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What Japan Must Do To Abide by Security Pact

Tokyo SHOKUN by Atsuyuki Sassa, director, Cabinet National Security Office
Aug 94 pp 26-37

Abrogation of Japan-U.S. Security Pact After U.S.-North Korea Detente--10 Rules of Crisis Management To Avoid Worst Scenario

The Korean peninsula crisis is alternately projecting hope and fear in the hearts of the Japanese people by vacillating between a peaceful settlement through "dialogue" and a forceful settlement through "UN sanctions."

The situation surrounding the suspicion of nuclear development by North Korea clearly indicates its posture of defiance against the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the United Nations, and its readiness to face a head-to-head showdown with President Clinton of the United States, its principal adversary, at a U.S.-North Korea summit meeting. Immediately prior to the Pacific war, outside pressure was applied against Japan in the form of the "ABCD encirclement network." As is well known, A=America, B=Britain, C=China, and D=Dutch. A diplomatic offensive was launched against Japan, which refused to halt its invasion of the Chinese mainland, in the form of economic sanctions including a ban on exports of oil and scrap iron and a freeze on Japan's overseas assets, which triggered the Pacific war. Is North Korea today not falling into a strong delusion of being subjected to an "AJK encirclement network" consisting of A (America), J (Japan), and K (South Korea), like Japan was once upon a time?

The fiercely agitative speech broadcast by Radio Pyongyang that it "considers economic sanctions to be a declaration of war" strikes the listener with a strong sense of repugnance and fear.

Until the end of the 1980's, North Korea was a negligible and insignificant Far Eastern ministate as a military threat from the standpoint of U.S. global strategy.

For a long time, the U.S. State Department had categorized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [North Korea] together with Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Cuba as nations providing state support for international terrorism in "low-profile conflict." Although it was internationally a political criminal state that provided funds, weapons, and passports to hijackers of the Arab guerrillas and the Japanese Red Army, it was never counted as a military threat.

It was on 29 May 1993 that North Korea, which was ignored in terms of the U.S. global security policy, appeared in the spotlight as a military threat and attracted world attention. North Korea test-fired the Nodong-1 ballistic missile--a further revised version of the remodeled C-type Scud missile under development (range of about 500 km) with a cruise range of about 1,000 km--from its east coast into the middle of the Japan Sea. Prior to that, the world knew that it had invested about 25 percent of its GDP [gross domestic product] to boost its military power and it had constructed nuclear facilities in Yongbyon with financial and technical support from China in line with plans to develop nuclear arms. However, no one showed any concern.

Rise as a Military Threat in the Far East

In the post-cold war era, the global threats have vanished and U.S. strategy has shifted to coping with local threats. In its newly devised "bottom-up" strategy, the Pentagon lists "coping with invasions in the Mideast, Southeast Asia, North Korea, and elsewhere" as an important task, and mentions the six nations of "Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba" as posing potential threats against the United States. Thus, North Korea, which had been categorized until the 1980's as a supporter of international terrorism by the U.S. State Department's antiterrorism division, was elevated to the position of a top military threat equipped with CBR (chemical, biological and nuclear weapons) capability due to its possession of the Nodong-1.

The United States has a propensity to always brand some nation as a "pernicious source of multiple evils" and to move impulsively on that basis. During the Carter administration, Iran's al-Khomeyni was the source of evil. During the Reagan era, hatred was directed toward Libya's Qadhdhafi. During Bush's term of office from the Gulf crisis to the Gulf war, Saddam Husayn of Iraq who was given support in the Iraq-Iran war became the devil incarnate. It now appears that the pendulum of history has swung back to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Far East, the old devil of 44 years ago that had been forgotten for a long time but suddenly returned to the spotlight. President Clinton has devoted himself to the policy of nuclear nonproliferation since he assumed office and has adopted an extremely severe posture against all developing nations that plan nuclear armament, including Saddam Husayn of Iraq and al-Qadhdhafi of Libya. At the outset of the North Korean crisis, President Clinton clarified his strong position of being prepared to take military options. Pinpoint bombing of the nuclear complex at Yongbyon with Tomahawk cruise missiles by the Seventh Fleet to tactically minimize U.S. personnel casualties was rumored. When this writer visited the United States last year, he was impressed by the U.S. naval authorities, who stated: "We are ready. The rest is up to the President's decision."

Beginning early this year, however, President Clinton's statements gradually steered toward a flexible war-or-peace posture. They began to show nuances of appeasement such as "the door is always open for negotiations," "caution is required due to the major impact on Japan and South Korea of military options," and "we will agree to a high-level U.S.-North Korea conference based on acceptance of IAEA inspections." This trend became pronounced during Defense Secretary Perry's visit to Japan this spring. According to certain news sources, Secretary Perry's view is as follows. "Perhaps North Korea has already extracted sufficient plutonium to produce two or three nuclear bombs. However, if North Korea freezes its future nuclear arms program, it is wiser to put the past aside, force it into economic bankruptcy and wait for it to self-destruct as in the case of Ceausescu of Romania."

North Korean Version of SS-20

From the U.S. standpoint, North Korea's suspected nuclear development program and the development of its "Nodong" ICBM missile became a North Korean version of the deployment of the SS-20. During the 1970's, the former Soviet Union actually deployed its political nuclear weapon, the SS-20, which could not reach the United States, its arch enemy, but was within firing range of the NATO nations, Japan, and South Korea. To counter the SS-20 which was aimed toward separating the NATO nations from the United States, the United States deployed the "Pershing-2" intermediate-range missile in the European theater. It thus eased the fears of the NATO nations and ultimately solved the problem of the INF [intermediate nuclear force] strategy through mutual abolition of the SS-20 and the Pershing-2 missiles. The episode of Japan's prime minister at the time, who utterly lacked political-military knowledge and awareness about the issue and was ignored at the summit conference, is well known.

The development of the Nodong-1 by North Korea was really a North Korean version of the INF SS-20. The Nodong-1, which cannot reach the United States or the NATO nations is a political weapon that will pose an extremely potent threat to Japan and South Korea, and also to the U.S. Forces deployed in the Korean peninsula and the Far East. It has become a truly awkward problem in that, whereas a global threat can be deterred by strategies of mutual verification and destruction with ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], their power cannot be fully effective against a local mini-military state. The United States has continued its commitments to the security of Japan and South Korea for a long time through the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense assistance pact. However, if North Korea becomes desperate and marches southward in a ground war as the result of bad military options, the 35,000 troops of the U.S. Army 2d Division and the 30,000 family members will suffer casualties. In such a case, the U.S. Congress and public opinion will lean toward opposition against Clinton, inviting distrust of President Clinton's leadership, which is beset by scandals and lack of consistency, and this may cause the Democratic Party to lose its ruling power in the next presidential election. Consequently, it will not be easy to enforce military sanctions against North Korea.

[Passage omitted]

It is therefore difficult to conceive that Kim Il-song, who misjudged the world situation in the Korean war and subsequently suffered international isolation for more than 40 years, would suddenly one day cross the 38th Parallel and perform the suicidal act of moving southward in today's post-cold war era when he absolutely cannot depend on support from Russia and China. Nor is it conceivable that, although they are within firing range of the Nodong-1, Japan and the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan will be subjected to a sneak missile attack. Also, despite the possible extraction of plutonium at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, it is doubtful whether the Nodong-1, which is reported to be 88 inches in diameter, has been perfected as a precision nuclear missile warhead with a triggering device attachable. It is impossible to deploy it for actual warfare without real testing.

We may go so far as to surmise that the state secret, which North Korea is stubbornly attempting to protect at the risk of UN sanctions, is accompanied by the negative fact that its nuclear arms development has still not made sufficient progress, and that it will require years before deployment for actual warfare.

Consequently, North Korea rejects interference by the IAEA and the United Nations and tried to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States by dealing directly with its arch foe. It is attempting to win recognition from Japan and the other summit nations and to acquire economic aid--particularly wartime reparations from Japan--through high-handed negotiations. With the salvation of North Korea's economy, which is on the brink of disaster, it will use acceptance of inspections or an international commitment to abstain from military use as its card in negotiations which it will sell at the highest price.

[Passage omitted]