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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


Security Council

10 April 1995


    The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the
Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman
of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution
687 (1991).
95-10422 (E)   120495                                      /...
Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation
of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and    
verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C 
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)
 I.  INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1 - 2   3
 II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ................................. 3 - 4   3
III. ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN ......................... 5 - 127 6
     A. Ongoing monitoring and verification operations ....  5 - 96  6
        1.  Missile activities ............................  5 - 23  6
        2.  Chemical activities ........................... 24 - 58 10
        3.  Biological activities ......................... 59 - 87 16
        4.  Nuclear activities ............................ 88 - 92 22
        5.  Aerial surveillance ........................... 93 - 96 23
     B. Export/import mechanism ........................... 97 - 113 23
        1.  Actions to establish the mechanism ............ 99 - 107 24
        2.  Actions to implement the mechanism ............108 - 113 25
     C. National implementation measures ..................114 - 116 26
     D. Organization ......................................117 - 127 27
        1.  Executive Office, New York ....................117 - 122   27
        2.  Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre ....123 - 127   28
IV.  FUTURE OPERATIONS ....................................128 - 132   29
     A. Financial status of the Special Commission ........128 - 130   29
     B. Operations and organization .......................131 - 132   30
 V.  CONCLUSIONS ..........................................133 - 136   30
Appendix.  Inspection schedule ..............................          32
                       I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  The present report is the seventh submitted pursuant to
paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) of 11
October 1991, by which the Council requested the Secretary-
General to submit a report to the Security Council every six
months on the implementation of the Special Commission's Plan
for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance
with relevant parts of section C of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).  It updates the information contained
in the first six reports (S/23801, S/24661, S/25620, S/26684,
S/1994/489 and S/1994/1138 and Corr.1).
2.  Further information concerning developments relating to
the implementation of the plan is contained in the report to
the Security Council of 15 December 1994 (S/1994/1422 and
Add.1), the seventh report provided in accordance with
paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991), the addendum to which
covers in detail the array of ongoing monitoring and
verification activities undertaken by the Commission in the
period from June to December 1994.
                  II.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3.  The basic elements of the ongoing monitoring and
verification system are regular inspections of relevant
facilities, inventories of dual-purpose items 1/ and
accounting for all inventoried items until they are consumed,
disposed of or no longer operable.  The inspections and the
establishment and maintenance of accurate inventories will be
underpinned by a full array of interlocking activities: 
aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, remote sensors,
tags and seals, a variety of detection technologies,
information obtained from other sources and, when sanctions on
the dual-purpose items are lifted, notifications under the
export/import control mechanism.  No one of these elements on
its own would suffice to provide confidence in the system, but
together they should constitute the most comprehensive
international monitoring system ever established in the sphere
of arms control.  Confidence in its effectiveness will rely,
inter alia, on the following:
    (a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture of
Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the
facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with
those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of
the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to
Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past
programmes, and the supplier networks it established to
acquire those elements of the programmes that it could not
acquire indigenously.  This information provides the baseline
data from which ongoing monitoring and verification proceeds;
    Knowledge of the level of technology attained by Iraq, of
the production and acquisition methods it used and of the
materials and equipment it had available are all key to
designing a system of monitoring that addresses issues of
concern and focuses monitoring effort where it would be most
effective and efficient.  For example, within Iraq, the system
should focus more of its efforts on those technologies and
production methods that Iraq is known to have mastered than on
technologies and methods that Iraq is known not to have
mastered, whereas, for the export/import monitoring regime,
the converse would be true, with effort focusing on those
items that Iraq would have to import in order to reactivate a
proscribed weapons programme.  Clearly, knowing where to focus
effort requires knowledge of what Iraq achieved in its past
    Similarly, knowledge of the procurement methods and routes
used by Iraq for its past programmes is key to the design of
an effective and efficient export/import monitoring regime. 
This system should be designed to be effective against the
procurement routes and methods that Iraq is known to have used
in the past.  Testing whether it is, is predicated on knowing
those routes and methods;
    Full accounting for the materials, items and equipment
associated with the past programmes is directly related to
what assets should be monitored under the system.  Dual-
purpose materials, items and equipment from the past
programmes must be monitored, along with other dual-purpose
capabilities available to Iraq. Uncertainties relating to the
accuracy or completeness of this accounting will consequently
lead to uncertainties as to whether the ongoing monitoring and
verification system is indeed monitoring all the materials,
items and equipment which should be monitored;
    Under Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715
(199l), Iraq is obliged to provide the above information,
which the Commission then verifies through its inspection and
analysis activities.  Iraq is required to update its
declarations on its dual-purpose activities and capabilities
every six months;
    (b) Completion of comprehensive monitoring and
verification protocols for each site at which monitoring will
be conducted as a consequence of the dual-purpose items
present or activities undertaken there.  These protocols are
the product of the baseline inspection process, i.e.,
inspections for the purposes of identifying all dual-purpose
capabilities requiring monitoring, tagging and inventorying,
sensor installation and protocol-building as necessary.  They
collate all the information required for future ongoing
monitoring and verification of, and contain recommendations as
to the conduct of such monitoring at, the specified site;
    (c) Successful testing of the system of ongoing monitoring
and verification in order to:
      - Establish a clear understanding and practice of how
        the elements of the system, including the actions
        required of Iraq, should operate; 
      - Evaluate the effectiveness of its elements, both
        individually and as a whole; 
    (d) Continuing reassessment of the operation of the system
of ongoing monitoring and verification in order to make
adjustments necessary in the light of Iraq's industrial
development and of any further information which becomes
available on Iraq's past programmes.  Because of the scale of
those past programmes, the damage caused during the Gulf war
and Iraq's own actions in allegedly destroying material
evidence, in particular documentation, elements could remain
unclear for a long time.  While these elements, except where
otherwise indicated in the present report, are not such as to
call into question the effectiveness and comprehensive nature
of the monitoring system, the Commission will continue to seek
out the information to clear them up.  The entire process of
verification of Iraq's declarations has been rendered both
difficult and prolonged as a result of Iraq's refusal or
inability to produce the documentation relating to its past
programmes and Iraq's providing the Commission with frequently
changing accounts of certain elements of its programmes.  This
has required the Commission to undertake more intensive
investigations than would otherwise have been necessary.  It
has also had to seek information from other Governments of
former suppliers to Iraq's programmes.  This has consumed
considerable periods of time.  This procedure is still ongoing
and will be vigorously pursued by the Commission.  The full
responsibility for the delays lies with Iraq.  In addition to
unclear elements of the nature referred to above, new
information may become available to the Commission requiring
investigation in the future.  Iraq clearly understands this to
be the case and the Deputy Prime Minister has on several
occasions provided explicit assurances that Iraq will in no
way hinder or interfere with such investigations.
While the system is premised on the provision by Iraq of
accurate and complete declarations of its dual-purpose
activities and capabilities and cannot be operated at its most
effective and least intrusive without such full declarations,
it has also been designed to be robust.  Experience has shown
that, even when initially presented with inadequate
declarations, the Commission has been able, through the
deployment of its various resources and the exercise of its
inspection rights, to elicit the information required for the
system to be established.  The Commission recognizes that it
has received full cooperation from Iraq in setting up and now
in operating the monitoring system.  It has also received
assurances from Iraq, at the highest levels, that this
cooperation will continue as the Security Council takes
decisions in respect of easing or lifting sanctions and the
oil embargo.  However, should Iraq seek systematically at any
time in the future to block the work of the Commission by, for
example, preventing access to sites, the Commission would not
be able to provide the Security Council with the assurances it
seeks concerning Iraq's compliance with the terms of paragraph
10 of resolution 687 (1991).  If such a case were to arise,
the Commission would immediately inform the Council.
4.  Once the sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661
(1990) are eased or lifted, in accordance with paragraph 21 of
resolution 687 (1991), to the extent that the export to Iraq
of dual-purpose items is again permitted, a further essential
element of the overall monitoring of Iraq's dual-purpose
capabilities will be the export/import mechanism envisaged
under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).
      A.  Ongoing monitoring and verification operations
                    1.  Missile activities
5.  The Commission has essentially completed the accounting of
facilities, equipment and materials used in the past
proscribed missile programmes of Iraq.  The Commission must
complete its verification of certain elements of Iraq's
account to ensure that all items subject to ongoing monitoring
and verification are indeed included in the monitoring
programme.  The Commission is still waiting for responses to
requests for information from a number of countries from which
Iraq acquired or sought to acquire items for proscribed
purposes about those transactions.  In most cases, the
remaining outstanding issues do not involve the receipt by
Iraq of prohibited items, but deal with the technological
level attained during, and the intended direction of, Iraq's
past missile activities.  Consequently, their resolution is
required to ensure the right focus of ongoing monitoring and
verification efforts.
6.  The Commission completed the baseline survey of Iraq's
permitted missile and related dual-purpose capabilities in May
1994.  Installation of sensors and tags for monitored missiles
and production equipment and related dual-purpose items was
completed in July 1994 and the resident missile monitoring
team began its monitoring activities in August 1994.  Since
then, the Commission has established a viable mechanism for
monitoring Iraq's design, testing and production of permitted
missile systems and related dual-purpose items.  Iraq has
provided support to ensure the proper operation of the
monitoring system. The missile monitoring is now operational.
Past programmes
7.  The lack of precision in the initial information provided
by Iraq on its past ballistic missile programmes and the
alleged destruction of documents by Iraq in late 1991 have
made obtaining a complete understanding of Iraq's past
ballistic missile programmes extremely difficult.  The
Commission has exerted considerable efforts to verify the
information provided in Iraq's "Full, final and comprehensive
report on ballistic missile activity", received in 1992. 
However, parts of the information provided have proved
confusing, misleading or inaccurate.  The Commission,
therefore, embarked on an effort to seek corroborating
information from a variety of sources to provide the
verification required by the Security Council.  Many of the
details of those programmes have been elucidated.  However,
several issues remain to be resolved.  These issues do not, in
general, involve the delivery to or possession by Iraq of
prohibited items, but bear directly on the technology level
attained by Iraq.  The Commission's understanding of this is
important for the design and operation of the monitoring
8.  Iraq's ballistic missile programme was initially centred
around the single- stage, liquid-engine 8K14 (SCUD B) missile,
for which it first received missiles and mobile launchers,
together with associated support equipment, starting in 1974. 
Iraq has stated that in 1987 it started a programme to extend
the range of these missiles and to reverse-engineer the
system.  In total, Iraq imported 819 such missiles and 11
mobile launchers for them.  In addition, it produced
indigenously 8 mobile launchers and constructed or was in the
process of constructing 60 fixed launch sites for these
missiles.  The Commission has supervised or verified the
destruction, and accounted for the expenditure, of the above
9.  The Commission has received numerous reports of the
importation by Iraq of SCUD systems from countries other than
the supplier of the 819 missiles described above.  No evidence
has been found of such imports.  The Commission assesses that
no additional missiles of this type or support equipment were
indeed supplied to Iraq.
10. In its efforts to extend the range of the imported SCUD B
missiles, Iraq used simple techniques which did not add
significantly to its missile technology base.  However, its
reverse-engineering efforts included the acquisition of
sophisticated production machinery and technology as well as
the acquisition from various suppliers of components for
missile systems.  In particular, Iraq gained expertise in
missile propulsion systems and their propellants, guidance and
control and airframe production technologies, and acquired the
hardware for high-precision machining.  The above
notwithstanding, Iraq was not successful in its efforts to
acquire an indigenous capability to produce indigenously
entire missile systems through its reverse-engineering
11. Beginning in 1985, Iraq started a cooperative effort with
other countries to develop a high-technology, two-stage
missile system designed for a range of around 1,000 km, called
the BADR 2000 in Iraq.  In this effort, Iraq constructed
sophisticated production facilities and imported high-
technology production equipment for the fabrication of the
first solid-propellant stage of this system.  The Commission
assesses, however, that no complete BADR 2000 missiles were
produced by Iraq.  The Commission has supervised and verified
the destruction of all known items, production equipment and
infrastructure directly associated with that programme.  The
Commission currently believes that Iraq did not acquire any
technology or equipment for the production of any other
aspects or components of that system, e.g., guidance and
control and launchers.
12. The Commission believes that it has a broad understanding
of the achievements of Iraq's past missile programmes and of
the level of technological development of Iraq in this area. 
It further believes that it has accounted for the majority of
the materials, items and equipment associated with these past
programmes.  Investigations into the disposition of some
remaining items, particularly related to the former missile
reverse-engineering project, are continuing.  The Commission
believes it has been able to design a reasonable monitoring
system based on this level of technology and that all the
physical assets that should be monitored are indeed being
13. However, there are still aspects of Iraq's past
programmes, regarding the direction of its research and
development efforts, that require further clarification.  The
Commission has, over the past six months, requested and
received information on Iraq's past activities from many
supporting nations.  The information provided, in most cases,
corroborates information provided by Iraq in its subsequent
declarations.  A few cases require continued investigation by
the Commission to eliminate any possibility that they present
potential loopholes in the ongoing monitoring and verification
mechanism.  The following cases exemplify such issues.
14. Supersonic parachute recovery system.  In 1988, Iraq
initiated the development of a supersonic parachute recovery
system for the Al Hussein missile warhead.  The programme
continued through 1990.  Iraq approached at least three
different companies for the development, production and supply
of the system.  However, no systems were provided to Iraq. 
The Commission is currently investigating and verifying the
programme's purpose and scope.  Information available to the
Commission from the potential suppliers does not corroborate
Iraq's current declarations about the programme.
15. Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH).  UDMH is a liquid
fuel which can improve the performance of liquid-propellant
rocket engines.  In 1987, Iraq began inquiring about and
procuring facilities, equipment, training and materials
concerning every aspect of the use and production of UDMH and
related systems in missiles.  The programme continued until
January 1991.  Iraq declared that it had unilaterally
destroyed 10.5 tons of UDMH in May 1991.  The Commission has
been unable to verify this.  Further, Iraq declared that no
experiments were performed using UDMH.  The Commission has
information which contradicts this statement.  If Iraq
mastered the technologies required for UDMH rocket engine
design, the Commission would need to modify the ongoing
monitoring and verification regime in the missile area to take
account of Iraq's access to these technologies.  The
Commission is continuing to investigate this issue to ensure
that it has an accurate account of Iraq's past activities in
this regard.
Baseline data
16. The monitoring system in the missile area has been
designed by assessing the critical aspects of each stage of
the production of permitted missile systems to ensure that no
components are produced or diverted for use in proscribed
missile systems.  Consequently, monitoring focuses on Iraq's
non-proscribed missile research, development, testing and
production activities, facilities and equipment.  In addition,
the system also monitors other facilities with related dual-
purpose technologies and items and high-precision engineering
manufacturing capabilities which could be used to support a
clandestine effort to produce proscribed missiles.
17. The Commission completed the baseline survey of all of
Iraq's declared missile and related research, development,
test and production facilities in May 1994.  Thirty-two
baseline inspections were conducted during UNSCOM 71/BM 22. 
The baseline process included identifying the critical
technologies and equipment, recommending the appropriate level
of monitoring for the same and creating the detailed protocols
necessary for conducting inspections at each site.
18. The Commission completed the installation of 41 monitoring
cameras at 15 sites related to missiles or associated dual-use
technology in July 1994.  These cameras were tested during
August 1994 and the system became operational in September
1994.  The Commission completed the tagging and inventorying
of 182 items of missile-related equipment in July 1994.  The
Commission completed a technical baseline survey of missile
systems to be subject to monitoring in June 1994, and the
tagging of all relevant operational missiles in Iraq in
July 1994.  The resident missile monitoring team initiated its
inspection activities in August 1994.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
19. The plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's
compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991), approved by the Security
Council in its resolution 715 (1991), states that facilities,
equipment, other items and technologies which could be used
for the development, construction, modification or acquisition
of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres
should be subject to monitoring and verification.  The
Commission has undertaken to fulfil this requirement of the
Security Council by designing a multi-level, comprehensive
monitoring system covering Iraq's missile research,
development, testing and production facilities as well as
facilities with related dual-use capabilities.  The monitoring
system provides for:  the periodic no-notice inspection of
facilities by the Baghdad resident missile monitoring group;
camera surveillance of critical areas and key production
machines; inventory control, by tagging and regular
inspection, of items and machinery located at key, related and
dual-use facilities; special inspection teams to address
specific issues (e.g., research and development activities);
inspections to verify Iraq's compliance with existing
resolutions; and aerial inspections and surveillance.
20. In order to accomplish the above tasks, the Commission has
undertaken inspections of research, development, testing,
production and modification activities and facilities. 
Inspection of research and development facilities establishes
the technological capabilities of Iraq and helps identify any
modifications necessary for the current monitoring regime. 
Inspection of testing facilities, including the witnessing of
testing activity, provides assurance that current missile
systems and those under development do not exceed the
constraints established by the resolutions.  Inspection of
production and modification facilities guarantees that all
missiles produced are accounted for and that no proscribed
missile systems are produced.  This is backed up by
inspections of sites not currently under monitoring to ensure
that no activities requiring monitoring are conducted at the
site in question, thereby ensuring, through a programme of
such inspections, the comprehensiveness of the monitoring
system (i.e., that all that should be is monitored).  Finally,
the verification inspections of the operational missile
ensures that no modification to extend the maximum range of
these missile systems will go undetected.
21. The resident missile monitoring teams have conducted 178
inspections since the last report.  These inspections have
established the effectiveness of the monitoring regime in
verifying the current status of Iraq's non-proscribed missile
programmes and related technology.  The resident team is
entrusted with the inspection of Iraq's missile and related
facilities to ensure that there is no research or development
into or production of missile systems exceeding the
specifications of the resolutions, that all declared equipment
is accounted for and that records agree with information on
research, development and production available from other
sources.  Further, regular collection and review of video
coverage of missile-related activities in critical areas and
key equipment is conducted to guarantee that the Commission
accounts for and tags all produced missiles subject to
monitoring and that no production of proscribed missile
systems occurs.
22. Since the last report the Commission has conducted three
inspections of the tagged operational missiles to ensure that
Iraq has not modified any missile to extend its range beyond
that allowed by the resolutions.  These inspections are
conducted on a random sample of 10 per cent of the operational
missile force three times per annum.  No modifications of
missiles under monitoring were detected.
23. The Commission has conducted, on a regular basis, research
and development update inspections to confirm that current
missile designs will not exceed the limits established by the
resolutions.  Such inspections are designed to review the
technical details of the design, development and testing of
missile systems and missile-related technological developments
twice per annum.  These inspections are designed to identify
any requirement to modify the monitoring regime to assure its
continued effectiveness.  The Commission conducted its latest
research and development update inspection in March 1995.
                    2.  Chemical activities
24. During the high-level talks held at Baghdad in February
1995, Iraq promised to present a new full, final and complete
declaration of its past chemical warfare activities in order
to comply with the requirements of resolution 707 (1991). 
This it did on 25 March 1995, during the most recent visit of
the Executive Chairman to Baghdad.  The new information
provided is now being verified, in particular the claim that
significantly reduced quantities of chemical warfare agents
were produced.
25. The chemical monitoring system in Iraq is now operational,
with the installation of its monitoring equipment almost
complete.  The additions and modifications to the system which
are in the course of being made are not such as to undermine
the effectiveness of the overall regime.  Together with an
efficient export/import monitoring regime, this system is
expected to preclude Iraq from resuming prohibited chemical
Past programmes
26. In order to resolve outstanding issues relating to its
past chemical weapons programmes, Iraq provided on 25 March
1995 a new "full, final and complete" declaration of all
aspects of its past chemical weapons programmes.  This
declaration contains new information on:  the history and
organizational structure of the past programmes; the
weaponization of chemical weapons agents; the procurement of
chemical weapons-related materials; and the material balance
for precursor chemicals and chemical weapons agents produced
and weaponized.  Iraq has agreed to provide additional
information and clarifications concerning these new
declarations as required and upon the Commission's request. 
Any such additional information will be attached as an
addendum to the new declaration.
27. In the new declaration, Iraq has revised some of the data
previously provided.  The most significant change relates to
the quantities of chemical warfare agents produced.  Iraq now
declares that it produced 290 tons of chemical weapons agents
less than previously stated.  The declaration also indicated
that, in 1985, certain biological activities were undertaken
at Iraq's principal chemical weapons site, Muthanna.  The
Commission has started the process of verifying this new
information.  Verification of the statement relating to
biological activities at Muthanna is dependent on full
verification of Iraq's declarations concerning its biological
activities in this time-frame.
28. On the basis of this new information, the Commission's
understanding of Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes is as
Agent production
29. Iraq started research into the production of chemical
weapons agents in the 1970s and started batch production of
agents in the early 1980s.  At that stage, production was
heavily reliant on the import of precursor chemicals from
foreign suppliers.
30. In 1981, Iraq started producing the blister agent mustard
(HD).  Iraq's earlier declarations of 3,080 tons produced have
been reduced in the latest disclosure to 2,850 tons.  The
quality of the mustard agent was good (not less than
80 per cent pure) and was such that the agent could be stored
for long periods, either in bulk or in weaponized form.  Even
years after its production, the mustard agent analysed by the
Commission was found to be in good and usable condition.
31. Production of the nerve gases tabun (GA) and sarin (GB)
started in 1984 and the method of production changed over time
in order to resolve stabilization problems.  Iraq's latest
declarations have reduced the stated amount of tabun produced
from 250 tons to 210 tons and of sarin produced from 812 tons
to 790 tons.
32. The tabun produced was poor, being of a maximum purity of
60 per cent.  As a result, the agent did not store well and
could only be stored for a limited period.  Furthermore, Iraq
experienced problems in the production of tabun owing to salt
blockages forming in pipes during synthesis.  Because of these
problems, Iraq refocused its nerve agent research, development
and production efforts on sarin (GB/GF).
33. The sarin produced was also of poor quality (maximum
purity of 60 per cent when solvent is taken into account) and
so too could only be stored for short periods.  In order to
overcome this problem, Iraq resorted to a binary approach to
weaponization:  the precursor chemicals for sarin (DF 2/ and
the alcohols cyclohexanol and isopropanol) were stored
separately for mixing in the munitions immediately prior to
use to produce a mixture of two G-series nerve agents, GB and
GF.  Given that the locally manufactured DF had a purity of
more than 95 per cent and the alcohols were imported and of
100 per cent purity, this process could be expected to yield
relatively pure sarin.
34. Over the period from June 1992 to June 1994, the
Commission's Chemical Destruction Group destroyed 30 tons of
tabun, 70 tons of sarin and 600 tons of mustard agent, stored
in bulk and in munitions.
35. Research into the production of CS was initiated at the
Salman Pak site in the late 1970s and early 1980s for the
purposes of riot control.  It was conducted under the auspices
of the Committee for National Security, not the Armed Forces. 
A few tons were produced at this site.  In the early 1980s,
military scale production of CS was started at the Muthanna
site.  The Commission has been unable to establish how much CS
was produced in total.  It is known that RPG-7 rocket-
propelled grenades, 250- and 500-gauge bombs and 82mm and
120mm mortar shells were filled with CS, but again the
quantity of munitions so filled cannot be established. 
Consequently, the Commission is unable to establish any kind
of material balance for Iraq's CS-related activities.
36. Iraq also had a research and development programme for the
production of a further nerve agent, VX.  According to Iraq's
account, VX was the focus of its research efforts in the
period after September 1987.  Iraq has stated that between
late 1987 and early 1988, a total of 250 tons of phosphorous
pentasulphide and 200 tons of di-isopropylamine were imported,
these being two key precursors required for the production of
VX.  For the other precursors required, Iraq claims to have
used only approximately 1 ton of methyl phosphonyl chloride
(MPC) from a total of 660 tons produced indigenously.  The
remaining MPC is claimed to have been used to produce DF, then
used in GB/GF production.  The fourth precursor required for
VX, ethylene oxide, was generally available, being a multi-
purpose chemical.
37. Iraq states that it produced a total of only 10 tons of
choline from the di-isopropylamine and ethylene oxide and
approximately 3 tons of methyl thiophosphonyl dichloride from
the phosphorous pentasulphide and methyl phosphonyl chloride. 
From this, Iraq states that it produced experimental
quantities of VX (recently increased to 260 kg from 160 kg). 
Iraq has recently admitted that three 250-gauge aerial bombs
had been filled with VX for experimental purposes.
38. Iraq claims that further attempts to produce VX were
unsuccessful and the programme was finally abandoned in
September 1988.  According to Iraq's account, the remaining
choline from the 10 tons was burned in early 1988 and the
remaining 247 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide was discarded
in 1991 by scattering it over an area of land and putting it
in pits.  Iraq also claims that 213 tons of di-isopropylamine
was destroyed by bombing during the Gulf war.  However, while
the Commission has found traces of these chemicals at the
sites at which Iraq states their destruction occurred, it has
not been able to verify the quantities destroyed.  Thus,
precursors for the production of at least 200 to 250 tons of
VX cannot be definitively accounted for.
39. The Commission has supervised the destruction, or verified
Iraq's unilateral destruction, of 125 250-gauge bombs and
several thousands 120mm mortar shells.  In its new
declaration, Iraq declared an additional 350 500-gauge and 100
250-gauge aerial bombs filled with CS in 1987.
Precursor chemical production
40. In the early stages of its chemical weapons programme,
Iraq imported all its precursor chemicals.  Over time,
however, Iraq sought to obtain the capability to produce
indigenously all the precursors required for the production of
the agents noted above.  Iraq acknowledges that it had or was
on the brink of having the capability to produce in quantity
the precursors for tabun (GA):  D4 and phosphorous oxychloride
(POCl3), the sarin/cyclosarin (GB/GF) precursors: 
methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF), methyl phosphonyl dichloride
(MPC), dimethylmethyl phosphonate (DMMP), trimethylphosphite
(TMP), hydrogen fluoride (HF), phosphorous trichloride (PCl3)
and thionyl chloride (SOCl2).  Phosphorous trichloride and
thionylchoride are also the main precursors for the production
of mustard (HD).
41. Iraq also had the capability to produce, at least at
laboratory scale, sodium sulphide (Na2S) and thiodiglycol
(both for sulphur mustard agent production), methyl benzilate
(for BZ production), triethanol amine (for nitrogen-mustard
agent production) and potassium bifluoride and ammonium
bifluoride (for GB/GF production).  In addition, Iraq had the
capability to produce the VX precursors choline, methyl
thiophosphonyl dichloride (MPS) at the least at pilot-plant
42. Clearly, any ongoing monitoring and verification system in
the chemical area will need to address these capabilities.
43. For its past chemical weapons programme, Iraq had
equipment for research and for production purposes, both of
which need to be covered by the monitoring system.  Iraq
claims that all the laboratory equipment used for research
purposes was destroyed during the Gulf war.  However, the
Commission has been unable to verify this independently and
hence cannot definitively account for all the equipment of
44. Of the production equipment, the Commission tagged and
inventoried 240 key pieces, of which 40 were subsequently
destroyed under the Commission's supervision.  This equipment
includes reaction vessels, heat exchangers, distillation
columns and corrosion-resistant fittings.  It is estimated
that a further 50 key pieces of equipment, known to have been
imported by Iraq, were destroyed during the Gulf war.
45. Iraq has the capability to produce certain of this dual-
purpose equipment indigenously, at welding and heavy
engineering plants.  However, Iraq is still reliant on imports
of corrosion-resistant metal alloys to do so.
46. The chemical component of the ongoing monitoring and
verification system has been designed to ensure monitoring of
all the appropriate laboratory and production equipment
identified and the facilities where this equipment could be
manufactured indigenously.
47. Iraq has declared that it weaponized for chemical weapons
purposes the following munitions:  RPG-7 rocket-propelled
grenades and 82mm and 120mm mortar shells exclusively for CS;
130mm and 155mm artillery shells for mustard agent; 250- and
500-gauge aerial bombs for mustard, tabun, sarin and CS; 122mm
rockets, R-400 and DB-2 aerial bombs for sarin and mixtures of
GB/GF; and Al Hussein missile warheads for sarin.  Of these,
Iraq acquired the capability to produce all of the aerial bomb
types listed and the Al Hussein missile warheads and chemical
containers for 122mm rockets.  It was reliant on imports of
the other empty munitions but had the capability to empty
conventional artillery shells and aerial bombs for subsequent
refill with chemical-weapons agent.
48. While the Commission can verify and confirm with
Governments of suppliers the declared quantities of munitions
imports, it cannot yet be sure that the declarations are
comprehensive in this regard.  However, the Commission's main
efforts to establish a material balance for the chemical-
weapons programmes as a whole rely more on material balances
for agents and precursor chemicals than for munitions.
49. The major part of Iraq's chemical-weapons production and
weaponization facilities has been destroyed.  Identified
chemical production equipment of dual-use character has been
tagged.  After the completion of the destruction of the
relevant facilities, stockpiles and approximately 40 pieces of
production equipment, the Commission's attention focused on
Iraq's dual-purpose chemical capabilities in its non-
proscribed industries.
Baseline data
50. The above indicates the technologies mastered by Iraq,
chemicals, materials, items and equipment available to it and
activities undertaken by it.  The Commission clearly has to
monitor these if it is to assure the Security Council that it
is effectively monitoring Iraq's compliance not to reacquire
chemical weapons.  In addition, in order to ensure that it
designed an effective and comprehensive monitoring system in
the chemical area, the Commission had to conduct a survey of
Iraq's non-proscribed chemical industries to assess the
following:  the level of research and development which could
be applied to the production of chemical weapons agents and
their precursors, either in laboratory or production
quantities; the ability of Iraq to purify, stabilize and store
either chemical weapons agents or their precursor chemicals;
Iraq's capability to produce dual-use equipment which could be
used to produce chemical weapons agents and precursors and its
mastery of technologies, such as production of corrosion-
resistant alloys and special welding technologies, required to
manufacture such equipment; and Iraq's capability to develop,
produce, fill or store munitions which could be used for
chemical weapons purposes (e.g., white-phosphorous-filled
155mm shells, multi-purpose aerial bombs, etc.).  Such
capabilities are found in the organophosphorous and
organohalide industries (such as pesticides, insecticides and
fertilizers), the petrochemical industry, chemical
laboratories, leather tanning, military munitions and heavy
engineering plants, and hence the Commission conducted
baseline inspections of these industries in order to assess
which sites and facilities required monitoring.
51. In 1994, the Commission completed baseline inspections of
57 chemical sites, and monitoring and verification protocols
were prepared for those sites related to production and
storage of chemicals of concern and for sites involved in the
manufacture of chemical production equipment.
52. In January and February 1995, baseline inspections were
conducted at 17 universities, colleges and research
institutions to assess their potential and hence their
relevance for monitoring.  In addition, five military storage
depots were visited because of their potential to store
munitions for chemical weapons (empty or filled).  Unless
other dual-purpose facilities come to the attention of the
Commission, this completed the process of preparing monitoring
and verification protocols for the sites to be monitored. 
However, it is expected that the number of chemical sites to
be monitored by the Commission will increase along with the
development of Iraq's chemical industry.
53. With the exception of two facilities in Iraq related to
pesticide formulation, none of the chemical sites currently
monitored has the capability to produce banned items.  In
addition, the research laboratories inspected currently have
no potential for conducting significant chemical weapons-
related research and development.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
54. In addition to the monitoring capabilities shared across
the disciplines, such as aerial surveillance, chemical
monitoring is centred around visits by the monitoring group to
sites to be monitored, tagging and inventorying of key
materials and equipment, collection and analysis of air
samples using automatic air samplers located at certain of
these sites, and monitoring of key items of equipment by
remote-controlled cameras.  In the future, flow meters and
seals may also be deployed at certain production facilities.
55. On 2 October 1994, the first chemical monitoring team (CG-
1) started its monitoring activities from its base in the
Baghdad Monitoring Centre.  Currently, the third chemical
monitoring group (CG-3) is in Iraq.  The chemical monitoring
groups have conducted 70 inspections to date.  Beyond
conducting ongoing monitoring and verification activities at
sites for which monitoring and verification protocols have
been prepared, the groups also visit chemical facilities which
are currently not monitored, as part of a programme to ensure
that such sites have not in fact acquired any capabilities
which would require monitoring.  If the group does identify a
site at which monitoring should be conducted, it will
establish procedures for regular monitoring of the site.
56. By the end of January 1995, all the sensor systems had
been installed at the sites of interest.  At six sites, 30
remote-controlled cameras were emplaced.  At eight sites, 15
computer-controlled air samplers were installed.  Sites so
monitored include those capable of the production of
precursors, dual-use equipment and pesticides.
57. At the end of February 1995, a chemical laboratory was
installed at the Baghdad Monitoring Centre.  The Centre now
has the capability to analyse all types of chemical samples,
including the samples from the air-sampling devices.  The
laboratory has a highly sensitive analytical capability using
instruments and wet chemistry, providing sensitivity to parts
per billion.
58. Minor adjustments are being made to the air-sampling
devices to increase their reliability.  These adjustments will
be completed in May 1995.  Meanwhile, manual-transportable air
samplers will be made available to the chemical monitoring
group.  This will enable the group to take random air samples
at sites during inspections.  By the end of May 1995, the
group will also be equipped with personal detection and
protection equipment suitable for protection against all
possible occupational and industrial hazards that might be
encountered at Iraq's chemical facilities.
                   3.  Biological activities
59. The task of establishing ongoing monitoring and
verification in the biological area has taken longer than in
other areas for two reasons:  the nature and scope of the task
made it a more difficult proposition; and Iraq's declarations
about its dual-use capabilities were initially far from
complete and the data contained in them varied from
declaration to declaration to the point of contradiction. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, through the activities of
its inspection teams, the Commission has been able to
establish sufficient baseline data on key sites for it to
commence monitoring.  All the apparatus for biological
monitoring is now in place and monitoring is proceeding.
60. However, Iraq has not provided an account of its past
biological warfare programme and a new full, final and
complete declaration recently received from Iraq does not
redress the problem.  It is unable to account definitively for
all the materials and items that may have been used in such a
programme and are known to have been acquired by Iraq.  The
Commission assesses that Iraq obtained or sought to obtain all
the items and materials required to produce biological warfare
agents in Iraq.  With Iraq's failure to account for all these
items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that
they had been purchased and in part used for proscribed
purposes - the production of agents for biological weapons. 
In these circumstances, the Commission cannot conclude that
its biological monitoring is comprehensive in coverage and
properly focused, i.e., that it is monitoring all biological
facilities, activities, materials and items that should be
subject to monitoring.
Past programmes
61. Iraq maintains that it had no biological weapons-related
activities, only a basic military biological research
programme.  This programme, declared to have been conducted
solely at the Salman Pak site, is stated by Iraq to have been
initiated in 1986 and discontinued in 1990.  It is stated to
have employed 10 persons and to have produced only 10 basic
research papers on various aspects of three bacteria (B.
anthracis, C1. botulinum and C1. perfringens).  It is further
claimed that no decision had been taken as to the longer-term
direction of the programme until the programme's
discontinuation in autumn 1990.  In its declarations, Iraq
fails to explain or account for various aspects of its
procurement or construction activities in the biological area
in this time-frame.
Complex growth media
62. Iraq acknowledges that it procured, through the Technical
and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID), 3/ very
large quantities of complex growth media 4/ in 1988 but has
failed to provide an accounting for the purposes of this
importation and for the use of a significant portion of it.
63. Iraq claims that, while the media was imported by TSMID,
the import was on behalf of the Ministry of Health for the
purposes of hospital diagnostic laboratories.  This
importation of media by types, quantities and packaging is
grossly out of proportion to Iraq's stated requirements for
hospital use.  Iraq explains the excessive quantities imported
and the inappropriate size of the packaging as being a one-of-
a-kind mistake and attempts to justify the import as
appropriate and required for medical diagnostic purposes.
64. However, for hospital diagnostic purposes, only small
quantities are needed.  According to Iraq's declarations,
which are imprecise and changing, over the period 1987-1994
Iraq's total hospital consumption of all such media was less
than 200 kg per annum.  But in 1988 alone, TSMID imported
nearly 39,000 kg of such media, which has a manufacturer's
guarantee of 4 to 5 years.  A further incongruity is that, of
all the types of media required for hospital use, only a
select few were "mistakenly" imported by TSMID in large
quantities.  These did not include those most frequently used
in hospitals.
65. Furthermore, the packaging of TSMID imports is
inconsistent with declared hospital usage:  diagnostic assays
use very small quantities of media and so, because the media
deteriorates rapidly once a package has been opened, media for
diagnostic purposes is normally distributed in 0.1-1 kg
packages.  However, the media imported by Iraq in 1988 was
packaged in 25-100 kg drums.  This style of packaging is
consistent with the large-scale usage of media associated with
the production of biological agents.  The types of media
imported are suitable for the production of anthrax and
botulinum, known biological warfare agents researched by Iraq
in its declared biological military programme.
66. The Special Commission has only accounted for some 22 tons
of the 39 tons of complex media imported by TSMID in 1988. 
The media accounted for is still stored in Iraq (in large
packages) and is under the Commission's monitoring regime. 
However, some 17 tons remain unaccounted for.  Iraq claims
that this quantity was distributed in original packages to
numerous hospitals in 1989 but that it was all destroyed
(along with documentation concerning its distribution, storage
and consumption in hospitals) during riots that occurred in
the aftermath of the Gulf war.  It is claimed that no media
was distributed to hospitals in regions where no riots
occurred, e.g., in the Baghdad region.  No attempts were made
by Iraq to resupply the affected regions or hospitals to
compensate for losses, although large amounts of the same
imported media in good condition were still available in Iraq.
67. Iraq initially presented a set of documents in an attempt
to prove that media had been received by a Ministry of Health
storage site and was partly distributed to certain regional
health centres.  Iraq subsequently admitted that these
documents had in fact been "recreated" and now claims that all
originals have been destroyed, misplaced or lost.
68. The Commission has information that, in addition to media
delivered to Iraq in 1988, quantities of media were also
purchased by Iraq in 1989 and 1990.  Evidence of additional
supplies in large packages was found in Iraq.  This undermines
Iraq's explanation that the TSMID purchases in 1988 were a
one-of-a-kind mistake as to types and packaging of media
imported, as does the fact that the Ministry of Health
continued, through its own import division, its regular small-
quantity purchases of media consistent with its diagnostic
requirements throughout the period, including the purchase of
kilogram quantities of two growth media only months after
TSMID purchased 21/4 tons of the same media.
69. Iraq's current accounting of media importation and
disposal is not acceptable.  Full and substantial accounting
by Iraq for the media, eminently suitable for production of
biological agents, is an essential task if the Commission is
to have any confidence that there was no production of
biological agent for weapons purposes and that Iraq's dual-use
capabilities are sufficiently monitored to ensure that Iraq
cannot clandestinely reacquire biological weapons.
70. Iraq has not provided satisfactory explanations for some
other significant procurement efforts by TSMID related to the
acquisition of dual-purpose biological equipment and supplies
critical to a biological warfare capability.  The following
illustrates some issues of concern.
71. When confronted by the Commission with evidence, Iraq
acknowledged the purchase by TSMID in 1989 of four filling
machines, ostensibly for a biopesticide project at the Salman
Pak site.  Until this acknowledgement, Iraq, while declaring
Salman Pak to be the site of its biological military research
programme, had not declared any biopesticide activity there. 
Filling machines, while having many uses, are required for
filling bacterial warfare agent into munitions or containers. 
Full accounting for these machines is therefore a requirement. 
Iraq claims that these four machines were destroyed by bombing
in the Gulf war.  No evidence (e.g., scrap) has been provided
to support this claim.  Furthermore, before describing this
loss of the filling machines, Iraq had previously declared
that all equipment at Salman Pak had been dispersed prior to
the commencement of the air war in order to protect it from
bombing and that no equipment had been destroyed at Salman
72. TSMID procured a spray dryer in 1989.  Again, it is
claimed that this was for the above-mentioned biopesticide
project at Salman Pak.  This spray dryer has technical
specifications which provide a capability of drying the
bacterial slurry resulting from the fermentation process to
produce dry matter with particle sizes in the range of 1 to 10
m.  This particle size is associated with efficient dispersion
of biological warfare agents, not with the production of
biopesticides.  Furthermore, dry bacterial matter is easier to
store for longer periods.  Such spray dryers, therefore, would
be a crucial component in acquiring an indigenous capability
to produce viable and durable biological weapons.
73. TSMID attempted to order various named and virulent
anthrax strains, known to be particularly appropriate for
biological warfare purposes.  Iraq flatly denies this, despite
confirmation to the Commission by the potential supplier.
Construction of biological facilities
74. As noted above, in addition to Iraq's procurement
activities, its construction activities for biological
purposes are also a matter of concern.  In particular, the
production facility at the Al Hakam site has long raised
concerns relating to its original intent, as opposed to its
current use.  Iraq claims that this facility is and always was
intended only as a single-cell protein (SCP) plant for the
production of animal feed.  However, certain design features
of the Al Hakam facility were superfluous to the requirements
of an SCP plant, and more consistent with the requirements of
a biological warfare agent facility.  Some examples follow.
75. The original design for Al Hakam had many costly features
associated with work with toxic or infectious materials. 
Production of SCP does not involve the use of such materials
and so would not require such safety features.  An example of
these features was the sophisticated air filtration system,
using HEPA filters, 5/ for both input and output air on the
declared animal house.  Iraq argues that this system was
required to prevent the spread of animal diseases.  If, as
claimed, the building were to house only animals for feeding,
there would be no requirement for such safety features.  On
the other hand, such an air filtration system would be
desirable if the building were planned for animal experiments
involving infectious agents.  According to information
available to the Commission from the potential supplier, Iraq
also ordered a similar air filtration system for another
building at Al Hakam, housing laboratories.  Iraq denies that
such an order was made.  When asked to present an air
ventilation design plan for the building, Iraq stated that
that particular page of the plans for the Al Hakam facility
had been lost.
76. The layout of Al Hakam and the security arrangements there
were more consistent with a military facility or a facility to
produce toxic or pathogenic material than with a commercial
SCP plant.  The facility was constructed and equipped under
conditions of great secrecy, akin to those used in Iraq's
other proscribed programmes.  No documents are available which
identified Al Hakam, at the time of construction, as a purely
civilian production project.  Iraq could not provide any
public announcements that were made about what it has since
claimed was intended to be one of the world's largest SCP
plants.  No foreign contractors or suppliers ever visited the
site.  Iraq falsified the information on an end-user
certificate for a fermenter purchased for Al Hakam, claiming
that it would be installed at another site and under the
management and supervision of another organization.  It
similarly falsified information for the import of spare parts
for equipment available at Al Hakam.
Baseline data
77. While monitoring activities, by definition, concentrate on
current dual-purpose biological capabilities and require
comprehensive and verified baseline data on these
capabilities, designing efficient and effective monitoring
also necessitates a full understanding of Iraq's past
biological programme.  For example, knowledge of Iraq's past
procurement methods for currently proscribed items or
information on Iraq's past programme priorities provides
important indicators in identifying choke points (either in
terms of physical assets or in terms of technologies) in
Iraq's ability to reacquire banned capabilities and hence for
identifying where monitoring efforts can most profitably be
78. In preparation for monitoring Iraq's biological
activities, the Commission evaluated those dual-purpose
technologies, activities, materials, items and equipment which
could contribute to a biological warfare capability and
proceeded to identify those sites or facilities in Iraq which,
through the possession of same, contribute to such a
capability.  The basis for the above was Iraq's declarations
of its dual-purpose capabilities, in turn verified by the
Commission, and information obtained by the Commission in the
course of its inspections of sites and facilities in Iraq.
79. The previous report submitted pursuant to Security Council
resolution 715 (1991) (S/1994/1138) detailed the problems
encountered by the Commission in establishing complete and
accurate baseline data for Iraq's dual-purpose biological
capabilities:  incomplete and inaccurate initial declarations
submitted by Iraq, inconsistencies in the data contained in
Iraq's various declarations and between them and the findings
of inspection teams, and undeclared movement of items to be
monitored between inspections so that inconsistencies arose
between the findings of inspection teams.  All this made it
impossible for the Commission to establish firm baseline data
from which to start its monitoring of Iraq's biological
80. The difficulties in obtaining reliable, accurate and
complete declarations on biological sites necessitated a more
radical and intensive approach to obtaining the baseline
information required.  The already intense schedule of
biological inspections was further intensified with the
initiation in December 1994 of a coordinated series of
intrusive inspections.  Interim biological monitoring began on
1 December 1994, comprising a Baghdad-based monitoring team
that, in concert with special ad hoc teams of experts, sought
to establish the baseline data necessary for the commencement
of monitoring.  Biological audits were conducted at 10
priority sites for which the information supplied by Iraq and
obtained by earlier inspection teams was the most disparate.
81. The aim of these inspections was:  to obtain information
not yet provided but required for monitoring purposes; to
assess Iraq's ability to produce indigenously key dual-purpose
biological equipment; to examine records at organizations
involved in the import and maintenance of such equipment; to
prepare a full inventory of dual-use equipment in Iraq; and,
through technical talks and interviews, to obtain a complete
understanding of Iraq's past military biological programme. 
For sites of particular concern for the monitoring regime, the
teams sought to obtain an in-depth understanding of the
current activities and plans with regard to personnel, chain
of command, reporting structure, operations and production,
research and development activities, and production
82. By pursuing interim monitoring as a means of obtaining the
baseline data required for monitoring, the Commission was
relying less on Iraq's openness and more on inspection
findings than originally intended.  This approach required a
greater outlay of resources and so could only be applied to a
few sites.  The interim monitoring process did not obviate the
need for Iraq to report accurately all its biological
activities which required declaration under the plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
83. Given the nature of biological weapons, effective
monitoring in the biological area necessitates a broader
monitoring effort than is required in the other areas.  The
Commission will monitor Iraq's basic biological research
potential, its stocks of micro-organisms and complex growth
media, its biological production capacity (i.e., fermenters
and incubators), its ability to isolate micro-organisms from
fermenter slurry (i.e., spray and drum dryers) and to create
particles of a size appropriate for biological warfare
(milling machines), its ability to fill containers with
biological materials and its ability to disperse such
84. These capabilities can be found in the following types of
institutions in Iraq (hence monitoring efforts will take the
Commission's teams to such facilities):  biological
laboratories (found in hospitals, universities and the food
industry), biological production facilities (e.g., single-cell
protein production, vaccine production, drug formulation and
production, breweries and distilleries), and agricultural crop
sprayers.  In all, monitoring of Iraq's biological activities
covers some 80 sites.
85. Monitoring is based on maintaining a comprehensive and
accurate inventory of dual-purpose items and activities in
Iraq, primarily through on-site inspections, i.e., by updating
the baseline data contained in the monitoring and verification
protocols.  This involves the identification of any sites not
yet subject to ongoing monitoring and verification which
acquire dual-purpose capabilities requiring monitoring, the
identification of newly acquired dual-use equipment, the
inventorying and tagging of such equipment and assessment of
its intended use and the assessment of how such newly acquired
capabilities increase Iraq's overall biological warfare
capabilities.  Monitoring modalities include: on-site
inspections (with or without prior notice); aerial
surveillance; interviews with key personnel at monitored
sites; examination of site records; updating of inventories;
continuous flow monitoring and sensor-activated camera
monitoring; sample taking; notifications of transfers within
Iraq of inventoried items; and notification of modification,
import or other acquisition of dual-purpose biological
research and production equipment of dual-use character.
86. Monitoring efforts have resulted in the installation of 24
cameras at 5 key sites and locations (16 of them at 3
locations at the Al Hakam site) and the initiation of
monitoring at those sites for which monitoring and
verification protocols were ready.  A total of 13 biological
inspections were undertaken in the period from October 1994 to
March 1995.  The interim monitoring groups conducted 51 visits
to 20 sites.  A biological room has been installed at the
Baghdad Monitoring Centre for the processing, packaging and
onward transmission of biological samples taken during the
course of monitoring.
87. Monitoring and verification protocols have now been
completed for all the key biological sites in Iraq identified
to date and monitoring of them is now proceeding.  However,
the failure of Iraq to disclose fully all aspects of its past
biological military research programme means that the
Commission cannot be certain that its monitoring programme in
the biological area is covering all the sites, facilities and
capabilities that require monitoring under the terms of the
plan approved by the Security Council.
                    4.  Nuclear activities
88. The Commission, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii)
of resolution 687 (1991), and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution
715 (1991), provides assistance and cooperation to the IAEA
687 Action Team set up to implement provisions of those
resolutions pertaining to nuclear weapons.  This includes the
designation of undeclared sites to be inspected.  The
Commission provides expertise for logistical, information and
other operational support for the Action Team's conduct of
ongoing monitoring and verification.  Monitoring activities in
Iraq are coordinated across disciplines, including the nuclear
area, not only to ensure the most effective and efficient use
of resources, but also to benefit from the synergies ensuing
from a multidisciplinary approach to the monitoring of sites
of interest to more than one discipline.
89. During the period under review, the Commission has: 
provided comments on Iraqi requests to relocate nuclear-
related, dual-use materials and equipment within Iraq;
participated in inspections and monitoring teams of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); provided fixed-wing
(C-160) and rotating wing (CH-53g) aircraft for the transport
of IAEA inspectors into Iraq from Bahrain, and between points
within Iraq; and provided the IAEA 687 Action Team with
logistic support for its inspection activities through the
Baghdad Monitoring Centre.
90. Iraqi requests to relocate materials, items and machine
tools of potential nuclear application are approved only after
two technical evaluations are concluded.  The first
evaluation, provided by IAEA, checks significance to past
nuclear programmes, or potential value to a renewed nuclear
programme.  The Commission, in turn, looks for significance to
all weapon programmes, including ballistic missiles and
chemical and biological weapons.  It provides its decision on
request as required under paragraph 3 (c) of Security Council
resolution 707 (1991).  Close coordination between IAEA and
the Commission is particularly important in the management and
control of machine tool movements within Iraq.  For example,
flow-forming machines are under the monitoring of both the
Commission and IAEA.
91. During the period since the last report, the Commission's
nuclear experts have participated in several IAEA monitoring
and inspection teams.  Such joint operations have resulted in
an increase in operating efficiency and improved decision-
making on such issues as site designation and equipment
92. In addition to routine transport of IAEA inspectors from
Bahrain to Habbaniyah by C-160 fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter
support has proved invaluable in facilitating long-haul
monitoring campaigns by IAEA environmental-sampling experts. 
Water sampling sites range from as far north as Zakho close to
the Turkish border, to a western site on the Euphrates just
west of Al Qa'im, to far south at several sites near Al
Basrah.  Without helicopter support, an effective widespread
water sampling programme would be rendered difficult.  In
addition to supporting the surface-water sampling programme,
the Commission has recently approved fitting its helicopters
with air samplers.  The helicopter-borne air samplers will
complement IAEA's ability to investigate nuclear contaminant
transport throughout the surface-water system and thus provide
a more fully integrated and effective environmental sampling
                    5.  Aerial surveillance
93. The Commission's aerial inspection assets, the high-
altitude surveillance aircraft (U2) and the Baghdad-based
Aerial Inspection Team, continue to play an important role in
the monitoring regime.
94. Both of the above assets continue to conduct aerial
surveillance of sites under monitoring in Iraq, at the
direction of the Commission, on a regular basis.  With the
advent of the permanent monitoring teams in Iraq, experts from
the teams now accompany the team in order to assist it in
focusing on particular areas of relevance at sites.  The
results obtained from these aerial missions is an important
part of the overall inspection process in Iraq.
95. Both aerial assets will also continue to undertake
missions at new sites in Iraq to ensure that the monitoring
regime continues to encompass all activities and facilities
within Iraq of relevance to the monitoring regime.
96. To date some 243 missions have been undertaken by the U2
and 550 missions by the Aerial Inspection Team.
                  B.  Export/import mechanism
97. The proposal for the export/import mechanism prepared by
the Commission and IAEA is now before the Sanctions Committee
for appropriate action to co-sponsor the proposal so that it
may be submitted to the Security Council for approval.  The
revised annexes to the Commission's and the IAEA's plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification, which list the items to
be notified under the mechanism, have been circulated to the
Council and made available to the Sanctions Committee.
98. Planning continues for the setting up by the Commission
and IAEA of a Joint Unit to process notifications received
under the mechanism, and for taking all other actions
necessary to put the mechanism into effect when the Council so
            1.  Actions to establish the mechanism
99. Under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) the Security
Council requested the Commission, in cooperation with the
Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (the
Sanctions Committee) and the Director General of IAEA "to
develop ... a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or
supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the
implementation of section C of resolution 687 and other
relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the
plans approved hereunder". 
100.The Commission and IAEA therefore undertook to prepare a
proposal outlining a mechanism which, in their view, would
fulfil these requirements.  The mechanism envisaged rested on
a system of notifications, made by Iraq and the Governments of
exporters, concerning the supply of dual-purpose items to
Iraq,  dual-purpose in this context being those items referred
to in the relevant annexes to the plans of the Commission and
IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the
Council in resolution 715 (1991). 6/  The mechanism also
envisaged the provision of information by Governments on any
attempts by Iraq to procure items prohibited to it under the
Council resolutions.
101.In February 1994, a seminar of invited export control experts
was convened at the Commission's offices in New York, in order
to explain the principles of the mechanism envisaged and to
obtain views on how it might be implemented in practice.  The
seminar was attended by representatives of IAEA and experts
from those Governments which had wide experience of exporting
goods to Iraq, prior to the imposition of sanctions, which
would now need to be notified under the mechanism.  On 28 and
29 May 1994, the Executive Chairman of the Commission met
senior representatives of the Government of Iraq, in order to
explain the principles of the mechanism, and an agreed summary
of that meeting was signed by both sides.
102.On 13 May 1994, the Executive Chairman wrote to the Sanctions
Committee Chairman, transmitting the proposal for
consideration and approval by the Committee.  The Executive
Chairman noted that paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) was
intended to make provision for the monitoring of sales or
supplies by other countries to Iraq of relevant dual-purpose
items after the general sanctions imposed by resolution 661
(1990) on those items had been lifted, pursuant to paragraph
21 of resolution 687 (1991).  In order to avoid confusion
between the sanctions regime and the monitoring mechanism, the
Executive Chairman proposed that the two regimes should be
kept entirely separate.  The role of the Sanctions Committee
would have priority for as long as items covered by the plans
for ongoing monitoring and verification remained subject to
the general sanctions under resolution 661 (1990).  Once the
sanctions under resolution 661 (1990) on any dual-purpose
items or categories of items were lifted or whenever the
Committee allowed Iraq to input such items under an exemption
from the general sanctions, those items would become subject
to the proposed export/import mechanism.
103.Informal discussions in the Sanctions Committee appeared to
reveal that a consensus could be arrived at on the mechanism
contained in the proposal.  However, before going to the
Security Council with the required tripartite proposal for the
export/import mechanism, the members of the Committee
preferred to see a more detailed list of items to be notified
than already appeared in the relevant annexes to the
Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. 
Such a list would provide greater specification, in technical
terms, of what constituted a dual-purpose item and hence the
export of which to Iraq would be subject to notification.  A
general requirement to revise the annexes had already become
apparent during the course of inspections in Iraq and the
establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification
regime.  Iraq had also requested that provisions of the
annexes to the Commission's plan be specified in greater
104.The Commission's plan, as approved by the Security Council in
its resolution 715 (1991), lays down in its paragraph 26 the
following procedure for revising the annexes:  "The Special
Commission, may, however after informing the Security Council,
update and revise the annexes in the light of information and
experience gained in the course of implementation of
resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) and of the plan.  The
Special Commission shall inform Iraq of any such changes."
105.In October 1994, the Commission convened a further informal
seminar of international experts to review the proposed
changes to the annexes.  While these lists were in large
measure accepted, proposals were made for further changes.  In
January 1995, a third seminar was held to review the draft of
the final versions of the lists, to consider the draft
notification forms to be completed by Governments pursuant to
the mechanism, and to discuss the practical implementation of
the mechanism.
106.The final version of the revised annexes to the Commission's
Plan were submitted to the Security Council on 17 March 1995
(S/1995/208) and to the IAEA's plan on 23 March 1995
107.The joint proposal by the Commission and IAEA was resubmitted
to the Sanctions Committee on 15 February 1995.  The
mechanism, upon receiving the concurrence of the Sanctions
Committee, will be transmitted to the Council for approval. 
It is anticipated that this will be done in the very near
            2.  Actions to implement the mechanism
108.The mechanism envisages the creation of a Joint Unit, staffed
by personnel from the Commission and IAEA.  The Joint Unit
will be represented by staff in New York and in the Monitoring
Centre in Baghdad.
109.Measures to establish these offices and the practical
procedures to implement the mechanism began some 18 months ago
with the recruitment of expert personnel to the Commission to
focus primarily on the export/import mechanism, in the context
of the overall ongoing monitoring and verification regime. 
These experts are also preparing the documentation which will
explain, in detail, the workings of the mechanism in respect
of the notification requirements levied on Iraq and the
exporting Governments.  These documents will be transmitted to
Governments in a circular note.  A customized computer
database is also being developed at the Commission's office in
New York, in order to ensure the swift processing of
notification data and to support analytical requirements.
110.The Joint Units in New York and Baghdad will be staffed by
customs experts and data-entry clerks.  They will be
responsible for receiving and processing, in manual and
computerized format, the notifications provided by Iraq and
exporting Governments.  The notifications will also be
analysed by experts of the Commission and IAEA and appropriate
actions taken on the basis of their recommendations.
111.In Iraq, Joint Unit personnel, in conjunction with the
resident monitoring team experts, will be responsible for
inspecting notified items and associated paperwork, on their
arrival in Iraq.  They will also undertake no-notice
inspections at points of entry into Iraq and other sites, in
order to verify that all notifiable items are being declared.
112.As further preparation for the implementation of the
export/import mechanism, the Commission has undertaken studies
to ascertain the likely volume of data which the mechanism
will generate.  The results of these internal studies, and
others undertaken by outside bodies, indicate that the number
of shipments of dual-use goods could be expected not to exceed
2,000 during a normal year.  Plans to acquire personnel and
equipment to support this volume of shipments are being put
into effect.  
113.The Commission has also begun a dialogue with Iraq, in order
to gain a full understanding of the existing customs and
import systems in place in the country and so better to plan
operations associated with the mechanism.  In addition, the
Commission will also shortly conduct baseline inspections of
points of entry into Iraq as further preparation with the aim
of foreshortening the time required to have a fully
operational mechanism after its adoption and the easing or
lifting of sanctions.
             C.  National implementation measures
114.Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Commission's monitoring plan
require Iraq to adopt the measures necessary to implement its
obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991),
resolution 707 (1991) and the plan itself, to include a
prohibition and penal legislation forbidding all natural and
legal persons under Iraq's jurisdiction from undertaking
anywhere any activity prohibited for Iraq by resolution 687
(1991) and all other related resolutions.
115.Iraq has consulted the Commission on the draft of a decision
by the Revolution Command Council intended to give effect to
those requirements.  The Commission made certain suggestions
to the Iraqi authorities concerning the need for such
legislation to follow closely the language of the Council's
resolutions.  Attention was also drawn to the need for such
legislation promptly to incorporate any changes to the lists
of controlled items contained in the annexes to the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification and to the need to provide
assurances to those who might cooperate with the Commission
and IAEA in the performance of their tasks that such
cooperation per se would not be the subject of any legal or
other punitive measures.
116.It is the Commission's understanding that a revised draft now
stands before the Revolution Command Council for adoption and,
during the most recent high-level discussions in Baghdad in
March 1995, the Iraqi authorities gave assurances that such
adoption could be anticipated early in April 1995.  The
Commission has also been provided with a copy of regulations
which the National Monitoring Directorate will issue to give
full effect to the Revolution Command Council's decision. 
These regulations have now been translated from Arabic into
English at United Nations Headquarters.  They are available to
any interested delegations in the Office of the Executive
                       D.  Organization
                1.  Executive Office, New York
117.In order to respond to changing priorities and tasks, the
organization and equipping of the Executive Office of the
Special Commission in New York has undergone substantial
changes since Iraq accepted Security Council resolution 715
(1991) in November 1993.  The increase in the number of staff
to cope with the increased workload has resulted in acute
overcrowding of the office space available to the Commission. 
If this issue is not resolved, it is bound to affect adversely
the work performance of the staff.
118.Under the terms of the plan approved under resolution 715
(1991), Iraq is required to produce a substantial volume and
range of declarations on a regular basis.  Thus the immediate
requirement for the Commission was to increase the number of
staff in New York, in order to handle the additional data. 
However, in addition to further experts specialized in
proscribed weapons systems, there was also a necessity to
recruit from supporting Governments individuals with knowledge
of relevant civil industries in which dual-use items and
equipment might be used and others to assist the experts in
the processing, handling and storage of the data.
119.Assistance was also required to collate much of the material
required for the creation of the site protocols and to update
those protocols in the light of declarations from Iraq and
reports from the inspection teams conducting baseline
inspections in Iraq.  At the conclusion of the baseline
process it also became apparent that such assistance would
continue to be central to the successful maintenance of the
monitoring system as the Commission established a
multi-layered system with the introduction of sensors,
primarily cameras and air-sampling equipment, at sites under
monitoring in Iraq.  The product from these sensors is an
integral part of the monitoring regime and, as such, must be
collated and analysed in the context of overall knowledge of
the functions of sites under monitoring.
120.As noted in section B above, describing preparations for the
export-import mechanism, the Commission began preparations for
establishing the mechanism some 18 months ago with the
recruitment of staff specialized in customs procedures.  In
1994, in the light of the highly specialized requirements of
administering such a mechanism, further staff were recruited. 
In the event of a modification to the existing sanctions
regime, additional staff will be recruited to administer the
export/import mechanism and to oversee the conduct of
operations in Iraq.  Analysis of the notifications provided by
Iraq and Governments of exporters under the mechanism will be
undertaken by the existing expert staff.
121.To support the above change of emphasis in mission focus, the
Commission has made major upgrades to its automated data-
processing equipment.  This has involved an upgrade to the
Commission's local area network (LAN) system and individual
workstations.  Many of these upgrades have been undertaken by
donations of equipment by supporting Governments.  The
Commission has also been able to take advantage of existing
computerized systems developed in other forums in support of
other arms-control efforts.  
122.To support the export/import mechanism, a dedicated,
customized database is being created, modelled on the export
control computer database used by a supporting Government. 
One prime concern in respect of handling the notifications
received under the mechanism will be to ensure the security of
such data, recognizing its commercial sensitivity.  The
computer equipment required to sustain the export/import
database will also be donated by supporting Governments.
        2.  Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
123.Preparations for the establishment of the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre, its staffing and early operations,
are described in annex II to the Commission's report of 7
October 1994 (S/1994/1138), which briefly describes the
current operational status of the Centre.
124.The Commission plans to complete its initial projects for the
Centre facilities during this summer.  A principal delaying
factor has been the lack of funding to purchase materials and
supplies for renovation and construction.  Several
contributing Governments have made direct donations of
materials, equipment and supplies so that seconded craftsmen
and technicians could accomplish their work.  The remaining
projects are not essential for effective ongoing monitoring
and verification but will, once completed, contribute to the
improved efficiency of the Centre.
125.The Centre currently provides:  space for an operations room,
supporting radio and telephone (voice and facsimile)
communications and real-time monitoring of sites through 107
remote-controlled cameras; offices for the aerial inspection
team, and the biological, chemical, missile and nuclear
monitoring groups (the latter group is staffed by IAEA);
aerial photography, biological and chemical laboratories; a
medical clinic; and offices for the Director and his support
staff.  The Centre staff also includes a German army
detachment with three CH-53G helicopters at Al-Rasheed air
base, deployed to support the operations of inspection teams
and monitoring groups throughout Iraq.  Approximately 80 staff
are assigned to the Centre.
126.The next development within the Centre will be preparations to
support an export/import mechanism at the appropriate time. 
The Centre includes adequate space for this purpose, and
specific facility modifications for the group are anticipated
to be minimal.
127.The operation of the Centre is supported by the United Nations
Administrative Unit-Baghdad which, inter alia, provides
maintenance for the Commission's vehicles.  Air transportation
to support the Centre continues to be provided from Bahrain by
a German air-force detachment with two C-160 Transall
aircraft.  This function, and all arrangements for the
movement of experts and technicians as well as for cargoes of
supplies, materials and equipment, is managed by the
Commission's field office in Bahrain.
                    IV.  FUTURE OPERATIONS
        A.  Financial status of the Special Commission
128.In order to plan for future monitoring and verification
activities, including those related to export/import, the
Commission needs secure long-term funding, rather than the ad
hoc funding of the present situation.  Lack of secure long-
term funding has complicated the Commission's task of
implementing its mandate and planning future operations.
129.Funds have only been identified for the first half of 1995 and
are being received piecemeal.  At present, there is no
indication that additional funds will be made available to the
Commission to cover operations for the remainder of 1995.  An
additional $13 million is required to support the Commission's
operations until the end of 1995.
130.If further funds are not identified in the near future, the
incremental shut-down of the Commission's operations, as
indicated in the Commission's letter to the President of the
Security Council of 3 November 1994, will ensue.
          Status of finance of the Special Commission
                      as at 31 March 1995
United States
Total funds provided through loans/contributions               
9 405 500
Designation of 778 funds                                      
82 190 000
  Total available for operations                              
91 595 500
Expenditures from inception to 31 December 1993               
55 230 704
1994 expenditures (estimated)                                 
24 390 000
1995 projected requirements                                   
25 000 000
  Estimated total requirements from inception
  to 31 December 1995                                        
104 620 704
Surplus/(deficit) against available funds                    
(13 025 204)
                B.  Operations and organization
131.As indicated in chapter III above, the main focus of the
Commission's activities in Iraq is currently the operation of
the system of ongoing monitoring and verification.  Funding
permitting, the Commission expects this to continue to be the
case.  Further effort will continue to be devoted to
clarifying and resolving the remaining outstanding issues in
relation to the past programmes and, once the export/import
mechanism has been adopted, also as indicated above, a greater
share of resources will be devoted to the operation of the
132.It is envisaged that, until the implementation of the
export/import mechanism, ongoing monitoring and verification
activities will comprise primarily the following types of
    (a) Inspection to verify the completeness of the list of
sites monitored and of the inventories, to verify declarations
as to the activities conducted at sites or to pursue any
information obtained that might question Iraq's compliance
with its obligations under paragraph 10 of resolution 687
    (b) Aerial surveillance, from both the Commission's high-
altitude surveillance aircraft (the U-2) and its helicopters;
    (c) Maintenance of the site monitoring and verification
protocols by the monitoring experts at the Baghdad Monitoring
    (d) Monitoring activities conducted by experts dispatched
to Iraq for a specific purpose because either the expertise
required for the activity is not available amongst the staff
of the Centre or because the scope of the activity is too
great for the staff of the Centre to undertake without
additional assistance; 
    (e) Review and analysis of the product of the sensors
installed at the various sites.
                        V.  CONCLUSIONS
133.The elements of ongoing monitoring and verification are now in
place and the system is operational.  Over time, additional
elements may be added or existing elements may be adapted in
the light of experience in order better to focus monitoring
efforts, to respond to developments in Iraq's industrial base
and to increase the level of assurance it provides that Iraq
is not reacquiring banned capabilities.  The Commission wishes
to place on record that it has received full cooperation from
Iraq in the setting up and operation of the monitoring system. 
Some issues, however, still remain.
134.There must be confidence that the system is comprehensive in
its coverage of all that needs to be monitored.  Accounting by
Iraq for the materials, items and equipment acquired for past
programmes and the use to which they have been put is thus
required.  An understanding of the levels of technologies
attained by Iraq in its past programmes is also required if
the Commission's efforts are to be correctly focused.  If this
accounting and understanding is not credibly provided by Iraq,
the Commission will not be able to state with confidence that
its monitoring is comprehensive and correctly focused, as is
now illustrated by the situation in the biological area.
135.As described elsewhere in the present report, the Commission
has continued its investigation in all areas of the past
proscribed weapons activities in Iraq and its verification of
Iraq's declarations.  The Commission has come to the
conclusion that Iraq has not provided a full and comprehensive
disclosure of its past military biological programme or
accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme. 
With Iraq's failure to account for the use of these items and
materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that
can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been
purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of
biological warfare agent.  The Commission will continue its
intensive efforts to elucidate all such outstanding issues
arising from this and the other past programmes.  It notes
that, if Iraq decided to provide full, accurate and verifiable
information, such matters could be resolved expeditiously.
136.An essential element of the system of ongoing monitoring and
verification will be the export/import mechanism.  The
Commission and IAEA have completed work on all the components
of the mechanism and it is now for the Sanctions Committee and
the Security Council to consider and take action on the
proposal for the mechanism prepared by the Commission and
IAEA.  The monitoring system, under Security Council
resolution 715 (1991), will not be complete until the Council
has acted on this matter.
    1/       I.e., those which have permitted uses but which
could be used for the acquisition of banned weapons.
    2/       Methyl phosphonyl difluoride.
    3/       The Technical and Scientific Materials Import
Division, the purchasing arm of the Technical Research Centre
that was, within the Military Industrialization Corporation,
directly responsible for Iraq's military biological programme.
    4/       Complex growth media constitute the substrate on
or in which bacteria or viruses are grown.  Types imported by
Iraq can be used in hospitals or laboratories as a diagnostic
tool or for large-scale production of bacteria and viruses, be
it for biological weapons purposes or civilian use, e.g.,
vaccine production.
    5/       These filters are of the sort used to create clean
environments or to ensure that contaminants are not released
from a workplace into the surrounding environment.  They are
therefore associated with work requiring high containment,
such as work on pathogens or toxins.
     6/ S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1, amended by
S/1995/208 and S/1995/215, respectively.
                      Inspection schedule
                      (in-country dates)
    15 May-21 May 1991                  IAEA1/UNSCOM  1
    22 June-3 July 1991                 IAEA2/UNSCOM  4
     7 July-18 July 1991                IAEA3/UNSCOM  5
    27 July-10 August 1991              IAEA4/UNSCOM  6
    14 September-20 September 1991      IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
    21 September-30 September 1991      IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
    11 October-22 October 1991          IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
    11 November-18 November 1991        IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
    11 January-14 January 1992          IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
     5 February-13 February 1992       IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
     7 April-15 April 1992             IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
    26 May-4 June 1992                 IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
    14 July-21 July 1992               IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
    31 August-7 September 1992         IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
     8 November-19 November 1992       IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
     6 December-14 December 1992       IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
    22 January-27 January 1993         IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
     3 March-11 March 1993             IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
    30 April-7 May 1993                IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
    25 June-30 June 1993               IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
    23 July-28 July 1993               IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
     1 November-9 November 1993        IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
     4 February-11 February 1994       IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
    11 April-22 April 1994             IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
    21 June-1 July 1994                IAEA25/UNSCOM 83
    22 August-2 September 1994         IAEA26/UNSCOM 90
     7 September-29 September 1994     NMG 94-01
    14 October-21 October 1994         IAEA27/UNSCOM 93
    29 September-21 October 1994       NMG 94-02
    21 October-9 November 1994         NMG 94-03
     8 November-29 November 1994       NMG 94-04
    29 November-16 December 1994       NMG 94-05
    16 December 1994-13 January 1995   NMG 94-06
    12 January-2 February 1995         NMG 95-01
     2 February-28 February 1995       NMG 95-02
    28 February-16 March 1995          NMG 95-03
    16 March-6 April 1995              NMG 95-04
     6 April-26 April 1995             NMG 95-05
     9 June-15 June 1991                CW1/UNSCOM  2
    15 August-22 August 1991            CW2/UNSCOM  9
    31 August-8 September 1991          CW3/UNSCOM 11
    31 August-5 September 1991          CW4/UNSCOM 12
     6 October-9 November 1991          CW5/UNSCOM 17
    22 October-2 November 1991          CW6/UNSCOM 20
    18 November-1 December 1991         CBW1/UNSCOM 21
    27 January-5 February 1992          CW7/UNSCOM 26
    21 February-24 March 1992           CD1/UNSCOM 29
     5 April-13 April 1992              CD2/UNSCOM 32
    15 April-29 April 1992              CW8/UNSCOM 35
    18 June 92-14 June 94               CDG/UNSCOM 38
    26 June-10 July 1992                CBW2/UNSCOM 39
    21 September-29 September 1992      CW9/UNSCOM 44
     6 December-14 December 1992        CBW3/UNSCOM 47
     6 April-18 April 1993              CW10/UNSCOM 55
    27 June-30 June 1993                CW11/UNSCOM 59
    19 November-22 November 1993        CW12/UNSCOM 65
     1 February-14 February 1994        CW13/UNSCOM 67
    20 March-26 March 1994              CW14/UNSCOM 70
    18 April-22 April 1994              CW15/UNSCOM 74
    25 May-5 June 1994                  CW16/UNSCOM 75
    31 May-12 June 1994                 CW17/UNSCOM 76
     8 June-14 June 1994                CW18/UNSCOM 77
    10 August-23 August 1994            CW19/UNSCOM 89
    13 September-24 September 1994      CW20/UNSCOM 91
     2 October 1994-14 January 1995    CG 1
    23 October-27 October 1994          CW21/UNSCOM 95
    11 January-21 January 1995          CW23/UNSCOM108
    16 January-22 January 1995          CW22/UNSCOM107
    14 January-15 April 1995            CG 2
    16 April-4 July 1995                CG 3
     2 August-8 August 1991             BW1/UNSCOM  7
    20 September-3 October 1991         BW2/UNSCOM 15
    11 March-18 March 1993              BW3/UNSCOM 53
     8 April-26 April 1994              BW4/UNSCOM 72
    28 May-7 June 1994                  BW5/UNSCOM 78
    24 June-5 July 1994                 BW6/UNSCOM 84
     5 June-8 June 1994                 BW7/UNSCOM 86
    25 July-7 September 1994            BW8/UNSCOM 87
    20 August-25 August 1994            BW9/UNSCOM 88
    29 August-3 September 1994          BW10/UNSCOM 92
    29 September-14 October 1994        BW11/UNSCOM 94
    23 September-26 September 1994      BW12/UNSCOM 96
    15 November-22 November 1994        BW15/UNSCOM104
     2 December-10 December 1994        BW16/UNSCOM105 (IMT)
     2 December-13 December 1994        BW13/UNSCOM 99 (IMT)
     9 December-18 December 1994        BW17/UNSCOM106 (IMT)
    28 December 1994-31 January 1995    IBG 1
    10 January-22 January 1995          BW18/UNSCOM109
    20 January-6 February 1995          BW19/UNSCOM110
    23 January-3 February 1995          BW22/UNSCOM113
     3 February-17 February 1995        BW20/UNSCOM111
     3 February-17 February 1995        BW21/UNSCOM112
    12 March-18 March 1995              BW23/UNSCOM115
    24 March-6 April 1995               BW24/UNSCOM116
     1 February-3 April 1995            IBG 2
     4 April-9 July 1995                BG 1
Ballistic missiles
    30 June-7 July 1991                 BM1/UNSCOM  3
    18 July-20 July 1991                BM2/UNSCOM 10
     8 August-15 August 1991            BM3/UNSCOM  8
     6 September-13 September 1991      BM4/UNSCOM 13
     1 October-9 October 1991           BM5/UNSCOM 18
     1 December-9 December 1991         BM6/UNSCOM 23
     9 December-17 December 1991        BM7/UNSCOM 24
    21 February-29 February 1992        BM8/UNSCOM 28
    21 March-29 March 1992              BM9/UNSCOM 31
    13 April-21 April 1992              BM10/UNSCOM 34
    14 May-22 May 1992                  BM11/UNSCOM 36
    11 July-29 July 1992                BM12/UNSCOM 40A+B
     7 August-18 August 1992            BM13/UNSCOM 42
    16 October-30 October 1992          BM14/UNSCOM 45
    25 January-23 March 1993            IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
    12 February-21 February 1993        BM15/UNSCOM 50
    22 February-23 February 1993        BM16/UNSCOM 51
    27 March-17 May 1993                IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
     5 June-28 June 1993                IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
    10 July-11 July 1993                BM17/UNSCOM 60
    24 August-15 September 1993         BM18/UNSCOM 62
    28 September-1 November 1993        BM19/UNSCOM 63
    21 January-29 January 1994          BM20/UNSCOM 66
    17 February-25 February 1994        BM21/UNSCOM 69
    30 March-20 May 1994                BM22/UNSCOM 71
    20 May-8 June 1994                  BM23/UNSCOM 79
    10 June-24 June 1994                BM24/UNSCOM 80
    14 June-22 June 1994                BM25/UNSCOM 81
     3 July-28 July 1994                BM26/UNSCOM 82
    15 July-24 July 1994                BM27/UNSCOM 85
    17 August-9 October 1994            MG 1
     2 October-6 October 1994           BM28/UNSCOM 98A
    23 October-28 October 1994          BM28/UNSCOM 98B
    14 October 1994-21 February 1995    MG 2
    19 October-22 October 1994          MG 2A
     2 December-6 December 1994         MG 2B
     9 December-14 December 1994        BM29/UNSCOM101
     9 December-16 December 1994        BM30/UNSCOM102
    27 January-31 January 1995          MG 2C
    22 February- ... 1995               MG 3
      6 March-14 March 1995             UNSCOM103/BM31
Computer search
     12 February 1992                   UNSCOM 30
Special missions
     30 June-3 July 1991  
     11 August-14 August 1991  
      4 October-6 October 1991  
     11 November-15 November 1991  
     27 January-30 January 1992  
     21 February-24 February 1992  
     17 July-19 July 1992  
     28 July-29 July 1992  
      6 September-12 September 1992  
      4 November-9 November 1992  
      4 November-8 November 1992  
     12 March-18 March 1993  
     14 March-20 March 1993  
     19 April-24 April 1993  
      4 June-5 July 1993  
     15 July-19 July 1993  
     25 July-5 August 1993  
      9 August-12 August 1993  
     10 September-24 September 1993  
     27 September-1 October 1993  
      1 October-8 October 1993  
      5 October-16 February 1994  
      2 December-10 December 1993  
      2 December-16 December 1993  
     21 January-27 January 1994  
      2 February-6 February 1994  
     10 April-14 April 1994  
     24 April-26 April 1994  
     28 May-29 May 1994  
      4 July-6 July 1994  
      8 August-16 August 1994  
     15 September-19 September 1994  
     21 September-25 September 1994  
     23 September-26 September 1994  
      3 October-6 October 1994  
      4 November-20 November 1994  
      7 November-12 November 1994  
     14 November-17 November 1994  
      4 December-18 December 1994  
     14 December-20 December 1994  
      7 January-31 January 1995  
      7 January-21 January 1995  
     13 January-26 January 1995  
     13 January-16 March 1995  
     12 January-28 January 1995  
     23 January-14 February 1995  
     25 January-4 February 1995  
     19 February-23 February 1995  
     22 February-28 February 1995  
     28 February-18 March 1995  
     16 March-29 March 1995  
     24 March-27 March 1995  

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