can give a satisfactory answer to such a simple question that ordinary people naturally want answered.

Fortunately, the 132d ordinary session of the Diet was convened on 20 January and is now in session. So, on behalf of Japan's silent majority, I would like to ask a hypothetical question of Prime Minister Murayama, and ask for his answer concerning "the U.S.-North Korea accord and Murayama's diplomacy" by regarding CHUO KORON as the Diet Building's First Committee Room, where the Budget Committee conducts its deliberations.

Hypothetical Question No. 1
In agreeing to the "U.S.-North Korea accord" and in making a commitment to Japan's sharing of $1 billion for the financial assistance to North Korea's light-water nuclear reactors, why did Prime Minister Murayama not ask Clinton to tell North Korea that Japan's assistance will be given on condition that North Korea eradicates its Nodong-1 missiles and biological and chemical weapons?

The Nodong-1 missile, which was successfully launched toward the Sea of Japan in a test on 29 May the year before last, is an improved version of the Scud-C missiles which were launched by Iraq's Saddam Husayn toward Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf war. Although the range of the Scud-C missile was 500 kilometers, that of the Nodong-1 missile is 1,000 kilometers, and it is estimated that Kyushu, Chugoku, Kansai, Sanin, Hokuriku, and Chubu come within its range. Although the Nodong-1 missile cannot reach the United States, it can reach Japan and South Korea. In Japan, biological and chemical weapons are regarded as inhumane weapons of mass destruction. The Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDPJ], which is chaired by Prime Minister Murayama, has strenuously opposed the use of nuclear weapons as well as poisonous gas and germ weapons, such as sarin and yperite -- the so-called CBR weapons (chemical, biological and radiological) or ABC weapons (atomic, biological and chemical). However, biological and chemical weapons are regarded as conventional weapons by the former communist countries; and tactical nuclear weapons, such as nuclear mines, nuclear shells, and nuclear depth charges except for strategic nuclear weapons, are treated almost in the same way as conventional weapons by those countries.

We must not forget the fact that the United States, which is a party to the "U.S.-North Korea accord," is also a country which has CBR weapons.

In the Gulf war, the United States leveled very rigid conditions for a cease-fire on Saddam Husayn's Iraq, which was further forced to eradicate not only nuclear weapons but also nuclear carrying medium-and long-range missiles, and biological and chemical weapons.

"The UN Security Council Resolution No. 687," which was adopted by the council on 3 April 1991, applied very rigid sanctions against Iraq, an aggressor: under the supervision of the United Nations, Iraq should eradicate all biological and chemical weapons, and all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 50 kilometers; Iraq should discontinue the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons; Iraq should accept the dismantlement and inspection of nuclear reactors by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]; Iraq should accept the stationing of UN peace supervisory bodies in the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border; Iraq should establish war reparation funds with income from the sale of the country's crude oil and oil products; Iraq should be subjected to continued arms embargoes.

"Clear and Present Danger," a film starring Harrison Ford, is now being shown in Tokyo's movie theater where Western movies are shown ahead of all other theaters. In the film, Harrison Ford plays the role of the acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], and has a strong sense of justice and fights against the president's intrigue. The "Clear and Present Danger" is one of the basic conditions for the U.S. President's exercise of military power for a short period of time, in accordance with the president's emergency powers.

From that viewpoint, Saddam Husayn in the Gulf war was a "Clear and Present Danger." Unlike Iraq, which invaded and annexed Kuwait, North Korea, which refused nuclear inspections and announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], did not invade South Korea. Therefore, to the United States, the country did not constitute a "Clear and Present Danger" justifying immediate exercise of its military power. Consequently, UN Resolution No. 687 directed against Iraq, and the U.S.-North Korea accord" are different in nature. It is impossible to expect the accord to have the same rigidity as the resolution. However, although the Nodong-1 missile cannot reach the United States, it can reach Japan. The United States, which is the great possessor of biological and chemical weapons, may find it difficult to demand North Korea eradicate the same kind of weapons from a moral point of view. However, Japan, which does not have any CBR weapons, is a peaceful nation which is appealing to the world for the eradication of weapons of mass destruction. Prime Minister Murayama, who is also chairman of the SDPJ, the supposed standard-bearer of the anti-CBS policy, did not, for the security of Japan, ask President Clinton to tell North Korea that it should suspend the development of Nodong-1 missiles, and abolish all biological and chemical weapons in return for Japan's consent to "the U.S.-North Korea accord" and provision of $1 billion for the construction of light-water reactors. This will be censured as unprincipled, irresponsible foreign policy which follows in the footsteps of the United States. We have to say that this was caused by the fact that Prime Minister Murayama, like President Clinton, is an amateur in security foreign policy and is deficient in the fundamental knowledge of politico-military science. However, it is not too late. At future Japan-U.S. talks concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, or at Japan-North Korea working-level meetings to be held again in the near future, Prime Minister Murayama should demand: (1) suspension of the development, experiment, and combat deployment of not only Nodong-1 missiles, but also Nodong-2 missiles which have a longer range; (2) abolition of inhumane biological and chemical weapons as a condition for providing $1 billion to North Korea. This is in Japan's national interest.

What should be remembered here is the politico-military diplomatic skill displayed by former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at the time of the conclusion of the so-called "INF Agreement" (intermediate-range nuclear force) -- aimed at the mutual, concurrent abolition of intermediate range ballistic missiles (the SS-20 for the Soviet Union; the Pershing II for the U.S.) -- which was realized as a result of the summit between President Reagan and President Gorbachev in December 1987. The United States took advantage of the fact that the Japanese Government was deficient in politico-military ideas and had little interest in the intermediate range nuclear ballistic missile issue. As a compromise with the Soviet Union, the United States was about to let the country keep 100 SS-20's in the Soviet Far East territory east of the Ural Mountains. At that time, then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone judged that the compromise plan was very detrimental to Japan's national interests. He strongly requested U.S. President Reagan scrap SS-20's in the Soviet Far East territory without exception. President Reagan accepted this request and succeeded in concluding the INF Agreement, which obligated both the United States and the Soviet Union to scrap all intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles, including those in Siberia. Few people in Japan know of former Prime Minister Nakasone's services to Japan's security in the total scrapping of SS-20's. I would like to take this opportunity to introduce this fact. The reason Prime Minister Murayama is called an amateur in security diplomacy, and is deficient in the knowledge of politico-military science, is that he does not know that several nuclear weapons do not constitute a military threat if there is no means to carry them, but that if a nuclear-armed nation has all or any of the following three nuclear carrying means -- "bombers," "intermediate range nuclear ballistic missiles," and "nuclear submarines loaded with submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's]" -- that can be a means of "gunboat diplomacy" and a powerful diplomatic weapon for military threat to its neighboring countries within shooting or cruising range. When U.S. Defense Secretary Perry visited Japan at the end of last year, he expressed the following view: "It seems that North Korea has extracted plutonium which is equivalent to two nuclear bombs, but we will ignore "the past." Behind this policy toward North Korea there seems to lie an optimistic perspective that sooner or later North Korea will face economic bankruptcy, will undergo internal collapse like Ceausescu's Romania, and as a result, North and South Korea will be unified without a war, and in that case, the light-water reactors will return to South Korea's possession.

To the United States, which is quite outside the range of Nodong-1 missiles, two or three nuclear bombs are certainly not a military threat. However, the threat of a Nodong-1 missile loaded with the dreadful nerve gas "sarin" is really great to Japan and South Korea which are within its range, even though North Korea cannot load a Nodong-1 missile with a nuclear warhead because of its inability to make a small, light nuclear warhead.

The threat of nuclear weapons is actualized militarily when they are linked to their carriers, which is evident when we look back over how North Korea's nuclear issue suddenly came to the surface as a serious problem in the security of Northeast Asia. The whole world knew that North Korea had been building nuclear facilities in Yongbyon with the help of China since the beginning of the 1990's. On 29 May 1993, North Korea succeeded in launching a Nodong-1 missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers in the Sea of Japan, giving it a nuclear weapons carrier.

Moreover, North Korea began to take a hard-line policy, such as refusing IAEA inspections as well as the announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT, in opposition to the world trend of nuclear non-proliferation. Thus the North Korean nuclear issue came into being, the way was paved for UN economic sanctions, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula suddenly became tense.

Hypothetical Question No. 2
Theater Missile Defense [TMD] cooperation and the U.S.-North Korea accord may be a U.S. match-pump [a Japanese-coined English word meaning "to reap undue profit by causing trouble and solving it behind the scenes at the same time]

Internationally, North Korea had been labeled as a "supporter of international terrorism." It was the target of the anti-terrorism headquarters of the U.S. State Department, but for the Defense Department the country's military threat was considered extremely low.

Furthermore, North Korea was defined as a "country providing a nuclear problem." The reason was that the country was attempting nuclear development by using outdated Chernobyl-type graphite-moderated reactors and was being watched as a "developing country likely to cause environmental problems to the earth -- lethal radioactive fallout -- because of nuclear accidents. If a Chernobyl-type nuclear accident should occur in Yongbyon, Seoul would be covered with radioactive fallout, and the polluted atmosphere driven by the prevailing westerlies would send radioactive rain across Kyushu, Japan. That was how the media and the specialists saw the North Korean nuclear problem then.

North Korea was designated as a "terrorism-supporting country" because of the Rangoon incident, and the South Korean jetliner bombing incident which it caused. It was also regarded as a problem country in the protection of the earth's environment because it was likely to cause a Chernobyl-type nuclear accident. It was raised to the rank of a country posing a potential military threat on 27 September 1993, when former Defense Minister Keisuke Nakanishi visited the United States and had talks with former Defense Secretary Aspin. Aspin expounded on the new "bottom up strategy" concerning a potential military threat to Japan in the post Cold War period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main enemy, and he cited Middle East and North Korea as a conceivable, potential military threat to Japan. Japan and the United States agreed to conduct joint research and development of the TMD system against the threat of Nodong-1 missiles under development by North Korea.

Of all the possible international crises, an emergency on the Korean Peninsula is the most likely factor to bring the trauma of war to Japan in this century. After the end of World War II, more than 100 military disputes occurred, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and a series of Middle East Wars. Fortunately, however, the flames of war did not spread to Japan. Japan, using these military disputes as a springboard, achieved high economic growth. History proves that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has brought peace and prosperity to Japan. However, when military tensions became acute on the Korean Peninsula because of the North Korean nuclear issue, the Japanese people began to feel more keenly the military threat of a foreign country as well as anxiety about chemical weapons, such as Nodong-1 missiles and sarin. I traveled north to Hokkaido and south to Kyushu, Shikoku, and Okinawa for a lecture. When the North Korean nuclear issue heightened the tension on the Korean Peninsula, I found the responses of the areas which are said to be within range of Nodong-1 missiles with a cruising range of 1,000 kilometers-- such as Niigata Prefecture and Ishikawa Prefecture, which are called the "Ginzas of the Nuclear Power Plants" because these prefectures have unprotected nuclear power plants along their coasts; Osaka Fu, where the Korean residents in Japan are concentrated; Nagasaki Prefecture, where boat people are likely to land -- were so nervous that they could be called an excessive reaction, quite different from the responses of Tokyo, and Kanto and Tohoku provinces.

The fears of the nation grew further when it was known that the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces cannot defend against attack by Nodong-1 missiles with their current weapons. Concerning the fact that the United States did not include the banning of the development of the nuclear carrier Nodong-1 missiles in the provisions of the U.S.-North Korea accord, we can understand the explanation that "the United States could not demand North Korea ban the development because North Korea did not act as wrongfully as Husayn, who invaded Kuwait." However, when we calmly look at the United States engaging in a trade war for selling its weapons to neighboring countries -- such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan -- we cannot help noting the egoism of a superpower. President Bush sold 150 F-16's to Taiwan just before his term expired. The Pentagon asked South Korean President Kim Yong-sam, after his cabinet reshuffle, to strengthen South Korea's missile defense system against the threat of North Korea's nuclear missiles, and the Pentagon has already deployed 120 U.S. Patriot missiles there. To modernize conventional weapons, South Korea is changing across from the outdated F-5 to F-16 bomber, the introduction of P-3C submarine-spotting planes, and the introduction of destroyers and submarines. It is unpleasant to see that behind these moves lies the U.S. intention of taking inventory of surplus weapons, and selling stockpiled bulk weapons.

Concerning the joint Japan-U.S. development of the TMD system proposed to Japan by the United States, early development of the system would have been unnecessary if the eradication of the Nodong-1 nuclear missile had been included in the agenda of the U.S.-North Korea talks. Taking advantage of the fact that Nodong-1 missiles cannot reach the United States, the country has allowed North Korea to keep Nodong-1 missiles, or biological and chemical weapons which it already has, to promote its own arms industry. The U.S. has asked Japan and South Korea, which are exposed to the threat of such weapons, not only to share the cost of switching to light-water reactors, but also for development of new weapons for modernization of their defense capabilities, as well as a change in their arms systems. It may not be me alone who detects the mercantile spirit of the United States in such an attitude.

National defense is the top priority of politics. So long as the United States and the United Nations cannot stop the development of Nodong-1 missiles by North Korea, Japan, which is within the range of the missiles, must expedite the joint Japan-U.S. development of TMD's, although it may be a little vexing to do so. What we should observe to the last then is the strategy of Sun-tzu -- "If one wants to protect every place, one will leave every place vulnerable." Even if we deploy hundreds of TMD antiballistic missile launchers by spending a colossal sum of money, we cannot avert the threat of the Nodong-1 missile 100 percent, which is evident from the lessons of the Gulf war. Prior to Prime Minister Murayama's visit to the United States in January, he said he wanted to have the following broad principle approved at the Japan-U.S. summit: both countries should reconstruct a new security doctrine; U.S. forces should follow the principle of frontal deployment in the Asian area by way of precaution against a new situation in Northeast Asia; and both countries should further activate the function of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Active cooperation for the joint development of TMD is a matter of priority which serves the best interests of Japan from the standpoint of its security. We should take this opportunity to imagine the worstcase scenario in which North Korea launches a Nodong-1 missile against Japan in case of emergency on the Korean Peninsula, just like Israel which was involved in the Gulf war. We should request U.S. forces to attack North Korea's Nodong-1 missile launching stations rather than "wait and die" by observing the principle of Japan-U.S. joint action -- Japan, which strictly adheres to defense, is a "shield"; the U.S. forces in Japan are a "spear" for attack. At the same time, we should immediately tackle the problem of emergency laws as well as the problem of providing facilities in such emergency cases within Japan so that our request will be immediately and smoothly approved at a "prior consultation" of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Council. The recent Japan-U.S. summit deserves praise in that it clearly rejected the idea that "the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is useless or should be annulled," which has recently cropped up in some quarters of both countries.

However, the prime minister's slogan, that is, adherence to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, will come to naught, no matter how strongly he insists on that, if he continues to follow an inconsistent security policy, such as the advocacy of ideological arms reduction, reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa, or face-saving reduction of defense budgets without real significance.

Hypothetical Question No. 3

Is $1 billion inside or outside the limit of war reparations which the Kanemaru-Tanabe delegation to North Korea promised? When Gallucci, the U.S. representative to the U.S.-North Korea high ranking officials talks, said at a news conference that "Japan is to share $1 billion for constructing light-water reactors and that the Japanese Government has agreed to that," people in Nagata-cho and Kasumigaseki, who were busy preparing for participation in the UN economic sanctions, looked at each other and asked, "Who decided on such a thing, and when?" It goes without saying that the leaders of the former nine coalition parties (the present Shinshinto) were not notified of this information. Even a certain leader of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], who played an important role as mediator in realizing the coalition government of the LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDPJ], and Sakigake [Harbinger], and in bringing Prime Minister Murayama onto the world stage, said in anger, "Who told Gallucci that $1 billion is to be provided to North Korea? I have never heard of that."

In September 1990, during the period of the Kaifu cabinet, the LDP's Vice President Kanemaru and the SDPJ's General Secretary Tanabe visited North Korea, apologized in tears, and promised to indemnify the country for the hardship Japan inflicted on it, not only during the period of annexation of Korea by Japan but also for the period of 45 years after World War II. If the financial aid to be given to North Korea this time for constructing light-water reactors is in line with the spirit of the three-party joint statement by the LDP, the SDPJ, and North Korea's Workers Party, the question that comes to everyone's mind will be whether "the aid is within or outside the limit of the reparations which Kanemaru and Tanabe promised. It is not clear how much the Kanemaru apology delegation promised to pay; the amount was said to be $10 billion or $20 billion at that time. The financial aid to be given to North Korea this time is reported to be $1 billion, but no one on the Japanese side, including Prime Minister Murayama, has ever admitted the figure officially. Consequently, foreign ministry leaders have refrained from answering the question of whether $1 billion is inside or outside the limit of the promised reparations, saying, "We cannot say as yet." The Murayama cabinet should clearly reply to the nation at the Budget Committee of the Diet how the nation's tax is spent, since this is an important issue concerned with Japan's security policy. The leader of the Kanemaru delegation which visited North Korea five years ago is now finance minister and head of Sakigake. This is a mere coincidence, but has caused the nation to fear that assistance favorable to Pyongyang will be given. The next obvious question to be discussed at the Budget Committee session is how to raise the colossal amount of $1 billion from the current ultra-tight, deficit budget, and from what item of the budget. Japan made a contribution of $13 billion in the Gulf war, and its source of revenue was a tax increase.

The Japanese people are totally against the expenditure of $1 billion for North Korea which does not even try to hide its anti-Japanese speech and action, much less the nuclear development of that country. The Murayama cabinet should clarify the revenue source issue through discussion at the Budget Committee and strive to reach a consensus on the matter. Moreover, Finance Minister Takemura once said at a news conference that "he has no intention to pay the 'reparations for the hardship' that Korea bore for 45 years after World War II." How do President Yohei Kono and Chairman Tomiichi Murayama adopt the ideas of the LDP's Kanemaru and the SDPJ's Tanabe concerning this matter? Do Kono and Murayama agree with Takemura, head of Sakigake, concerning this matter? I would like to have a definite answer to these two questions.

Hypothetical Question No. 4
Japan's entry into the UN Security Council and North Korea's anti-Japanese attitude

After the conclusion of the U.S.-North Korea accord, it was thought that North Korea's feeling toward Japan would change for the better because Japan expressed its intention to give aid for the construction of the light-water reactors. Despite that, there is little improvement in North Korea's enmity toward Japan. On 25 November last year, the 6th Committee (Law) of UN General Assembly adopted by a vote of 117-0 with one abstention (North Korea) a resolution to refer the so-called "enemy clauses" -- Articles 53 and 170 of the UN Charter -- to the Charter Special Committee for examination of their deletion. As a result, the United Nations is to reach a conclusion concerning this matter at the General Assembly of September next year on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. "The enemy clauses" provide for an exception to the general rule: Military sanctions may be applied, without the decision of the UN Security Council, against the former seven Axis powers -- Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland -- if they commit an aggressive act.

It was on 26 June 1945 that the Allied Powers decided to establish the United Nations. It is natural that Japan was designated as an "enemy" because it was still waging a fierce battle on Okinawa, committing its kamikaze corps.

However, the passage of history thereafter has changed these "enemy clauses" into an outdated, meaningless entity. One of Japan's earnest wishes since its entry into the United Nations has been the deletion of these enemy clauses. It is a matter for mutual congratulation that this has been realized at the UN 6th Committee, and that there is a great possibility of its realization this fall.

What is to be noted, however, is that North Korea, which joined the United Nations only recently, claimed that "Japan has not yet conducted the postwar disposal of the affairs concerning an act of aggression committed in colonizing the Korean Peninsula." North Korea was against the adoption of a resolution for "deletion of the enemy clauses" without voting by consensus at the 6th Committee, which was scheduled to be held on 23 November. As a result, the matter was put to the vote on 25 November.

Furthermore, North Korea proposed a counter motion to oppose the removal of Japan from the enemy clauses, which was rejected by a vote of 103-3 (North Korea, Cuba, and the Sudan) with seven abstentions (China, Iran, and others). Thus North Korea openly showed its anti-Japanese posture in defiance of the general trend of the United Nations.

Moreover, when the three ruling parties, the LDP, the SDPJ, and Sakigake, proposed dispatching a joint delegation to North Korea in December last year, it showed disapproval of the proposal, saying, "It is difficult to accept the delegation." As a result, the visit to North Korea by the delegation was postponed. The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan [Chongyon] cited in protest the following as the reasons for the declination: (1) A Japanese diplomat stationed in the United States was discourteous in dealing with North Korea's UN mission; (2) A Japanese Government official concerned with this matter said that prior coordination with South Korea was necessary; (3) Concerning the three-party joint statement by the LDP, the SDPJ, and North Korea's Workers Party issued in 1990, Finance Minister Masayoshi Takemura proposed reexamination of the joint statement by saying that "it is not right for the joint statement to have a clause which approves reparation covering a period of 45 years after the end of World War II." On 17 December last year, a U.S. military helicopter crossed the military demarcation line, entered into North Korean territory, and was shot down. As a result, one pilot was killed, and the other was detained. The attitude of North Korea then was very stiff when it issued the following statement: "If this incident exerts a bad influence on the North Korea-U.S. relationship, the United States, a warmonger, will have to assume full responsibility...our revolutionary force which guards the security of our homeland as well as the autonomy of our state will never tolerate anyone who invades even 0.001 millimeter of our land, sea, and airspace." This statement seems to show that a competition for a tougher foreign policy is going on in the collective leadership system of North Korea since the death of President Kim Il-song. North Korea seems to think that if it takes an aggressive attitude, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will surely back down. At present the Japanese people are harboring a simple question about why it is necessary for Japan to give light-water reactor assistance to North Korea which plainly shows such distrust and animosity toward Japan.

According to a "Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy" (3,000 pollees; 2,061 respondents; the rate of respondence: 68.7%) compiled by the Prime Minister's Office on 9 January, 18.7% of the respondents agreed and 37.3% rather agreed with Japan's UN Security Council permanent membership. It was found that in total, 56.0% wanted Japan to become a permanent member of the council.

When asked about it by the opposition party at the Budget Committee, we wonder how the Murayama cabinet will answer the problem of equating the following two facts: (1) Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council has been a longstanding, earnest wish of Japanese diplomacy, and has the approval of 56% of the nation; (2) The appeasement policy toward North Korea taken by Japan in obeying both the United States and North Korea is shown by Japan's financial assistance of $1 billion to North Korea, even though North Korea dared to propose a motion against removing Japan from the enemy clauses after the conclusion of the U.S.-North Korea accord.

Hypothetical Question No. 5
Is it possible to rely on promises after five years?

On 5 January, Defense Secretary Perry made a speech in Washington in which he said, "In June of last year, the U.S. Government was, in connection with economic sanctions against North Korea, thinking of deterring the military action of that country by reinforcing the war potential of the U.S. land, sea, and air forces, including the dispatch of a carrier squadron." "North Korea and the United States faced the danger of war, and the relations between the two countries were such that war could have broken out at the slightest provocation."

At that time, the Japanese Government, at the request of and in cooperation with the United States, was making every effort in all quarters to participate in the economic sanctions against North Korea by the United Nations, when the U.S.-North Korea accord was suddenly concluded. Last year, at the Republican Party's diplomatic issues seminar, Paul Wolfowitz, former assistant defense secretary and now president of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, accurately pointed out the whole affair, as outlined below.

Concerning the tackling of the North Korean nuclear issue by the Clinton administration, Wolfowitz expressed sharp criticism: "The Clinton administration was asking Japan and South Korea to prepare for economic sanctions against North Korea. Then, suddenly it concluded an agreement with North Korea, and this time it asked Japan and South Korea to give economic assistance to North Korea. There is no consistency and coordination in the administration's policy, and this will betray confidence in the administration...no matter how hard Japan and South Korea -- the United States' allies -- try to cooperate with that country, they will never know the intentions of the Clinton administration...The Clinton administration slighted South Korea and placed it in a subordinate position by conducting negotiations only with North Korea and concluded a nuclear agreement with that country." (according to SANKEI SHIMBUN foreign report dated 22 December 1994, titled "U.S. Betrays the Confidence of Japan and South Korea: Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Criticizes the Current Administration" (sent by Hisayoshi Komori, chief of the Washington Bureau).

The situation is exactly as pointed out by Wolfowitz. At the vigorous request of Pentagon sources, Japan had begun to seriously tackle, though a little too late, national emergency management problems that are likely to occur in the event of an emergency on the Korean peninsula, when the Clinton administration took a sudden turn in its policy, which made Japan unhappy.

Problems which are likely to occur are: a mass exodus of refugees; asylum cases similar to the MiG-25 incident; assistance for overseas evacuation, as well as protection and rescue of 10,000 Japanese residents in South Korea and 35,000 servicemen and their dependents of the Army's Second Division stationed in South Korea; nonmilitary sanctions against North Korea by the Security Council through invocation of Article 41 of the UN Charter, such as prohibition of diplomats' contact with North Korea and limitation of civilian passage to North Korea; suspension of the navigation of the regular cargo-passenger boat "Mankyongbong" from Niigata to North Korea; regulation of airplane flights to North Korea; suspension of cultural and sports exchanges; suspension of the so-called "pachinko remittances"; and preparation of all these matters listed above; various measures to insure the smooth application of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, in preparation for action to be taken by the U.S. forces in Japan, with Japanese facilities and areas as bases, for the peace and security of Northeast Asia in accordance with Article 6 of the Security Treaty. One of the various measures to be taken is: partial amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Act (Paragraph 8, Article 100; to be established anew through amendment) so that, in preparation for an emergency on the Korean peninsula, government planes operated by self-defense officials, or airplanes, like self-defense force transport planes, can conduct the emergency transport and rescue of Japanese residents, U.S. servicemen and their families, and civilians of Western countries, as well as ASEAN countries.

Another thing is promotion of negotiations for the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA] so that aircraft fuel and other goods can be supplied to the U.S. forces in Japan just like NATO nations do to each other. According to the "National Property Law" or "Commodity Management Law," which are under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry, the commodities owned and managed by the Self-Defense Forces are national property, and it is legally impossible to provide it to the U.S. forces.

A study of conditions relating to Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has also been initiated. The reason is: For example, in order to obtain smooth approval, according to the "prior negotiations" of the Kishi-Herter Agreement, "of the initiation of direct combat action from facilities and areas in Japan" as provided for in Article 6, an actual survey must be made of facilities and areas which the Self-Defense Forces usually use -- for example, Komatsu Base of the Air Self-Defense Force, Maizuru Base of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and others which are provided for in "2-4-B" [Part B of Paragraph 4, Article 2] of the so-called Status of Forces Agreement [SOFA] -- but which the U.S. forces in Japan can share with the Self-Defense Forces in case of emergency in Japan or Korea, in addition to those exclusively provided for the use of the U.S. forces -- for example, Yokota Base, Iwakuni Base, and others which are provided for in 2-4-A (Part A of Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the SOFA).

A refugee center in Omura, Nagasaki Prefecture, which is under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry and which is used for the management of illegal foreign entrants, can accommodate only 1,500 people. By way of precaution against an expected influx of refugees into the country, measures have been taken to increase the Justice Ministry's budget for the improvement of the center's accommodations.

Just as Japan began to seriously consider these measures, President Kim Il-song died suddenly (8 July 1994). From a long range view, President Kim Il-song racked his brains to prevent North Korea from becoming another Ceausescu-type Romania, joined the NPT, accepted the IAEA's inspections, called for U.S.-North Korea summits, and called for North-South talks as well as simultaneous entry into the United Nations by both countries. It was believed that President Kim Il-song had promoted all these open policies to prevent the international isolation of that country. On the other hand, Secretary Kim Chong-il, successor to President Kim Il-song, was regarded as a hawk representing a hard-line foreign policy through assistance in international terrorism, such as the attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Tu-hwan by blowing up the Aung San Temple in Rangoon, and the bombing of the Korean Air jetliner by Kim Hyong-hui, as well as insistence on strengthening North Korea's voice in the international arena through the military use of nuclear weapons. Such hard-line diplomacy as the test-launch of a Nodong-1 missile on 29 May 1993, the refusal of nuclear inspections by the IAEA, the unilateral declaration of withdrawal from the NPT, and others, which heightened tension on the Korean peninsula, was generally considered to have been developed under the leadership of Kim Chong-il. If that was the case, it was thought that the death of President Kim Il-song would intensify the tension. However, U.S.-North Korea cooperation, which was growing after Jimmy Carter's visit, rapidly progressed after the death of President Kim Il-song, and the U.S.-North Korea accord was realized on 21 October 1994. Moreover, the contents of the accord were a heavy concession for the U.S. side: (1) The IAEA will not conduct nuclear inspections for five years. (2) North Korea's nuclear development "in the past" will be ignored. (3) North Korea will swap graphite-moderated reactors for light-water reactors. (4) The expense for the construction of light-water reactors as well as the expense for substitute energy -- heavy oil -- for five years until the completion of the light-water reactors will be borne by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. (5) The United States and North Korea will respectively establish representative offices.

Setting aside the question of ignoring the "past," and the "postponement of nuclear inspections for five years" is quite an irresponsible act for a politician. The recent progress of science and technology is very rapid, and five years will make it possible for North Korea to heighten the accuracy rate of the Nodong-1 missile, and to make a nuclear bomb small and light enough that it can be made the warhead of the missile. It seems that North Korea is governed by a collective leadership, which makes it difficult for Kim Chong-il to succeed to the presidency. The point is whether there are any reliable politicians who can faithfully observe the "U.S.-North Korea accord," an international pledge, for these five years. There is no guarantee that U.S. President Clinton will be in power five years from now. It is inconceivable that Deng Xiaoping will still retain leadership five years from now, as, having reached the great age of 91, he is said to have difficulty in moving or walking about unaided. With all due respect to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, we wonder if he can assume the responsibility for Japan's politics and administration five years from now. We wonder the same about Russian President Yeltsin, who is having difficulty controlling the military because of the situation in Chechen. How long will the Kim Yong-Sam administration last in South Korea? Under these circumstances, two-plus-four, that is, Kim Chong-il (North Korea), Kim Yong-Sam (South Korea), Clinton (U.S.), Murayama (Japan), Deng Xiaoping (China), and Yeltsin (Russia) will not be in a position to assume the political responsibility for promises five years from now, even though now they may be capable of handling the security policy on the Korean peninsula. National security is a matter of establishing a grand plan for the long-term future of the nation. Prime Minister Murayama, swayed by the needs of the moment, supported the "U.S.-North Korea accord" and thereby committed the fate of Japan to "nuclear inspections five years from now" for which he cannot take the responsibility. It is irresponsible of him to have done so.

The SDPJ was in opposition for the past 38 years, during which time it had always taken an obstinate, "negative" attitude toward the Japan-U.S. relationship, such as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. military bases, and joint military exercises. However, since the SDPJ became a ruling party, it seems it has been blindly obedient to Clinton's diplomacy and has developed "Yes-Sir-Diplomacy," which makes one feel uneasy. The commitment to the construction of light-water reactors must absolutely be a consent with a proviso -- "No, but."

Hypothetical Question No. 6
Security diplomacy must be viewed in bird's eye perspective.

In early November last year, I visited Washington to attend three sessions, including a seminar of the International Department, Johns Hopkins University, a security study meeting of the National Defense Research Center, and another. It was just before a midterm election.

I renewed my old friendship with security specialists who supported the Republican governments of Reagan and Bush for 12 years: Gaston Segur, former special assistant to the U.S. President for security affairs; Carl Jackson, former assistant to Vice President Dan Quayle for security affairs; Dag Paul, presidential assistant for the National Security Council; Richard Armitage, former assistant secretary of defense; James Lilley, former ambassador to Beijing; Fred Ikle, former undersecretary of defense [as published]; Professor Nathaniel Thayer at SAIS [School of Advanced International Studies], Johns Hopkins University. To the question "How long are you going to stay?" I answered "until 7 November." At this, they said, "Stay two days longer. We will show you a landslide victory for the Republican Party in the midterm election." They were indeed in hearty spirits.

It is said that President Clinton is a man of no principle, is influenced by each person he meets, and frequently changes his opinions. As presidential aides do not last long, there are constant vacancies in the Clinton administration. He does not have trustworthy advisers. Great expectations were held by the nation for his social reform when Clinton came on the stage. However, what he did first of all was to allow homosexuals to join the army; he failed to introduce an idealistic all-American health insurance system proposed by Hillary; he suffered a crushing defeat in the midterm election.

What my old friends said with one voice was that to begin with, Clinton's personnel management was a failure: "Clinton devoted himself solely to economics and trade issues, placed full confidence in Kantor, a court lawyer (divorce specialist), and had treated the security issue lightly. Recently he noticed the importance of the issue, appointed Professor Joseph Nye as the Pentagon's assistant for security affairs -- a post once held by Armitage -- and later appointed Professor Ezra Vogel as CIA national intelligence officer. They are all academics, not specialists of administrative work."

They leveled serious criticism at the "U.S.-North Korea accord": "The U.S.-North Korea accord is an unnecessary concession made for the first time since the appeasement policy adopted by British Prime Minister Chamberlain toward Hitler's Nazi Germany at the Munich conference in September 1938." "The U.S.-North Korea accord is the agreement which has landed Northeast Asia in difficulties."

I spoke directly to them, "Why did the United States not ban Nodong-1 missiles, and chemical and biological weapons, as a prior condition for negotiations for the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations?" "I had a distrust of the United States for the first time since the negotiations for the normalization of U.S.-China relations initiated by Nixon and Kissinger, without regard to Japan." At this, they answered that they really felt the same way.

I had a little doubt about the analogy that this "U.S.-North Korea accord" is the Munich conference and that Clinton is Chamberlain. Hitler existed at the time of the Munich conference, but Kim Il-song was dead at the time of the U.S.-North Korea accord; a dreadful dictator, a formidable enemy to be appeased was not in existence. Probably Clinton was fearful of the possibility of war, and was also afraid that if the 30,000 servicemen of the U.S. Army's Second Division in South Korea and their 35,000 family members were engulfed by an overwhelming southward-invasion of the North Korean army, and if there were a large number of casualties as a result, this would have a bad effect on the midterm election and the presidential election two years from now. All this may have made Clinton play the role of Chamberlain without Hitler at the "Munich conference." What Clinton feared was his own shadow. In the midst of our discussion, what former Assistant Defense Secretary Armitage said touched my heart. He said, "When the crisis on the Korean Peninsula became acute, Clinton was not ready to take military sanctions as an option both physically and spiritually." "Kim Yong-sam of South Korea was not ready either, nor was Murayama of Japan; the United States, Japan, and South Korea were in a state of `We are not ready'." "What is good about Clinton's U.S.-North Korea accord is that he earned necessary, valuable lead time for the United States, Japan, and South Korea so that the three countries could take countermeasures as a precaution against the worst case on the Korean Peninsula." These comments by the former U.S. assistant defense secretary, who had rich experience in actual combat, had persuasive power as a cool, valid way of thinking.

The Republican Party may win two years from now, and the Clinton line may be changed again. Is it all right for Japan to attach weight to such an unstable Clinton establishment? It is common knowledge that the security policies, pursued by U.S. President Clinton around the world recently, ended in failure, one after another, especially in the field of restoration and maintenance of peace against the low level strife which has occurred frequently all over the world, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

The U.S. forces, sent independently of the UN Security Council's PKO forces, ended with a miserable failure in Somalia. Taking Haiti's regional strife as a "clear and present danger," Clinton sent U.S. forces on his own presidential prerogatives, but international police activities there went on in perplexing confusion.

As an international police officer, the United States, burning with an ideal for peace, has been busy dealing with strifes breaking out in various parts of the world. However, it is regrettable to say that there are only a few examples of successful peacekeeping activities despite its goodwill. It is ironic that U.S. forces did not participate in the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia where the unified national election was conducted with good success under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] (headed by Representative Yasushi Akashi). It was a rare, successful UN operation, and the United States should have participated in it. The failure to participate was nothing but Clinton's misjudgment.

PLO Chairman 'Arafat, who had carried a gun for many years, and Israel's Rabin took a vow of peace and shook hands with each other in the presence of President Clinton. The news was published in bold headlines as a historical, peaceful settlement of 2,000 years of deep-rooted rancor harbored by the Jewish people and the Arabs. The so-called "Middle East peace settlement" became the object of the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize, probably at the strong suggestion of the United States. And the U.S. democratic administration made it known inside and outside the country as President Clinton's great contribution to peace. However, the joy was short-lived, for there were bloody clashes between armed Palestinian groups Algerian terrorists, who hijacked a French airliner in Marseilles, were shot to death by French storm troopers; as revenge, four innocent French and Belgian priests were killed in Algeria. Thus the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize became the superb parody of 1994, which disclosed the optimism of the peace diplomacy conducted by Clinton and Christopher -- amateurs in diplomacy, but who wanted to recover what Clinton had lost in his domestic policy. It is absolutely absurd to give a Nobel Peace Prize to the leader of international terrorism which actually took the lives of a great many people for the past several decades just because he stopped terrorism. President Clinton, who thought the handshake between 'Arafat and Rabin to be his diplomatic victory of the century, became the laughingstock of the world and greatly degraded the value of a Nobel prize.

Then came the "U.S.-North Korea accord" of last October. Some think that the "U.S.-North Korea accord" is a great diplomatic achievement of Clinton's diplomacy in that it eased the military tensions which were running high in Northeast Asia at that time, and secured peace; while others in Japan and the United States severely criticize Clinton's diplomacy as a failure second only to the extremely weak-kneed appeasement policy taken by British Prime Minister Chamberlain toward Hitler. It is true that the evaluation differs. If North Korea, which was about to go nuclear, can receive $4 billion in exchange for its abandonment of the program, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan will also ask for money.

Hypothetic Question No. 7
Could Japan buy peace with $1 billion?

Some Japanese intellectuals voiced the opinion: "We have bought peace on the Korean Peninsula with $1 billion. It is a bargain at that price." I doubt if we could buy peace with $1 billion. As Armitage pointed out aptly, what we could buy with $1 billion is the "lead time" necessary to prepare for a probable future crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Immediately after the "U.S.- North Korea accord," a U.S. Army helicopter which crossed the border into North Korea because of carelessness was immediately shot down by North Korea, which released a remarkable warlike statement by taking one surviving pilot hostage. The armistice line which extends 241 kilometers from east to west along the 38th parallel has a demilitarized zone 2 kilometers wide on in North and South Korea. It is said that North Korea has massed 70 percent of its about 1 million total land forces along the border between North and South Korea, and has densely deployed the greater part of about 12,500 antiaircraft weapons along the armistice line (according to a national defense white paper for 1994-1995 issued by the South Korean Defense Ministry). Under ordinary circumstances, especially in the midst of reduced tensions after the conclusion of the "U.S.-North Korea accord," North Korea should have used discretion. Instead, North Korea shot down the helicopter that crossed the border. We can hardly call the country's posture peace-oriented.

The criticism is being voiced in the United States that the "U.S.-North Korea accord" instead threatens world peace, because the accord is similar to the appeasement policy which was taken by British Prime Minister Chamberlain at the Munich conference and which touched off the dictator's military adventure. The criticisms levelled at Clinton by Republican Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, may be a little eccentric. However, Senate majority leader Bob Dole also expressed his opposition to the "U.S.-North Korea accord" in an NBC political program, saying: "It is unthinkable that this accord will be in the national interest of the United States." "We should hold a public Senate hearing to discuss its contents." In addition to saying that "North Korea is notorious for breaking its promises," Bob Dole showed his posture to oppose the Clinton administration by saying that "North Korea will profit much from this accord, but the United States will not." Senator Frank Murkowski (from Alaska) of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs says he cannot approve of the contents of the accord and that he intends to prevent the provision of heavy oil to North Korea in Congress. The Republican Party, which commands a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, is poised to submit an amendment bill, the essentials of which are: amendment of the U.S.-North Korea accord in the 104th Congress to be held in January; prohibition of a budget outlay for the construction of light-water reactors and the provision of heavy oil by the U.S. Government for North Korea if conditions, such as thorough nuclear inspections, are not observed by North Korea. In Japanese political circles, too, Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa of Shinshinto [New Frontier Party] appeared in a political TV program on 18 December and said, "Japan should not use a huge amount of taxes for the construction of light-water nuclear reactors when North Korea's nuclear issue is not clear." LDP former Vice President Michio Watanabe said, "We cannot put in a great deal of money unless North Korea guarantees that it will not develop nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the years to come." Watanabe showed his position that the prior condition for providing assistance for the construction of light-water reactors is for North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons and missiles. However, Komeito (Clean Government Party] and others expressed misgivings: "If we refuse assistance for the construction of light-water reactors, we will be taken as hardliners." "If we oppose the U.S.-North Korea accord, we will be regard as anti-American." The view that the assistance of $1 billion is inevitable tends to spread from the Foreign Ministry.

Now that Prime Minister Murayama has made a commitment at the APEC summit and at the Japan-U.S. summit in Washington to help construct light-water reactors, it is useless to discuss the the rights and wrongs of the matter. However, concerning the Nodong-1 missiles -- carriers of nuclear as well as biological and chemical weapons -- I think we should continue to demand strongly their eradication at future Japan-U.S. conferences, Japan-U.S.-South Korea conferences, as well as at Japan-North Korea conferences which may be held again in the future.

As a precaution against the time when even the U.S.-North Korea accord and assistance of $1 billion cannot buy peace, we should make good use of the valuable lead time which was bought with these. And, as a precaution against an emergency on the Korean Peninsula -- the worst case scenario in terms of Japan's security which could break out within this century [as published] -- we must study the national crisis management measures already mentioned above, such as a study on conditions relating to Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. They are: smooth rear support to be given to the U.S. Forces in Japan in case of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, measures for refugees, measures for exile, preparation of a rescue manual for Japanese residents in North Korea as well as families of U.S. servicemen in South Korea, and preparation of ACSA (the Acquisition and Corss-Servicing Agreement). It is the mission of government to examine these measures and systematize them in time of peace even though the "U.S.-North Korea accord" has been concluded.

Hypothetic Question No. 8
Envisioning an emergency on the Korean Peninsula in terms of the United Nations system

By making good use of the valuable lead time provided by the "U.S.-North Korea Accord," Japan must prepare for a probable emergency on the Korean Peninsula. However, there is one element which is definitely lacking in the preparation. That is the "United Nations."

What kind of measure should Japan take in case of the following: in case of a situation where it is necessary for the United Nations to take nonmilitary sanctions in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the UN Charter; that is, when North Korea refuses the IAEA's nuclear inspections and unilaterally declares withdrawal from the NPT like it did last year, and when the UN Security Council takes nonmilitary sanctions against North Korea in the areas of diplomacy, economics, transportation, and postal services; or when the UN Security Council, because of the inefficiency of sanctions under Article 41, decides to take military sanctions using land, sea and air forces as provided for in Article 42. In other words, even the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry have never practically studied as yet the role to be played by Japan when an emergency like the Gulf War is tackled on the Korea Peninsula by UN forces or by multinational forces with U.S. forces as the main body.

The idea of the "United Nations system" is lacking in Japan's security administration both legally and practically, which became a problem when Japan sent Self-Defense Forces' peacekeeping troops to Cambodia.

An emergency on the Korean Peninsula is included in Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; therefore, the people in charge of Japan's security administration have approached this problem in terms of a "study on conditions relating to Article 6."

However, since the end of the Cold War the world security organization has been changing from a system largely dependent on the United States as the police officer of the world to a peacekeeping operations system and a peace-enforcing units system called peacekeeping forces in Japan.

The UNTAC system, adopted by Representative Yasushi Akashi in Cambodia, succeeded in restoring peace without the participation of U.S. forces, and it was the UN's first victory. A glance at the actual situations of the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda shows that the UN Security Council is playing the leading role, that the five permanent member countries no longer abuse their veto right in voting resolutions at the Security Council as they did in the Cold War era -- at the time of the Gulf War, Russia cast a favorable vote, China abstained -- and that the UN system of solving conflicts through the multinaitonal forces system has taken root.

Then, if the situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes tense, the U.S. forces in South Korea will naturally be reinforced in accordance with the U.S.-South Korea Defense Treaty. And the United Nations will also convene the Security Council and take necessary measures for the resolution of conflicts in stages: "warnings" according to Article 39, Chapter 7 of the Charter; "provisional measures for the resolution of conflicts" according to Article 40 (which corresponds to the prior deployment of peace-enforceing units for the prevention of conflicts which are more heavily armed than peacekeeping operations troops, according to the "Agenda for Peace" by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali); "nonmilitary sanctions" according to Article 41; if necessary, "military sanctions" according to Article 42. In the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union and China would have exercised their veto right to help North Korea. Under the recent international situation which has become more sophisticated, they may abstain from voting. There is a strong probability that UN peacekeeping operations will begin in Northeast Asia with South Korea at center stage and Japan backstage.

Now, I would like to call the attention of readers to the actual situation of the UN forces in South Korea, about which most of Japan's intellectuals have forgotten.

Even now UN forces are in South Korea, raising a blue UN flag. As organs, they are: "UN Forces Command," "special advisors to the UN Forces commander-in-chief and the advisors' office," "Liaison Officer Corps of the UN Forces in South Korea," "commission members' group of the Military Armistice Commission [MAC]," "Secretariat of the MAC members' group," "Military Armistice Commission Joint Security Area Support Force," and "Honor Guards of the UN Forces Command." In addition, the "UN Forces Logistic Command" is stationed in Tokyo. The UN Forces commander is U.S. Army Lieutenant General Gary Luck. Moreover, Lt. General Luck serves concurrently as Commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea (the Army's Second Division and Air Force's Seventh Air Command) -- which are under the command of Admiral Richard Macke, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet -- and as commander of the U.S.-RKO Combined Forces in accordance with the U.S.-RKO Defense Treaty. The Liaison Officer Corps of the UN forces in South Korea is composed of 18 officers and six noncommissioned officers representing eight countries -- the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and Colombia -- and seven honor guards of the Thai Forces -- 31 in total. The combat force is the "Joint Security Area Support Force." Although its number is not released, the force is composed of several hundred personnel. Thus the total strength of these UN forces is about 1,000.

This means that if the situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes tense, those countries which have already dispatched their military personnel to South Korea will further dispatch headquarters' staff members, marines for guarding, supply personnel, signalmen, military policemen, and combat infantry troops, thus reorganizing combat units; or they will withdraw to Japan, South Korea's neighbor located just behind it, thus trying to make their headquarters function in Japan. Some countries may send their reinforcements straight to South Korea, but it is expected that others will send theirs by way of U.S. military bases in Japan or Japan's civilian sea and air ports. In either case, the establishment of a relationship between the Japanese Government and the UN troops will become inevitable.

In the case of the Korean war in 1950, each country's UN troops passed through Japan, which was under Allied military occupation. Being an occupied country, not a sovereign one, Japan did not conduct CIQ administration (customs, immigration, and quarantine), such as the inspection of passports, the confiscation of small arms and other prohibited goods, and the quarantine of animals and plants with regard to the transportation of weapons, the entrance and exit of armed soldiers, the carrying in and out of ordnance. Consequently, U.S. forces and UN forces could pass through Japan without reservation. However, if the situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes tense and if UN peacekeeping operations begin around the peninsula, naturally Japan must give its cooperation to the operations as a member nation of the United Nations. In case of a naval blockade, Japan must consider not only the provision of rear transportation assistance, such as the supply of fuel and perishable foods to naval vessels of countries participating in the blockade, the provision of sleeping facilities, but also the approval of right of transit. Japan must make a manual for these matters while there is still peace. Emergency laws regarding the action of the Self- Defense forces have yet to be promulgated, as well as legal exception clauses regarding the action of the U.S. forces in Japan. Therefore, Japan's security administration has given no thought to the provision of convenience to UN troops or UN peacekeeping operations, which is a regrettable state of affairs. We would like to ask Prime Minister Murayama to give thought to this matter.

Last of all, the most dreadful situation for Japan would be an overreaction by the younger generation in Japan when they find that North Korea, which seemed so trustworthy that no nuclear inspections had been conducted for five years, deceived Japan, the United States, and South Korea by declaring itself a nuclear nation and deploying Nodong-2 and Nodong-3 missiles for combat purposes, unmasking itself suddenly at the end of this century. It is true that today's younger generation is in a state of political apathy. No one displayed much enthusiasm even when Shinshinto was formed. Fifty-two percent of respondents supported no political party; the voting rate for an upper house by-election in Aichi Prefecture was 48 percent. Apolitical young men are clearly increasing in number. However, history proves that there is a possibility that political distrust in the existing political parties will suddenly change into radical nationalism one day.

When the younger generation in Japan learn that Japanese political leaders who were born during 1926-1936 had been persuaded by President Clinton -- by Gallucci, in reality, who is an ambassador-level representative -- to provide $1 billion to North Korea for the construction of light-water reactors only to be deceived and threatened by the country's nuclear weapons, they will never tolerate "Japan's Chamberlain," Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, who has been steeped in ideological, sentimental pacifism, who has been deficient in the courage to face up to reality, and who has failed to establish a farsighted security policy for Japan. And, when a great chorus of nationalism -- "If North Korea goes nuclear, we should also go nuclear for the existence of the Japanese race," arises, no one will be able to stop it. To prevent such a bad dream from becoming a reality, Prime Minister Murayama should, standing on the great principle of nuclear nonproliferation, take courage to strongly request that North Korea eradicate Nodong-1 missiles and chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons.

Natural Disasters and Crisis Management

On the morning when this article was compiled, a great earthquake broke out in the south of Hyogo Prefecture. The media continuously reported ever-increasing disasters, and in a few days the death toll surpassed the 3,769 lives lost in the Fukui earthquake (28 June 1948), which bred the largest number of sufferers since the end of World War II. The earthquake caused record-breaking disasters in terms of burned districts and the number of fallen houses. A search for the missing is still being conducted with utmost effort, and the sufferers are still living in shelters. The media is daily reporting the disastrous scenes of the locale as well as the wretched conditions of the sufferers; as a result, many people all over Japan are supporting the sufferers. Whenever a disaster or a great earthquake occurs, the media criticizes the ineptitude and the problems of the government and administrative agencies in dealing with the matter. I have experienced many crises as a government official, so I have taken every opportunity to give suggestions regarding the crisis management of various cases. Next time, I would like to point out the problems of the "earthquake in the south of Hyogo Prefecture" via the pages of this magazine.

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