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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


Security Council

11 October 1995


1.    The Secretary-General  has  the  honour  to transmit  to  the Security
Council  a  report  submitted  by  the  Executive  Chairman  of  the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant  to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
2.   The  present  report  is the  eighth  submitted under  paragraph  8  of
Security Council resolution  715 (1991)  of 11  October 1991,  by which  the
Council requested the Secretary-General to submit  a report to the  Security
Council every six months on the  implementation of the Special  Commission's
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification  of Iraq's compliance with  the
relevant parts of section  C of Security Council  resolution 687 (1991).  It
updates the  information  contained in  the  first  seven reports  (S/23801,
S/24661,   S/25620,  S/26684,   S/1994/489,   S/1994/1138  and   Corr.1  and
3.   Further  information  concerning  developments  since the  last  report
submitted  under resolution  715 (1991)  is contained  in the  report to the
Security Council of 20 June 1995 (S/1995/494),  the ninth report provided in
accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991).
95-30615 (E)   141095/...
        Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation
        of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and
        verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)
  Paragraphs  Page
I.  INTRODUCTION .........................................1 - 64
  EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN TO IRAQ ...........................7 - 286
  A.  Summary of the Executive Chairman's visits .......  7 - 86
  B.  Cooperation, ultimatum and disclosures ...........  9 - 206
  C.  Some consequences of recent disclosures ..........  21 - 289
    1.  Unilateral destruction by Iraq ...............21 - 229
    2.  Documentation ................................23 - 2710
    3.  Rationale for Iraq's biological and chemical
      weapons ......................................     2811
III.  MISSILE ACTIVITIES ...................................29 - 4612
  A.  The monitoring system ............................  29 - 3712
  B.  Destruction of proscribed items ..................      3813
  C.  Proscribed programme .............................  39 - 4614
IV.  CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES ..................................47 - 6316
  A.  The monitoring system ............................  47 - 5116
  B.  Proscribed programme .............................  52 - 6317
V.  BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES ................................64 - 8019
  A.  The monitoring system ............................  64 - 6719
  B.  Proscribed programme .............................  68 - 8020
VI.  NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ...................................81 - 8528
CONTENTS (continued)
  Paragraphs  Page
VII.  OTHER ACTIVITIES .....................................86 - 9529
  A.  Export/import mechanism ..........................  86 - 9229
  B.  National implementation measures .................      9331
  C.  Aerial surveillance ..............................  94 - 9531
IX.  CONCLUSION ...........................................106 - 11633
Appendix.  Inspection schedule .........................................36
/...  S/1995/864
1.   The six months which  have elapsed since  the last  report submitted to
the Security  Council under paragraph 8  of resolution 715  (1991) have been
among the most  eventful in the history of  the Special Commission, both  in
respect of relations with  the Government of Iraq  and of the  progress made
in  obtaining information  regarding  Iraq's programmes  for  production  of
weapons  of mass  destruction  and missiles  with a  range greater  than 150
kilometres.   While the present report  is submitted  pursuant to resolution
relating  to  ongoing  monitoring  and  verification,  the  Commission   has
repeatedly  pointed out that a  full understanding of all  aspects of Iraq's
programmes for weapons of mass destruction is essential to the planning  and
the  operation  of  an  effective  system  of  monitoring  to  ensure Iraq's
compliance with  its undertaking not to  use, develop,  construct or acquire
any  of the items  proscribed to  it under paragraphs 8  and 9 of resolution
687  (1991), namely "(a) all chemical and biological  weapons and all stocks
of agents  and  all related  subsystems  and  components and  all  research,
development, support and  manufacturing facilities related thereto; (b)  all
ballistic  missiles with a  range greater  than 150  kilometres, and related
major parts and repair and production facilities".
2.  While describing  the developments which have taken place in the conduct
and strengthening  of monitoring  operations since April  1995, the  present
report  contains   a  detailed  account  of  the  new  information  obtained
regarding Iraq's  prohibited  programmes  and  its probable  impact  on  the
monitoring system.   In the period  under review,  Iraq has taken  important
decisions  to acknowledge  its offensive  biological weapons  programme  and
documents  are being  obtained  in  all areas.    However, much  of the  new
information contradicts  earlier declarations by  Iraq and some  assessments
made  by the Commission  now must be revised.   A more enduring and coherent
explanation  of past activities  must be  provided by Iraq in  the new full,
final  and complete  disclosures which  it is  to submit  in all  areas,  as
described more fully elsewhere in this report.
3.   The Commission's  report in April  1995 (S/1995/284) contained,  in its
paragraphs  3  and  4,  a  comprehensive   description  of  the  concept  of
operations  underlying  the Commission's  monitoring system.    It is  worth
while, in  the light of  developments in the last six  months, to recall the
sections  in  that  description  which  explain  the  importance  of  a full
knowledge of Iraq's prohibited programmes for  the monitoring system and for
confidence in its effectiveness and comprehensiveness.  These require: 
"Possession by the  Commission of a full  picture of Iraq's  past programmes
and a  full accounting  of the  facilities, equipment,  items and  materials
associated with  those past programmes, in  conjunction with full  knowledge
of the  disposition of dual-purpose items  currently available  to Iraq, the
technologies  acquired by  Iraq in  pursuing  the  past programmes,  and the
supplier  networks  it  established  to   acquire  those  elements   of  the
programmes  that it  could  not  acquire  indigenously.    This  information
provides the  baseline data from which  ongoing monitoring and  verification
 "Knowledge of the level of  technology attained by Iraq,  of the production
and acquisition methods it  used and of the  materials and equipment  it had
available are all  key to designing  a system of  monitoring that  addresses
issues  of concern  and focuses  monitoring effort  where it  would be  most
effective and  efficient.  For example, within Iraq, the system should focus
more of its efforts  on those technologies and  production methods that Iraq
is known  to have  mastered than on  technologies and methods  that Iraq  is
known  not to  have  mastered,  whereas,  for the  export/import  monitoring
regime, the  converse would  be true, with  effort focusing  on those  items
that Iraq would have  to import in order to reactivate a proscribed  weapons
programme.   Clearly, knowing  where to  focus effort  requires knowledge of
what Iraq would have achieved in its past programmes;
"Similarly,  knowledge of the  procurement methods  and routes  used by Iraq
for its past programmes is  key to the design of an effective and  efficient
export/import  monitoring regime.   This  system  should  be designed  to be
effective against the procurement  routes and methods that  Iraq is known to
have  used in  the past.   Testing whether it  is, is predicated  on knowing
those routes and methods;
"Full accounting for the materials, items  and equipment associated with the
past  programmes is  directly related  to  what  assets should  be monitored
under the  system.   Dual-purpose materials,  items and  equipment from  the
past  programmes   must  be   monitored,  along   with  other   dual-purpose
capabilities available to Iraq.  Uncertainties  relating to the accuracy  or
completeness of this accounting will  consequently lead to  uncertainties as
to  whether  the  ongoing  monitoring  and  verification  system  is  indeed
monitoring  all  the   materials,  items  and  equipment  which  should   be
monitored".  (ibid., para. 3 (a))
4.   Under Security  Council resolutions 687,  707 and 715  (1991), Iraq  is
obliged  to  provide  the  above  information,  which  the  Commission  then
verifies  through its inspection,  monitoring and analysis activities.  Iraq
is required  to update its declarations  on its  dual-purpose activities and
capabilities every six months.
5.  The  description in the present report  of the new information  received
from Iraq in the period under review is intended to  assist in assessing the
extent  to which such  information, together  with that previously obtained,
contributes to  meeting the  criteria set out  above.  This,  in turn,  will
bear upon the assessment of the  effectiveness and comprehensiveness of  the
monitoring system  and  the  extent  to which  it  may  have to  be  further
modified  and augmented to take  account of recent developments.  Because of
the challenges  to the  monitoring system  implied in  the new  revelations,
this  report  contains,  under each  separate  weapons  heading,  a detailed
description of the operations of the newly designed monitoring system.
6.  The present  report, after summarizing relations with Iraq in the period
under review,  contains chapters on the  various areas  of responsibility of
the  Special Commission,  namely those  relating  to  missiles with  a range
greater  than  150  kilometres  and  to  chemical  and  biological  weapons.
Further chapters cover  the Commission's support and other  responsibilities
in the nuclear  area; other activities,  such as  those in  relation to  the
export/import mechanism;  and finance, organization  and air  support.   The
final chapter contains the conclusion of  the Commission on the developments
which have occurred in the last six months.
A.  Summary of the Executive Chairman's visits
7.   During the period under  review, the Executive  Chairman has paid  five
visits to  Baghdad to maintain  contact with the  most senior  levels of the
Iraqi  Government  and  to  seek to  expedite  the work  of  the Commission,
particularly in relation  to Iraq's prohibited  programmes, by  pressing the
Government to follow a  policy of complete and  frank disclosure.   This was
specially  important in  respect  of Iraq's  biological  weapons  programme,
which the  Commission's experts  had determined  to be  of very  significant
proportions, despite Iraq's constant denials that  it had done anything more
than limited research.
8.   The Executive  Chairman's visits  took place as  follows:  29  May to 1
June, 30 June to 2  July, 4 to 6 August, 17 to 20 August and 29 September to
1  October 1995.    Two visits  were  also paid  to  Baghdad by  the  Deputy
Executive  Chairman, from  14 to  17  May and  17 to  20 September  1995, to
address issues  relating to  Iraq's prohibited  programmes.   Information on
those visits,  from April to 1 June  1995, will be found in the Commission's
June 1995 report (S/1995/494, paras. 4-10).
B.  Cooperation, ultimatum and disclosures
9.   The  visits  listed above  illustrate  the  rocky  road of  cooperation
between  Iraq  and  the  Commission  in   the  period  under  review,  where
indications that Iraq was contemplating ceasing such cooperation  culminated
in an ultimatum,  early in  August 1995, that  such cooperation would  cease
if, by 31 August 1995, no progress was  made in the Security Council  in the
direction of easing or  lifting the sanctions and the oil embargo.  However,
the ultimatum  was  withdrawn  following the  departure of  General  Hussein
Kamel Hassan  from Baghdad and his receipt of asylum in Jordan.  The General
had,  among a large  number of  important responsibilities,  been in charge,
over  considerable periods of  time, of  Iraq's programmes in  the areas now
proscribed to  it.   Since his  departure,  the Deputy  Prime Minister,  Mr.
Tariq  Aziz, has  stated  that  Iraq has  adopted a  new policy  of complete
cooperation  and transparency  with  the Commission  and  the  International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without any time-limit.
10.   In the  first of the  Executive Chairman's visits,  at the  end of May
1995,  the Deputy  Prime Minister  of Iraq  sounded  a  warning that,  if no
prospect appeared  for reintegrating Iraq  into the international  community
through the easing or lifting  of sanctions and the oil embargo, it would be
difficult  for  Iraq  to justify  the  expense and  the  effort involved  in
cooperation  with the Commission  and IAEA.   Iraq  required statements from
the Commission that the chemical weapons  and missile files were  closed and
the  monitoring system was operational, and from IAEA  that the nuclear file
was closed.  If  Iraq received such assurances and thus judged the prospects
for reintegration to  be positive, it would, in  late June, address the  one
outstanding issue of significance, the biological  issue.  In response,  and
subsequently in his June 1995 report  to the Security Council  (S/1995/494),
the  Chairman  stated that  the  bulk  of  what  was  required to  implement
paragraphs 8 to 10 of Security Council resolution  687 (1991) with regard to
chemical  weapons and  missiles had  been  achieved.   However, in  view  of
Iraq's late  and incomplete declarations, a longer period had been needed to
identify  all aspects of  Iraq's programmes  than might  otherwise have been
required.    Furthermore,  the  major  area  of  Iraq's  biological  weapons
programme remained non-disclosed.   Monitoring was operational in all areas.
Those uncertainties which remained in the  missile and chemical areas needed
to  be resolved and in order  to do so  the Commission would continue to use
its rights under the relevant Security  Council resolutions and the exchange
of letters  of  7  and  14  May  1991  on  the  facilities,  privileges  and
immunities of the Commission in Iraq.
11.   Upon the  Executive Chairman's  arrival in  Baghdad on  30 June  1995,
Deputy  Prime Minister  Tariq Aziz  said  that  his Government  had reviewed
carefully the  Commission's report  of June 1995.   While it  had found  the
report to  contain both  negative and  positive elements,  it had  concluded
that the positive elements  were such that Iraq  would now address the issue
of its  biological weapons  programme. The following  day, on  1 July  1995,
Iraq made a brief oral presentation in the  course of which it  acknowledged
an offensive  biological weapons  programme, including  the production  of a
number of  biological agents, but denied  the weaponization  of such agents.
The Chairman welcomed this disclosure but expressed  the view that it needed
to be  augmented,  particularly as  regards  weaponization,  and had  to  be
presented  to the  Commission in  the form  of a  full, final  and  complete
disclosure as  required by Security Council resolution 707 (1991).  A fuller
account  of this  and subsequent  disclosures relating to  Iraq's biological
weapons programme will be found in chapter V of the present report.
12.  Iraq's decision to disclose  its offensive biological weapons programme
appeared  to indicate  that it  was moving  away from  its warning  of  non-
cooperation, expressed  by Mr.  Tariq Aziz  during the Executive  Chairman's
preceding visit to Baghdad.  However,  this situation was abruptly  reversed
in the  course of July 1995.   On 17 July,  President Saddam  Hussein made a
speech in  Baghdad in which  he indicated  that his  Government would  cease
cooperation  with the  Security Council  if there  were no  progress in  the
Council towards the lifting  of sanctions and the oil embargo.  No  deadline
was given by the  President for such progress.   However, a few  days later,
in Cairo, the Foreign  Minister of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf, made a
speech in which he stated that 31 August 1995 was the deadline.
13.  The  Executive Chairman arrived in Baghdad  for the third of his visits
in the period under review on  4 August 1995.  Iraq delivered to him what it
stated  to be  its full,  final  and complete  disclosure of  its biological
weapons programme, still  denying that any of  the agents produced  had been
weaponized. In a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz,  on
5  August,  the latter  stressed  to  the Chairman  that  Iraq  would  cease
cooperation with  the Security Council  and the Commission if  there were no
progress, by 31 August  1995, towards lifting sanctions and the oil embargo.
The Deputy Prime Minister asked the  Chairman to convey this  information to
the Security Council upon  his return to United  Nations Headquarters.   The
Chairman reached New York on 7  August, and immediately thereafter  received
a  message from Mr. Tariq Aziz, through the Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations,  that the deadline was  serious and that the Chairman
should inform  the Council  accordingly.  The  Chairman did so,  in an  oral
briefing to the Council on 10 August.
14.  Three days  previously, on 7 August 1995, General Hussein Kamel  Hassan
had left Baghdad, arriving in  Amman the following day.   On 13 August,  the
Executive Chairman  received a  letter from  General Amer  Rashid al-Ubeidi,
Minister  of  Oil and  former  Director  of  the Military  Industrialization
Corporation (MIC),  inviting him to  return to Baghdad.   In  the letter, it
was stated  that the Government had  ascertained that  General Hussein Kamel
Hassan had  been  responsible  for hiding  important information  on  Iraq's
prohibited  programmes from the  Commission and  IAEA by  ordering the Iraqi
technical personnel not to disclose  such information and also not to inform
Mr. Tariq Aziz or  General Amer of these instructions.  An identical  letter
was addressed  to  the  Director General  of  IAEA.   In  a message  to  the
Chairman  on 14  August,  Mr.  Tariq Aziz  stated that  the deadline  was no
longer in effect.
15.   The  Executive Chairman and  the Leader  of the  IAEA Action  Team, in
response to  the invitations  from Iraq,  arrived in  Baghdad  on 17  August
1995.  On the evening of that day, a plenary meeting  was held with an Iraqi
delegation  led by  the Deputy  Prime  Minister,  and including  the Foreign
Minister, Mr.  Al-Sahaf,  the Minister  of  Oil,  General Amer,  the  Under-
Secretary  of the Foreign  Ministry, Dr.  Riyadh Al-Qaysi,  and other senior
officials.   Mr. Tariq Aziz made an initial statement in the course of which
he repeated  that General Hussein Kamel Hassan had, unbeknown  to the senior
levels  of  the  Iraqi leadership,  hidden  information  on  the  prohibited
programmes which Iraq would  now disclose to the  Commission and IAEA.  Iraq
had  decided on  a  policy  of cooperation  and full  transparency  with the
Commission  and  IAEA,  without  imposing   any  time-limit,  and   also  of
cooperation  and good-neighbourliness  with  the States  of  the  region and
elsewhere and  of economic  development in Iraq  itself.   Following on  the
plenary  meeting,   in  a  meeting  devoted  to  Iraq's  biological  weapons
programme,  Iraq  for  the  first  time  disclosed  a  much  more  extensive
programme than that contained in  its full, final and complete disclosure of
early  August  1995,  admitting  weaponization  immediately  prior  to   the
outbreak of  the  Gulf war,  including  the  filling of  biological  warfare
agents into 166 bombs and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads.
16.  In the course of  the following two days, Iraq made further disclosures
in regard  to other prohibited  programmes, including indigenous  production
of  Scud-type  missile engines,  assembled  from  both imported  and locally
produced parts, and the  testing of such engines.  The significance of this,
and its  consequences for  Iraq's previous  statements regarding  unilateral
destruction of proscribed materials, is discussed  in paragraphs 21, 22  and
44 below.
17.   On  20 August  1995, at  the  conclusion  of the  Executive Chairman's
visit,  a considerable cache  of documents  and other  materials was located
and taken possession of by the Commission, as described in paragraphs 24  to
27 below.
 18.   The Executive  Chairman returned  to New  York  through Jordan,  thus
affording the  opportunity  to meet  General  Hussein  Kamel Hassan  and  to
discuss  with  him Iraq's  programmes  in  the  proscribed  fields.   Useful
information was obtained.
19.  Both  during and  after the  Executive Chairman's  mid-August visit  to
Baghdad,   expert  teams   in   all  areas   of  the   Special  Commission's
responsibility held discussions with their  Iraqi counterparts.  The missile
and  biological  teams   obtained  much  valuable   information,  indicating
programmes  larger or  more  advanced  in every  dimension  than  previously
declared.   In  the chemical  field,  after  being confronted  with evidence
found by  the chemical team  in the new  documentation, Iraq  acknowledged a
much  larger and  more advanced  programme  than  hitherto admitted  for the
production and storage of  the chemical warfare agent  VX.  In  this regard,
the Deputy Executive  Chairman visited Baghdad from 17 to 20 September 1995,
in the course  of which he pointed out to Iraqi officials, at senior levels,
the gravity of the clear deception of Iraq  in its spring 1995  declarations
to the  Commission concerning the  VX nerve  agent in  particular. This  had
been  reported to  the Security  Council in  June 1995  and the  intentional
deception would have to be underscored in the current report.
20.  On  29 September 1995, the Executive  Chairman arrived in Baghdad,  for
his  last visit  in  the period  under  review,  to  assess with  the  Iraqi
authorities the situation  resulting from the recent disclosures,  following
on  the departure of  General Hussein Kamel Hassan.   The Chairman expressed
the view, in the various meetings which he  held, that it was in Iraq's best
interests to provide everything now,  rather than to drag out the uncovering
of  information which  would have  an  increasingly  negative impact.   Iraq
undertook to  do its best,  and the Deputy  Prime Minister,  Mr. Tariq Aziz,
pledged his  Government's cooperation and full  openness with  regard to the
implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
C.  Some consequences of recent disclosures
1.  Unilateral destruction by Iraq
21.  Iraq's decision in 1991 to undertake,  in violation of Security Council
resolution 687  (1991), the  unilateral destruction  of various  elements of
its prohibited programmes has had the  most severe consequences in delaying,
and in rendering much more complicated,  any determination by the Commission
that  it has a  complete picture  of those programmes and  has accounted for
all the  significant components thereof.   This destruction  has been stated
by Iraq  to cover all  three areas of  proscribed missiles  and chemical and
biological programmes.   Unilateral  destruction of  weapons, equipment  and
materials,  including   agent  and   precursors,   has  made   verification,
particularly  of  the   quantities  involved,  extremely  difficult.     The
Commission has thus  pressed for any documentation Iraq may have relating to
such destruction, including the orders to carry it out and field reports  on
how those orders were executed.
22.  The picture is further complicated by certain recent disclosures  which
show that  Iraq has used alleged unilateral destruction to cover up elements
of its prohibited programmes  which it wished  to keep concealed.   Possibly
the  most important  example of  this,  uncovered  to date,  relates to  the
missile field.  Iraq declared in 1992 that  it had unilaterally destroyed 89
Scud/Al Hussein missiles.  Recent analysis  by the Commission's experts, and
admissions by Iraq,  now reveal that only 83  missiles were so destroyed  in
1991.   The figure  was inflated  by Iraq  to 89,  in order  to conceal  its
indigenous production  of engines  for  Scud-type missiles,  as reported  in
paragraphs 43  and 44 of the present  report.  This example will require the
Commission  to take  a new  look at  all Iraq's  declarations  on unilateral
destruction  and for it  to press  for documentation and any  other means of
verification of such declarations.
2.  Documentation
23.  The Commission  has, on every available occasion, stressed to Iraq that
the handing over of documentation relating  to its prohibited programmes  is
the  best   and  quickest  means  for   the  Commission   to  verify  Iraq's
declarations  relating to  the programmes.    Iraq,  however, has  sought to
maintain  that, some  time  in  1991, it  issued  an order  to  destroy  all
documentation  on those  programmes.   The  Commission's attempts  to obtain
evidence of such an  order, and to  ascertain precisely when it was  issued,
have been  unsuccessful.   The Commission  has remained  sceptical that  any
such  wholesale destruction  ever  took place.    It  has  so told  Iraq  on
numerous occasions.   It  was not  conceivable that  all  evidence would  be
destroyed of  major  and very  costly  scientific  research and  engineering
undertakings, representing billions  of dollars in investment and  countless
manhours of work.
24.  On 20 August 1995, at the  conclusion of the Executive Chairman's visit
to Baghdad (17-20 August), the Chairman,  in a public statement,  complained
that, while  very  significant new  information  had  been provided,  not  a
single document,  which could help in  verifying that  information, had been
handed  over.    Shortly  after  that  statement  was made,  and  while  the
Chairman's team  was preparing  for departure  to  the Habbaniyah  airfield,
General Amer Rashid al-Ubeidi contacted the  Chairman and requested that, on
his way to  the airfield, he visit a farm  which the General stated to  have
belonged  to General Hussein Kamel  Hassan, where items of great interest to
the Commission could be  found.  On arrival  at the  farm, in addition to  a
number  of shipping  containers with  miscellaneous equipment  in  them, the
Chairman and his team  found, in a locked chicken house, numerous metal  and
wooden  boxes   which  were   packed  with   documentation,  together   with
microfiches, computer  diskettes,  videotapes,  photographs  and  prohibited
hardware  components.  Orders  were immediately  issued to  the Commission's
personnel, who  had been brought  to the site,  to secure  this material and
transfer it to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.
25.   Examination of the contents of  the boxes at  the Centre revealed well
over half a million pages  of documentation.  While most of this related  to
the nuclear  area, a  large amount  concerned the  chemical, biological  and
missile areas.   This documentation  has now  been inventoried and  is being
arranged, after scanning, on a priority basis  for examination.  The initial
assessment  of the  Commission  is that  the bulk  of  the material  in  the
missile, chemical  and biological fields  comes from a  number of the  sites
where Iraq's  proscribed programmes  had been  carried out.   The amount  of
material  varies from  area to  area,  being  more comprehensive  in certain
areas than in others.  However,  documentation from the Headquarters  of the
Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC)  is not included,  nor are  the
relevant archives of the  Ministry of Defence.  From recent statements  made
by  senior Iraqi  officials, the  Ministry's  records  are still  intact and
26.   Since  the  discovery of  the  documents,  Iraq  has admitted  to  the
Commission's personnel that, in  the summer of 1991, orders were issued by a
"high  authority"  to  the  directors  of   the  sites  involved  in  Iraq's
proscribed  programmes  to   protect  "important  documents"  -  which   was
understood to relate to  the technology of production  - by packing them, in
a  very  brief   period  of  time,   and  delivering   them  on  demand   to
representatives from the special security  organizations.  This  delivery is
said  to  have taken  place  without  written orders  or  the  provision  of
receipts by the  representatives of those organizations when they  collected
the packed  documents.   Iraq's original  claim that  all documentation  was
destroyed is thus patently false.
27.  The Commission doubts that the materials  obtained are all those  which
were  gathered  under the  protection  order  issued in  1991.    More  such
documentation must  still exist, particularly  in certain significant  areas
such  as  production records,  Iraq's  procurement  networks and  sources of
supply.  Also, the relevant MIC  headquarters documentation and archives  of
the Ministry  of Defence  are missing.   These are materials  which must  be
handed  over if  the Commission  is to  be able  to undertake  a  speedy and
thorough  verification  of  Iraq's  declarations  regarding  its  prohibited
programmes.  The  Commission, nevertheless, acknowledges that the  materials
already   obtained,  together   with  the   admission  that   the   relevant
documentation  was  not  all  destroyed,  is  one  of  the  most significant
breakthroughs in the four years of its operations in Iraq, and will  provide
an invaluable  source  of verification  material.    What has  been  started
should be  completed by handing  over the  missing documentation  identified
3.  Rationale for Iraq's biological and chemical weapons
28.  Iraq's intentions  with regard to the operational use of its biological
and chemical weapons have been subject  to conflicting presentations by  the
Iraqi  authorities in the  period under  review.   On the  one side,  it was
explained that the biological  and chemical weapons  were seen by Iraq as  a
useful means  to counter a  numerically superior force;  on the other,  they
were  presented as a means of last  resort for retaliation in the  case of a
nuclear attack  on Baghdad.  Certain documentation  supports the  contention
that  Iraq was  actively planning  and  had  actually deployed  its chemical
weapons in  a pattern corresponding to  strategic and  offensive use through
surprise  attack against perceived  enemies. The known pattern of deployment
of long-range missiles (Al Hussein) supports  this contention.  Iraq stated,
during visits of  both the Chairman and  the Deputy Chairman, that authority
to launch  biological and chemical warheads  was pre-delegated  in the event
that Baghdad was  hit by nuclear  weapons during the  Gulf war.   This  pre-
delegation does not  exclude the alternative  use of such  a capability  and
therefore does  not constitute  proof of  only intentions  concerning second
use.  It is  evident that the Commission must have a complete  understanding
of  the concept  behind  each  stage of  the development  of  all proscribed
weapons systems, together with their intended and actual deployment plans.
A.  The monitoring system
29.  Pursuant to the plan for  ongoing monitoring and verification, approved
by  the  Security Council  in  resolution  715  (1991),  the Commission  has
established a  multi-layered monitoring  system in  the missile  area.   The
system  is  designed to  cover  essential  elements  of  Iraq's missile  and
related  research, development,  testing  and manufacturing  facilities  and
non-proscribed missiles with ranges less than  150 kilometres as defined  by
the plan.   The  system is  designed to  compensate the  limitations of  one
layer  of the  system  with the  strengths of  other  layers.   The  current
monitoring system includes, inter alia:
30.   On-site  monitoring inspections.    Such  inspections are  carried out
without advance notice by a resident expert  team based at the  Commission's
Baghdad  Monitoring  and Verification  Centre  (BMVC).    These  inspections
include  verification  of  Iraq's  declarations under  the  plan,  review of
related facility documentation, inspection of items produced and  production
techniques, and  inspection of  all areas  and buildings  at each  facility.
Currently, over  30 different facilities are  inspected on  a routine basis,
with the frequency of  visits dependent on the  nature of activities  at the
specific sites.
31.  Continuous sensor  monitoring.  This is  directed at critical  areas of
missile-related activities and  dual-purpose machines.  On-site cameras  are
connected to  and can be viewed  remotely from the  BMVC.  Furthermore,  the
BMVC staff collect videotapes from the  monitored facilities every 30  days,
or more  frequently if required, for  detailed analysis.   Tamper-proof tags
and labels  are  used to  positively  identify  important equipment  at  the
facilities to assist in  the monitoring of their  use, movement or disposal.
Currently, over  120 pieces of missile  related equipment  carry UNSCOM tags
and  labels.  The Commission regularly reviews the  need to upgrade, replace
or add additional sensors to improve its missile monitoring.
32.  Special  inspections.  Special  inspection teams are tasked  to address
specific  issues,  for  example  assessing  non-proscribed  ongoing  missile
research and  development activities.   These  teams are  staffed by  highly
qualified experts in specific fields who  advise the Commission of potential
modifications to the monitoring regime.
33.   Compliance inspections.    Such inspection  teams are  used to  verify
information available to the Commission on  Iraq's activities.  These  teams
are also  used to  determine if  new facilities  should be  included in  the
monitoring regime.
34.  Aerial  surveillance.   The Commission uses  both helicopter and  high-
level surveillance assets  to monitor  activities and the infrastructure  of
relevant facilities throughout Iraq.
35.    After  completion  of  the  baseline  process  for  each  site  being
monitored,  the  Commission  began  operating  the  ongoing  monitoring  and
verification system for Iraq's missile and  related facilities on 17  August
1994.   Since that time, the  Commission has performed  over 450 inspections
at a variety of missile facilities and has  installed over 40 video  cameras
at  16 facilities monitored for missile production-related activities.  Iraq
has  continued to  provide the  support requested by  the Commission  in the
conduct of these inspections, including,  inter alia, access  to production,
quality control and inventory  records; access to  buildings, facilities  or
equipment located at  the sites; installation of  cameras and tags;  and the
provision of  technical  experts to  explain designs,  tests and  production
activities to the monitoring and inspection teams.
36.   During  the reporting  period,  the  Commission conducted  the  second
annual   verification  of  Iraq's  non-proscribed  operational  missiles  as
defined by  Security Council  resolutions 687  (1991) and  715 (1991),  i.e.
missiles with ranges less than 150 kilometres that  are designed for use, or
capable  of  being modified  for use,  in a  surface-to-surface role  with a
range greater than 50 kilometres.  The Commission uses tags to confirm  that
all such missiles are  identified in Iraq and  to ensure that  these missile
systems are not modified  to ranges prohibited by the Security Council.  The
Commission has established modalities pursuant to  which Iraq is required to
present 10  per  cent  of  its  missiles,  three  times  per  year,  to  the
Commission for  its verification.  The  Commission selects  the missiles for
Iraq to  present and the timing  of these inspections.   In accordance  with
the established procedures, Iraq submitted  the requested number of missiles
for  verification  by  the   inspection  team  during   the  second   annual
verification.  No modifications of these missiles were detected.
37.  The  Commission has recently obtained information that Iraq has resumed
its acquisition efforts in support  of its missile facilities.   Iraq placed
a number  of orders,  both directly  and indirectly  (through middlemen  and
front  companies), for the purchase of equipment, technologies, supplies and
material  for both  missile-  and non-missile-related  activities  at  these
facilities.    Iraq  explained that  many of  these  efforts were  in direct
support  of  its   Ababil-100  programme  for  indigenous  development   and
production of surface-to-surface  missiles with  ranges between 100 and  150
kilometres.   During the period  since the last  report in  April 1995, Iraq
has acknowledged these procurement activities, including the actual  import,
without notifications to the United Nations Sanctions Committee  established
under Security  Council resolution  661 (1990), of equipment  and materials.
In most cases, Iraq has  wrongly asserted that such  equipment and materials
were purchased within Iraq.
B.  Destruction of proscribed items
38.   In April  1995, the  Commission completed  an investigation  of Iraq's
acquisition  and   use  of  equipment  for   Project  1728  (production   of
liquidpropellant rocket engines) prior  to the Gulf war.   On 21  April, the
Commission sent a letter  to Iraq outlining measures that needed to be taken
for the disposal  of this equipment,  including the destruction of  five key
pieces  of  production and  testing  equipment  purchased  specifically  for
proscribed missile activities.   Iraq was also  informed that all  work must
cease on equipment requiring destruction.   The personnel in the  facilities
where this equipment  was located apparently disregarded these  instructions
and continued  to operate the machinery to produce parts for current missile
programmes.    The  Commission detected  the  continued  operation  of  this
equipment,  in  contravention  of  the  Commission's  instructions,  through
several  elements  of  its  monitoring  system,  primarily  the   monitoring
cameras.   Iraq also  tried to delay the destruction  of the equipment.  The
relevant  developments  were  reported by  the  Executive  Chairman  to  the
Security Council on 2  July 1995.  Shortly thereafter, Iraq agreed to comply
with the  Commission's decision  and the  destruction of  the equipment  was
completed by the end of July 1995. 
C.  Proscribed programme
39.   During the period since the  report in April  1995, the Commission has
continued  its   investigations   of   Iraq's  proscribed   former   missile
activities.  These  investigations concentrated  on  the  unresolved  issues
mainly connected with Iraq's past research  and development activities.  The
Commission sought additional data from  Iraq and its explanations concerning
work on a number of  undeclared missile designs or components, missile fuels
and  the connections  between the  missile  programme and  other  proscribed
activities.   These issues  were addressed  during the  rounds of high-level
talks from May  until early August 1995  and additionally by the  inspection
team UNSCOM  122/BM 33.   At that time,  Iraq provided some  answers to  the
Commission's requests, but mainly limited its  admissions to cases where the
Commission had evidence of Iraq's activities.   However, in the  majority of
cases in  the period  prior to mid-August  1995, Iraq tried  to mislead  the
Commission by  withholding information or by  attributing the  case on which
information was requested to some other  activity.  Thus, Iraq  specifically
denied  the  existence  of  any  biological  warheads,  test  activity  with
chemical warheads,  any work on  advanced liquidpropellant missile  systems,
using new  materials for  missile  airframes (like  aluminium), and  missile
fuels  (like  UDMH).   Iraq  also continued,  in  the  period  indicated, to
falsify  its accounting  of  missiles, warheads  and  supporting/  auxiliary
40.  During the Executive  Chairman's visit to Baghdad from 17 to 20  August
1995,  following on the  events described  in paragraph  14 above,  Iraq, in
contradistinction to its attitude prior to that time, disclosed  substantial
new  information   related  to  its  proscribed  missile  programme.    Iraq
acknowledged for the first time work  on advanced rocket engines,  including
those with increased thrust or  using UDMH fuel.  Iraq also admitted to  the
production of  proscribed rocket  engines made of  indigenously produced  or
imported  parts and without cannibalization of the imported Soviet-made Scud
engines.  Iraq  further admitted that the number  and the purpose of  static
and flight tests of proscribed  missiles had previously been misrepresented.
41.  As  described in paragraphs  24 to  27 above,  the Commission  obtained
boxes  with documents  and  materials  including,  in  addition  to  written
documentation,  videotapes,   films,  microfiches  and  computer   diskettes
related to  missile  activities.   Some prohibited  missile components  were
also found  in  the  boxes.  Apparently  these  documents had  at  one  time
belonged  to projects that  were engaged in  activities such  as project 144
(modification  and  production  of  missile  systems),  the  Karama  project
(production  of  missile   guidance  and  control  systems),  project   1728
(production  of liquid-propellant  rocket engines) and  Badr-2000 (two-stage
solid-propellant  missile).   The Iraqi  representatives  who had  worked on
these projects explained that they had  been ordered to prepare  a selection
of  the most  important  documents and  to hand  them  over to  the  special
security organizations.  In  the view of the Commission, the boxes  obtained
by it do  not contain the full record  of proscribed missile activities or a
complete set of  documentation which could be expected  to be found at  such
facilities. The Commission  intends to exploit fully available documents  in
the verification process, while continuing to press  for the handing over of
all the relevant documents.
42.  During the  Executive Chairman's visit to  Baghdad from 29 September to
1  October, and the  UNSCOM 123/BM  34 inspection  (27 September-1 October),
the  Iraqi  authorities  provided   additional  information  on   previously
undisclosed  activities.   It  appeared  that  Iraq  considered  this to  be
critical and essential information on its  prohibited activities and it  was
therefore withheld  from the Commission  for more than  four years.   At the
end  of September 1995,  the Commission  obtained new  information on Iraq's
testing activity, including both static and  flight testing of Scud  variant
missile  systems;  several new  designs  of  longer-range  missile  systems;
development and testing of new liquidpropellant engine designs;  development
and successful testing of a warhead  separation system; an indigenous design
of a  600 mm diameter  supergun system; and  three separate  flight tests of
chemical warheads.   Some  of  the previously  undisclosed designs  included
missiles that could reach targets at ranges  of up to 3,000 kilometres.  The
Commission also obtained information of a  special missile under design  for
delivery  of  a  nuclear  explosive  device.     Since  these  and  previous
declarations substantially  change the  scope of  Iraq's missile  programme,
the Commission has requested,  and Iraq has agreed  to provide, a  new full,
final and complete disclosure (FFCD) for its  proscribed missile activities.
43.   New  Iraqi  disclosures,  including production  of  indigenous  rocket
engines, have a severe impact on  the Commission's accounting of  proscribed
weapons and equipment used in the  missile programmes prohibited by Security
Council  resolution  687  (1991).    So  far  Iraq  has  failed  to  provide
conclusive evidence on the quantity of engines produced by Iraq.  Thus,  the
Commission  has no  firm basis  for  establishing at  this time  a  reliable
accounting of Iraq's proscribed missiles.
44.   Another serious complicating factor  in establishing  a new accounting
of proscribed  weapons  and items  in  Iraq  is associated  with  unilateral
destruction allegedly  carried out by Iraq  in the summer  of 1991 to  which
reference  has already  been  made in  paragraphs  21  and  22 above.    The
destruction  of large  quantities and varieties of  proscribed items carried
out  at that time  was disclosed  by Iraq  to the  Commission only  in March
1992.  However, the  Commission has come to  the conclusion that  this March
declaration and  Iraq's original  FFCD of  May 1992  had been  intentionally
falsified to  cover  activities that  Iraq  intended  to withhold  from  the
Commission  at that  time.   For example, Iraq  declared that  89 proscribed
operational missiles  were destroyed in summer  1991, although  only 83 such
missiles were actually destroyed.   In this case, the  inflated number seems
to have been put  forward by Iraq to cover undeclared static and flight test
activities  and  its  efforts  to  produce  its  own  missiles.  Iraq  later
presented an  incorrect accounting of missile  warheads -  both imported and
indigenously produced  - to hide  its projects  involving unconventional and
separating warheads.    Iraq presented  false  figures  on the  quantity  of
destroyed imported missile components and other  items.  Iraq has  agreed to
provide a new declaration on the material balance  of proscribed weapons and
other prohibited items, in  the new FFCD,  to correct these and other  false
or misleading  disclosures.  Until it  verifies Iraq's  new declaration, the
Commission  will not  be able  to provide  a definite accounting  of weapons
(missiles,  launchers  and   supporting/auxiliary  equipment)  as  well   as
equipment and materials used in the proscribed missile programme of Iraq. 
45.  As may  be seen  from the above, during  much of the reporting  period,
Iraq  has  continued  to  withhold  information  related to  its  proscribed
missile programme.  For the most part, Iraq has  provided new data only when
there were clear indications that the Commission  possessed information from
other sources. However, after the Executive Chairman's visit in  mid-August,
Iraq  volunteered  some  important  new  information and  in  several  cases
supported these disclosures with additional documents.  Nevertheless,  based
on the totality  of the information available to it, the Commission believes
that Iraq has not yet  disclosed fully and completely its proscribed missile
activities.  The information  to be included in the forthcoming FFCD will be
crucial  for the  Commission's  verification of  Iraq's compliance  with its
obligations.    For  this  reason,  Iraq   needs  to  provide  accurate  and
substantiated   data,  including   documentary   evidence  to   support  its
statements, and to make suggestions for speedy and effective verification. 
46.    The Commission  intends  to  continue  its  intensive inspection  and
investigation missions under  resolution 687  (1991), including  application
of new verification methods, in order to obtain  a full and complete picture
of  Iraq's proscribed missile activities.  Iraq's cooperation, including the
provision of  accurate information and  supporting documentation, access  to
personnel  involved   in  the  relevant   activities  and   support  of  the
Commission's  inspection  and  monitoring efforts  will  be  required,  on a
continuous  basis,  in  order  to  enable  the  Commission  to  achieve this
objective in a speedy and efficient manner.
A.  The monitoring system
47.   During the period under  review, four  additional baseline inspections
were completed in the chemical area.   Monitoring and verification protocols
were prepared  for one  research institute  and three  chemical storage  and
production  sites.    These   activities  were  conducted  by  the  chemical
monitoring  team  stationed  at  the  Baghdad  Monitoring  and  Verification
Centre.   The  Commission has  thus  completed  baseline inspections  of  62
chemical sites and 18 universities, colleges  and research institutes.  Over
200 monitoring inspections  have been undertaken  by the chemical monitoring
team to  date.  Some  site protocols  will be  re-evaluated in the  light of
recent findings that sites outside of  the Muthanna State Establishment were
also involved in  Iraq's chemical weapons  programme, a fact which  has been
denied until  very recently.   It is  anticipated that information  from the
documents  obtained on  20 August  1995 will  lead  to inspections  at newly
identified sites not yet visited.
48.   During  monitoring inspections  in June  and July  1995, the  chemical
monitoring  team detected the  unauthorized movement  and use  of four major
items  of  tagged  equipment  at  two  sites  under  monitoring.   Iraq  was
immediately instructed to replace  the equipment in  its original  position.
This  was  done. The  seriousness  of  this  unauthorized  activity and  the
attendant  considerations  of possible  destruction  of  the  equipment  was
underlined to Iraq at the highest level.
49.   In  addition to  the  monitoring  tools  and modalities  described  in
paragraphs 30  to 34  of the  chapter on  missile activities in  the present
report, the Commission's  chemical monitoring apparatus also includes 19 air
samplers installed at  6 chemical production  sites in  Iraq.  From 2  to 11
July 1995, a technical  support team performed a  retrofit of these samplers
and reviewed their  locations in order to optimize their use.   As a result,
several samplers  were moved  and some  added or  removed from  sites.   The
upgraded  samplers   are  now   better  equipped   to  withstand   difficult
conditions, such as humidity and chemical extremes. 
50.   Ten  sampling pumps  and  supporting  calibration equipment  have been
provided  to  the  chemical  monitoring  team.    This  gives  the  team the
capability to  take air  samples  at any  location  in  Iraq.   An  infrared
spectrometer  and  a  melting-point  determination  apparatus  are currently
under procurement to enlarge the range of samples which can be analysed.
51.   A  reverse  osmosis  water  purification  system  and a  complete  air
filtration system  for the  chemical fume  hood has  been  installed in  the
chemical  laboratory at  the  Baghdad Monitoring  and  Verification  Centre.
These  will  enhance the  health  and safety  of  personnel working  in  the
laboratory.  To ensure the health and safety of monitoring personnel in  the
field, protective equipment has also been procured, including HEPA  filters,
a variety of respirators and pressed air suits. 
B.  Proscribed programme
52.  The new information obtained by the  Commission in August and September
1995  clearly  shows  that   Iraq's  full,  final  and  complete  disclosure
presented  on 25 March 1995, the attachment of 27 March 1995 and the addenda
to  the attachment, received  on 29 May 1995,  are incorrect and incomplete.
The new  information was gathered initially  from material  obtained in Iraq
on 20  August 1995 and subsequently  admitted by Iraq  during the course  of
technical  talks undertaken by  the UNSCOM 124/CW  25 inspection  team.  The
material includes documents, videotapes,  microfiches and microfilm  records
and  computer  discs  spanning  a  large  part  of  Iraq's  chemical weapons
53.   In response to the  Commission's statements that  the March 1995  FFCD
was  no longer adequate,  on 7  October 1995,  Iraq provided  the Commission
with a  number of revised  chapters.  The  revised chapters, however,  cover
only  those  areas  already  raised by  UNSCOM  124/CW  25  as  examples  of
shortcomings in the  existing FFCD.  The March 1995 FFCD omitted information
on  major militarily  significant  chemical weapons  capabilities,  such  as
additional  types   of  warfare   agents,  advanced   agent  and   precursor
production, stabilization  and storage technologies,  new types and  numbers
of  munitions  and  field  trials  and  additional  sites  involved  in  the
54.  During  the technical  talks  held in  Baghdad in  September 1995,   it
became clear that Iraq was continuing  to withhold important information  on
the  extent and technical  depth of  its chemical  weapons programme.   Iraq
officially stated  that the March  1995 FFCD was  complete and accurate  and
that  there was no additional  information available.  Only belatedly did it
admit shortcomings in its latest FFCD.
55.  Of greatest concern are new  revelations concerning the timing,  extent
and success of  Iraq's programme for the production  of the nerve agent  VX.
In  the March 1995 Iraqi FFCD  and its amendments, it was  asserted that the
VX programme  existed only from April 1987 to September 1988, conducted only
laboratory-scale  production and  had been  abandoned because  of poor agent
quality and instability.
56.  Based on the new  findings, it is now clear that the VX programme began
at  least  as early  as May  1985 and  continued without  interruption until
December 1990.   The  Commission has  concluded that  VX was produced  on an
industrial scale.   Precursor and agent  storage and  stabilization problems
were solved.   Furthermore, one of Iraq's  documents on this  subject, dated
1989, proposes "the  creation of strategic  storage of the  substance (VX  -
hydrochloride,  one step from  conversion into VX) so it  can be used at any
time if needed".
57.  Significant in  this context is Iraq's admission, in September 1995, of
the production in 1990 of 65 tonnes of choline, a chemical used  exclusively
for  the  production  of VX.    This  amount  would  be  sufficient for  the
production of approximately 90  tonnes of VX.  Furthermore, Iraq had,  inter
alia,  over 200 tons  each of  the precursors  phosphorous pentasulphide and
di-isopropylamine.   These quantities  would be  sufficient to produce  more
than  400 tonnes  of VX.   At present,  there is  no conclusive  evidence to
support  Iraq's  claims  concerning  the  complete  disposal  of  these  two
precursors and the choline.
58.  Iraq's  recent declarations concerning  the weaponization of biological
agents  has rendered  invalid  the  current  material balance  for  chemical
munitions and  the quantities of weaponized  chemical agents.   This derives
from the  fact that the munitions,  including missile  warheads, declared as
being used for  biological agents had previously  been declared as used  for
chemical weapons purposes.
59.  Iraq has also admitted the development  of prototypes of binary  sarin-
filled artillery shells, 122  mm rockets and aerial bombs.  However, the new
documentation shows production  in quantities well beyond prototype  levels.
Iraq has  also  admitted three  flight  tests  of long-range  missiles  with
chemical warheads, including one, in April 1990, with sarin.
60.  Iraq admitted that it  had received significant assistance from abroad.
This  support   included,  at   a  minimum,   the  provision   of  munitions
specifically designed for chemical weapons fill,  technical support for  the
development  of a VX  precursor manufacturing  process and  the provision of
technical personnel directly to the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE).
61.   The recently obtained  documentation contains significant  information
on procurement and financing  for MSE.  These records indicate that at least
$100 million  in procurement remains undeclared.   This finding  contradicts
Iraqi statements that all MSE procurement had been declared.
62.   The new  information on  Iraq's proscribed  chemical weapons programme
will require appropriate  follow-up action, including technical analysis  of
the documents and expert seminars.   The documentation shows Iraq's  efforts
to produce indigenously  key precursors  for chemical weapons, for  example,
the  synthesis  of  cyclohexanol  (a  GF  precursor)  from  phenol  and  the
synthesis of di-isopropylamine (a  VX precursor) from  ammonia and  acetone.
In the light of this, certain proposals by Iraq to construct new  facilities
with dual-use capabilities will have to be considered very  carefully by the
Commission and the monitoring system adjusted accordingly.
63.   The  new information  invalidates  material  balances provided  in the
March  1995 FFCD and  subsequent amendments.   At the present  time also the
Commission  cannot exclude  the potential  existence  of  stocks of  VX, its
direct   precursors   and  undeclared   munitions   in   Iraq.     In  these
circumstances, the  Commission is requiring a  new full,  final and complete
disclosure from  Iraq which  will give a  coherent and true  account of  its
chemical weapons programme.
A.  The monitoring system
64.   Monitoring  in the  biological  area began  in full  on 4  April 1995,
preceded by a four-month interim monitoring phase.  The scope of  activities
and sites  to be encompassed by the  monitoring needs to be broad because of
the inherent  dual-use nature  of biological  technology and  the ease  with
which civilian facilities can be converted  for biological weapons purposes.
The Commission has  been compelled to  cast a  wider net  in the  biological
field because  of Iraq's incomplete  disclosure of  the full  extent of  its
past  biological warfare activities.   In  actively seeking  to establish an
understanding of such a  programme, the Commission has  had to rely  less on
Iraq's openness and more on its own findings.
65.   Currently, 79  sites throughout  Iraq are  included in  the biological
monitoring and verification regime.  These sites are comprised of:
  (a)   Five sites  currently known  to have  played a  significant role  in
Iraq's past biological weapons programme;
  (b)  Five vaccine or pharmaceutical facilities;
  (c)   Thirty-five  research  and university  sites which  have significant
technology or equipment;
  (d)    Thirteen breweries,  distilleries  and  dairies  with  dual-purpose
  (e)  Eight diagnostic laboratories;
   (f)      Five  acquisition   and   distribution   sites   of   biological
  (g)  Four facilities associated with biological equipment development;
  (h)  Four product development organizations.
Of these sites, 9 are category A (most intense monitoring), 15 are  category
B, 10 category C and 45 category D.
66.   The  monitoring concept  that has  been implemented  by the Commission
includes:  equipment inventory at all  sites where dual-purpose equipment is
located; notifications by Iraq of transfer, modification  and acquisition of
such equipment; placement of cameras at selected sites to observe change  in
activity or  use of  equipment; routine inspections  of sites by  a Baghdad-
based  monitoring team, primarily  on a  no-notice basis, and  on a variable
frequency; and  identification of factors  related to "break-out"  scenarios
at  sites and  of  their possible  role  in  proscribed  activities.   These
monitoring activities  from the Baghdad  Monitoring and Verification  Centre
are  reinforced  by   special  inspections  where  investigations  by   most
experienced specialists are desired.  Key  aspects of the baseline  process,
including  identification  of   additional  sites  of  interest  and   their
capability, identification  of undeclared dual-use  equipment, assessment of
their  present  and  future  use,  are  also  ongoing  activities  that  are
incorporated into the monitoring process.
67.  During the reporting period since 10  April 1995, over 150  inspections
or visits to  different sites have  been made  by the biological  monitoring
team, including  over 20  inspections of the  Al Hakam facility.   At  three
sites, including Al  Hakam, video monitoring, using  a total of 22  cameras,
supplement the other monitoring efforts.   Both realtime images and recorded
videotapes  are  analysed  and the  information  is  incorporated  into  the
monitoring process.
B.  Proscribed programme
68.   While  ongoing monitoring  concentrates mainly  on dual-use biological
capabilities in Iraq, an efficient and  effective monitoring is not possible
without a  full understanding  of Iraq's  proscribed biological  activities.
In  its  report  to  the  Security  Council  last  April  (S/1995/284),  the
Commission stated that  "it has come  to the  conclusion that  Iraq has  not
provided  a  full  and   comprehensive  disclosure  of   its  past  military
biological  programme  or  accounted  for  items   and  materials  for  that
69.    Up to  the middle  of the  reporting period,  Iraq continued  to deny
having ever  had any offensive  biological weapons  programme or activities.
It should be recalled  that, in March 1995,  Iraq officially submitted a new
full, final and complete disclosure in  the biological area which,  like its
original  FFCD in May  1992, and  other declarations  since the  adoption of
resolution 687  (1991), adhered  to the  position that  Iraq had had  only a
very small  defensive biological research programme  conducted by 10  people
from 1985  until the autumn of 1990.  The March 1995 FFCD was so contrary to
the information  in the Commission's possession  that the  Commission saw no
merit in initiating verification of the  document.  Essentially a  stalemate
developed  between Iraq  and the  Commission.  The Commission  continued  to
collect information  related to Iraq's  biological weapons programme  while,
in parallel, trying to persuade Iraq, through a dialogue, to present a  true
declaration covering its biological weapons activities.
70.   In April  and May  1995, Iraq  continued to  display an  uncooperative
attitude.  During the Executive  Chairman's visit  to Iraq  (29 May-1 June),
Iraq  refused even  to meet  with  the  biological experts  accompanying the
Chairman.   The stalemate  continued through  June, but  with promises  from
Iraq of  information about its biological  weapons programme  to be provided
only in late  June or early July, if Iraq at that time  concluded that there
were indications that progress was being  made towards the reintegration  of
Iraq into the international community (see para. 10 above).
71.   On 1 July  1995, during the  Executive Chairman's visit  to Iraq  (see
para. 11 above), Iraq  did provide an oral  overview of its  past programme,
admitting for the first  time that it indeed had had an offensive biological
weapons  programme   from  April  1986  to   September  1990.     But  while
acknowledging an offensive  programme that included the production of  large
quantities of two  warfare agents  at the Al  Hakam facility, the  overview,
nevertheless, firmly denied  weaponization of these  or any other biological
warfare  agents.   During  technical  discussions  that followed  this  oral
presentation, the Commission's  experts indicated that several major  issues
related to Iraq's biological weapons programme - for example  weaponization,
earlier  initiation  date  of the  programme, larger  involvement  of Iraq's
other establishments,  and the  material balance  of supplies  and agents  -
were still outstanding and urged Iraq to  address those issues in a new FFCD
that Iraq undertook to submit to the Commission.
72.  In the second half  of July, Iraq prepared a  draft FFCD and the UNSCOM
121/BW  26 team  was sent to  Iraq to review  the draft together  with Iraqi
personnel in  order to  assist them  in the  preparation of a  document that
would be amenable to speedy and effective verification.
73.   The  July  draft declaration  contained  many areas  in  which  Iraq's
disclosures were  inconsistent with  the Commission's  information or  where
information was missing or unclear.   These deficiencies followed a pattern:
they appeared to be designed to  deny information that would  either provide
evidence  of   weaponization  or  reveal   military  connections  with   the
biological weapons  programme.   There  was  also  a strong  suspicion  that
Iraq's  new  accounts  of   agent  production  and   complex  growth   media
consumption  were manipulated  to provide  what Iraq  hoped would pass  as a
credible accounting  for the missing media,  as previously  described by the
Commission in its April 1995 report (S/1995/284,  paras. 62-69).  The UNSCOM
121/BW 26 team strongly advised Iraq not to submit a deficient declaration.
74.  Nevertheless, on  4 August 1995, Iraq  officially submitted its FFCD to
the Executive  Chairman.   This  new FFCD  was consistent  with Iraq's  oral
presentation of  1 July  and the  July  draft and  ignored the  Commission's
suggestions.   Because  of  the acknowledgement  that  Iraq's  programme was
offensive in nature, it was considered a breakthrough in the stalemate  that
had  existed between  the Commission  and  Iraq.   The  Commission initiated
verification efforts,  including analysis by  the Commission's and  visiting
experts  of various portions  of Iraq's  declaration; inquiries  with States
concerning supplier  information; detailed  assessment of the  new FFCD  and
correlation with information available to the Commission.
75.   On 17 August 1995,  after the events  described in paragraph 14 above,
Iraq  informed the  Executive Chairman  that  the  full, final  and complete
disclosure of 4 August should not be considered valid.  Iraq then  presented
to  the  Chairman a  vastly  different  account  of  Iraq's past  biological
warfare   programme  that  included  weaponization,  additional  agents  and
additional  sites involved  in the programme.   Iraq undertook  to submit to
the Commission a new FFCD.  During this  visit, some documents were obtained
which related to the proscribed  biological weapons programme.  On 22 August
1995, a biological expert team (UNSCOM 125/BW  27) visited Baghdad in  order
to collect detailed information and clarifications on the revelations  which
had  been presented during  the Chairman's  visit.  A summation  of the most
recent revelations  of  Iraq's  biological weapons  programme follows.    It
should be stressed  that it is  solely based  on declarations  made by  Iraq
since  mid-August, which  remain subject  to  verification.   At  this time,
therefore,  the Commission can give no assurances as  to the correctness and
comprehensiveness of that information:
  (a)   Iraq stated that,  in 1974, the  Government had  adopted a policy to
acquire biological weapons.  In 1975,  a research and development biological
weapons  programme  was  established  under  the  Al  Hazen  Ibn  Al Haytham
Institute at a  site located in Al  Salman.  The  work was  poorly directed.
Coupled with  a lack of  appropriate facilities and  equipment, it was  said
the Institute achieved little and it closed in 1978;
  (b)   The failure  of the  Al Hazen Institute  was claimed to  be a severe
setback for the programme  and the following years  are alleged to be devoid
of any  biological weapons-related  activity.  In  the early  period of  the
Iran/Iraq war  (perhaps in 1982 or  1983), a  prominent Iraqi microbiologist
wrote  a report expressing  his concerns on scientific developments relating
to biological  warfare agents and suggesting  that research  in this subject
be commenced  in Iraq.    It is  still  uncertain  whether this  report  was
followed  up, but  in 1985  the  Muthanna  State Establishment,  Iraq's main
facility  for chemical  weapons  research and  development,  production  and
weaponization,   recommended  the  commencement  of   a  biological  weapons
programme.  In May  or June 1985,  Muthanna sought and obtained  endorsement
from the Ministry  of Defence for  this programme.  It was anticipated  that
the biological  weapons research  would be productionoriented  and thus,  in
addition to  laboratory-scale equipment, a  pilot plant in  the form of  one
150-litre fermenter was  purchased by Muthanna.   Throughout 1985, personnel
were recruited by  Muthanna and by the  end of the year,  a staff of  10 was
working on biological weapons research;
  (c)   Initial work at  Muthanna was said  to focus  on literature studies,
until April  1986,  when  bacterial  strains were  received  from  overseas.
Research then  concentrated on  the characterization  of Bacillus  anthracis
(anthrax)  and   Clostridium  botulinum   (botulinum  toxin)   to  establish
pathogenicity,   growth  and  sporulation   conditions,  and  their  storage
parameters.  (Anthrax is  an acute bacterial disease  of animals and  humans
that can be incurred by ingestion or inhalation  of the bacterial spores  or
through skin lesions.   It produces an infection  resulting in death in days
to  weeks  after exposure.    Botulinum  toxin  produces  an acute  muscular
paralysis  resulting in  death of  animals or  humans.) As  claimed by Iraq,
there was no  production of agents and  the imported fermenters  at Muthanna
were not  used.  However,  Muthanna was  still looking  ahead to  biological
warfare  agent production  and wrote  a report  to the  Ministry of  Defence
recommending that  the former  single-cell protein  plant at  Taji be  taken
over by  Muthanna for the production  of botulinum toxin.   The Ministry  of
Defence agreed but,  in early 1987,  before the  plan could be  implemented,
the proposal  went into abeyance  for a short  time owing  to administrative
  (d)  In  May 1987, the  biological weapons programme was  transferred from
Muthanna  to  Al  Salman.   The reason  for  this was  said to  be  that the
biological work  interfered with the  (presumably higher-priority)  chemical
weapons programme  at Muthanna.  At Al Salman, the  biological weapons group
administratively  came  under  the  Forensic  Research  Department  of   the
Technical  Research   Centre  (TRC)   of   the  Military   Industrialization
Corporation.   After  a slow  beginning,  it  appeared that  the  biological
weapons  programme  flourished  at  Al  Salman.   Equipment,  including  the
fermenters, was transferred from Muthanna,  new equipment was  acquired, and
new staff joined the  biological weapons group to  bring the workforce up to
about 18.   The research at Al Salman shifted to issues related  more to the
application  of the  agents as  biological weapons.   The effects  on larger
animals, including  sheep, donkeys,  monkeys and  dogs, were  studied within
the laboratory  and inhalation chamber, as  well as in  the field.   Initial
weapons field  trials were conducted  in early  1988.   Studies of  scale-up
production were initiated on botulinum toxin and anthrax;
  (e)   The earlier  proposal for  the acquisition  of a biological  weapons
production site  was revived  and the  former single-cell  protein plant  at
Taji was taken over by TRC in mid-1987.  The plant was said to be in a  run-
down  condition  and  it was  not  until  early in  1988  that  it  was made
operational.   With  a workforce  of eight people,  and using  one 450-litre
fermenter, production  of botulinum  toxin commenced  in  February or  March
1988 and  continued until  September/October of  that year.   Production  of
botulinum toxin also was  carried out at  Al Salman in flasks or  laboratory
  (f)   Initial production  fermentation studies  with anthrax  at Al Salman
used 7- and 14-litre  laboratory-scale fermenters at the end of 1988.   From
the beginning  of 1989,  the 150-litre  fermenter transferred from  Muthanna
was used  to  produce  Bacillus  subtilis,  a  simulant  for  anthrax  as  a
biological warfare  agent. After  five or  six runs  of producing  subtilis,
anthrax production began  at Al Salman  around March  1989.  About 15  or 16
production  runs were performed,  producing up  to 1,500  litres of anthrax,
which  was  concentrated  to  150  litres.  Additional production  with  the
laboratory fermenters was also accomplished;
  (g)   Towards  the end  of  1987, a  report on  the success  of biological
weapons  work by TRC was submitted to  MIC.  This resulted in  a decision to
enter the full-scale production phase for a biological weapons programme;
  (h)   In March  1988, a  new site  for biological  weapons production  was
selected at  a location now known  as Al Hakam.   The project was given  the
designator "324".   The design philosophy for the  Al Hakam plant was  taken
from  the chemical  weapons research  and  production facility  at Muthanna:
the buildings  were to  be well  separated, research  areas were  segregated
from production areas  and the architectural features of Muthanna  buildings
copied where  appropriate.   The  plan for  the  new  facility at  Al  Hakam
envisaged research  and development,  production and  storage of  biological
warfare agents, but not munitions filling.   Construction of the  production
buildings at the northern end  of the Al Hakam site  was largely complete by
September 1988  after which  work commenced  on erection  of the  laboratory
  (i)    In 1988,  a  search for  production  equipment for  the  biological
weapons programme was  conducted in Iraq.   Two 1,850-litre and seven 1,480-
litre fermenters from the Veterinary Research Laboratories were  transferred
to  Al Hakam in November 1988.   The 450-litre fermenter line at Taji, which
was  at the  time  used  in the  production  of botulinum  toxin,  was  also
earmarked for transfer to Al Hakam and was  relocated there in October 1988.
From mid-1988,  large fermenters  were also  sought from  abroad, but  after
Iraq  completed a contract  for a  5,000-litre fermenter,  an export licence
was not granted; 
  (j)   At  Al Hakam,  production of  botulinum toxin  for weapons  purposes
began  in  April  1989 and  anthrax  in May  1989.   Initially  much  of the
fermentation  capacity for anthrax  was used  for the  production of anthrax
simulant  for weapons  field trials.   Production  of anthrax  itself, it is
claimed,  began in  earnest  in 1990.    In  total,  about 6,000  litres  of
concentrated botulinum  toxin and 8,425 litres  of anthrax  were produced at
Al Hakam during 1990;
  (k)   From the  early period  of the  biological weapons  programme at  Al
Salman,  there was  interest  in other  potential biological  warfare agents
beyond anthrax and  botulinum toxin.   It became  the policy  to expand  the
biological weapons  programme  into these  other  fields.   Thus,  from  the
design  phase of Al  Hakam as a biological  weapons research, production and
storage  facility, there  were  plans for  such  diversification,  including
facilities to work on viruses and  laboratory space for genetic  engineering
  (l)   In April 1988,  in addition to  anthrax and botulinum  toxin, a  new
agent, Clostridium perfringens  (gas gangrene),  was added to the  bacterial
research work at Al Salman.   (Clostridium perfringens produces a  condition
known  as  gas gangrene,  so  named  because  of the  production  of gaseous
rotting of flesh, common in war  casualties requiring amputation of  limbs.)
In August  1989, work on  perfringens was transferred  from Al  Salman to Al
  (m)   In May  1988, studies  were said  to be  initiated at  Al Salman  on
aflatoxin.     (Aflatoxin  is  a  toxin  commonly  associated  with  fungal-
contaminated  food grains and is  known for its induction  of liver cancers.
It  is generally  considered  to be  non-lethal  in humans  but  of  serious
medical concern because of its carcinogenic  activity.)  Later research  was
also done on trichothecene  mycotoxins such as  T-2 and DAS.   (Tricothecene
mycotoxins  produce nausea,  vomiting, diarrhoea  and skin  irritation  and,
unlike  most microbial toxins, can be absorbed through  the skin.)  Research
was  conducted into the  toxic effects  of aflatoxins  as biological warfare
agents  and their effect when  combined with other chemicals.  Aflatoxin was
produced  by the growth  of the  fungus aspergillus in 5-litre  flasks at Al
   (n)  In 1989,  it was decided to move aflatoxin production for biological
weapons purposes  to a  facility at Fudaliyah.   The facility  was used  for
aflatoxin production  in flasks  from April/May  1990 to December  1990.   A
total of  about 1,850  litres of  toxin in  solution was declared  as having
been produced at Fudaliyah;
  (o)   Another fungal  agent examined by  Iraq for  its biological  weapons
potential was wheat cover  smut.  (Wheat cover smut produces a black  growth
on  wheat and  other  cereal grains;  contaminated grain  cannot be  used as
foodstuff.) After  small production  at Al  Salman, larger-scale  production
was carried out near  Mosul in 1987 and 1988 and considerable quantities  of
contaminated grain  were harvested.   The  idea was  said not  to have  been
further  developed;  however,  it  was  only   sometime  in  1990  that  the
contaminated grain was destroyed by burning at the Fudaliyah site;
  (p)  Another toxin worked for weapons application was ricin.   (Ricin is a
protein toxin  derived from  castor bean  plants that  is  highly lethal  to
humans  and  animals.    When  inhaled,  ricin  produces  a  severe  diffuse
breakdown of lung tissue resulting in  a haemorrhagic pneumonia and  death.)
It appears  that work started in  1988 at Al Salman.   The  first samples of
ricin  were supplied from the  Sammarra drug factory  and after some initial
toxicological tests in conjunction  with Muthanna, the quantity required for
a  weapons test  was  determined.   Ten litres  of  concentrated  ricin were
prepared.   A weapons trial  was conducted with  the assistance of  Muthanna
using  artillery shells.   The  test was  considered to  be a failure.   The
project was said to have been abandoned after this;
  (q)  Work on  virus for biological  weapons purposes started at Al  Salman
in July 1990.  Shortly thereafter, a decision was taken  to acquire the Foot
and Mouth  Disease facility at  Daura and it  was taken  over for biological
weapons purposes, in  addition to the continued  production of vaccines.  It
was  decided that the  Daura plant  within the  biological weapons programme
would   include   facilities  for   bacteriology,   virology   and   genetic
engineering.  Three viral agents for  the biological weapons programme  were
obtained from  within Iraq: haemorrhagic  conjunctivitis virus, a  rotavirus
and camel pox virus. (Haemorrhagic conjunctivitis  is an acute disease  that
causes  extreme  pain  and  temporary blindness.    Rotavirus  causes  acute
diarrhoea that could lead to dehydration and death.  Camel pox causes  fever
and skin rash in  camels; infection of humans is  rare.)  It was stated that
very little work had been done on these  viruses and none had been  produced
in quantity;
  (r)   Early  in 1988,  efforts  began in  the weaponization  of biological
warfare agents and some of the senior  scientists involved in the biological
weapons  programme  at  TRC  were  sent  to  Iraq's  munitions  factories to
familiarize themselves with this  aspect.  At about the same time, TRC first
discussed with the Muthanna State Establishment weaponization of  biological
warfare agents and it  was agreed that, because  of Muthanna's experience in
the  weaponization of chemical agents, the Establishment  would also provide
the necessary  assistance for  the selection  of weapons  types for  warfare
agents and the conduct of field trials;
  (s)  The first field trials of biological  weapons were said to have  been
conducted  in March  1988 at  Muthanna's weapons  test range,  Muhammadiyat.
Two  tests were  done  on  the same  day,  one using  the anthrax  simulant,
Bacillus  subtilis, and  the other  using  botulinum  toxin.   The munitions
chosen for the tests were aerial bombs positioned  on adjacent stands.   The
effects were  observed on  test animals  (for botulinum toxin)  or on  Petri
dishes (for  subtilis).   The  first tests  of both  agents were  considered
failures.  The agents  in both  cases did not spread  far enough.  Later  in
March, the  second field  trial with  the same  weapons systems was  said to
have been conducted and it was considered successful;
  (t)   No further  weapons field  trials were claimed to  have been carried
out for the next 18 months.  In November 1989, further weaponization  trials
for  anthrax  (again using  subtilis),  botulinum  toxin and  aflatoxin were
conducted, this time  using 122 mm  rockets, again at  Muhammadiyat.   These
tests  were also  considered  a success.   Live  firings  of filled  122  mm
rockets with the  same agents were carried out in May 1990.   Trials of R400
aerial  bombs with  Bacillus  subtilis  were first  conducted in  mid-August
1990.   Final  R400 trials  using  subtilis,  botulinum toxin  and aflatoxin
followed in late August 1990;
  (u)  After 2  August 1990, the date of  Iraq's invasion of  Kuwait, Iraq's
biological weapons programme was drastically  intensified:  the emphasis was
shifted  to production  and later  to weaponization  of  produced biological
warfare agents.  The foot and mouth disease plant at Daura  was converted to
biological weapons  production.   The six vaccine fermenters  with ancillary
equipment at  the plant  were used for  production of  botulinum toxin  from
November 1990  until 15 January 1991,  by which time  about 5,400 litres  of
concentrated toxin had  been produced.   It was  decided that  there was  an
additional  requirement  for anthrax  production and  the  fermenters at  Al
Hakam that had been  previously used for the  production of botulinum  toxin
there  were  modified  to  meet   the  requirements  for  increased  anthrax
production.  Production of perfringens for biological  weapons purposes also
began at  Al Hakam in August  1990 using the  150-litre fermenter which  had
been  relocated from  Al Salman.   A  total  of  340 litres  of concentrated
perfringens was produced;
  (v)  In December 1990, a programme was  initiated to develop an additional
delivery  means,  a  biological  weapons  spray  tank  based  on  a modified
aircraft drop tank.  The concept  was that tanks would be fitted either to a
piloted fighter  or to  a remotely  piloted aircraft  to spray  up to  2,000
litres of anthrax over a  target.  The field trials for both the spray  tank
and the remotely piloted  vehicle were conducted in January 1991.  The  test
was considered a failure and no  further effort towards further  development
was said to have  been made.  Nevertheless, three additional drop tanks were
modified and stored,  ready for use.  They  are said to have been  destroyed
in July 1991.  The prototype  spray tank used for trials was claimed to have
been destroyed during the Gulf war bombing;
  (w)  Weaponization of biological warfare agents began  on a large scale in
December  1990 at Muthanna.   As  declared, the R400 bombs  were selected as
the appropriate  munition  for aerial  delivery  and  100 were  filled  with
botulinum toxin, 50  with anthrax and 16 with aflatoxin.  In addition, 25 Al
Hussein warheads, which had been produced in a special production run  since
August  1990,  were filled  with  botulinum  toxin  (13),  anthrax (10)  and
aflatoxin (2).  These  weapons were then deployed  in early January  1991 at
four locations, where they remained throughout the war;
  (x)   In summary,  Iraq has  declared the  production of  at least  19,000
litres  of concentrated  botulinum toxin  (nearly 10,000 litres  were filled
into  munitions), 8,500  litres of  concentrated anthrax  (some 6,500 litres
were  filled  into munitions)  and  2,200  litres of  concentrated aflatoxin
(1,580 litres were filled into munitions);
  (y)   Iraq declared that  it had decided  to destroy biological  munitions
and the  remaining biological  warfare bulk  agent after  the Gulf war.   An
order for destruction  was claimed to have been  given orally, and no  Iraqi
representative seems  to be able to  recall an exact date  for the order  or
the dates of destruction operations.   The order was said to have been given
some time  in May or June 1991.  All filled  biological bombs were relocated
to one airfield and deactivation chemicals added to  agent fill.  The  bombs
were  then  explosively  destroyed and  burnt, and  the  remains buried.   A
similar disposal technique was  used for the missile  warheads at a separate
site.  In late  August 1995, Iraq showed to  an UNSCOM team a location which
it  claimed to  be  a  warhead destruction  site.   However, later  on, Iraq
changed its story  and was unable to identify  with any degree of  certainty
the exact location of warheads destruction operations;
  (z)  Of the bacterial  bulk agent stored at Al  Hakam, Iraq stated  that a
similar deactivation procedure had been adopted.   The detoxified liquid was
emptied into  the facility's septic tank and eventually dumped  at the site.
About  8,000 litres of  concentrated botulinum  toxin, over  2,000 litres of
concentrated  anthrax,  340  litres  of  concentrated  perfringens  and   an
unspecified quantity  of aflatoxin,  according to  Iraq's declaration,  were
destroyed at Al Hakam.
76.   Iraq's biological  weapons programme  as described  to the  Commission
embraced a  comprehensive  range of  agents  and  munitions.   Agents  under
Iraq's biological  weapons programme included  lethal agents, e.g.  anthrax,
botulinum  toxin  and ricin,  and  incapacitating  agents,  e.g.  aflatoxin,
mycotoxins, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis  virus and rotavirus.  The scope  of
biological warfare  agents worked on by Iraq encompassed both anti-personnel
and  anti-plant  weapons.    The  programme   covered  a  whole  variety  of
biological  weapons  delivery means,  from  tactical  weapons  (e.g. 122  mm
rockets and artillery shells), to strategic  weapons (e.g. aerial bombs  and
Al Hussein warheads filled with anthrax,  botulinum toxin and aflatoxin) and
"economic"  weapons, e.g. wheat cover smut. Given the  Iraqi claim that only
five  years  had  elapsed  since  its   declared  inception  in  1985,   the
achievements of Iraq's biological weapons programme were remarkable. 
77.   The achievements included the  production and  actual weaponization of
large  quantities  of bacterial  agents  and  aflatoxin  and  research on  a
variety of other biological weapons agents.   A special dedicated  facility,
Al Hakam, for biological weapons research and development as well as  large-
scale  production  was under  construction,  with  most  essential  elements
completed  at  the  time   of  the  Gulf  war  and  production  and  storage
capabilities operational.  A number  of other facilities  and establishments
in  Iraq provided active support for the biological  weapons programme.  The
programme appears  to have a degree  of balance suggesting  a high level  of
management  and planning that  envisioned the inclusion of  all aspects of a
biological weapons  programme, from research to  weaponization.   It is also
reasonable to assume that, given that  biological weapons were considered as
strategic weapons  and were  actually deployed, detailed  thought must  have
been given  to the  doctrine of  operational use  for these weapons  of mass
78.  It appears  that, until August  1990, the biological weapons  programme
had been  developing at a steady  pace, continuing to  expand and diversify.
In  August 1990, a  "crash" programme  was launched  and the  imperatives of
production and weaponization took over.
79.   The documentation on Iraq's  biological weapons  programme obtained by
the  Commission in August  1995 appears  to represent a fraction  of all the
documents  generated  under  the  programme.    For  example,  studies  were
described orally by Iraq to the Commission  that are not included in  any of
the documentation.  Some  of the studies referred to in the documents differ
significantly  from  those   described  to  the  Commission.     Information
available to  the  Commission from  other  sources  does not  correspond  in
important aspects to the information provided by Iraq.
80.  In spite  of the substantial new  disclosures made by  Iraq since  mid-
August, the  Commission does  not believe  that Iraq  has given  a full  and
correct account  of  its  biological  weapons  programme.    The  Commission
intends to  continue its intensive  inspection, verification and  analytical
efforts with the  objective of presenting to  the Security Council,  as soon
as  possible,  its  assessments  of Iraq's  compliance  with  the biological
weapons-related  provisions  of  Security  Council  resolution  687  (1991).
Success  will  depend on  Iraq's  cooperation  with  these  efforts and  its
complete   openness,  including   provision  to   the  Commission   of   all
documentation and of a truly full,  final and complete disclosure  of Iraq's
proscribed biological weapons programme.
81.  The Director General of IAEA is  reporting separately on the activities
of  the UNSC 687  Action Team  set up to  implement paragraphs 12  and 13 of
Security  Council  resolution 687  (1991)  and  the  IAEA  plan for  ongoing
monitoring   and   verification  approved   under   resolution   715  (1991)
(S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1).
82.  The Special  Commission continues, in accordance  with paragraph 9  (b)
(iii)  of resolution  687  (1991) and  paragraph  4 (b)  of  resolution  715
(1991),  to provide its  assistance and cooperation to  the IAEA Action Team
through the  provision of  special expertise  and logistical,  informational
and other  operational support  for the  carrying out  of the IAEA  plan for
ongoing  monitoring and verification.   In  accordance with  paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4  (a) of resolution 715  (1991),
it designates sites  for inspection.  In  accordance with paragraph 3  (iii)
of  resolution 707  (1991), it  decides on  requests from  Iraq to  move  or
destroy any material or equipment relating  to its nuclear weapons programme
or  other nuclear activities.  Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with
paragraph  4 (c) of resolution 715 (1991), to  perform such other functions,
in cooperation in the  nuclear field with the  Director General of  IAEA, as
may be  necessary  to coordinate  activities  under  the plans  for  ongoing
monitoring  and verification,  including making  use of  commonly  available
services  and  information to  the  fullest  extent  possible,  in order  to
achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources.
83.  During  the current reporting period,  the Commission has reviewed  and
concurred with  a number of  IAEA evaluations of Iraqi  requests to relocate
materials  and equipment  within Iraq,  participated with  IAEA teams during
routine  inspections, provided,  through  the German  Government, fixed-wing
(C-160)  and  rotating-wing  (CH-53G) aircraft  for  the  transport  of IAEA
inspectors  into  Iraq from  Bahrain  and  between  points  within Iraq  and
provided  the  UNSC  687  Action  Team  with  working  room  and  supporting
facilities at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.
84.  Close coordination between IAEA and  the Commission is already  ongoing
in the management and  control of machine tool  movements within Iraq, and a
better integration between  the IAEA and UNSCOM  systems of survey has  been
implemented,  for   example  for  machines   located  at   the  Nassr  State
Establishment, which are under both missile  and nuclear monitoring.  Cross-
disciplinary inspections  have been more frequent  in order  to increase the
information  flow and  develop  crossfertilization  between the  specialized
teams.  IAEA  and the Commission also  cooperated in the initial  assessment
of the documents obtained in Iraq on 20 August 1995.
85.    The  Commission's   nuclear  experts  will   participate  in  certain
inspections decided by  the Action Team during  the coming months.   Regular
meetings  are  now scheduled,  alternatively  in  New  York  and Vienna,  to
exchange  information  from  all  sources  and  to  plan  cross-disciplinary
inspections.  Commission experts regularly visit  Vienna to update the  IAEA
photo library.   The Commission's experts  are continuing  to participate in
IAEA's negotiations  with the Russian Federation  regarding the  sale of the
nuclear materials removed from Iraq and reprocessed in Russia.
A.  Export/import mechanism
86.   As mentioned in the April  1995 report, the joint proposal prepared by
the Special Commission and IAEA for  the export/import mechanism called  for
in paragraph 7 of  Security Council resolution  715 (1991) was submitted  to
the Sanctions Committee in February 1995.   Upon receipt of  the concurrence
of that Committee, it is to be transmitted to the Council for its approval.
87.  In  the course of  the consideration  of the proposal by  the Sanctions
Committee,  certain  delegations requested  information  on  the  modalities
which  would   be  followed  by  the   Special  Commission   and  IAEA  when
implementing  the  mechanism in  Iraq.    On  17  July  1995, the  Executive
Chairman of the Commission  sent a letter  to the Chairman of the  Sanctions
Committee responding to this request.  In that letter, the Chairman  pointed
out that  the Security Council  had on several occasions  confirmed that the
sole responsibility for carrying  out their mandates in Iraq rested with the
Commission and IAEA.   Nevertheless, the  Commission and  IAEA had kept  the
Council fully  informed of their  activities and their  modus operandi.   In
keeping  with  that  practice,  it  was   useful  to  indicate  the  general
principles which would be followed in implementing the mechanism in Iraq.
88.   In his  letter, the  Executive Chairman  explained that  an office  of
export/import specialists  would be  established in  the Baghdad  Monitoring
and Verification  Centre  which would  serve as  an administrative  clearing
house  for communications from  Iraq regarding  the notification forms which
it would  be required  to submit.   That office  and the  Centre would  also
implement  inspections within Iraq  to ensure  that the  mechanism was being
complied with.   These  inspections would  be  as vigorous  as necessary  to
ensure that no violations of the export/import regime would occur.  In  this
regard, the Commission and  the IAEA intended to  rely on their  full rights
under the relevant  Security Council resolutions (including resolutions  687
(1991),  707 (1991)  and 715  (1991), the  plans for ongoing  monitoring and
verification (S/22871/Rev.1  and S/22872/Rev.1 and  Corr.1), the  privileges
and immunities as set  forth in the  exchange of letters between the  United
Nations and  Iraq of 6 and 17 May  1991 and the decision  to be taken by the
Security Council approving the mechanism.
89.  The letter  further stated that  inspections under the mechanism  would
take place  not only  at the  declared end-user  sites where  notified items
would be tagged, as  appropriate, and entered into  the site protocols,  but
would also  be conducted anywhere  else in Iraq,  including points of  entry
into Iraq, where there  was reason to believe  that notified items  or dual-
use items in respect  of which there should  have been notification might be
found.   To  ensure Iraqi  compliance  the  monitoring activities  would  be
carried out in whatever ways yielded the  most effective results, whether by
monitoring end-user sites, or border crossings, or other locations.
90.  The Executive Chairman proposed, when the  Sanctions Committee was in a
position to forward the  proposal for the mechanism to the Security Council,
as the  tripartite proposal  called for  in  paragraph 7  of resolution  715
(1991),  that it should be accompanied, for purposes  of information, by his
letter setting  out in general  terms the modalities  which it was  intended
would be followed in implementing the mechanism.
91.  On 20  July 1995, the Sanctions  Committee resumed consideration of the
Special  Commission's  and  IAEA's  joint  proposal  for  the  export/import
mechanism,  together with the Executive  Chairman's letter of 17  July.  The
Committee  approved  the  proposal  and  the  suggestion  of  the  Executive
Chairman that  its transmission to the  Council should be accompanied by the
letter of 17 July. Because of a request,  formal transmission to the Council
has been postponed. Transmission  is expected to  take place as soon as  all
members indicate the concurrence of their Governments.
92.  In the  meantime, the Special  Commission has continued its efforts  to
prepare for the  implementation of the  mechanism after its adoption  by the
Security Council so as to be  able to put it into effect as of such time  as
the Council directs.
 B.  National implementation measures
93.  There have been no new developments  since the Commission's reports  in
April and  June 1995  regarding the  national implementation  measures which
Iraq  is  required to  take  under  the plans  for  ongoing  monitoring  and
verification.   The  Commission has  continued to pursue  the matter  and to
press for the adoption  of the necessary legislation.  On each occasion that
the matter has been raised,  the Iraqi representatives have  stated that the
legislation is with the Office of the Presidency  and that no problems  were
foreseen  in  its  adoption.    Assurances   that  such  adoption  would  be
forthcoming  in a  matter of  days or  weeks have  not been  fulfilled.  The
absence  of  this legislation,  almost  four  years  after  the adoption  of
resolution  715  (1991)  approving  the  plans  for  ongoing monitoring  and
verification, is  of great  concern to the  Commission.  There  is no  doubt
that  the enactment  of  this  legislation, inter  alia,  prohibiting  Iraqi
citizens  from engaging  in activities proscribed by  resolution 687 (1991),
would  be regarded as an indication of Iraq's will  to comply fully with the
requirements of the resolution.
C.  Aerial surveillance
94.    The  aerial  imagery  provided   by  the  Commission's  high-altitude
surveillance aircraft  (U-2) and  the Baghdad-based  aerial inspection  team
continues to  be an  essential tool  for the  monitoring regime and  for the
investigation of new sites. To date, over 600  missions have been undertaken
by the aerial inspection team and 269 missions by the U-2.
95.   The establishment  of the  photographic development  laboratory in the
Monitoring  Centre  in  Baghdad has  facilitated  the  swift processing  and
review of  the  aerial photographic  product.    The capability  to  process
photography at  the  Centre  has also  proved  a  useful  asset  for  ground
inspection teams.
96.  The  financial situation of the  Special Commission is more  precarious
than  ever.    Funds,  either  from  frozen  Iraqi  assets  or  provided  as
contributions  to  the  Commission,  have  been  trickling  into the  escrow
account established under Security Council resolution  778 (1992) on a  very
irregular basis.  While funding has been secured  for the remainder of 1995,
funds have  yet  to  be  identified for  1996.    The level  of  operational
expenditures of the Commission from its inception in May 1991 until the  end
of 1995  will have  reached $100  million.   The operational  budget of  the
Commission,  under  the current  rate  of  activities,  will  be around  $20
million for the next year.
97.    The  above  figures  only  reflect  the  operational  budget  of  the
Commission, which  has greatly benefited from  the assistance of  supporting
Governments through  the direct provision  of services, staff and equipment.
Such Governments  may seek  reimbursement when  adequate funds  are obtained
from Iraq, which has responsibility for all  costs incurred under section  C
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
98.  The number  of the Special  Commission's experts in New York  has  been
increased  over the last few months to cope with  the growing workload.  All
additional experts have been provided by Member States at their own cost.
99.  The Commission is strengthening  its communications system between  New
York and  Baghdad and  is acquiring  an improved  voice and fax  data system
which will enable the transmission of data in a highly secure manner.
100.  The office space  situation of the Commission in  New York is becoming
more difficult.  It will be impossible to accommodate,  within the currently
available space, the additional documents obtained  in August which are  now
arriving  in New  York.    A special  request has  been made  for additional
secure space for this purpose.
101.   The  Commission  has  described the  establishment, preparations  and
resources of  the  Baghdad Monitoring  and  Verification  Centre in  earlier
reports (S/1994/1138 and S/1995/284).  All  the projects planned to renovate
the Canal Hotel facilities  for the Centre,  in part using Iraqi labour  and
materials, are now  completed.   This effort has taken  up much of the  last
year and could not have been finished  without the generous contributions of
personnel, equipment and materials from supporting States.
102.   The field office  in Bahrain continues  to support  the operations of
the  Commission   and  the   activities  of   the  Baghdad   Monitoring  and
Verification Centre. The Commission wishes to  place on record its gratitude
to  the  Government of  Bahrain  for  its  great  generosity and  unstinting
support  in  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  the  field  office in
Bahrain.   This has  constituted one of the  most important contributions to
the work of the Commission and has considerably expedited that work.
103.   Recently, the Secretary-General  noted the substantial  contributions
of air support  from the Government  of Germany  for the  operations of  the
Special Commission and  IAEA in Iraq (A/50/1,  para. 701).  Indeed,  without
the C-160  transport aircraft  and the  CH-53G  helicopters, the  Commission
would not have accomplished its work and could  not meet the requirements of
the  Security Council  in carrying  out ongoing monitoring  and verification
and its other responsibilities in Iraq.
104.   The  airlift  support  provided by  Germany has  been of  the highest
quality. One measure  of the success of this  effort is that the  helicopter
unit recently  achieved 3,000 accident-free flying  hours in  Iraq under the
difficult and complex flight conditions existing  there.  The C-160 Transall
aircraft has  flown over 10,000 passengers  into and out  of Iraq.   Another
measure  is  the  outstanding  logistical  support  from  the   contributing
Government  to  its  forward-deployed units  in Bahrain  and  in Iraq.   Air
support will continue to  be critical to  Commission and IAEA operations  in
105.  Helicopter support  in Iraq has been and will continue to be vital for
the  independence of  the operations  of the Commission  and IAEA.   Indeed,
with  the lifting of  sanctions and  the resumption  of international trade,
the  requirement   for  helicopter  support   will  increase  significantly.
Helicopters will  provide efficient transportation  for inspection teams  to
travel to  border crossings and  points of  entry.   At the  same time,  the
current  requirements  will   remain  for  low-altitude  aerial   inspection
photography; medical  evacuation; rapid,  no-notice  movement of  inspection
teams; and airlift for vehicles.   These many needs are met with the CH-53G,
which appears  to be  the most  efficient aircraft  currently available  for
this purpose.  The Commission remains  profoundly grateful to the Government
of  Germany for  its  unique and  vital  contribution in  carrying  out  the
Security  Council's mandate  in Iraq  under  section  C of  Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).
106.   During the  period under  review and since  the Special  Commission's
report  in June 1995,  very important  developments have taken  place in all
areas, and a considerable amount of  information has become available to the
Commission  concerning  Iraq's  proscribed  programmes.    The  Commission's
preliminary  analysis  of  this  information  reveals  that  Iraq  has  been
concealing  proscribed  activities  and  that,  consequently,  some  of  the
assessments in the Commission's earlier reports have to be revised.
107.   Iraq has  been misleading  the Commission  by withholding information
that, before  the  Gulf war,  it  had  secretly produced  Scud-type  missile
engines and carried  out research and development  on a variety of  projects
on missiles  of prohibited ranges.   Furthermore, Iraq's  efforts to conceal
its biological weapons programme, its chemical missile warhead flight  tests
and work  on the  development of  a missile  for the  delivery of a  nuclear
device  led it to  provide incorrect  information concerning  certain of its
missile activities.   The new  revelations cast into  doubt the veracity  of
Iraq's previous  declarations in  the missile area,  including the  material
balance for proscribed weapons and items.  Consequently, Iraq has agreed  to
provide a new declaration with a full, final and complete disclosure in  the
missile area.
108.  In the chemical weapons  area, the Special Commission's investigations
have  led  to  disclosure  of activities  aiming  at  the acquisition  of  a
considerable capability for the production of  the advanced nerve agent  VX.
Whether Iraq still keeps precursors in storage for immediate VX use has  not
been fully clarified.  The revelations also shed new light on the scope  and
ambition of Iraq's chemical weapons programme.   The Commission must  adjust
the direction  of some of its  monitoring activities,  especially to prevent
Iraq from using its chemical compounds,  equipment and activities for secret
acquisition  of  chemical  weapons.    Further  destruction  of  some  Iraqi
chemical assets has to be contemplated.   The Commission has requested  Iraq
to  provide  a  new  declaration  comprising  a  full,  final  and  complete
disclosure of its capabilities with regard to chemical weapons.
109.  The Special  Commission has detected and  identified a hitherto secret
offensive  biological weapons  programme in  Iraq comprising  a  large-scale
production of  biological  warfare  agents, the  filling and  deployment  of
missile  warheads  and aerial  bombs  with  agents,  as  well as  biological
weapons  research  and development  activities  of  considerable  width  and
depth.   As late as August of this year, Iraq  presented to the Commission a
formal,  but  essentially  false,  declaration  on  its  biological  weapons
activities.   Consequently, the  Commission has  requested again  and - Iraq
has  agreed to  provide  - a  full, final  and  complete disclosure  of  its
biological  weapons programme  in  the form  of  a new  declaration.    Much
remains to  be  verified with  regard to  these weapons,  in particular  the
destruction of munitions and bulk agents. 
110.   Given  the new  disclosures, the  Special  Commission  is obliged  to
consider, in accordance with paragraph 8  of Security Council resolution 687
(1991),  the possible destruction of facilities and items which were used in
the production of biological weapons.
111.   For the  fulfilment of  the Special  Commission's tasks,  it needs  a
complete understanding of the concept behind  each stage of the  development
of all  proscribed weapons.   A special  concern of the  Commission in  this
respect is  the matter of the  deployment of Iraq's proscribed missiles with
non-conventional warheads for strategic and offensive use.
112.    The  increased flow  of  data,  whether  originating  in  Iraq's new
admissions  or   in  recently  obtained   documents  and   other  types   of
documentation, has  opened up  new possibilities  for a  solid and  credible
account of the  proscribed weapons and weapons capabilities.  With these new
developments,  the prospects  for  the  full implementation  of the  weapons
chapter of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) have improved.
113.   Further exploration  and investigation  are necessary  to verify that
Iraq's  new  statements  and  the  declarations  in  all  the  weapons areas
requested by  the Commission  are true  representations of  the facts.   The
large  amount of documentation obtained will  be of use in this regard.  The
Special Commission  will concentrate its  personnel and technical  resources
in order to achieve a complete and reliable account as fast as possible.
114.   The system for ongoing  monitoring and verification  is now in  place
and has been tested for some  time.  It is as much in the interests of  Iraq
as  of the Commission  that the  ongoing monitoring  and verification system
functions  without any  flaws.   Even if  the new  revelations have  led  to
adjustments,  redirection and  augmentation of  activities, the  system  has
already proved to be  robust and fundamentally sound.  Indeed, it was during
the build-up of  the monitoring structures that the Commission's  scientists
and analysts were able to detect  Iraq's concealment of its  hitherto secret
biological weapons  programme. Likewise, as  mentioned above, Iraqi  efforts
to  circumvent the control  arrangements in  the missile  and chemical areas
have  been detected before any  serious damage has occurred.  The Commission
also detected undeclared efforts by Iraq  to establish a covert  procurement
network for activities under monitoring.
115.  In this report, the Commission has outlined its concerns in all  areas
of its responsibility.   Questions can still be raised about the  intentions
of Iraq as regards possible remnants of its  proscribed programmes.  In  the
coming months,  the Government of Iraq  must present  three new declarations
comprising  full,  final and  complete  disclosures  of  all its  proscribed
capabilities.     Iraq  must  at  the  same  time   hand  over  the  weapons
documentation still  in its  hands. Access to  and control  of all  relevant
documentary  evidence is necessary for the Commission to be able quickly and
effectively  to verify  Iraq's declarations  and  ascertain that  all Iraq's
proscribed weapons  capabilities  have indeed  been  disposed  of.   If  the
requested declarations  and actions by Iraq  fulfil the  requirements of the
Security Council, a solid base will be laid  for the full implementation  of
all aspects of section  C of Security  Council resolution 687 (1991).   With
an  effective and proven  monitoring and  verification system  in place, the
Commission should be able to confirm that Iraq  would have no capability  to
project any threat with proscribed weapons against its neighbours.
116.   A necessary prerequisite  for a comprehensive  solution is that  Iraq
demonstrate  a full openness and  a manifest willingness to cooperate in all
its  dealings with the  Special Commission.   Iraq's  stated preparedness to
provide such cooperation is  a hopeful sign.   The true character  of Iraq's
expressed political intent  will soon  be tested  by the  Commission in  its
inspections and  analytical activity.  If  Iraq were  genuinely to translate
its statements into action,  there would be a  real hope for  the completion
of the  task entrusted to  the Special Commission within  a reasonable time-

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